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                                      ABSTRACT 
            Admiral Peter Rainier and the Command of the East Indies Station 1794-1805.     
 
Peter Rainier was the longest serving commander on the East Indies station by some margin, 
and the longest serving commander of any of the navy’s stations in the long Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars.  
 
This thesis illustrates the issues that needed to be addressed on this station and considers how 
successfully Rainier dealt with them. It will also suggest that he remains so little known 
amongst the pantheon of British admirals of the Napoleonic era because the traditional 
measure of value of a naval commander is success in battle. Although Rainier had a 
reputation as a fighting captain, as a commander in chief he saw action only in combined 
operations. Perhaps it is time to acknowledge that skill other than fighting battles is 
important. Rainier’s thorough knowledge of the station, his capacity to work with people over 
whom he had no authority, his ability to protect a rapidly expanding and wealth creating 
trade, and his administrative and financial professionalism, enabled him to play an important, 
if secondary, part in the establishment of the Second British Empire which, arguably, had a 
far greater impact on British history than all but the most seminal battle. 
 
The East Indies Station had a number of unique elements that heavily influenced the actions 
of its commander in chief. The two-way communication process between Rainier and the 
Admiralty could take a whole year. Its thirty million plus square mile area meant that 
communication and logistics within the station needed long term planning. It was still 
relatively unfamiliar to British navigators, and charting it was still in progress.  
 
The relationship between the admiral and the East India Company, the official government of 
British India, could make or break the success of both the navy and the Company. With his 
diplomatic skills and wide experience of the station, Rainier worked with its officials and 
army commanders to defend current British possessions in the East Indies and India, to 
extend them to such an extent that, by his return to Britain, they were the foundation of the 
second British Empire. During this period the centre of power on the station moved eastwards 
as the value of trade with China overtook that with India – Rainier had to take this into 
account when allocating his resources. The constraints on navigation and timing caused by 
the narrow channels in the East Indies and by the weather made it easier for enemy vessels to 
know by which route the British trade would travel. Rainier had to cover potential threats off 
Macao, through the Straits of Bali, Banda, Sunda and Malacca, in the Bay of Bengal, off 
Madras, around Ceylon and between Bombay and the Persian Gulf. When possible he had to 
cover the French naval base at Mauritius.  With a limited number of vessels,1 of which some 
were always in need of repair, Rainier was often on the defensive. Acquisition of new 
colonies opened new trading routes which, together with his commitment to trade protection, 
                                                            
1 See Chapter Eight for details of naval vessels at Rainier’s disposal. 
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led to a steady, if often unregulated, expansion in British trade. His attention to detail and his 
management skills also allowed him to establish an efficient logistics, victualling and 
financial operation.  
 
What Rainier achieved has to be seen in the context of the complexity of his station and the 
role of the East India Company. Then it stands far above the level of its absolute 
achievement. This thesis shows that Rainier’s organization and man management skills, 
unruffled nature, sound strategic judgement made him a “Safe Pair of Hands”, ideal for such 
a detached but important command.  
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     CHAPTER 1 
 
                               INTRODUCTION: WHO WAS PETER RAINIER? 
 
The monumental tomb of Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Fellowes, which dominates a graveyard 
in rural Wiltshire, led the author to enquire if the admiral was a suitable subject for an MA 
dissertation. Research pointed the way to the relationship between the navy and the East India 
Company Maritime Service, Thomas having served as the fourth mate, under his brother, 
William Dorset, the commander of Indiaman Royal Admiral and the two brothers serving in 
both the navy and Company Marine.2 Whilst the life of the admiral did not prove suitable for 
further investigation, an interest was awakened in the role of these two powerful maritime 
organisations and their roles in the East Indies. This was encouraged by the discovery of the 
“Bombay Diaries” in the library of the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at Exeter 
University. These are transcriptions of the correspondence to and from the Bombay 
Presidency from 1778 to1820. Reading these documents led to the discovery of Admiral 
Rainier, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) East Indies, and his role in protecting India during the 
French occupation of Egypt.  
 
The French Wars of 1793 to 1815 were fought on a global scale. The attempt of revolutionary 
and imperial France to become the pre-eminent power in Europe eventually failed due to the 
fluid permutations of the continental powers of Russia, Austria, Prussia and Spain combining 
with the colonial and industrial power of Britain. Naturally the conflict centred on Europe but 
the colonial aspirations of Britain and France, together with the declining powers of Spain 
and the Netherlands, and the rising power of the United States, meant that the conflict spread 
to all parts of the globe. And the resources provided by the East Indies were essential to 
enable Britain to sustain these long and exhaustive wars. Rainier had been placed and kept in 
the key position to protect these resources. 
 
The role played by Britain in the downfall of Napoleon was primarily naval and financial as 
its navy was by far the biggest in the world and its army comparatively tiny when compared 
with the manpower that could be put into the field by the continental powers.3 The incipient 
industrial revolution gave Britain enormous wealth, which it realised through trade with other 
countries. Naturally the naval efforts were concentrated around the shores of Britain and the 
coast of Western Europe. England and Ireland had to be protected from invasion, the rapidly 
expanding sea borne trade of Britain had to be protected as it came to, and left, European 
waters, the British army had to be transported to wherever it could most effectively damage 
the interests of France, support had to be sent, unhindered, to Britain’s far flung colonies and, 
equally, succour sent by France to its colonies should, wherever possible, be frustrated. The 
                                                            
2A. Farrington, A Biographical Index of East India Company Maritime Service Officers 1600-1834 (British 
Library, London, 1999), p. 265. 
3 R. Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1816 (Yale, CT., 1996), p. 379, N.A.M. Rodger, The 
Command of the Ocean, A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815 (London, 2004), pp. 579-80. 
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trade with the East Indies played an increasing part in this wealth creation throughout the 
war4 and it had to be protected. In the previous two wars France had sent large naval 
squadrons to India to try and wrest control of that trade from Britain.5 There was nothing to 
alter the view that it would do so again, which made the British government anxious about 
how it should defend its Indian interests. 
  
The disposition of Royal Naval vessels, as illustrated in ADM 8 at the National Archive, 
shows that the greatest numbers were maintained in the western approaches, the English 
Channel, and the Mediterranean, where they could most effectively carry out the functions 
described above. The importance of the Baltic Sea as a source of naval supplies and as a route 
to Russia after Napoleon’s invasion of that country, led to a concentration of naval power 
developing there in the later years of the war. The western reaches of the Atlantic saw British 
forces attack French West Indian colonies and later defend Canada whilst at the same time 
attack the United States during the War of 1812-15. The effective application in South 
America of liberal democratic views was hindered by Portugal and Spain becoming allies of 
Britain after 1807 and 1808 respectively. Therefore, apart from the Guiana campaigns of 
1795-6 and 1803-4 and Montevideo and Buenos Aires 1806-7, naval activity in South 
America was minor. Efforts in Africa centred on taking the Dutch colony of the Cape, twice, 
which leads us finally to explore the role and importance of the navy in the East Indies and 
Far East.  
 
Reviewing specifically the strategic situation in the East Indies, Britain maintained a small 
squadron primarily for trade protection and to watch for any French moves against its 
possessions in the region. Although at war with Britain from 1795-6, the Spanish and Dutch 
colonies showed little belligerence, but they did allow their bases to be used by the more 
combative French. As the situation at home absorbed all their efforts, the French had little 
ability to reinforce their possessions in the Far East. Yet, as the war progressed and France 
became more successful, its attack on Egypt was widely seen as the precursor to an attack on 
India. Portugal remained an ally throughout the wars. In some ways this was a disadvantage 
to Britain. Without British protection, the Portuguese colony of Goa could easily be taken by 
the French. But the Goan authorities would not accept direct British support. This had 
therefore to be provided indirectly without upsetting Portuguese sensibilities.   Consequently, 
apart from several notable single ship actions, there were no major battles on the station. 
Indeed the only minor battle was a defeat for the Royal Navy [Grand Port in 1810] and the 
moves to extend British control over India by Governor General Wellesley were largely 
hidden from the government.  
 
Indeed British actions in 1793 seem to predestine this attitude. Firstly a naval force under 
Rear Admiral Gardner was planned to capture Mauritius. When this was achieved he would 
move on to be the C-in-C East Indies. Then it was realised that French energies were being 
                                                            
4 See Appendix 4, Trade Statistics. 
5 Sir H.W. Richmond, The Navy in India 1763-1783 (London, 1931). 
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concentrated in Europe. British troops were needed in Europe to take advantage of 
opportunities offered by Royalist risings in the Vendee and at Toulon. The Mauritius 
expedition was deferred, though it was still hoped that it might be revived at a later date. 
Suddenly India was seen as a backwater, as exemplified by the C-in-C, Rear Admiral 
Cornwallis, leaving the station in January 1794 entirely bereft of any British warships at all 
even though he knew war had been declared.6 This was too risky, even for the Admiralty, 
which felt that India’s naval defence should at least rest on the shoulders of a senior captain 
leading a small squadron. If the situation in India grew more dangerous, naval reinforcements 
could be sent out to India under a more senior flag officer who could assume overall 
command. And threats did arise; in 1795 from Dutch colonies in the East following the 
French occupation of the Netherlands, in 1796 with the despatch of a French naval squadron 
to Mauritius, and in 1798 with the French invasion of Egypt. 
 
These threats had to be taken seriously. The trade and consequent revenue was vital to the 
British economy. John Bruce wrote in 1793:  
 
         The importance to the government and revenues of the British possessions in 
Asia, will readily be admitted, if we consider the extent of the British provinces, 
the number of the inhabitants, or the actual amount of the revenues. The 
importance of the trade will become obvious, if we advert to the tonnage which it 
employs, to its forming one of the most considerable branches of our foreign 
navigation, to the quantity of British manufactures exported to the East, to the 
relation between the revenues of India and the trade, to the materials which the 
Public derive from the imports.7  
 
Exports to India and China, including private trade, amounted to £1,500,000 p.a. Privately 
owned wealth was repatriated to Britain at an estimated value of £1,000,000 p.a. The duty on 
imported tea raised more than £1,000,000 each year out of a total government revenue of £18, 
732,000 in 1794.8 The tonnage of ships employed by East India Company [hereafter called 
the Company] was 81,000, requiring the service of 7,000 seamen.9 Almost the entire amounts 
of saltpetre used in the manufacture of gunpowder came from India.10 Indigo was another 
                                                            
6 T.N.A., ADM 1/167, Cornwallis to Admiralty, 21 April 1794. 
7 John Bruce, Historical Views of plans, for the Government of British India and the regulation of trade to the 
East Indies (London, 1793), pp.  272-3.  
8 B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1971), p. 388. 
9 Henry Dundas, Substance of the Speech of the Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas on the British government and trade in 
the East Indies, April 23rd 1793 (London, 1793), pp. 6 and 29. It is worth noting that Joseph Cotton, an Indiaman 
Commander, wrote in 1798 that the required tonnage for the Eastern trade was 50,000 tons and that there was 
30,000 tons of merchant shipping belonging to Bengal residents employed in the Country Trade. A Review of the 
shipping systems on the East India Company with suggestions for its improvement to secure the continuance of 
the carrying trade (London, 1798), pp. 23 and 42. 
10 C.N. Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas (Cambridge, 1937), p. 78. 
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product of which Britain was dependent on India since the loss of the American colonies and 
the move away from its production in the West Indies.11 
 
And there was an added benefit; not only did Britain gain from the import of Asian goods but 
from re-exporting them also: ‘from whence other articles, paying duties, are brought in 
exchange … the commerce of the country is considerably invigorated.12 The British 
government could not take risks with the resources and income generated in the Far East.   
 
Understanding the challenges of commanding the East Indies Station also required  
understanding the Company and its role in India. During the period of Rainier’s command, 
1794-1805, trade between Britain and the East Indies, including China, was a monopoly of 
the Company. But the energy of private merchants, both Indian and European, and their 
increasing wealth, needed an outlet. This was found in the “Country Trade”, carried out 
within the vast 30 million plus square miles that constituted the East Indies Station, between 
India, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and China. This trade, and that between 
Asia and Europe, needed protecting.  
 
The successes of the Royal Navy in battle, especially during the French Wars, have led naval 
historians traditionally to concentrate on those admirals, such as Nelson, who won famous 
victories. With the Far Eastern trade being so important to British finances, the flag officer’s 
role was primarily one of trade protection - much danger coming from warships and 
privateers operating out of Mauritius, and this function required considerable managerial and 
administrative expertise. Consequently the naval war in this region has largely been ignored 
by naval historians. However, recently, there has been a movement towards appreciating the 
management and organisation skills required to control large numbers of ships and men over 
broad expanses of sea, even if these admirals fought no major battles. Such admirals 
receiving attention are Admirals Keith and Saumarez.13  Rainier will now receive the same 
consideration. For eleven of the twenty two years of almost continuous war with France, with 
the exception of one twelve month period, from May 1795, when the nominal commander in 
chief was Sir George Elphinstone,14 the Admiralty allowed Rainier to remain in command. 
Even for this brief period it should be noted that Rainier was de facto the senior naval officer 
at sea in the Far East. This thesis is a study of this man, Admiral of the Blue Peter Rainier, 
and the rapidly changing world of imperial conquest in which he found himself.  
 
                                                            
11 J.R. Ward, ‘The Industrial Revolution and British Imperialism 1750-1850’, Economic History Review, vol. 
47, No. 1 (February 1994), p. 48. 
12 Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas, p. 331. 
13 K.D. McCranie, Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon (Gainesville, FL, 2006), T. 
Voelcker, Admiral Saumarez versus Napoleon: the Baltic 1807-12 (Woodbridge, 2008). 
14 Rear Admiral Sir George Elphinstone, Admiral of the Red, Viscount Lord Keith, served as third mate on 
Indiaman as a youth, captain 1775, MP 1781, knighted and rear admiral 1794, C-in-C Cape & East Indies 1795, 
Irish baron 1797, C-in-C Mediterranean 1799, British baron 1800, C-in-C North Sea 1803, C-in-C Channel 
1810, died 1823. 
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The only orders Rainier received on the subject of grand strategy were those given to him at 
the start of his command: ‘[to attend to]...the Protection of the Trade and Settlements of His 
Majesty’s Subjects and ... Allies’.15 It is noteworthy that trade comes before settlements and 
Rainier consistently placed trade protection above all other issues – sometimes to the 
displeasure of Governor General Wellesley. Fortunately Rainier took a wide interpretation of 
what constituted these goals. Protection of trade could mean offensive action - depriving the 
enemy of bases from which to attack.  
 
In order to comprehend Rainier and to place him in perspective within the events of the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars it is necessary to describe briefly his life. On 
joining the navy in 1756, aged fifteen, he sailed immediately to the East Indies where he 
remained until 1763, participating in both fleet actions and the capture of Pondicherry and 
Manila. On returning to England as a midshipman, he became the master of one of his 
family’s merchant vessels, sailing primarily to the West Indies and North America. Although 
not from an influential naval family, the Rainiers were important in the economy and politics 
of Sandwich in Kent,16 an Admiralty borough, one of whose MP’s was Philip Stephens, the 
Secretary to the Board of Admiralty.17 Therefore the support of the Rainier family would be 
extremely helpful during elections. One way to ensure its backing would be to give 
encouragement to the naval career of one of its members, and the correlation between 
Rainier’s promotions in his early naval career and the imminence of general elections was 
surely more than coincidental.18 His brother, George, also benefitted from these contacts, 
being a Navy Board clerk from 1777 until his death in 1790.19 As the Company agent in 
Deal, George also provided the link between the Rainier family and the Company. This was a 
key role, requiring heavy initial capital outlay as he collected and distributed the Company’s 
mail, corresponded with the Court of Directors and handled large sums of specie which were 
carried in Company or navy ships to India in order to finance the Trade. 
 
In 1774 Rainier was sent to the West Indies, appointed lieutenant on the Maidstone (28), 
Captain Alan Gardner, whose own rise through the ranks of higher command was to provide 
Rainier with further influential patronage.20 Steady promotion saw Rainier move to the 
                                                            
15 T.N.A., ADM 2/1347, Admiralty to Rainier, 25 February 1794, see Appendix 9 for details. 
16 See Appendix 3 for Family Tree. 
17 Philip Stephens 1723-1809 (Bart. 1795), Clerk at Navy Board 1739-51, Admiralty Clerk  1751-9, serving as 
Anson’s personal secretary, Second Secretary to Board of Admiralty 1759-63, First Secretary 1763-95, 
Commissioner 1795-1806. MP for Liskeard 1759-68, MP for Sandwich 1768-1806. 
18 1768 General Election, Rainier examined for lieutenant and commissioned into first ship for few months; 
1774 General Election, Rainier appointed to Maidstone (28), Capt. Gardner, in West Indies. 
19 J.M. Collinge (ed.), Office Holders in Modern Britain vol. VII Navy Board Officials 1660-1832 (London, 
1978), p. 133. 
20 Admiral of the Red, Lord Gardner. Present at Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759, lieutenant 1760, commander 
1762, post captain 1766. Served in West Indies and North America during American Revolution, present at the 
Battle of the Saints in 1782. Appointed as C-in-C West Indies in 1786. Returned to England in 1790 when 
appointed to Board of Admiralty of which he was a member until 1795. Promoted rear admiral in 1793 and vice 
admiral 1794 after participating in Battle of Glorious First of June. 1797 saw him second in command of 
Channel Fleet. In 1800 appointed C-in-C Ireland and made an Irish Baron which was elevated to English barony 
in 1806. MP for Plymouth 1790-6 and Westminster 1796-1801. He never went to India. 
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flagship and then appointment as master and commander of the Ostrich (14) in 1777. He was 
seriously wounded the following year when the Ostrich captured an American privateer and 
he had to resign his command. This disappointment was ameliorated by his reward in being 
made post on October 29 1778.21 It was most unusual to be promoted for capturing a non 
national ship and for this munificence Rainier must surely have thanked Philip Stephens, 
Secretary to the Board of Admiralty and MP for Sandwich. 
 
Rainier’s next step came three months later when he was appointed to the Burford (70), 
joining Sir Edward Hughes’ squadron sailing for India in 1779, where he participated in five 
fleet actions off the Indian coast against the French under Suffren in 1782-3. As a post-
captain under Hughes, Rainier was able to appreciate the need for excellent supply and 
victualling support from a cooperative Company. The quarrelsome Hughes rarely benefitted 
from this assistance and thus his freedom of action was much diminished. Rainier also 
learned to understand the trade routes and the importance of protecting both the routes and 
the key bases that lay across them, such as Trincomalee.22 
 
A brief period of half pay on returning home ended in 1786 by appointment as captain of the 
Astraea (32) in the West Indies under Commodore Gardner, his old captain from the 
Maidstone.23 Here he learned, along with his colleague Captain Horatio Nelson, the 
frustrations of policing the laws against smuggling with a not entirely honest local merchant 
class.24 The end of the commission in 1790 saw him ordered home only to be appointed to the 
Monarch (74) during the Spanish Armament.25 There then followed another period of half 
pay until the outbreak with war in 1793 when Rainier was appointed to the Suffolk (74) in the 
Channel Fleet.26 
 
As the French wars were now to occupy Rainier until his return from India in 1805, it is 
worth reflecting that, since his first appointment as lieutenant in 1774, he was employed for 
fourteen out of nineteen years, even though only six were during wartime. This is surely a 
signal as to the influence of the Rainier family’s Sandwich connection with Philip Stephens.  
 
It was intended that Rear Admiral Alan Gardner would take a detachment from the Channel 
Fleet to become commander-in-chief of the East Indies, capturing the French base Mauritius 
en route and taking his old acolyte Rainier with him.27 Circumstances changed with other 
demands for the troops and the French threat to India not seen as serious enough to send a 
powerful squadron to protect British interests there. Consequently only a small detached 
                                                            
21 T.N.A., ADM 1/240, Gayton to Admiralty, 15 June 1777, ADM 1/241/ Parker to Admiralty, 17 September 
1778, C. Wilkinson, ‘Peter Rainier, 1741-1808’, in P. Le Fevre and R. Harding (eds.), British Admirals of the 
Napoleonic Wars: the Contemporaries of Nelson (London, 2005), p. 92.  
22 Sir H.W. Richmond, The Navy in India, p. 91, pp. 181-379, pp. 189-90, p. 182. 
23 T.N.A., ADM 1/2394, Rainier to Admiralty, 6 November 1786. 
24 Asiatic Journal, December 1819, p. 522. 
25 London Chronicle, 29 July, 1790. 
26 T.N.A., ADM 2/125, Admiralty to Rainier, 19 November 1793. 
27 T.N.A., ADM 3/129, Board of Admiralty Rough Minutes, 12 November 1793. 
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squadron would be sent with a senior captain in command. Gardner, also a member of the 
Board of Admiralty, had sufficient interest to obtain this post for Rainier.28 The suitability of 
Rainier for this position is analysed in Chapter Two. 
 
After initiating a naval supplies system Rainier’s first offensive operation came following the 
occupation of the Netherlands by France.29 This made all Dutch colonies enemy territory and, 
knowing the importance of Trincomalee in Ceylon, Rainier and a contingent of Company 
troops took it in 1795. The occupation of the capital, Columbo, followed the next year but the 
whole island was not conquered until 1818 when the Kingdom of Kandy became a British 
protectorate.30 This success was quickly followed by the seizure of Malacca, a key defensive 
port in the eponymous Straits, on the major route between India and China.31  
 
The onslaught on Dutch possessions also included the occupation of the Cape of Good Hope 
by Rear Admiral Sir George Elphinstone and the Admiralty’s decision to combine this new 
station with that of the East Indies under Elphinstone’s command. But Rainier and the 
President of Madras had already begun to assemble a force to capture the Dutch Spice Islands 
of Banda and Amboina.32 Rainier sailed eastwards before his plans could be altered. The 
successful capture of these centres of the spice trade early in 1796 not only brought much 
prize money, but also formally opened up the region to British merchant and naval vessels, 
expanding the trade opportunities and beginning the move of the centre of gravity of the 
station eastwards.33 Admiralty approval of his swift action to gain this advantage meant that 
on Elphinstone’s return to the Cape to fend off a Dutch counter-attack and subsequent return 
to Britain, Rainier was again left in full command of a separate East Indies station.34  
 
In 1797, Rainier planned to attack Manila following the declaration of war with Spain. 
However, news of peace between France and Austria, the depredations on British trade by 
French Admiral Sercey’s frigate squadron and French privateers made Rainier and the Indian 
government fearful for the safety of India. Added to this Tippoo Sultan of Mysore, an enemy 
of Britain and a friend of France threatened warlike moves against British India.35 This year 
also saw the appointment of Richard Wellesley as governor general and he was to become a 
key contributor to Rainier’s career. He commanded many of the resources Rainier needed, he 
made many demands on the activities of the navy, and he had ambitions to make Britain the 
pre-eminent power in India.36 Over the next two years Rainier’s squadron was heavily 
engaged in supporting Wellesley in the defeat of Tippoo and in destroying Sercey’s force, 
thereby protecting trade. 
                                                            
28 T.N.A., Admiralty to Rainier, 25 February 1794. 
29 T.N.A., ADM 1/168, Rainier to Spencer, 20 March 1795. 
30 C.N. Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas 1793-1815 (London, 1954), p. 80. 
31 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 80. 
32 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
33 ADM 1/168, Rainier to Elphinstone, 27 March 1796. 
34 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 90. 
35 Ibid., p. 119. 
36 E. Ingram, Two Views of British India (Bath, 1970), p. 1. 
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The news of Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, with its perceived threat of overland 
attack on India, caused Rainier to divide his forces further. He rapidly sent two warships to 
the Red Sea to stifle any French attempts to leave the area by sea or to reinforce its army 
from the south. With the Admiralty sending a small force directly from England Rainier’s 
role became one of logistical support from Bombay and of calming the nerves of that 
Presidency’s government, which he did admirably.37 
 
1800 saw another planned attack on Batavia cancelled because of the perceived threat to 
India following another peace treaty in Europe and Rainier’s relations with Wellesley reached 
a low point with the former’s refusal to support an attack on Mauritius.38 The following year 
involved much logistical effort to support the movement of General Baird’s army from India 
to the Red Sea, where it participated in the removal of French forces from Egypt.39 
 
The Peace of Amiens from March 1802 to May 1803, initiated the rapid reduction in 
Rainier’s squadron, leading to his belief that he might be recalled. However, his experience in 
an atmosphere of impending war ensured that he was kept in position.40 
 
Part of the Treaty of Amiens was the restoration of Pondicherry to France. But the British 
government, fearing the benefit it would give to France if war resumed, ordered Wellesley 
not to return it. However, a French squadron under Admiral Linois arrived in July 1803 to 
claim it. Delaying tactics gave time for Rainier to bring his own squadron and anchor it 
amongst the French ships off Pondicherry. But Linois escaped at night leaving lights on the 
buoys to deceive the British. Although still at peace and without orders to attack the French, 
Rainier has been criticised for not seizing the French ships which went on to cause 
considerable damage to British shipping.41 But it was almost another six weeks before 
Rainier was to hear officially of the outbreak of war and it is certain that, if he had taken 
action, there would have been a strident diplomatic reaction from France which Rainier 
would have found impossible to defend without having direct orders from London for such 
action. Nevertheless, the main objective of Rainier’s move, the defence of Pondicherry, was 
achieved. 
 
The remainder of the year, and into 1804, saw the struggle to protect the trade culminating in 
the battle of Pulo Aur the following February. Unsure where Linois was, without information 
from the Company as to when the China Fleet would sail, and with insufficient ships to 
protect all the trade, Rainier had gambled that the China Fleet would be safe. Unfortunately it 
was discovered by Linois. However, aggressive action by its Commodore, Nathaniel Dance, 
                                                            
37 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, pp. 140, 148.  
38 B.L., I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, H/481, Rainier to Wellesley, 20 December 1800 and Wellesley to Rainier 5 
February 1801. 
39 B.L., I.O.R., East India Company General Correspondence, E/4/457, Abstract of Dispatches, 19 May, 1801. 
40 N.M.M., RAI/7, Rainier to Admiralty, 6 October 1802, St. Vincent to Rainier, 16 November 1802, in D. 
Smith (ed.), Letters of Lord St. Vincent, vol. 2, N.R.S. vol. LXI (London, 1927), p. 265. 
41 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, pp. 204-6. 
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drove off the French who believed the convoy was escorted by British third rates. Debate 
continues as to whether Rainier was correct in not attending the convoy, but with only one 
serviceable “64” against the 80 gun Marengo and its attendant heavy frigates victory would 
not be a foregone conclusion.42 
 
The remainder of Rainier’s time in command, until March 1805, was largely taken up in trade 
protection and chasing Linois. Although the Spice Islands had also been returned to the 
Netherlands at the Peace of Amiens, it was believed that the pusillanimous nature of the 
Dutch meant that Linois was seen as a far greater threat and therefore the islands were not 
retaken until 1810. There were no further key events until he handed over command to Rear 
Admiral Pellew. Yet relief was still not at hand as his final duty was to escort the most 
valuable convoy ever to have left the East Indies back to England through waters in which 
Nelson was seeking the enormous Franco Spanish fleet under Villeneuve. Luckily they did 
not meet and Rainier arrived home safely. 
 
But peace was still not at hand. The Navy Board scrutinised Rainier’s records to ensure that 
all his paperwork was in order. After eleven years this was not entirely the case and much 
communication followed until the accounts were finally settled. This friction did not stop the 
Navy Board from asking Rainier’s advice on the optimum organisation to ensure naval 
supply and accurate accounting systems in India, which he readily gave. Surprisingly no 
honours or awards were given to Rainier and he was not selected as the Admiralty candidate 
for the seat of Sandwich during the 1806 and 1807 elections. But he stood as an independent 
in 1807 and came first in the pole. Unfortunately he did not have long to make an impact in 
the House of Commons, dying in April 1808. A chronology of Rainier’s life from 1794 can 
be found in Appendix Two. 
 
These studies raised a number of issues which need to be analysed; the reason he remained in 
India during a period when the normal posting of command was three years 43 when the 
Admiralty was keen to rotate its flag officers, when there was pressure from deserving 
officers to be given commands, and when there were continual rumours that Rainier was to 
be replaced. One also needs to answer what were the reasons he received no honours, even 
though there were also rumours about a knighthood. As Rainier was clearly a competent 
admiral who commanded for an unprecedented eleven years, one needs to answer the 
question as to why there is an almost complete absence of mention of him in the literature. 
 
Historiography 
 
There has been no full biography written on Rainier. However several refer to him either in 
compendia or in books on related subjects. Rainier is too young for Charnock’s Biographia 
                                                            
42 Ibid., pp. 229-235. 
43 T.N.A., ADM 8 (various), C.D. Hall, Book Review, MM. 95, 2009, p. 493, and Richmond, The Navy in India 
1763-1783, p. 77. 
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Navalis 44 and too old for Marshall’s Royal Naval Biography.45  Brenton wrote in 1823, 
probably using sources who knew Rainier personally: ‘… by his kindness to individuals and 
his attention to the various duties of his station, had acquired the love and esteem of every 
description of person under his command’.46 However, Ralfe did not even mention him in his 
Naval Biography of Great Britain, although he did find space to include 13 pages on 
Rainier’s brother-in-law Admiral Vashon, who did not see a shot fired in anger during the 
French Wars and retired in 1808 after four years as commander in chief at Leith.47 This fact 
tends to support the premise that the farther one is from London the less likely one is to be 
noticed. After mentioning briefly Rainier’s capture of the Spice Islands, James, in The Naval 
History of Great Britain only considers at length Linois’ escape from Pondicherry in 1803.48 
In describing the dates of the communication of the outbreak of war to India, he shows no 
criticism of Rainier. In his rather descriptive history of the Royal Navy, Laird Clowes was, 
like James, critical of Rainier’s inertia after finding Linois at Pondicherry before the outbreak 
of war in 1803.49 Neither James nor Laird Clowes explores the problems of dispersing a weak 
squadron across such a vast station when the enemy possesses the most powerful ship in 
those seas. 
 
Writing at about the same time as Laird Clowes, Laughton’s entry in the Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography was generally positive.50 He described Rainier as eminently suited for 
the East Indies role due to his long experience there. But Laughton is not always reliable, he 
was mistaken about Rainier serving in the Company’s Maritime Service, he did not mention 
his command of the Astraea (32) in the West Indies between 1786 and 1790, and made the 
common mistake that he commanded until 1804, rather than the actual March 1805.  
 
Nor does Rainier appear much in the several biographies of Wellesley and their authors show 
a remarkable ignorance of the impact of the navy on Wellesley’s successes. The nineteenth 
century biographies of Wellesley are rather more hagiographies, providing the opportunity to 
establish a school of thought critical to Rainier over the one issue – the only one which they 
thought worth mentioning. Malleson and Hutton, both writing in the 1890s, introduced 
Rainier only to criticise him over his refusal to support Wellesley’s desire for an attack on 
Mauritius. The former wrote: ‘But it is not given to all British admirals to possess that 
disregard for punctiliousness which distinguished a Nelson’.51 Hutton described Rainier as: ‘a 
martinet of the most pedantic school, who had already, on another occasion, acted without 
Wellesley’s orders’.52 If Hutton had read Wellesley’s letters to Dundas he would have known 
                                                            
44 J. Charnock, Biographica Navalis, Six vols (London, 1798). 
45 J. Marshall, Royal Naval Biography, Twelve vols (London, 1823). 
46 E.P. Brenton, The Naval History of Great Britain from the Year MDCCLXXXIII to MDCCCXXXVI, vol. 2 
(London, 1823), p. 172. 
47 J. Ralfe, The Naval Biography of Great Britain: consisting of historical memoirs of those officers of the 
British Navy who distinguished themselves during the reign of George III (London, 1828). 
48 W. James, The Naval History of Great Britain, Six vols (London, 1860, 7th edition, 1886), vol. III, pp. 208-11. 
49 Sir W. Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History - From Earliest Times to 1900, seven vols (London, 1899). 
50 Sir J.K. Laughton, Dictionary of National Biography, Lee, S. (ed.), vol. XLVII (London, 1909), pp. 622-3. 
51 G.B. Malleson, Life of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G. (London, 1889), p. 91. 
52 W.H. Hutton, The Marquess Wellesley, K.G. (London, 1893), p. 131. 
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that Wellesley did not have the authority to give orders to the admiral – a situation which he 
continually tried to change.  
 
Unfortunately, Malleson and Hutton’s view of the admiral even percolated into the twentieth 
century. P.E. Roberts in his book India under Wellesley made only one reference to Rainier 
and that, naturally, concerns his refusal to “cooperate” over the attack on Mauritius. Again he 
referred to the comment of Rainier about needing ‘express orders from the Crown’.53 
Confusion arose from a misunderstanding of the inability of the governor general to give 
orders to the naval commander-in-chief. He quoted J. Mill to support his view:  
 
It is impossible to avoid suspecting that he [Rainier] was influenced, however 
unconsciously, by a jealous tenaciousness of authority which disdained 
receiving orders from an East India Company Governor.54  
 
Roberts made no reference to the other points made by the admiral; the proximity to the 
monsoon season, the poor accuracy of charts of the Mauritius coastline, the need for more 
troops than were available, and the vulnerability of the Trade that would result in so many 
warships being diverted from trade protection.  
 
C.N. Parkinson from the 1930s to the 1950s is the only naval historian to have undertaken a 
detailed study of the entire period of the Great French War in the East Indies, both from a 
naval and mercantile point of view.55 This makes his writings and opinions critical to an 
understanding of Rainier as he could fully appreciate the challenges of commanding on such 
a large, remote station. Yet even Parkinson failed to realise in his PhD thesis that John Spratt 
and Peter Rainier junior were the admiral’s nephews, not his sons. In War in the Eastern Seas 
Parkinson took a positive view of Rainier’s overall achievements noting especially his skills 
as a seaman and his extensive knowledge of the station.56 He wrote in depth of Rainier’s 
strategic abilities although he was critical of both Linois’ escape from Pondicherry in 1803 
and from the trap laid for him by Rainier in late 1804.57 His belief was that, after ten years on 
station, the admiral had become rather tired. Parkinson also had some criticisms over his 
reactions to the near disaster of the Battle of Pulo Aur.58 A detailed review of Rainier’s 
actions around the battle of Pulo Aur appeared at the same time in Gillespie’s article in The 
                                                            
53 P.E. Roberts, India under Wellesley (London, 1929), pp. 147-8. 
54 J. Hill, History of India, vol. VI, p. 246, quoted in P.E. Roberts,  India under Wellesley (London, 1929), p. 
148. 
55 C.N. Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas 1793-1813 (Cambridge, 1937), The Trade Winds, Parkinson (ed.) 
(London 1948), War in the Eastern Seas 1793-1815 (London, 1954), Trade and War in the Eastern Seas 1803-
10, unpublished PhD thesis (University of London 1935). 
56 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas 1793-1815. 
57 This important episode is reviewed in Chapter Four. 
58 The Battle of Pulo Aur, 16th February 1804. The China Trade Fleet, returning from Canton without naval 
escort, and under the command of Commodore Dance, was attacked by a French squadron under Admiral Linois 
in the Marengo (84). Five East Indiamen, pretending to be British 64’s, attacked the French and caused Linois to 
flee 
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Mariner’s Mirror.59 Gillespie clearly demonstrated Rainier’s anxiety and frustration over the 
lack of information about the sailing dates and course of the China Fleet, together with his 
actions to protect it. However he was puzzled by Rainier’s orders to the small squadron he 
had sent on this duty not to sail further east than Penang, whereby it might have met the 
China Fleet. Admiral Ballard, who had long experience in the Far East ‘under both sail and 
steam’, commented on this article in a later Mariner’s Mirror. He believed that: ‘Rainier’s 
dispositions were the best that could be foreseen’.60 Parkinson showed little interest in the 
complex logistical requirements of the command but he did write favourably about Rainier’s 
background and personality. There is a synopsis by Parkinson in Appendix E of War in the 
Eastern Seas.61  
 
Whilst Parkinson did not explore fully the difficulties of commanding a squadron in the East 
Indies, he did acknowledge the speed with which Rainier reacted to seal off the Red Sea 
when Bonaparte invaded Egypt, and the skill with which he generally dispersed his ships. He 
also supported the admiral in his conflict with Richard Wellesley over his refusal to support 
an attack on Mauritius in 1801.62 This is the one issue which gives Rainier the most exposure, 
usually via biased books on the Governor General. But Parkinson’s views did not dent the pro 
Wellesley faction so that even John Galbraith, not renowned as a naval historian, felt he knew 
enough to describe Rainier as ‘a recalcitrant admiral’.63  
 
Revival of Rainier’s reputation has resumed only recently in the spurt of activity stimulated 
by the “Nelson Decade”. Wilkinson, in Contemporaries of Nelson, joins Parkinson, as the 
only authors to make an in depth study of Rainier.64 Whilst admitting that the admiral was not 
exactly in the Nelson mould, he felt Rainier’s abilities were more appropriate for the East 
Indies Station, being an able administrator and manager as well as an excellent navigator. It is 
worth noting that the book’s editors, Le Fevre and Harding, chose Rainier for inclusion in the 
book for his ‘administrative and diplomatic skills of the highest order’.65 Wilkinson is also an 
expert in the management in the navy, the interrelationships between the various Admiralty 
boards and how they interacted with the station commanders; his views can be found in The 
British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century.66 Thus he was able to appreciate 
Rainier’s particular skills in these fields. 
 
A forthcoming book on victualling the Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, by Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox, describes clearly the organisation and 
                                                            
59 Col. R. St. J. Gillespie, ‘Sir Nathaniel Dance’s Battle off Pulo Auro’, M.M., 21, No. 2, 1935, pp. 163-86. 
60 Admiral G.A. Ballard, letter in MM, 22, 1936, p. 108. 
61 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, pp.  431-6. 
62 Richard Wellesley, Earl of Mornington, Governor General of India 1797-1805, elder brother of Duke of 
Wellington whose career he launched in India; future Foreign Minister. 
63 J.S. Galbraith, ‘The “Turbulent Frontier” as a Factor in British Expansion’, in Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan. 1960), p. 154. 
64 C. Wilkinson, ‘Peter Rainier, 1741-1808’, in P. Le Fevre  & R. Harding (eds), British Admirals of the 
Napoleonic Wars: The Contemporaries of Nelson (London, 2005), pp. 91-112. 
65 P. Le Fevre, & R. Harding (eds), British Admirals of the Napoleonic Wars, p. 15. 
66 C. Wilkinson, The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2004). 
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process of this key task which enabled British predominance at sea. Appreciating the unique 
issues surrounding victualling in the East Indies, an entire chapter addresses how Rainier and 
Basil Cochrane successfully met the challenge.67 
 
Of the literature in which Rainier is placed in a secondary role, perhaps Edward Ingram is the 
most important, illustrating the geopolitical aspects with which Rainier had to contend in his 
writings of books and articles on the beginnings of the Great Game in Asia. These describe 
the relationship between the Governor General, Lord Wellesley, and the Secretary of State 
for War, Dundas.68  The study of the British government’s motivations and actions in the east 
were reviewed by Ingram in several books and articles. His first book, Two Views of British 
India: The Private Correspondence of Mr. Dundas and Lord Wellesley: 1798-1801, is 
particularly useful in illustrating not only the relationship between the two individual men, 
but also the organisational conflict brought about by trying to manage a situation from such 
enormous distance with inadequate information. As part of this exercise Ingram judged the 
performance of the Royal Navy somewhat negatively, although not singling out Rainier for 
any particular opprobrium. He positioned the events in India, Egypt and the Middle East into 
the context of the evolution of the British Empire and the beginning of the “Great Game in 
Asia” whereby Britain did its utmost to defend its Indian Empire by a series of treaties with 
different powers. He said, somewhat provocatively, that:  
 
… the Treaty of Amiens represented both Britain’s failure to achieve her war 
aims and the geopolitical success of the French invasion on Egypt… in throwing 
the British on the defensive in the wider world. Britain returned her overseas 
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conquests not to buy relative security in Europe … but to buy relative security 
in Asia by persuading the French to withdraw from Egypt.69  
 
Some might argue that this was indeed the case as Dundas was a keen supporter of the British 
invasion of Egypt in 1800 in order to stop that country being used as a bargaining tool by the 
French. Unfortunately, at the time the peace preliminaries were signed, the British 
government did not know that the French in Egypt had capitulated.  
 
Ingram’s view of the navy’s role can easily be discerned in his chapter: ‘The Failure of 
British Sea Power’ in his book In Defence of British India. In summary he said:  
 
The failures of British sea power in the war of the Second Coalition were 
numerous. The navy had not protected British trade; it had not protected the 
British Empire, it had not protected Great Britain’s allies; it had not protected 
British social stability; it had failed to protect Great Britain as [a] great power. 
An army was needed to remove the French from Egypt.70  
 
Although he went on to praise the navy for landing the army in Egypt, this is a severe 
criticism, of which some must be laid at Rainier’s feet if he was correct.71  
 
N.A.M. Rodger conjoined the use of sea power to the rise of empire in his article in volume II 
of the Oxford History of the British Empire.72 In his Command of the Ocean, he only referred 
to Rainier to note his relaxed attitude to Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt, the size of his 
fortune, and his return home in 1805 escorting a valuable convoy through French infested 
waters.73 He summed up the admiral as ‘a safe pair of hands whose sound judgement and 
long experience on the station had earned the trust of the Admiralty and the East India 
Company’.74 Kenneth Breen amended Laughton’s original D.N.B. entry with little change.75 
But, whilst he did acknowledge that Rainier did not return to England until 1805, he 
reiterated Laughton’s two other errors. Meanwhile the positive attitude to Rainier has 
continued in Brian Vale’s article on the subject of scurvy and Rainier’s role in the navy’s 
acceptance of lemon juice as a cure explored in The Mariner’s Mirror.76 
 
Primary Sources 
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Major Sources 
Although Rainier was a voluminous writer of official letters, virtually none of a private 
nature has surfaced. Personal contact with two present day descendents, Colin Rainier in 
Ireland and Peter Rainier on Vancouver Island, has not proved fruitful, both reporting that 
they have nothing relevant to the admiral. We are therefore left with three major primary 
sources of documents pertaining to Rainier, all relating entirely to official matters. They are 
his personal papers at the National Maritime Museum, Admiralty records at the National 
Archive, and the papers of the East India Company, Wellesley’s and Earl Spencer’s private 
papers at the British Library. Spencer papers are also found in four volumes of the N.R.S. 
which illustrate the good working relationship between the First Lord and Rainier.77 
 
It would appear that the only documents once owned by the family were given to the National 
Maritime Museum by Captain J.W. Rainier R.N. in 1948. These take the form of his logs, 
letter and order books from his time as a master and commander in 1778 until 1807.78 
Additionally there are also many letters of his two nephews, Rear Admiral John Spratt 
Rainier and Captain Peter Rainier, who both served under him in the East Indies.79  Much can 
be discerned of the admiral’s character from one letter he wrote to nephew Peter Rainier on 
the latter attaining post rank in 1805.80 It is a weakness that there are no personal letters so his 
character can only be deduced from his official correspondence. Nevertheless one can 
surmise much of the love of detail from the voluminous nature of his letters. 
 
The National Archive is the source for Rainier’s early career which can be ascertained from 
the ADM 36 Muster Books, and the ADM 6 Commission and Warrant List. The majority of 
Rainier’s official correspondence can be found in ADM 1 and ADM 2 Admiralty In and Out 
Letters, providing generous detail. These are also the source of data on Admirals Hughes, 
Keith, and Pellew. ADM 106 provides useful evidence of Rainier’s relationship with the 
Navy Board illustrating much attention to detail, certain conflict and stress, and the attempts 
to reconcile the admiral’s accounts after he returned to England. The key three way link 
between the Navy Board, Rainier, and Victualling Contractor the Hon. Basil Cochrane also 
benefits from study of ADM 106 and ADM 110. Cochrane’s response to his alleged ill 
treatment by the Victualling Board can be read in ADM 7/40. ADM 7/733-748 illustrates 
Hughes’ management of his squadron during the American Revolution, from which Rainier 
learned what to do and not to do as a fleet commander.  
 
ADM 106 contains the leave books which prove that Rainier did not serve in the Company 
Marine Service as presumed in the previously mentioned D.N.B./ O.D.N.B. entries. ADM 8 is 
useful in defining the size of the East Indies squadron but causes confusion as to who was its 
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commander-in-chief as the names it gives conflict with what is known from other sources.81 
General information can be gleaned from ADM 50, Admirals’ Journals and ADM 51 and 53, 
ships’ logs. The decision process by which Rainier replaced Rear-Admiral Gardner as the 
commanding officer in the East Indies can be explored in the Admiral Board minutes of 
ADM 3. 
 
The British Library holds not only the records of the East India Company, but also the  
official correspondence of Lord Wellesley and Earl Spencer the First Lord of the Admiralty 
from 1788 to 1801.82 They therefore include considerable documentation between themselves 
and Rainier. The Company’s Home Miscellaneous and Maritime Series hold much of the 
correspondence between Rainier and the various Company officials, including the presidents 
of Madras and Bombay Councils.83  
 
Supporting Sources. 
 
The East Kent Archive was a good source of information on Rainier’s early life.84 The 
Huguenot Library in London was of limited benefit but providing some background 
information.85 Following on chronologically, the Hughes letter books at the Royal Naval 
Museum, Portsmouth, and East India Company Correspondence at the British Library, give a 
good insight into the issues he faced as a C-in-C in the East Indies during the American 
Revolution, when Rainier was one of his captains.86 Also useful at the N.M.M. are the 
Sandwich papers for an understanding of Sir Edward Hughes’ relationship with the First 
Lord, and the Keith papers which illustrate not only how Keith managed Rainier but also 
what he thought of the East Indies station, its connection with that of the Cape of Good Hope, 
and the advisability of conjoining the Cape and East Indies stations.87  More letters of Lord 
Keith can be found in Perrin’s N.R.S. Volume One, illustrating his experience as an officer in 
the Company Maritime Service which helped to form his views on the challenges of 
commanding in the Eastern Seas.88 The complexities of navigation in the Eastern Seas come 
to light in the Remarks Books of various vessels sailing in that region.89 They are to be found 
at the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office at Taunton. 
 
As Dundas was so important in the direction of war strategy and government in India, useful 
papers of his can be found in the Melville papers at the British Library.90 Personal letters can 
be found in the manuscript series. Merrick Shaw, private secretary to the Governor General, 
was a close friend of Captain Benjamin William Page, RN, and their correspondence in the 
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88 W.G. Perrin (ed.), Letters & Papers of Admiral Viscount Keith, I, N.R.S. LXII (London, 1927). 
89 UKHO, Miscellaneous Papers, Vols. 42, 64, 65. 
90 B.L., Add. Mss. Various.  
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British Library gives an insight into the issues facing a naval captain in Rainier’s squadron.91 
General correspondence of the three presidencies lies in the E Series of the India Office 
Records, and that pertaining to naval issues and the Bombay Marine are covered in the 
L/MAR series.92 The minutes of the Secret Committee of the Commissioners for the Affairs 
of India, together with its letters, give a good view of the strategic and intelligence matters of 
the period. They are found in the L/ P&S/ Series.93 Relevant minutes of presidency board 
meetings can be found in Board’s Collection Series.94 Many documents found in these 
sources often directly or indirectly pertain to Wellesley and are therefore important 
background material. Not to be forgotten is the Fort William-India House Correspondence, 
edited by S.R. Kohli, which gives a useful insight into the letters written by the governors 
general to the Court of Directors of the Company. Especially important are those letters 
illustrating how the Company provided the navy with ordnance.95 
 
In addition to the above, the author has also had access to the Bombay Diaries at the 
University of Exeter. The Bombay Diaries consist of a selection of all those documents 
covering the transactions and communications of the Bombay Presidency relating to the 
activities of the Company, the Royal Navy and the British Government in the Red Sea and 
the Gulf of Arabia. These documents give a thorough picture of what were the concerns of 
the governments of India and Britain at a strategic level, of the relationship between the 
Company and the navy, and of the issues that concerned government, company and naval 
officers at a local level.96 They illustrate the complexities of dealing with Arab rulers, 
supplying ships, soldiers and sailors with the necessary materials to perform their duties in 
such a harsh climate, and of the problems of communication and misunderstanding so easily 
engendered.  
 
The Scottish National Archive and the National Library of Scotland are prime sources of 
material relating to Henry Dundas who played such a large part in defining the British 
strategy for the war in the East Indies.97 Documents relating to one of Rainier’s captains, and 
to Basil Cochrane are also found here, as are the family correspondence of the Malcolm 
family, of which Sir Pulteney Malcolm was Rainier’s flag captain.98 One letter written by 
Rainier to Sir Pulteney Malcolm, after he had returned to England in 1805, one from the 
admiral to Sir John Malcolm in India in 1802, and one to Admiral Alexander Cochrane in 
1806 are the only pieces of private correspondence discovered by the author.99 The Blair 
                                                            
91 B.L., Add. Mss. 13753 
92 B.L., IOR/E/ 1 – 4, 92 B.L., BIOR/L/MAR/1, 3, 7 and IOR/L/MAR/C. 
93 B.L., IOR/L/PS/1 – 6, 19. 
94 B.L., IOR/F/4. 
95 S.R. Kohli, Fort William-India House Correspondence (Military Series), vols XV-XXI (Delhi, 1969-1978). 
96 Exeter University, Bombay Diaries 45, 46, 48, 50, 53, 54, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66A, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 93, 98, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 116, 121, 127, 151, 158. 
97 Scottish Archive, Henry Dundas Correspondence, GD/51/2 & 3, National Library of Scotland, Ms. 7199, 
9735. 
98 N.L.S., Malcolm Family Correspondence, Ms. Acc. 6990-5.  
99 N.L.S., Pulteney Family Correspondence, Acc. 6990-5, ff. 1-12. N.L.S., Pulteney Family Correspondence, 
Acc. 6990-5, ff. 1-12. N.L.S., Cochrane Family Correspondence, f. 71, Rainier to Cochrane 6 May 1806. 
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Adam Collection at Kelty, Kinross-shire, contains many documents pertaining to Admiral Sir 
Charles Adam who served under Rainier from 1796 to 1802.100 The author was the first 
person to view these papers. The admiral’s order book, copied by Adam, reveals how the 
squadron’s captains were managed. The Red Sea campaign is also particularly well covered. 
Further correspondence concerning Basil Cochrane’s battles with the government can also be 
read at the National Library of Scotland.101 It indicates that Cochrane was both a friend of 
Dundas and also that he had the ability to command a private audience with the Prime 
Minister, Lord Liverpool.  
 
St. Vincent, the First Lord between 1801 and 1804, with his explanations of why Rainier 
could not be replaced, gives the only feedback – however slight – as to what were the 
perceptions of Rainier at the Admiralty when he refused Rainier’s request to be allowed 
home.102  
 
For the period towards the end of Rainier’s command, and during that of Pellew, the Grey 
family papers at Durham University and the Grenville Papers at the Huntington Library in 
San Marino, California, were of limited benefit but provided some background 
information.103 
 
The question did arise as to how useful would be a study of those potentially relevant records 
residing in India. It was put to three experts on the East India Company, the late Anthony 
Farrington, Huw Bowen and William Dalrymple. All advised that the time that would be 
consumed in obtaining access, the uncertainty of actually finding anything relevant, and the 
fact that the vast proportion of documents pertaining to the Company are in the British 
Library, meant that such an expenditure of effort would be unproductive. 
 
Chapter Plan 
 
This thesis is divided into two sections. After the Introductory Chapter the organisational 
environment in which Rainier operated, namely the Royal Navy and the Company and the 
communication and intelligence tools that were available to him on this vast station, are 
analysed. These are investigated in Chapters Two, Three and Four. The second section, 
chapters Five, Six and Seven, reviews in detail his goals and achievements and how 
successful he was in meeting them. His major goal was the protection of Trade; his second 
one was the defence of British possessions, necessitating both a defence of current colonies 
and, the occupation of enemy territories; his third achievement. In order to best utilise his 
resources across the station Rainier required an effective logistical organisation and this 
                                                            
100 Blair Adam Papers, Private Collection. 
101 N.L.S., Basil Cochrane correspondence, Ms. 1054, 2264, 2303, 2573, 5375. 
102 D.B. Smith (ed.), The Letters of Lord St. Vincent 1801-1804, I & II, N.R.S. LV &  LX (London, 1922 & 
1927). 
103 Durham University, Charles, 2nd Earl Grey Papers, ASC Ref Z GRE. 
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constitutes his fourth achievement. A Conclusion summarises Rainier’s position in the wider 
chronicle of British admirals. 
 
Chapter One, the Introductory Chapter, illustrates the key importance of the East Indies 
during the French Wars and gives a brief description of the important events in Rainier’s life 
before he was appointed to command in the East Indies. It also reviews the Historiography 
and Sources used.  
 
Chapter Two analyses how he came to be appointed to command in the East Indies.  An 
evaluation follows of his behaviour within the naval structure, of his dealing with the 
Admiralty, and of his skill in managing downwards. Finally his ability as a leader and 
communicator is investigated. 
 
The second organisational factor that must be understood in order to evaluate Rainier’s 
achievements is how he cooperated with the Company. This joint stock organisation was 
responsible for the government of all British possessions in the East Indies. Especially 
important was Rainier’s relationship with Richard Wellesley, the Governor General from 
1797 to 1805, a difficult man to handle and one whose goal was to establish Britain as the 
major land power in India. How it was structured and how Rainier dealt with this unique 
source of power is analysed in Chapter Three. 
 
Communications, both within the station and between Europe and the Indies, were difficult 
and complex. How they were managed, and by what means, is analysed in Chapter Four. 
Intelligence, which played a large part in shaping Rainier’s decisions, naturally used these 
communications channels. How successful he was in the use of this intelligence, in analysing 
its sources and quality, and what impact it had on his decision making and assessment of 
priorities is then evaluated.  
 
Having studied the environment in which Rainier operated the second section studies his 
achievements. Chapter Five describes the geographic features of the station and its weather 
patterns which dictated the trade routes that are then described. How Rainier protected the 
trade is then analysed, differentiating between the inter-continental and the intra station trade.  
The impact of commerce raiding concludes this chapter. 
 
Chapter Six reviews Rainier’s defence of British colonies and the acquisition of enemy 
possessions. This entails an explanation of the political situation of the army and how he 
cooperated with it. The first part covers the offensive period between 1795 and 1798, the 
second defensive period from 1798 to 1805. Not to be forgotten is the navy’s role in 
supporting the army with coastal blockades, the transport and convoying of troops and their 
equipment. 
 
In order to execute his strategy Rainier needed a well found and well manned squadron. 
Chapter Seven analyses how he maintained the effectiveness of his vessels through the 
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acquisition of naval supplies, ordnance, victuals and healthy crews, together with the 
necessary finance to enable his squadron to operate over such a vast station. The role of the 
Admiralty, Navy, Victualling, and Sick and Hurt Boards in maintaining the squadron is also 
analysed, taking into account the problems caused by the enormous distance from London.  
 
The Conclusion, Chapter Eight, examines Rainier’s record over the eleven years during 
which he was in command – a unique period of time for a commander-in-chief. It 
acknowledges how rapidly trade grew under his protection, what role he played in the 
extension of British control of India, what colonial expansion he had achieved, how well he 
managed the people on his station, and how efficient a logistics and financial manager he 
was. Given the external factors of physical complexity of the station, and the role of the 
Company, it emphasises how much more commendable were Rainier’s achievements than if 
they had been made on a more traditional station. Naturally there were some events that 
occurred upon which there is criticism of Rainier. One major issue is that of corruption. He 
had a close relationship with the Hon. Basil Cochrane, the prime supplier of victuals to the 
squadron. The questions are asked as to whether or not  the admiral manipulated the 
accounting system to benefit both himself and Cochrane and if there is any suggestion that 
suspicion in the Navy Board might have been the reason that Rainier received no sign of 
approbation from the government after his eleven successful years in command in India. As 
there is no direct evidence, the balance of probability is analysed. The arguments are 
examined. Finally, a decision is made as to how far he could be deemed to be a successful C-
in-C, comparing the import of the achievements of a managerial and diplomatic admiral with 
those of the more traditionally honoured winners of battles. 
 
27 
 
     CHAPTER 2. 
 
‘THE BOARD COULD NOT COMPLY WITH YOUR REQUEST TO  
           BE  RELIEVED’.1 RAINIER AND THE ROYAL NAVY. 
 
This chapter will review Rainier’s relations with the most important of the organisations with 
which he had to operate, the Royal Navy. He was first and foremost a naval officer and 
without its active support, and its belief that he was successful, he would have been recalled. 
Initially one should assess the factors which led to his appointment. This will be followed by 
an evaluation of how Rainier used these skills in his contacts with the Royal Navy hierarchy. 
 
The Choice of Rainier. 
 
By early November 1793 Gardner had been assigned to succeed Cornwallis as C-in-C East 
Indies, having previously taken a squadron to the West Indies in March. The Board of 
Admiralty Rough Minutes state: ‘Alan Gardner Esq., Rear Admiral of the Blue, to be 
Commander in Chief of a squadron of His Majesty’s Ships and Vessels to be employed on a 
Particular Service’.2 Although not public knowledge at the time, it is clear that there was a 
plan to attack Mauritius using troops sent from India by the Company. That this service was 
ultimately the East Indies is shown by a letter from the Admiralty to Gardner telling him that, 
as he is to be commander in chief in the East Indies, he was to load stores for that destination 
into East Indiamen and not into warships.3  
 
The Company had a change of heart and withdrew its offer of troops intended for the attack 
on Mauritius because it was concerned that such a move would leave the mainland of India 
unprotected and the troops could only arrive at the island a few weeks before the local 
monsoon season.4 Additionally, the newly acquired colonies in the West Indies required 
garrisons and ships to defend them, which meant fewer forces available for the East Indies. 
Calling off the entire expedition therefore meant the East Indies command was no longer 
senior enough for a rear admiral. Gardner remained with the Channel Fleet, possibly waiting 
to take up the command when more reinforcements for the Indian Ocean became available. 
But a small British squadron was still needed to protect British interests in the east as 
Cornwallis had left no naval vessels on that station. The question now was who would best 
fill the role of commodore until, and if, French activity in the East became so threatening that 
a rear admiral would be needed to command the station.  
 
Although there would be many senior captains whom the Admiralty might have chosen, 
Rainier had several attributes that made him an attractive candidate. He already had extensive 
experience in the East Indies in two wars, while his capture of the American privateer and 
involvement in five fleet actions under Hughes showed he was a fighting captain. Indeed, 
Hughes, who rarely commented on any of his captains, did make positive remarks about 
Rainier in one battle report to the Admiralty.5 What would be understood would be his legal 
knowledge, built up in the West Indies, trying to stop illegal trade between British, French 
and rebel colonies, and his concern for his men – an irreplaceable commodity in the Far East. 
                                                 
1 St. Vincent to Rainier, 16 November 1802, D.B. Smith (ed.), Letters of Lord St. Vincent 1801-4, vol. 2, p. 265. 
2 T.N.A., ADM 3/129, Board of Admiralty Rough Minutes, 12 November 1793. 
3 T.N.A., ADM 2/603, Admiralty to Gardner, 20 December, 1793. 
4 B.L., I.O.R., L/PS/19, Box 12, William Devaynes, Chairman of the E.I.C., to Henry Dundas, 17 March 1794, 
G.S. Misra, British Foreign Policy and Indian Affairs 1783-1815 (London, 1963), p. 29. 
5 T.N.A., ADM 1/164, Hughes to Admiralty, 15 July 1782. 
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He also knew from personal observation about the need for close relations with the Company 
and the army commanders. Finally, at a time when admirals were likely to complain 
vociferously if they thought their standing and pride had been damaged, Rainier was a man 
whose ego would not give pain to the Admiralty if it felt the need to supercede him at a later 
stage. On the negative side, he had never controlled a squadron, apart from what had fallen to 
him as a naval captain in command of a ship, he had no senior administrative experience with 
naval systems, nor with trade protection – the station’s prime responsibility.6 
 
The Suffolk was already victualled and stored for ‘foreign service’, probably in readiness for 
the Mauritius expedition, and was close at hand at Spithead. One could believe that the 
choice of Rainier was not a difficult one and he would be proposed by one of his patrons at 
the Admiralty Board, Gardner or Stephens - probably Gardner who may have been intended 
to go out at a more opportune moment for the Mauritius expedition. Rainier must have had an 
inkling of what was to come because, on 20 February, Admiral Parker, the port admiral at 
Portsmouth, forwarded to the Admiralty a request from Rainier asking for a week’s leave ‘to 
settle some private affairs’.7 
 
This was the last step up that Gardner was able to provide for Rainier and from now on he 
would need to rely on other sources for support. There is no evidence of any other officer 
encouraging his protégé’s career. Yet Rainier could still benefit from the presence of 
Stephens, still Sandwich’s MP and Secretary to the Board of Admiralty. Indeed Stephen’s 
promotion to full member of the Board the following year would ensure that support for the 
junior commodore continued at the highest level. And Rainier was able to show his gratitude 
to Gardner by appointing his son, Captain Alan Hyde Gardner, to command the naval forces 
which took Columbo in 1796, thereby acquiring a sizeable sum in prize money.8  
 
Rainier’s orders of 25 February 1794 told him to take Centurion, Orpheus, and Resistance, 
currently cruising off the Cape, under his command, escort the China/ India convoy together 
with the Swift, sloop, to eastern waters and put himself under the command of Cornwallis. [It 
must be remembered that the Admiralty had no idea that he was on his way home]. If Rainier 
could find neither Cornwallis nor any other senior officer he was to take command himself 
and, after consulting with the Governor General and the Governor of Madras act so as ‘to 
best protect the Trade and Settlements of His Majesty’s Subjects and Allies in the East 
Indies’.9 On the same day, a letter to Cornwallis ordered him to take Rainier under his 
command.10 
 
Rainier’s knowledge of the difficulty of obtaining replacement seamen in India would be 
sufficient incentive for him to try any methods which might maintain the health of his crews. 
Whether motivated by compassion or the need to keep as many seamen as possible, his 
request to the Admiralty to release a deserter from the Suffolk who had joined the 
Marlborough, was accepted, although he was to lose his bounty.11 Nevertheless this action 
would have signaled to his crew that Rainier was not at the sadistic end of the spectrum of 
captains’ behaviour.  
 
                                                 
6 T.N.A., ADM 2/1347, Admiralty to Rainier, 25 February 1794, see Appendix 9 for details. 
7 T.N.A., ADM 1/1006, Parker to Admiralty, 20 February, 1794. 
8 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 91. 
9 T.N.A., ADM 2/1347, Admiralty to Rainier, 25 February 1794. 
10 T.N.A., ADM 2/1347, Admiralty to Cornwallis, 25 February 1794. 
11 T.N.A., ADM 2/771, Admiralty to Rainier, 12 February, 1794. 
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His concern for the health of his crew also paid off. His involvement with the experiment in 
the use of lemon juice, originally planned for Gardner’s aborted expedition to Mauritius, 
entailed experimenting with larger amounts of lemon juice than was usual and given to all 
seamen, not just the sick.  He arrived with a healthy crew and his report on the matter to the 
Admiralty formed the basis of a more rigorous application of this anti-scorbutic in the navy. 
It allowed him to report that he had fewer men on the sick list than when he departed.12 When 
he had sailed with Hughes in 1779 the average sick list per ship had been well over 100. The 
Suffolk rarely had more than 30.  
 
In the midst of Rainier’s preparations Cornwallis, although he had been given leave to return 
to England as early as February 1792, sailed into Spithead in the Minerva on the 21 April to 
the great surprise of all concerned.13  There is no account of any meeting between Cornwallis 
and Rainier although it must be assumed one took place. An order to Cornwallis from the 
Admiralty sent the very next day after his arrival, told him to pass to Rainier some of the 
letters he had received, which the Admiralty had expected to be delivered at some time later 
when they both met in India. These letters would now be needed by the new commodore.14 
And on the following day Rainier acknowledged to Stephens the receipt of papers given to 
him by Cornwallis.15 They indicated that the Admiralty was still comfortable with their 
decision to send Rainier even though it was now certain there would be no senior officer of 
the station. But his exact status was demonstrated in the Admiralty letter to Cornwallis on the 
subject; the letters should be returned to Rainier: ‘that he on his arrival in the East Indies, 
may as Senior Officer for the time being [author’s italics] carry them into execution’.16 But 
there was still confusion on the station as to who was in command. This lasted almost a year; 
letters from Captain Osborn of the Centurion (50), who had been sent out in December and 
was cruising off the Cape, were written on 20 November and 14 December 1794 to Gardner 
as C-in-C East Indies.17  
 
Rainier sailed on May 2 1794 from St. Helens with Lord Howe’s fleet, which was escorting 
the trade to Quebec and the Mediterranean. On the 11 May he parted company, taking sixty 
five sail on their journey to India and China, and leaving Howe to search for the French fleet 
and an incoming French grain convoy in the campaign that terminated in the victory of the 
‘Glorious First of June’. He did not put into the Cape but sailed directly for India, arriving off 
Madras on the 11 September. This was about the normal length of passage for an East 
Indiaman sailing alone but not with a huge convoy.18 This fact was raised in the press:  
 
[Rainier] has gained great credit among the Commanders of the India ships … 
aided by his judicious management, made their passage to Madras in 4 months 
and 8 days. This is the only instance of so large a fleet performing that voyage in 
so short a time.19 
 
                                                 
12 B. Vale, ‘The Conquest of Scurvy in the Royal Navy 1793-1800: A Challenge to Current Orthodoxy’, M.M., 
94 (2008), pp. 160-75. 
13 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 59, T.N.A., ADM 1/1006, Parker to Admiralty, 21 April 1794. 
14 T.N.A., ADM 2/604, Admiralty to Cornwallis, 22 April 1794. 
15 T.N.A., ADM 1/2397, Rainier to Stephens, 24 April 1794. 
16 T.N.A., ADM 2/604, Admiralty to Cornwallis, 22 April, 1794. 
17 T.N.A., ADM 1/167, Osborne to Gardner, 20 November and 14 December 1794. 
18 Wilkinson, ‘Peter Rainier’, in Le Fevre & Harding (eds), British Admirals of the Napoleonic Wars, p. 96. 
19 St. James Chronicle or the British Evening Post, 7 March 1795. 
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The Admiralty had told Rainier that he would be given extra lemon juice, sugar and 
medicines and also a time keeper, as he had previously requested.20 As there is no reference 
to a marine chronometer in the Suffolk’s log, Wilkinson surmised that there was not one 
aboard although a letter from the Admiralty to Rainier told him that he would get a 
timekeeper.21 But even if he did not have one, it is almost certain that some of the Indiamen 
would have them and they could have told him the time by signal flags or firing a gun at 
midday. Whatever tools he had, he confirmed the Admiralty’s perception of his navigation 
skills which Wilkinson describes: 
 
There are almost no landmarks between the Equator and the Cape, which was 
sighted exactly when expected. Likewise, a near perfect landfall was made off the 
coast of India after the voyage across the Southern Ocean with frequent entries of 
‘all convoy in sight’.22 
 
Managing Relationships. 
 
Rainier had to manage both downwards and upwards to keep a maximum of independence. 
Any orders he received would be at least three months out of date and might not be 
appropriate to the actual conditions in which he found himself.  This section will evaluate his 
relations with the Admiralty, how he handled the appointment of Elphinstone as his 
temporary commander. Finally, managing downwards, his leadership, patronage and 
communications skills will be studied. 
 
a)The Admiralty. 
Once on station, for the first time in his career, Rainier had an independent command. He 
now had to communicate by letter with his direct superiors, officially the Board of Admiralty. 
His letters to Nepean, from March 1795 Stephen’s successor as the Secretary to the Board of 
Admiralty, show a detailed mind much concerned with the need to maintain his ships at sea 
through effective administration. Rainier must have felt some comfort in communicating with 
the Admiralty, knowing Stephens was now on the Board. He had benefitted from his 
influence since obtaining his commission in 1768, just before Stephens became MP for 
Sandwich for the first time. 
 
Even before he departed for the East Indies this trait was shown by his requests for more 
lemon juice, sugar and medicines.23 The importance of Rainier’s journey to the treatment of 
scurvy is amply demonstrated in Brian Vale’s article in the Mariner’s Mirror.24  When he 
arrived on station, his concerns over the poor condition of stores, led him to request 
gunpowder from the Company, and many other commodities from the Navy and Victualling 
Boards.25 
 
Rainier’s epistolary efforts to keep the Admiralty and Navy Board informed of his actions, 
clearly allowed them to feel comfortable because he was informed that ‘your Conduct 
subsequent to your arrival at that Presidency merits their Lordships’ full approbation’.26 
                                                 
20 T.N.A., ADM 2/772, Admiralty to Rainier, 13 March, 15 March, 17 March, 1794. 
21 T.N.A., ADM 2/772, Admiralty to Rainier 17 March 1794. 
22 Wilkinson, ‘Peter Rainier’, in Le Fevre & Harding (eds), British Admirals of the Napoleonic Wars, p. 95.  
23 T.N.A., ADM 2/772, Admiralty to Rainier, 15 March 1794. 
24 Vale, ‘The Conquest of Scurvy in the Royal Navy 1793-1800’, MM, 94 (2008), pp. 160-175. 
25 T.N.A., ADM 1/168, Rainier to Sir John Shore, Governor General, 14 February 1795. 
26 T.N.A., ADM 2/1349, Admiralty to Rainier, 7 May 1795. 
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Unfortunately for Rainier, the sting in the tail was another letter from the same source on the 
same day, advising him that Rear Admiral Elphinstone was coming to take overall command 
of the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies. But, as a sop, he could now have a flag 
captain of his own and thus remain a commodore.27 Spencer, as First Lord, knew that this 
would not be good news to Rainier and showed his sensitivity by writing to the admiral 
congratulating him on his captures and confirming all the promotions Rainier wanted before 
Elphinstone could get involved in case ‘they might have been superceded’.28 And not even 
Elphinstone could always obtain approval for his promotions: ‘The Admiralty refuse to 
confirm half my commissions’.29 Yet he had already been very successful in his negotiations 
with the Admiralty. At his initial refusal to take the offered command of the Cape and East 
Indies, he had been offered a salary of £8,000 p.a. and all the patronage.30 
 
Rainier continued to have a good relationship with Spencer. When Spencer wrote to him that 
he was ‘quitting’ his position as First Lord he continued by:  
 
expressing the satisfaction I have derived from my correspondence with you … 
and my hopes that when circumstances permit your return to England, I shall have 
an opportunity of cultivating in person that acquaintance with you.31 
 
However, there is no evidence that this did in fact take place.  
 
Thus the Admiral’s means and frequency of communication seem to have been appreciated. 
This belief is supported by a letter from Spencer to Rainier written at the height of the Egypt 
invasion scare. Spencer says that he has not heard from Blankett.32 He continued: ‘from the 
measures you very judiciously placed in his hands I have no doubt that Blankett will 
succeed’.33 This reinforced another letter written by Spencer a year earlier:  
 
The distance of your Station from home, and the few opportunities which occur of 
communication with you, leave us so much in the dark with respect to the course 
of your Operations that it is very difficult to write anything upon the subject of 
them. I shall therefore confine myself to mentioning my satisfaction that the 
Expedition … to Manilla (sic) did not take place.34 
 
How well Rainier dealt with the Admiralty, and most importantly, the First Lord, is 
illustrated by his understanding of the rule of “no surprises for your boss”. In 1800 he refused 
to help Wellesley, the Governor General, when he asked for naval support for an attack from 
India on Mauritius. How this affected relations with Wellesley will be examined in Chapter 
Three. Here will be studied how Rainier communicated the disagreement to the Admiralty, in 
the face of a savage rebuttal by Wellesley, which included heavy criticism of Rainier’s 
knowledge and attitude. Rainier therefore wrote to Spencer:  
 
                                                 
27 T.N.A., ADM 2/1349, Admiralty to Rainier, 7 May 1795. 
28 B.L., Add. Mss. 75862, Spencer to Rainier, 6 May 1796. 
29 N.M.M., KEI/46, Elphinstone to his sister, Mary, 21 January 1797. 
30 Ibid., 7 March 1795 
31 B.L., Add. Mss. 75850, Spencer to Rainier, 17 February 1801. 
32 Rear Admiral Blankett, sent by Dundas with a small squadron to Red Sea in 1798 to halt French advances.   
Had already served in East Indies under Hughes during American Revolution. Promoted rear admiral in 1799. 
He died on station in 1801. 
33 B.L., Add. Mss. 75862, Spencer to Rainier, 17 August 1799. 
34 B.L., Add. Mss. 77862, Spencer to Rainier, 30 May 1798. 
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I received a letter from Lord Wellesley expressive of much Chagrin at my refusal 
to cooperate with His Majesty’s Squadron in the project His Excellency had 
proposed and suggesting a variety of arguments tending to prove me in the wrong, 
to impress me with the idea that his public consequence and intimate connexion 
(sic) with His Majesty’s Ministers was more than sufficient to shelter my Conduct 
from any degree of reprehensibility. … in the project His Excellency had prepared 
....I must confirm to your Lordship that I am not in the least convinced by His 
Excellency’s reasoning, and have therefore forborn to make any reply to them, 
having neither inclination or leisure to enter into such tedious discussion. … The 
Answer … from Vice Admiral Sir Roger Curtis [the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Cape] and Sir George Yonge [the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope] has fully 
verified my conjecture expressed to His Excellency about his Plan for Mauritius.35 
By this letter Rainier forewarned Spencer that there could be fallout from his refusal to assist 
Wellesley and, although he does not give his own reasons beyond saying that the plans were 
impracticable, his views were supported by Sir Roger Curtis who, as the C-in-C Cape, would 
be the person most directly involved in any attack on Mauritius as the island lay within his 
station, not Rainier’s. 
 
Rainier had some influence with the Admiralty on strategic matters. Ceylon, which he 
occupied in 1795, became a major naval base and Bombay was used to build ships for the 
Royal Navy. He had been promoting shipbuilding in Bombay for several years and it only 
came to fruition after his departure. Clearly it had frustrated him because he replied to 
Duncan’s 36 question about the viability of building a 74 by saying that he already had been 
asked the same question by another official. As everything he had said had been ignored he 
thought it pointless to tell Duncan his thoughts.37 But, by the time he returned in 1805, he had 
a clear view of his lack of influence concerning promotions. On 13 November 1805 he wrote 
to Sir Pulteney Malcolm, his old flag captain, that: ‘we are at present much embarrassed by 
the objections the Admiralty have raised against some of my nephew’s time in India to 
qualify him to pass for lieutenant’,38 and later in the same letter: ‘I have no interest at the 
Admiralty’,39 [Although Stephens was still on the Board for another eleven months]. It is not 
known if Rainier wished for further service, after eleven years away from home and family, 
but his name was not mentioned by Admiral Young, Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, to 
First Lord Thomas Grenville reviewing the possible candidates for future senior command in 
late 1806.40 
 
b) A New Commanding Officer. 
After a short period of time Rainier was back with a commanding officer between him and 
the Admiralty although, for all intents and purposes, the physical distances between the two 
were almost as distant as with the previous arrangement. It will now be described how he 
‘managed’ the upward chain of command.  
 
Rainier had been sent out to the East Indies, largely as the default commander, but with 
probable hopes that he would be able to make a name for himself and thus avoid the irritant 
of a senior officer sent to command over him. But Elphinstone would see himself as an expert 
                                                 
35 T.N.A., ADM 1/171, Rainier to Spencer, 10 May 1801. 
36 Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, 1795-1811. 
37 T.N.A., ADM 1/175, Rainier to Duncan, 23 June 1804. 
38 N.L.S., Malcolm Collection, Acc. 6990-5, ff. 2-3, Rainier to Pulteney Malcolm, 13 November 1805. 
39 N.L.S., Malcolm Collection, Acc. 6990-5, f. 4, Rainier to Pulteney Malcolm, 13 November 1805. 
40 Huntington Library, STG. Box 169, Folder 43, Young to Thomas Grenville, 29 November 1806. 
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in the region, having served as the fourth mate of an Indiaman during 1766/7, and with 
several relations as officers, even commanders, in the Company service. One brother, 
William, became a director of the Company.41 
 
The first action was to absent himself from Madras when he knew his new commander was 
coming. Naturally he established a plausible reason for so doing. He wrote to Elphinstone:  
 
…agreeable to the plans concerted with the Right Honourable the President in 
Council, the Commander of the Troops on the Coast, and myself in pursuance of 
the orders received from the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, Secretary of State, 
and confirmed by your own orders …42  
 
In this way Rainier illustrated that he had the support of the local Company command and 
was following the strategic directions he had received from London so it was absolutely 
imperative, but unfortunate, that he would not be in Madras to greet his new commander. 
Elphinstone demonstrated his disappointment:  
 
The object of the Rear Admiral [Rainier] will doubtless be conducive to the 
British interest; but another arrangement might have retained the Naval Force 
more collected and prepared for Service not so remote.43  
 
It was probable that any attack on Mauritius would begin from the Cape. Therefore it would 
appear that Elphinstone’s comment was designed to ensure that Rainier was close at hand and 
under his direct control. 
 
But Elphinstone did not appear to appreciate the many and varied claims on the ‘Service’. To 
concentrate naval forces would have laid bare all the British shipping interests to 
depredations, not only by pirates, but also by French, Dutch and soon Spanish ships across 
the station. War could be declared in Europe six months before the knowledge reached the far 
corners of the East Indies. It was important to have British ships in position ready to attack 
the enemy and defend British trade as soon as war was declared. Information and 
misinformation - often from neutral vessels, such as Danish and American44 – had to be 
evaluated and the disposition of Royal Naval vessels made accordingly. With these factors in 
mind a sensible interpretation of the situation comes from Parkinson: ‘What other plans 
Rainier could have made Elphinstone omitted to suggest….it is not clear what else he could 
have done’.45 
 
Unsurprisingly, Rainier discovered that the situation in the Spice Islands was worse than he 
had anticipated and: ‘’tis not possible to say what my detention there may be which must be 
regulated by the Force of the Enemy… (I) shall return to this Coast as soon as possible’.46 He 
also covered himself by writing, the following month, a detailed letter (eleven pages) to 
Nepean. He was going to the Spice Islands:  
 
                                                 
41 Farrington, A Biographical Index of the East India Company Maritime Serving Officers 1600-1834, p.251. 
42 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Elphinstone, 14 October 1795. 
43 N.M.M., KEI/5/3, Elphinstone to Nepean, 23 February 1796. 
44 See Chapter Four. 
45 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 84. 
46 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Elphinstone, 11 October 1795. 
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or otherwise as I shall [author’s italics] on my arrival judge to be most condusive 
(sic) to the execution of His Majesty’s Commands … after having made the 
necessary dispositions for the object of the expedition and protection of the Trade 
in the China Seas, purpose (sic) to return and join Rear Admiral the Honourable 
George Elphinstone as far as possible but may be detained longer than I can now 
forsee (sic).47  
 
Here is a not very subtle message to the Admiralty that his new superior would be able to add 
nothing to the conduct of the war and he knew best how to protect the Trade – his first 
responsibility. He was also keeping up the pressure to demonstrate that he was so busy that 
he would not be able to meet Elphinstone. Again, Rainier illustrates the communication 
problem, and opportunities to avoid control, caused by such a large physical command:  
 
The great uncertainty I am under with respect to the time you may arrive on the 
Coast and not having received any order from you since the arrival of the Arniston 
[which brought news of Elphinstone’s appointment] … have induced me to detach 
HMS Centurion and Swift to protect the Trades.48 
 
Rainier gave Elphinstone no chance to argue that he was not communicating, even if it were 
news that the C-in-C did not want to hear: ‘…my presence [is] indispencably (sic) necessary, 
at Amboina’.49 And to show the difficulties Rainier was struggling under to keep on writing: 
‘We are so short of Stationery I fear it will not be in my power to furnish you with a complete 
set of duplicates’,50 yet another excuse to avoid Elphinstone’s authority. 
 
But he also knew he had to maintain at least the outward signs of good relationships: ‘I shall 
be happy to hear of your success, which have little doubt of, but am concerned it has so long 
been delayed from circumstances wholly out of the control of your acknowledged abilities to 
command’.51  
 
As Rainier had lost approximately £25,000 because Elphinstone took the commander-in-
chief’s share of the prize money for capturing the Dutch Spice Islands, one has to doubt the 
sincerity of the sentiments. But, as Parkinson says of Rainier on learning that he had a new 
commander: ‘Any annoyance he may have felt he forbore to express.’52 However, it could be 
argued that Rainier’s movement to the east, away from Elphinstone, was his means of 
expressing his anger. Another example of Elphinstone’s lack of understanding of the situation 
in Indian waters is found in his letter to Spencer requesting permission to withdraw ships 
when he has destroyed the French threat: ‘so large a force may not be required in India’.53 It 
is known that the newly arrived admiral had designs on Mauritius but whether this is the 
“French threat” he had in mind is unclear. In fact British knowledge of the situation on 
Mauritius at that time was so incomplete that British forces were felt to be inadequate for 
such a venture. Bearing in mind the time taken to send out reinforcements to India after any 
new French threat was discovered, surely the East Indies was the last station on which to take 
a gamble on the number of French ships remaining small. Rainier’s politeness and 
                                                 
47 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Nepean, 12 November 1795. 
48 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Elphinstone, 6 January 1796. 
49 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Elphinstone, 11 April 1796. 
50 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Elphinstone, 6 June 1796. 
51 N.M.M., KEI/5/3, Rainier to Elphinstone, 6 January 1796. 
52 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 82. 
53 B.L., Add. Mss. 75856, Elphinstone to Spencer, 13 November 1795. 
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communication with his superiors seems to have been effective because Elphinstone wrote to 
Nepean that the capture of Amboina and Banda ‘appear to me to be highly creditable to that 
excellent Officer [Rainier]’.54 Of course, his opinion could have been tempered by the fact 
that Rainier had just obtained for him a large sum of prize money. 
 
Whilst Elphinstone waited for Rainier in India, he had news that the Dutch were planning to 
retake the Cape and, knowing he had insufficient forces there, decided to return, reaching 
Saldhana Bay on August 12, 1796, never again to set foot in Indian waters. In fact, Spencer 
had already written to Rainier to this effect:  
 
In the event of the return home of Sir George Elphinstone, Rear Admiral Pringle 
will have command of the Cape of Good Hope but it is intended that that should 
be a separate Command from the one you will have in that Case and of course you 
will be Commander in Chief of the Station comprised of the Asiatic Seas.55  
 
The arrival of Elphinstone had not helped the smooth working of the chain of command in 
the East Indies. In July 1795 Rainier wrote: ‘As the uncertainty of my Situation may 
sometimes render it expedient …’.56 This was advice given to Captain Newcombe that he 
may not be able to rely on Rainier’s support, because of the uncertainty of his position as the 
senior naval officer in the East Indies.  Any differences Newcombe might have when 
supporting the army in combined operations might need more flexibility on behalf of the 
navy than was usual. This shows a rare honesty when dealing with his subordinates so that 
they had all the information necessary to do the job, even if it admitted the weakness of 
Rainier’s position. But it is clear that Rainier was not a man who relished the emblems of 
command. In his journal describing the expedition to capture the Molucca Islands, the 
expedition’s chief engineer and secretary, Captain Lennon, described their arrival at Malacca. 
Even though it was protocol, the defeated Dutch governor did not offer Rainier the use of his 
official residence. But rather than ejecting the governor, Rainier merely stayed in a local 
private residence.57 
 
Luckily Rainier had a high degree of self confidence. The departure of Elphinstone appears to 
mark the end of Rainier’s subjection to ‘local’ superior officers. However, ADM 8 does 
indicate another possibility. The statement that Rear Admiral Pringle was the commander of 
both the Cape and East Indies in January 1797 can be seen as a clerical error, as it only lasted 
for one month.58 However later ADM 8s indicate that Rear Admiral Christian was overall 
commander of the two stations from October 1797 to May 1798.59 Yet study of the archives 
shows no documents appointing Christian, no letters making reference to his overall 
command, and no acknowledgment from Rainier of the fact. Indeed the letter of appointment 
to Christian: ‘appoints you Commander in Chief of His Majesty’s Ships at the Cape of Good 
Hope,’60  and during the period Christian is purportedly in command of both stations, he 
wrote to Nepean, describing Rainier as ‘Commander in Chief in the Indian Seas’.61 Virtually 
all the letters to Pringle and Christian from the Admiralty make no reference to the East 
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Indies, apart from as information. This would surely not be the case if the two stations were 
combined.  
 
In fact, the reverse may be said to be true. When Christian died on station, Nepean wrote to 
Rainier that: ‘command of His Majesty’s Ships and Vessels at the Cape of Good Hope having 
thereby devolved to you.’62 
 
However another sign of the Admiralty’s thinking, and perhaps confusion, can be noted by 
the fact that Admiralty Out Letters in ADM 2/937, are categorised as those to the East Indies 
even when they are to the Cape. There is no separate category for letters to the Cape of Good 
Hope. 
 
Rainier must have been disconcerted. He wrote to Christian: ’tis confidently said here that Sir 
John Colpoys is coming out to Command on this Station, if he stops at the Cape on his way, 
please remind him of this circumstance’.63 Then there were rumours in the press; Lord Hugh 
Seymour would be taking his family out to India with him when he took command in the East 
Indies.64 Whether or not this uncertainty played any part in Rainier’s decision to offer his 
resignation a year later is unknown but his offer might have been made to see what level of 
support he had.65 It was not until November 1802 that the new First Lord, St. Vincent, wrote: 
‘that the Board could not comply with your request to be relieved’.66   
 
Thus, for two years, Rainier was left in a state of suspended animation waiting for a reply to 
his offer of resignation, not knowing how it would be received. His sense of security would 
not have been improved by the regular flow of information found when reading The Times: 
‘Sir Roger Curtis is ordered to the East Indies from the Cape of Good Hope, in order to 
succeed Vice Admiral Rainier in the naval command on that station.’67 The Times also wrote: 
‘Lord Radstock, who is appointed Commander in Chief in the East Indies, in the room of 
Vice Admiral Rainier, will leave town in the course of a day or two, to proceed to his 
station,’68 and ‘Sir Thomas Troubridge is to be appointed a Commodore to succeed Admiral 
Rainier in the East Indies.’69 It is difficult to understand how these stories got into The Times 
if there were no thoughts at the Admiralty that these changes might occur. In June 1802 St. 
Vincent wrote to Dundas to warn him of potential unrest between two officers, Troubridge 
and Alexander Cochrane, for whom he had great respect and who had both asked for the East 
Indies command for themselves.70 And their timing would have meant at least some of them 
would have reached Rainier, making him believe that his request to resign would be granted. 
It must have come as a surprise when it was refused.  
 
The situation was confused by the reduction of the squadron in the East Indies station during 
the Peace of Amiens as its smaller size now warranted only a commodore to command, 
Rainier, now a vice admiral, was clearly too senior for the station. He would expect to be 
recalled. As he wrote: ‘… my situation is too precarious at present to trust to its conveyance 
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[taking his baggage home] to me as being in hourly expectation of seeing my successor.’71 
On this particular occasion The Times comment of 3 March 1802, concerning Troubridge, is 
probably true, noting that Sir Thomas Troubridge was to be appointed commodore to succeed 
Rainier in the East Indies. 
 
But authority imbued with an unusually long period of command kept Rainier’s self 
confidence at an effective level. He was still signing orders and promotions as commander in 
chief up to 25 March 1805, and indeed his former title was written and then crossed out as 
late as 5 July 1805.72 These dates are noteworthy as secondary sources, such as the 
O.D.N.B.,73 all say that Rainier’s command ended in 1804. It is true that the order telling 
Pellew to hoist his flag as Commander in Chief in the East Indies were written on 14 May 
1804 but the actual handover on the station did not occur until March of the following year.74 
Thus it can be seen that, whilst ADM 8 implies that, apart from the period from March to 
September 1797, Rainier was a subordinate admiral until June 1798, and The Times received 
information on his several potential replacements, none actually occurred. 
 
However it must have given Rainier some concern as to the solidity of his position in the East 
Indies, in spite of the presence of his benefactor, Philip Stephens. In the circumstances it is to 
his credit that he pursued his objectives without complaint and with as much vigour and 
commitment as he did. 
 
c) Rainier the Leader. 
One needs to ask what kind of captain was Rainier and what was important to him. From his 
earlier captains Latham of the Tyger would have given him an example of the benefits of 
maintaining a healthy and happy crew.75 Latham’s successor on the Tyger, Brereton,76 
showed him how to command a ship in devastating battle with a third of the crew being 
casualties. Kempenfelt of the Norfolk had the reputation as a thoughtful, intellectual officer 
who would have given midshipman Rainier respect for the professional knowledge required 
to be an efficient and successful captain.77  
 
Rainier’s philosophy of the role of a leader and commanding officer can best be seen in the 
letter to his nephew, Peter Rainier, written in 1805, when the latter was promoted acting 
captain by his uncle.78 This advice ranges from having good manners and behaving well in 
the company of ladies, to increasing his knowledge of all things, especially naval matters. His 
character shows itself to be quite modern:  
 
 … muster the crew in order to become familiar to their tempers, their manners  
and dispositions from your own knowledge and not from the information of your 
Officers, many of whom are not very liberal in their ideas, or are but too often 
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influenced in their description of them to you by prejudices and private 
animosities and resentments. Consider your self at all times their advocate … 
never proceed to punishment but on the fullest conviction of proper evidence and 
never by simple hearsay … Be attentive to all their complaints and relieve their 
little wants when it is in your power. Few are their rights but never suffer them to 
be infringed … Abstain most religiously from ever reviling them with foul or 
abusive language, or suffer your Officers to do so … when obliged to punish them 
let them see the object is the Vice and not the Man .. Never punish with too much 
severity.  
 
He emphasised the need for a competent captain to prepare the mind by being ‘sensible of our 
ignorance’: 
 
Presumption is the reverse of this in pretending to a knowledge we have no claim 
to from experience, and it is therefore a certain barrier to improvement. This 
remark is no more applicable to you than any other young man in your situation 
but certainly is not less so… 
 
     He turns from commanding downwards to managing upwards and administrative affairs;  
 
One obvious means of gaining in your profession is by associating with your 
brother Officers, particularly those senior to you … [You must be conversant 
with] …  the method of keeping the Ship’s Books, inspecting and auditing 
Warrant Officer’s accounts, weekly and monthly, the Purser’s at every time of re-
victualling, and examining strictly into the particulars stated in his Quarterly 
account with the Victualling Office … In short  you should understand thoroughly 
the business of a Captain’s Clerk for whose conduct the Service holds you 
responsible, and it requires but a very small portion of your leisure time to become 
perfect in it.  
 
The admiral’s careful personality comes out in the next sentence: 
 
When your receive orders from a Commanding Officer don’t be content with a 
simple perusal of them, but look them over every now and then that you may not 
mistake their meaning. In cases of doubt whether as to rules of Service or 
professional practice always ask the opinion of your brother officers who are most 
competent to give you information … Be sure to show every respectful attention 
to Sir Edward Pellew, [his new commander-in-chief] address him always by the 
title of His Excellency, I am persuaded you will meet with a friend and counsellor 
in him if you conduct yourself toward him with propriety. His character you know 
stands very high in the Service and that deservedly.  
 
And, to ensure the efficiency of ship:  
 
Exercise your Crew frequently, at great guns and small arms, reefing and furling 
sails, and (what is too much neglected) heaving up the anchor, catting and fishing 
them. The more active they are employed the less time they have to employ on 
evil and undutiful and immoral subjects, but never work of Sundays, if it can be 
avoided… Avoid all profane cursing and swearing, and all obscene expressions, 
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particularly conversation at table, for a man is certainly the worse for having 
listened to or read anything of that nature.  
 
Never letting go of the concept of improvement:  
 
You should be very attentive in the improving yourself in the Arithmetical 
Knowledge of it, such as the curves of Chase to come up with enemy with the 
least possible loss of time. And buy Clark on Naval Tactics.79 
 
Thus we can see a man who cares for his crew and wants it to be efficient, is wise enough to 
see that what he is told is not always the truth and that orders can sometimes be misleading 
and require careful study, is considerate to his superiors, fully understands the administration 
of his ship, and is always desirous of learning more. It gave him a reputation as a commander 
that the Admiralty was prepared to trust. 
 
Several of his letters to the Admiralty illustrate that he carried these beliefs into practice.  
When paying off the Burford in 1784 Rainier asked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Philip 
Stephens, to give good treatment to a marine who had been discharged from the Service due 
to a badly damaged hand and to get confirmation of a gunner’s warrant as it might be lost in 
all the confusion of paying off a large proportion of the Fleet.80 This ability also allowed him 
to handle the expected spin off from the 1797 mutinies when knowledge of them finally 
reached the East Indies; a theme which was also experienced in Canada and at the Cape. 
When the crew of the Trident refused to obey orders Captain Osborne spoke to the crew, 
reminding them of Admiral Rainier’s fights for their welfare, obtaining good quality 
provisions and tea, and establishing a seamen’s hospital at Madras.81 When news of Duncan’s 
victory at Camperdown reached India, Rainier pardoned all the mutineers who had been 
awaiting execution and they returned to their ships. His desire to assist those not able to 
defend themselves is also illustrated in copies of the Times newspaper which notes the 
donations he made, and also in the Returns of Charitable Donations,82 and to the £595 he left 
in his will to the poor of St. Mary’s Church, Sandwich.83 And this concern spread to the 
treatment of ‘native’ sailors and clerks, such as when he wished one of the Company’s 
commanders to be dismissed for the bad treatment of his lascars, and in his evidence to the 
Navy Board concerning the establishment of a naval administration organisation in India. 
 
It is not surprising that his behaviour towards his subordinate officers also shows concern for 
their well being, their development, and the need to have them fully understand the situation. 
It would be more important on this station, where a ship could be months away from support, 
for a captain to be able to use his initiative wisely. And Rainier was cautious enough, as with 
Captain Cooke, not to allow them to take risks which their inexperience might not be able to 
calculate. Yet it would appear that certain behaviour from some subordinates did not meet 
with his approval. For example he did not like Home Popham’s dealings with officials above 
his direct superior, bypassing himself, nor Popham’s efforts to ingratiate himself with those 
he thought would be helpful to his career, or his request for a commodore’s pendant which he 
said would make his job easier. Popham was an extreme case; his wife even wrote to the First 
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Lord, Thomas Grenville, asking if her husband could be given a position on the Board of 
Admiralty. Grenville’s frosty reply stated that he would not get into such discussions with a 
naval officer’s wife.84 This mentality was completely opposite to Rainier’s and he was 
extremely censorious about it.  
 
Rainier also did not forget the officers of the Company whom he felt were deserving of 
credit:  
 
I have the honor (sic) to inclose (sic) the representation of Ensign Grace with 
whose Services I have every reason to be satisfied as also the other young men in 
his situation and beg leave to recommend them to Your Lordship’s favour, the 
Service has been much distressed for Subalterns and suffered much for want of 
the usual Complements.85  
 
The need for making rapid appointments as commanding officer on a remote and often 
unhealthy station during war gave Rainier the opportunity for a high degree of patronage and 
he made ample use of all his opportunities. It would appear that over the eleven years of his 
command he controlled approximately forty nine captains, commanders and lieutenants-in-
command. Of these five were lost at sea, two died in battle, two died of illness, one returned 
to the UK due to ill health, and one was dismissed by court martial. 
 
Admittedly, the opportunities for naval officers to make a name for themselves were more 
limited after 1805. But some of those who served under Rainier appear to have enhanced 
their careers; seven merited an entrance in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography of 
whom Pulteney Malcolm, his flag captain, later had a distinguished career. Edward Cooke 
might have developed his great potential but he was mortally wounded whilst capturing the 
French frigate La Forte (44) in La Sybille (38). La Forte, when she had been launched in 
1795, was the largest frigate in the world.86 He had previously shown great daring in entering 
the harbour at Manila, in company with Malcolm’s ship, and, whilst pretending to be French 
by speaking the language perfectly, obtained much intelligence from his unsuspecting 
Spanish visitors, and capturing three large gunboats. However, his unique daring had already 
caused the more conservative Rainier some concern: ‘The expedition you have been pleased 
to project [against what not stated] as therein detailed, may be very ingenious but ‘tis utterly 
impossible for me to give it the shadow of an approval’.87 It is likely that, had he lived, both 
Cooke and Rainier would have found their working relationship somewhat stressful. Cooke 
managed to upset his admiral, even after death. Whilst ill from his wounds and before he 
died, he ordered extensive battle repairs to La Sybille without authorisation. In its usual 
manner the Navy Board then billed Rainier and La Sybille’s acting captain, Lieutenant 
Hardyman, for the cost of these repairs, totalling £20,059 19s. 2d., because the work had been 
done without proper authorisation. A weary Rainier had to write to Nepean in order to get the 
amount taken off his account.88 Of all the officers that spent some time under Rainier’s 
command, two became full admirals, two vice admirals, four rear admirals and four post 
captains. Perhaps his largest leap of faith was to give acting Lieutenant Nesbit Willoughby 
command of a brig after he had been found guilty of insubordination at a court martial and 
dismissed his ship. This officer went on to experience three other courts martial in a career 
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highlighted by brilliant close combat operations on his way to becoming a rear admiral. 
Clearly Rainier felt he had the skill to manage a maverick because he could see Willoughby’s 
inherent talent.89 
 
The admiral needed to place much trust in his captains as, unlike those on most other stations, 
they were usually acting remotely with huge distances between them and their commanding 
officer. He was always open and honest with the ones who had been with him for long 
periods and often owed their ranks to Rainier’s support. Where he felt he trusted the officer, 
he fully supported them, as when he received a complaint from the commander of an East 
Indiaman who had lost some of his crew to a naval press:  
 
The Commander of the Thetis has represented to me that You have taken 11 men 
out of his Ship … You are the best Judge whether that Ship’s Company will bear 
that draught for His Majesty’s Service.90  
 
And again to Captain Lucas of the Arrogant (74) who was the senior naval officer on the 
Malabar Coast:  
 
It is impossible for me at this distance to give you any particular orders, as much 
must depend upon circumstances as they arrive and your prudence in making 
every advantage of them for the good of His Majesty’s Service, which I have no 
doubt you will do.91  
 
In another letter to Lucas five days later, he goes into great detail to explain the big strategic 
picture in order that Lucas can make his best informed judgements.92 Rainier described the 
situation on the Malabar Coast. Having castigated the greed of the Bombay merchants he 
then recounted the news from British newspapers given to him by a passing American ship, 
telling of a Dutch squadron heading for the Cape and of Admiral Duncan’s search for the 
main Dutch fleet in the North Sea. To demonstrate that Lucas was not the only captain to 
receive such latitude, Rainier wrote to Captain Bathurst, who was on convoy escort duty: 
‘...Much must depend on your Judgement in which I have every confidence from your known 
professional ability and zeal’.93  
 
Even with the highly visible conflict in Egypt Rainier was able to tell Nepean that he had 
given orders to Blankett which allowed him as much latitude as he wanted.94 Many senior 
flag officers in the same situation would have wanted to ‘micro-manage’ for fear that their 
subordinate would make mistakes which would reflect on them. Rainier had the confidence to 
give his experienced subordinates the kind of freedom to use and develop their skills, like any 
good manager. 
 
However, he was careful to which his captains he gave this degree of independence as 
illustrated in a letter from Captain Clarke of the Victorious to the Bombay Presidency. 
                                                 
89 N. Tracey, Who’s Who in Nelson’s Navy (London, 2006), various, and O.D.N.B. 
90 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Lucas, 14 March 1797. 
91 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Lucas, 23 October 1796. 
92 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Lucas 28 October 1796. 
93 B.L., Add. Mss. 13762, Rainier to Capt. Bathurst of HMS Concorde, 30 August 1803. 
94 N.M.M., RAI/7, Rainier to Admiralty, 12 October 1799. 
42 
 
Replying to its request to attack a pirate base, Clarke is reported to have said that he: ‘would 
do as far as his orders from the Admiral permitted’.95 
 
But Rainier did show concern for the feelings of newly promoted officers when appointed 
commander of a ship for the first time. In his letter to Lieutenant Douglas, assigning him to 
command the frigate La Forte, he devoted much time to give him advice as to how to buy 
stores and boats, keep the ship’s accounts and how to obtain sailors.96  
 
During Rainier’s period of command he had two unwilling subordinate flag officers, Blankett 
and Home Popham, both of whom had been sent to the East on independent command before 
being ordered to put themselves under Rainier’s control. During the American Revolution, 
when Rainier had been a post captain under Hughes, Blankett had been a master and 
commander, so they were old acquaintances. But now, possibly because Blankett had caused 
so much alarm and frustration by taking so long to reach the Red Sea, Rainier put on the 
pressure to show who was in command. In December 1799 he wrote:  
 
I could have wished you had been more circumstantial as the conveyance to be 
depended upon [for letters], as I am desirous of being acquainted with your 
reasons for quitting the Red Sea and leaving so small a Force there, as if there was 
nothing to be apprehended from the operations of the French Army in Egypt.97  
 
Blankett naturally took offence at this letter and his reply caused Rainier to write again to 
him: 
 
[I] cannot help expressing my surprise at your having so far misconstrued my 
meaning in the extract you quoted from in my letter … as to have conceived it 
was indicative of my displeasure at your leaving the Red Sea … nothing was 
further from my intention, being thoroughly satisfied with your conduct in so 
doing.98  
 
Given Rainier’s written communication skills it is difficult to believe that he did not know 
how his first letter would be received. Why he made Blankett’s life more difficult and did not 
help him with his relationships in the Company is more puzzling. Perhaps there was some 
bad history between them from their time together under Hughes or perhaps it was a way of 
bringing Blankett under his control; he would have to look to Rainier for support as there was 
no-one else to whom he could turn. It might be that he resented Blankett being sent directly to 
the Red Sea and not immediately put under his control. But it does show that Rainier was not 
always the perfect commander. 
 
However, apart from this little exchange, Rainier saw his role as the provider of as many 
ships as he could spare, together with supplies and money, and leaving Blankett to manage 
his day to day affairs without interference. Unfortunately the diplomatic skills required to co-
operate with the Company Presidencies, the Governor General, the army, and Arab rulers 
were too much for Blankett. He died, a disillusioned and frustrated man, as Home Popham 
was about to take over his command. 
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Popham, like Blankett, had come to the notice of Secretary Dundas by writing learned papers 
to him.  He was disliked by many of his brother officers, affecting the title of the knighthood 
of Malta bestowed on him by the Czar and by gaining his post rank at the request of the Duke 
of York for his services in charge of the ill-fated Helder expedition. He was a maverick who 
had traded illegally as a merchant before the outbreak of war, had been arrested and his ship 
confiscated at great personal financial cost. He had also been struck off the lieutenants’ list 
for not requesting permission for his absences in the East. This was not the type of person 
with whom Rainier would immediately find rapport. The fact that Popham was an excellent 
chart maker, an expert in amphibious warfare, and later the creator of a much used signal 
book which became adopted by the Admiralty in 1812 would be insufficient to balance his 
perceived self serving publicity seeking in the eyes of Rainier. 
 
Whilst Popham remained in the Red Sea, Rainier treated him as he had treated Blankett and 
left him to his own devices. But Popham had heard that the French might invade Portugal and 
he and the Governor General thought that Macao should be occupied. When he arrived at 
Penang in mid 1801, without any orders to do so, Rainier was furious. It was not the duty of a 
senior naval officer to move ships and men several thousand miles without orders. Rainier 
ordered Popham to remove all the stores he had to other ships, and to return to the Red Sea.99 
The admiral had already planned to go to Macao. He then wrote to Nepean saying that 
Popham had asked him if he thought he had acted correctly, to which he  replied that he 
thought so but that Popham should return to the Red Sea as he had no orders to go anywhere 
else.100 Again, Rainier had covered his tracks in case Popham had more friends in London 
who could turn the event into a criticism of himself. But, to Rainier’s credit, when he later 
wrote to Wellesley, he mentioned that he had met Popham and sent him back to the Red Sea 
via Madras and the Bay of Bengal as he had heard there were French privateers in the region. 
He made no mention of any private altercation.101 He also wrote to the Admiralty telling their 
Lordships that he had told Popham to give all his supplies to Osborne, return to Madras, re 
supply himself and get back to the Red Sea: ‘in further prosecution of their Lordships’ 
Orders’.102  
 
When Popham returned to the Red Sea he heard that the Treaty of Amiens had been ratified. 
As he believed his career could no longer be developed there he asked Rainier if he could 
return to England. Unsurprisingly Rainier agreed. 
 
d) Patronage. 
Rainier’s powers of patronage were not always effective. Rainier had promoted his distant 
relative, Commander Alexander Milner, to the heavy frigate Resistance (44) in 1799. But it 
was lost at sea before he could take command. Rainier wrote to Spencer asking that the First 
Lord view him with favour.103 Evidently this request went unheard because Milner was not 
promoted to post captain until 12 August 1812.104 
 
More success was found when Rainier was working for his immediate family. And for them 
he acted shamelessly. He appointed his eldest nephew, John Sprat Rainier, a lieutenant at the 
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age of sixteen, just after he set sail for India in 1794, and he was posted captain at the highly 
illegal age of eighteen on 22 December 1796. Within four months he was the captain of the 
64 gun ship, the Dordrecht, captured from the Dutch at the Cape the previous year. 
Admittedly J.S. Rainier grew to be a highly competent and effective captain and he did much 
excellent work in the Red Sea during Bonaparte’s occupation of Egypt. But there can be little 
uncertainty that, at the age of eighteen, he would not have been competent in such a role. 
That the admiral was concerned for his nephew’s safety, relative to his experience, is shown 
by his letter just after he promoted the young officer to be master and commander:  
 
…. Having heard from you since I am apprehensive the expedition [to capture 
Columbo on Ceylon] miscarried … [there] are reports of some strange Ships 
being at Bornio (sic), so be upon your Guard as I hope you always are at times of 
seeming security.105   
 
The letter also illustrates the cautious side of the admiral’s nature which comes through many 
of his actions. 
 
His second nephew, also called Peter Rainier, was born in 1784 and also moved rapidly in 
rank, so rapidly in fact that the dates of his lieutenant’s and commander’s commissions are 
not found in Syrett & DiNardo’s book.106 Whilst they show his captain’s commission dated 
17 January 1806, this was only a confirmation of Admiral Rainier’s decision to post him into 
the Caroline (36) in April 1805, when he was only twenty years old.107 Like his cousin, he 
was a successful officer and the next year he captured a Spanish treasure ship worth over 
£500,000.108 The same year he captured the Dutch warships Maria (36), William (20), Patriot 
(18), Zeephong (14) and Zeerop (16), also destroying the Phoenix (36), all off Batavia.109 
Unlike his cousin, he was born too late to make flag rank, but he did become the naval 
A.D.C. to King William IV in 1830.110 
 
Rainier also strove to advance the career of another nephew, son of his sister, Sarah. William 
Broughton had had a close relationship with Rainier, having been his first lieutenant on the 
Burford during the American Revolution.111 He had later commanded the brig Chatham 
during Vancouver’s charting of the Pacific North West of America. Vancouver, who had 
served with Rainier under Gardner in the West Indies, named Mount Rainier after his 
friend.112 
 
However, the bonds of former shipmates were nothing compared to family ties. The 
Providence, commanded by Broughton with Vashon as his first lieutenant, struck a coral reef 
near Taiwan and was lost, although all her crew were saved.113 Broughton waited until all the 
crew was dispersed before blaming Vashon for the loss of his ship, as he had been on watch 
when the incident occurred. Rainier was furious, saying Broughton had not been fair in 
waiting until all potential witnesses had been dispersed around the globe and in not advising 
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Vashon of his complaints before making them official.114 He called his behaviour ‘irregular 
and reprehensible’,115 Rainier wrote to the Admiralty that Broughton should not be employed 
again.116 
 
A court martial found Vashon guilty but Rainier, employing his powers of patronage, ignored 
the result and reinstated him.117 However, his influence with the Admiralty, away from his 
own Station, was shown again to be ineffective when he later appointed Vashon to post rank, 
the official date of which was delayed by the Admiralty.118 He was also ineffective in his 
demands for the punishment of Broughton who continued to hold post commissions and, 
indeed, was present at the eventual fall of Mauritius in 1810, commanding of the Illustrious 
(74). He was the commodore and senior naval officer off Java the following year.119 
 
When Captain the Honourable John Murray took his frigate home without permission Rainier 
wrote to the Admiralty that: ‘The Honourable John Murray in H.M.S. Heroine has deserted 
the Station totally, without any authority from me,’ he demanded a court martial for 
desertion.120 On his way home Murray had stopped at the Cape and Rainier mildly 
admonished the Commander-in-Chief of the Cape, Christian:‘…am a little surprised you did 
not order the Honourable John Murray to return to his Station, as he had no authority from 
me to go even to the Cape’.121 The limits of Rainier’s power are illustrated by the fact that, 
after an enquiry into Murray’s behaviour, Spencer learned that Murray was ordered home by 
Admiral Christian, even though he was not Murray’s commanding officer.122 With this 
information Spencer decided not to take the matter any further. With this information one can 
see that Rainier had every reason to be annoyed with Christian and frustrated at the loss of a 
much valued frigate. 
 
Rainier also followed the normal procedure of helping the careers of the sons of flag officers 
who had helped him. Alan Hyde Gardner, son of his patron, was already a post captain when 
he was ordered to the East Indies, but Rainier ensured that his career and opportunities for 
prize money were always protected. Because Elphinstone had not hindered the meteoric rise 
of John Sprat Rainier, we also find that his nephew, Charles Elphinstone, promoted to 
lieutenant (7 August 1799) and post captain (27 February 1801) at the age of seventeen.123 
Unfortunately he was lost at sea when the Blenheim (74) foundered off Mauritius whilst 
bringing Admiral Troubridge home in 1807. 
 
e) The Communicator. 
Rainier certainly fulfilled all the expectations of him that must have been held by those who 
agreed to send him to the Far East. He did not take any risks, or, at least, any which led to 
disastrous consequences, he spent much time on the minutiae of administration which 
enabled him to keep as many effective ships as possible at sea; he kept their Lordships aware 
of all that he was doing, even though this was not always appreciated:  
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Having always sent to Mr. Nepean regular dispatches ever since I commanded His 
Majesty’s Ships in this Country, by every conveyance, not one of which has 
miscarried, I am not a little surprised at your Lordship’s continuing to complain of 
a deficiency of the Accounts of my proceedings.124  
 
Clearly Rainier was stung by the criticism.  
 
He showed no overt annoyance at the appointment of Elphinstone although the move cost 
him a great deal. He did not complain of the various rumours of who was coming out to 
replace him. He was clearly not a man of great self importance and pride and perhaps he was 
content to fulfill the role, to the best of his abilities, in which God had placed him – he was a 
very religious person – and if God decided that he had completed his task, then that was 
sufficient for him. 
 
Rainier was not a politician who ensured he had many allies in London to look after his 
interests, although his Sandwich parliamentary connection was a powerful instrument. His 
diplomatic skills were directed largely at those he had to work with on the station; at the 
Governor General, the other two Presidents, and all three Councils, together with the senior 
officers of the regular and East India Company armies. He also had to charm those at the 
Admiralty who could help him to obtain the resources he needed from England. He appears 
to have looked no further ahead than his current position. But Rainier never wrote to senior 
officials about any subject not directly relevant to his command; he clearly was not one to 
play politics by bringing his name to the attention of the decision makers. This was an 
extremely risky attitude to take in such a highly competitive Service. But he would always 
show deference to those in high command, sometimes in a rather oleaginous manner; in his 
letter to Nepean announcing the capture of Malacca, he wrote:  
 
…being doubtful of the propriety of my conduct in not having corresponded with 
… Dundas on the subject of the late expedition, in which I co-operated in Council 
and execution, in obedience to the King’s orders by him transmitted, and as 
therein prescribed, (not having then even received their Lordships directions so to 
do, and which are also silent on that head) I have to request you will please to 
intercede influence to remove any culpability that may reflect upon my conduct 
for this omission; in which, if I have erred, it has been thro’ defect of instructions 
and my inexperience in the receipt of such orders.125  
 
Perhaps if this were the kind of letter that Rainier sent, few would wish to read one from him. 
Indeed, in his will he notes that his naval career had provided him with more than his talents 
would expect – not the sign of a man with great expectations or self importance. He was what 
today would be called “low key”.  
 
Conclusion. 
 
Rainier’s personality dictated the results of his relationships with the Navy. His 
uncomplaining approach to lack of resources probably contributed to his longevity on the 
station and ensured he was largely left to perform his role as he wished. But it also meant that 
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he never had the resources to destroy French power completely, which might have given him 
a higher profile in London and in history. The calm manner in which he managed the brief 
but expensive sojourn of Elphinstone in India shows great skill in not incurring his 
commander’s wrath. Care had to be taken as two of his captains were Elphinstone’s son and 
nephew, whilst Malcolm and Cochrane were other members of the “Scottish Mafia” with 
much influence in government. He understood the necessity of good communications, which 
must have endeared him to the Admiralty, where he had the support of Stephens as Secretary 
to the Board from 1763 to1795 and Board members; Gardner from 1790 to 1795, and again, 
Stephens from 1795 to 1806.  
 
As a leader he appears to have identified many capable officers. Tracy identified twelve 
captains and above who served part of their careers under Rainier’s tutelage.126 But his 
“modern” approach to the management and care of his men was probably untimely as naval 
society became more rigid into the nineteenth century.  
 
Having investigated how Rainier worked within the rules of the navy, the next chapter will 
review how he obtained the support of that other organisation which was vital to the success 
of his enterprise – the Company.  
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    CHAPTER 3 
   
     ‘[I AM] HAPPY TO HEAR OF THE HARMONY AND GOOD 
UNDERSTANDING THAT EXISTS BETWEEN YOU AND THE 
KING’S CIVIL SERVANTS IN INDIA’.1  
 
RAINIER, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, AND THE KING’S  
CIVIL SERVANTS IN INDIA. 
        
 
The relationship between the Navy, in the form of the C-in-C, and the still powerful East 
India Company, was one not found on any other station. Its governor general was the most 
important individual in India with whom Rainier had to work: serious conflict between the 
two would almost certainly have led to failure for Rainier. This chapter will review how he 
managed his relationships with the various bodies within the Company and how far he was 
successful in meeting its demands, without damaging the goals set for him by the Admiralty.  
 
The East India Company. 
 
The period of Rainier’s command in the East Indies saw great advances in the amount of 
Indian territory under British control, and in the increasing influence of India in the 
formulation of British government strategy. Since the admiral had first been in India, 
Company control over Bengal had grown in a steady, if not linear, fashion. Control over 
British India by the British Government had increased when the 1773 Regulating Act was 
passed in an attempt to reduce the corruption, perceived or otherwise, of Company rule on the 
subcontinent. Part of the Act stipulated that there would be in future a crown appointed 
‘Governor General in Council [of the Calcutta Presidency] [who] would have superior, but 
not overriding powers over the Presidencies of Bombay and Fort St. George [Madras]’.2 
Further legislation through the India Act of 1784, the Supplementary Act of 1786, and the 
Declaratory Act of 1788 strengthened both government control over India and the governor 
general’s control of government in India. 
 
As might be expected: ‘The small print of the Regulating Act was not well drafted; the 
relationship of the ‘Governor General in Council’ with his brother governors, was ill 
defined’.3 For the next three decades this lack of clarity would create the confusion, 
sometimes deliberate, found in many dealings between the three presidencies and the army 
and navy commanders. The questions arose as to who was in overall command, if anyone, 
and whether the responsibilities of the political and military decision makers were 
subordinate to the individual presidencies or to the Crown. Richmond stated that the perilous 
situation in which the British found themselves in 1782 was not due so much to the abilities 
of the French but to the disorganised and individualistic manner in which the three 
presidencies fought their private wars with little thought to the common good.4 However, by 
the time Wellesley arrived in 1798 there was at least an operational understanding that he was 
in command. 
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The relationship between the Company and the British Government had been evolving since 
the Seven Years War, when Company ships and men were used in the capture of Manila. The 
government realised that here was a resource it could use as an extension of British power in 
the east and which, it also believed, would be at no cost to the Treasury. During the American 
Revolution there had been regular planning between the Company’s Secret Committee and 
the Government, but little came of their plans because of the defensive nature of Britain’s 
strategies in the region caused by the effective campaigns fought by her enemies. But this war 
saw two important developments; the Company was obliged to pay for royal troops sent out 
to India, which it had thought should be a national cost, and the key role of the Cape of Good 
Hope was first mooted – illustrating that India would need to be defended several thousand 
miles to the west.5 
 
The evolution of the Company government of India impacted the relationships between it and 
the navy, Whereas Hughes had to struggle against the narrow interests of both the semi-
independent Madras and Bombay Presidencies, with little input from Calcutta, by 1794 
Rainier benefitted from a clear central command from the governor general. And this was 
accelerated with the arrival of Wellesley. Although the cooperation between army and navy 
commanders was first class in both American and French wars, the rapid expansion of the 
Company army during the latter led to severe stresses in its organisation and in its relations 
with the royal army regiments in India. These tensions were not mirrored between the navy 
and Bombay Marine because the disparity in size between the two was the reverse of that on 
land. There was no doubt that the Royal Navy was the superior force. And this juxtaposition 
was maintained by the close relationship which Rainier developed with all three presidencies. 
 
The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars saw the interconnection of forces even more 
closely wedded. By 1805, the armies of the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and 
Bombay had 192,000 men, compared with the 20,000 royal troops in India.6 During the 
French wars Company troops and ships participated in attacks on Ceylon (1795), Malacca 
and the Moluccas (1795), Egypt (1801), Reunion and Mauritius (1810) and Java (1811).7 The 
proposed occupation of Macao in 1808 had a less successful outcome as the Chinese 
government let everyone know it would not accept weak Portuguese rule of the colony being 
replaced by a more aggressive European power. Without these Company forces the British 
government would have found it impossible to conduct the war in such a proactive manner. 
 
Dundas, as Secretary of State for War and President of the Board of Control of the East India 
Company, was in a position to put heavy pressure on the Company and this he did with 
enthusiasm, feeling that, in return for the Government’s support for its monopoly position, it 
should give generously to the war effort. And assistance was given by the Company, even if 
somewhat reluctantly. Sixteen Company leased vessels were loaned for the attack on the 
French West Indies in 1795, £2 million was loaned in 1796 and ten East Indiamen were 
converted into 64 guns warships, each manned by 300 men recruited by the Company.8 There 
were also occasions when requests went in the opposite direction. The reduction of dockyard 
workers in private yards during the Peace of Amiens led to a serious strike by artificers and 
the Company could not prepare its ships adequately for next season’s convoys to China and 
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India. It requested assistance from the craftsmen from naval yards. But feeling was so high 
that most refused to transfer and those that did were soon intimidated into withdrawing.9 
 
Rainier, in his role as commander in chief in the East Indies, played a large part in making 
possible the growth of British power over Indian territory and, indirectly, demonstrating the 
importance of the Far East to Britain’s worldwide interests. But how far he understood what 
was happening in the shifting balance of global power politics is unclear. There is certainly 
no sign of understanding in any of his writings. He was not a visionary in the mould of 
Wellesley or Dundas. He was more the traditional naval officer who saw his role as serving 
the Crown through the direction of his superiors at the Admiralty and he concentrated on a 
narrow naval interpretation of those goals. This section will attempt to identify the various 
elements of the East India Company that impacted on the Navy and to demonstrate how 
Rainier addressed them, adjudicating whether or not he did so in an effective manner. For 
many people it was difficult to see where the Company ended and the ‘Crown’ began. 
Indeed, Captain Lennon notes in his Journal that the Admiral had great difficulty trying to 
explain to a native prince the difference between the Company and the King, made worse by 
an understandable poor command of English by the prince.10 
 
At this point it is worth illustrating the difference between life as a senior army officer or 
government official, and that of an admiral in India. The army was in fact a combination of 
the British regular army and that of the Company. There was continual rivalry and jealousy 
between the two because an officer in the former always had seniority over an officer of the 
same rank in the latter, even if their age and experience made this illogical. For example, a 
captain of 17 years’ experience in the Company army was placed under the command of a 
regular army captain, newly arrived from England, with 26 months’ experience.11 Although it 
was never a possibility that an officer in the Bombay Marine could ever command anyone in 
the Royal Navy, their interaction was more limited so friction was minimised. Also, there 
was such a close interaction between army and government that, in the early 1790s, the 
governor generalship and presidencies of Madras and Bombay were all held by army officers; 
Cornwallis, Meadows and Abercromby respectively. Cornwallis would have felt comfortable 
with this approach as he had been told by Dundas in 1789 that military men were the best 
source for governors in India.12 All European Company officers were expected to enhance 
their meagre army pay by participating in private trade and speculation, both legal and illegal, 
which meant they were less likely to give full attention to their military duties. But, in some 
ways, they were only following the advice of Governor General and Commander-in-Chief 
Cornwallis who wrote that to be a successful officer in the Company army one had to learn 
the language, customs and religious prejudices in order to be effective.13 Making money from 
the circumstance in which one found oneself was certainly a custom in Indian government. 
 
They also lived their lives close to the local Indian society which they would need to 
understand. They would have Indian servants, they would buy and sell with Indian 
merchants, they would eat Indian food and live with the smells and dust of a hot alien culture. 
Often they would have Indian mistresses – some of the older men would have Indian wives 
although this practice was declining as an increasing Christian evangelicalism scorned such 
                                                 
9 R. Morriss, Naval Power and Culture (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 51-52. 
10 B.L., I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, H/441, Captain Lennon, ‘Journal of Admiral Rainier’s Expedition to the 
Molucca Islands’, 1795-6, p. 197. 
11 T.A. Heathcote, The Military in British India (Manchester, 1995), p. 52. 
12 C.H. Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834 (Manchester, 1961), p. 67. 
13 J. Black, Britain as a Military Power 1688-1816 (London, 1999), p. 256. 
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formal contact with the natives. Their war was waged largely against Indian armies on behalf 
of Indian rulers, although admittedly with many European officers. Their diplomatic and 
intelligence activities were carried out under Indian protocols. ‘In India … the British were 
forced to master and manipulate the information systems of their Hindu and Mughal 
predecessors’.14 
 
Compare this world to that of a naval officer. Apart from the weather and some items of food, 
he would still be living in a well regulated world where all ranks and hierarchies were clearly 
defined and understood, duties were the same, meal times unchanged, watches were 
followed, everyone spoke the same language, and few were the contacts with the native 
population.15 This difference would mean there was much less incentive and opportunity for 
Rainier and his senior officers to build up relationships and a deep understanding of Indian 
culture and practices.16 Although, as commander in chief, Rainier was provided by the 
Company with palatial living quarters in Madras, he knew that he could always retreat to his 
ship – a safe and perfectly understood world over which he was in complete control. And that 
this was Rainier’s preferred ‘home’ can be inferred by the fact that the most celebrated diarist 
of Anglo-Indian society in that period, William Hickey, does not even mention Rainier once, 
despite his eleven years on station.17  
 
In fact, Hickey illustrates well the situation that Rainier’s predecessor, Admiral Cornwallis 
left behind, saying that he had left Indian waters unprotected, which allowed much 
depredation of merchant shipping by the French – so much so that the Company equipped 
four East Indiamen and a private ship to protect them. ‘This little fleet soon cleared the Bay 
of Bengal of privateers; then proceeded to the Straits of Malacca and China Seas, altogether 
proving of important use’.18 He also refers to Elphinstone as that ‘gallant officer’ who would 
drive the privateers away, but he was not successful: ‘two out of every three ships that had 
ventured to sea being captured’.19 There is a slight inference here that the current naval 
commander was not doing his job, hence the hope that Elphinstone would be successful. Of 
the capture of the Dutch Spice islands by Admiral Rainier he writes: ‘In consequence of this 
the English ships of war immediately took possession of all the Dutch Islands’.20 Concerning 
events in late 1804, he wrote: ‘In November, Admiral Sir Edward Pellew arrived … he being 
nominated to the chief command of His Majesty’s Squadron in the East Indies’.21  Even with 
Rainier’s frequent travels around the station, it is difficult to understand why Rainier was so 
invisible. 
 
The themes of this complex relationship will be reviewed under the following headings; 
a) Rainier and Dundas. 
b) Rainier and the Governors General, Shore and Wellesley. 
c) Rainier and the Native Princes. 
d) Dealing with the Presidencies and China. 
e) The Bombay Marine. 
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Rainier’s achievements in working with the army are explored in Chapter Six. 
 
a) Rainier and Dundas. 
Rainier’s direct dealings with Dundas were rare but important. As the latter was the President 
of the Board of Control and Secretary of State for War, he was, in effect, the person who 
drove British strategy in India even though he was three months distant by mail. Normally 
Dundas would manage his strategy indirectly through the First Lord. However it is worth 
noting that it was very dangerous to make him an enemy. Four directors of the Company 
voted against Dundas’ nomination of General Meadows as Governor of Bombay and he 
wrote to Pitt: ‘As to the Directors who voted against Meadows, I hope we shall consider them 
as objects of vengeance’.22 It can be believed that Dundas found Rainier acceptable. He wrote 
to Spencer in March 1796 that he feared the ‘Eastern World’ was the only area in which the 
French could attack and he was worried that the army and naval command at the Cape would 
not be effective. The absence of any mention of concern about the Navy in the East Indies 
suggests that he was satisfied with the situation there.23 Because Rainier had the Admiralty, 
described as practising a kind of ‘benevolent supervision’,24 between himself and Dundas, he 
was spared the ‘micro-management’ that was Dundas’ trade mark. He had, for example, 
ordered Governor General Cornwallis [and Admiral Cornwallis’s elder brother] in 1791 to 
make peace with Tippoo Sultan – an order Cornwallis ignored as he knew that Dundas did 
not have the current information to give such orders.  
 
Although stubborn, Rainier was not an aristocratic or arrogant man, he would have had 
difficulties in avoiding the direction of such a strong personality as Dundas. But clearly he 
did manage to avoid having direct communication with Dundas. In a letter Dundas wrote to 
Wellesley, who knew Rainier well by this time: ‘I have communicated this letter to Lord 
Spencer, and the instructions will be given to the officer commanding on the Indian station’ 
[author’s italics].25 Although, perhaps Dundas did not use Rainier’s name in case the latter 
had been superceded. 
 
b) Rainier & the Governors General Shore & Wellesley. 
The following letter from Spencer to Rainier refers to ‘the King’s Civil Servants in India’. As 
there were less than a handful at a time when those of the Company were to be found across 
the entire region, one must assume that he also meant to include the senior officials of the 
Company:  
 
I am very happy to hear of the harmony and good understanding that exists 
between you and the King’s Civil Servants in India which I do not doubt from 
everything I hear of you … a very good inducement to me … to be desirous of 
your continuance on your present Station as long as your health may allow of it 
and as long as an Officer of your Rank is required in that part of the world.26  
 
It makes clear the respect that the First Lord had for Rainier from their seventeen month 
period of correspondence and from what others must have told him because he had never met 
Rainier. 
                                                 
22 T.N.A., Chatham Papers, vol. 157, Dundas to Pitt, 19 September 1787, quoted in Philips, The East India 
Company, p. 55. 
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25 Dundas to Wellesley, 31 October 1799, quoted in Ingram Two Views of British India, p. 207. 
26 B.L., Add. Mss., 75862, Spencer to Rainier, 6 May 1796. 
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The first four years of Rainier’s command saw Sir John Shore as the Governor General and it 
was from him that Rainier learnt the protocol of working with the senior officials of the 
Company. Luckily, Shore was of a similar personality to Rainier; he interpreted his orders in 
a way that precluded adventures, he was an expert in administration and revenue gathering, 
and he was a highly religious person, later becoming the President of the British and Foreign 
Bible Society. He was also a believer in the traditional eighteenth century Company view that 
non-intervention was the best policy – the complete opposite view to his successor, 
Wellesley.27 Rainier clearly managed him well. As described below, Shore believed he could 
control the newly appointed senior naval officer.    
 
I think it my duty to point out to your particular Notice the Zeal and Attention of 
Commodore Rainier, he duly apprizes me of all his Operations, & does me the 
honor to consult me upon them; as long as he remains on the Command …, no 
difficulties can arise on the degree of subordination due from his Majesty’s 
Commanding officer to the Government of India.28 
 
Within a week of his arrival, Rainier wrote to Shore telling him he had been ordered to 
consult with ‘Your Excellency and the Governor and Council of Madras on the employment 
of His Majesty’s Ships under my command for the protection of the Settlements and Trade of 
His Majesty’s Subjects and Allies in the East Indies’.29 Thus he told Shore of what he was 
expected to do and that, although he was to ‘consult’ with the most senior officials of the 
Company, he was also implying that he, personally, would be making the decisions. It is also 
interesting that his orders made no mention of consulting with the junior presidency, that of 
Bombay, where his squadron would be sheltering during the north east monsoons and where 
he would expect to have his ships repaired at the Bombay dockyard. 
 
Rainier was assiduous in keeping Shore abreast of his thoughts and events on the station. In 
December he wrote that the Dutch wanted naval help against an expected French attack and 
that the China private trade was without his protection as the ship owners would not sail in 
convoy. He said that he would need Shore’s help next year to make them more disciplined if 
they wanted naval protection. He was also concerned that neutral Danish ships were 
supplying Mauritius.30 The next month he wrote agreeing with Shore that the danger from 
privateers was much exaggerated and also warned him of the poor quality of naval stores.31 In 
February he wrote him a long letter describing the dispositions of all naval ships which he 
hoped would protect the Trade.32 Thus it can be seen that Rainier was establishing a protocol 
for frequent, regular communication with the Governor General. Rainier showed how he 
interpreted his orders to the benefit of trade by another letter written just before Shore was 
recalled. In it he explained what he saw as the relative merits between concentrating on trade 
protection and an attack on the Philippines. Rainier stated that the former was his prime 
objective because such an expedition would be difficult from a navigational point of view, 
would take a long time to assemble the transports, and would leave India vulnerable to attack 
because so many of the Company’s troops would be needed for foreign expedition. Again it 
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can be seen that Rainier was more concerned with the unrewarding but, to him, vital duty of 
trade protection, rather than the career enhancing and dispatch writing opportunities arising 
from capturing enemy colonies. 
 
The situation changed with the arrival of Shore’s replacement. The personalities of the 
successive governor generals were completely opposite. Shore was a man of the old school, 
believing that the Company should, wherever possible, keep out of wars and avoid 
interference with the Indian states. Maintaining a balance of power would ensure the peace in 
which trade, the reason for the existence of the Company, could flourish. According to 
Wellesley, the situation of Mysore and the Maratha Confederacy were precarious and British 
India was threatened from Afghanistan by its ruler Zeman Shah.33 The only permanent way 
for Britain to obtain a lasting peace would be to defeat the first two states. All that was 
needed was a casus belli and this was handed to Wellesley when news broke of Tippoo 
Sultan’s attempts to form an alliance with France to oust Britain from India. 
 
By the time that the new governor general arrived, Rainier was an experienced flag officer 
who had most successfully extended the territories of the British Empire and Company. 
Wellesley was unknown to Rainier. But this ambitious, amoral man was to be the governor 
general from 1798 to 1805 and the most important influence on Rainier’s performance in 
India, together with Basil Cochrane.34 Additionally he was a personal friend of Pitt, the prime 
minister. His personality was summed up by Cavaliero: ‘He [Wellesley] had energy and 
brilliance and the self importance of Toad of Toad Hall. His despatches wearied all who read 
them, including Dundas’.35 Even his biographer, Iris Butler admits:  
 
His vanity was universal: it was essential for him to feel that he knew best and, if 
everyone (British and Indian) did what they were told, all could be sweetness and 
light. He really did believe this ideal situation could be achieved, hence the fury, 
frantic indignation, when ever his will was crossed.36  
 
The differing personalities of the two governors general were also illustrated in the way in 
which Wellesley criticised all those who reported to him, both civil and military. But, as 
Ingram says: ‘His real complaint against them was their having been allowed by Sir John 
Shore to do their jobs’.37 He did not want men who could act independently, he wanted men 
who would obey his orders without question. Contemporaneously, Hickey wrote that 
Wellesley arrived: ‘at once bursting forth like a constellation in all his pomp and splendour 
amongst us’.38 Ingram describes him as: ‘a bad-tempered and overbearing man’, his letters 
reveal him as ‘ungenerous’.39 Wellesley’s own words leave no chance of misunderstanding. 
‘Let me have a sober, well tempered, tractable man, and I am content’.40 Fry described him 
as: ‘manic depressive, by turns euphoric and despondent, hyperactive and lethargic, 
altogether difficult to work with’.41  
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Yet the situation was such that the new governor general could put into action his plans:  
 
Those [the Court of Directors] … could not more prevent the Bengal Council 
building a road … than they could later rein in the territorial ambitions of ... 
Wellesley, ... actions were always determined by men of influence “on the 
spot”.42  
 
As Ingram said: ‘British India under Wellesley acted as a revolutionary state, not formulating 
a policy in response to local conditions but trying to create the conditions necessary for the 
attainment of his objectives’.43 Rainier had always to take into account, when making his 
decisions, that whatever he might feel about the sanctity of the naval command process, his 
close colleague in the Company was the kind of person who would make whatever decision 
he wanted, at whatever cost, almost irrespective of what the Court of Directors of the East 
India Company wanted. However, Wellesley’s approach of ignoring the Court led ultimately 
to his downfall in 1805 as the Directors fought to have him recalled. The argument used was 
that he had created a new, enlarged type of government in India which did not meet with their 
approval and had spent vast amounts of their money fighting wars to expand British control 
over India. Wellesley’s influential predecessors, such as Cornwallis and Shore, were more 
amenable to direction from London but he:  
 
was an enormously single minded Governor General who was reluctant to 
acknowledge the authority of the directors over him, and who also developed a 
vision of empire that was fundamentally different from most of those in London.44  
 
Rainier was fortunate that he served his apprenticeship as commander-in-chief with Shore so 
that, by the time Wellesley arrived, he was more experienced, confident and self assured.  
 
By 1786 the rivalry between the three presidencies was over and Cornwallis had established 
the protocol that the governor general was also the commander-in-chief of all troops on the 
sub continent, thus setting the scene for Wellesley’s arrival. But control of the Navy was 
another matter. Wellesley worked assiduously to obtain this control. ‘Remember my ideas … 
[of] a power of superintending the fleet in India. Without [it], I cannot answer for anything in 
times of war’.45 However, he came up against the natural opposition of the Admiralty and of 
Rainier himself. Dundas responded to Wellesley’s request by saying:  
 
…if I was to propose to transfer from the admiralty to the governor general the 
whole control or power of the fleet serving in India, it would be productive of 
very unpleasant consequences. I am, therefore, perfectly aware of the convenience 
that would arise from the exercise of the authority by land and sea going on in 
perfect unison and understanding together, and therefore I shall endeavour to 
concert with Lord Spencer some argument for that purpose.46  
 
In the same letter Dundas also explained that the army would not relinquish its control over 
the patronage of the British regiments in India although it was accepted that ‘every movement 
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or operation’ of both royal and Company troops must be under the control of the governor 
general. A year later he was again dampening Wellesley’s hopes:  
 
…to obtain any direct authority from the admiralty over the fleet is so impossible 
as to be idle to attempt it. The utmost that can be hoped for is pointed instructions 
to co-operate in their proceedings with the supreme civil government of the 
country.47  
 
Yet, although Rainier was officially in command, he had to walk a fine line between not 
upsetting Wellesley and keeping his own independence from this strong willed aristocrat. 
That he was successful from the earliest days of their relationship is illustrated by several 
letters between the two of them; for example: ‘The Public Service must derive great 
advantage from this early proof of your Excellency’s inclination to cooperate with me’,48 and: 
‘Whatever measures it may be proper for me to take in consequence, the disposition of the 
Naval Force under my Command shall be duly communicated to Your Lordship’.49  
 
Apart from the one instance over Wellesley’s planned attack on Mauritius, Rainier managed 
the relationship very well. He kept the Governor General informed of what he was doing and 
perhaps more importantly, what were his thought processes: ‘… the particular plan I have 
marked out for the employment of His Majesty’s Ships under my Command for the rest of 
the present, and part of the ensuing season’.50 His nervousness at the late arrival of Blankett 
in the Red Sea led him to write:  
 
It would afford me much satisfaction to have the Honour of a personal 
communication with Your Lordship on the subject of the disposition of His 
Majesty’s Ships for the ensuing season … what occurs to me at present on this 
head is to dispatch a Ship of 64 guns with one or two frigates to the Red Sea as 
soon as possible … in order to supply the place of Commodore Blankett’s 
squadron should he have failed in reaching that Station.51 
 
This shows how well Rainier explained his ideas to Wellesley, what resources he had at his 
disposal, and that he was fully aware that he had to make contingency arrangements in case 
Dundas’ plan of sending Blankett to the Red Sea did not work. In describing the complexity 
of his command, he further expounded his fears that the French might join the Spanish at 
Manila and attack the China and Country Trades. He further had to patrol the Malabar Coast 
to stop French supplies reaching Tippoo Sultan. He was quick to thank Wellesley for any 
help he gave to the Navy: ‘[I] am much gratified in the resources provided by Your 
Lordship’s direction for the reception of His Majesty’s Ship La Sybille’ [Severely damaged 
capturing the French frigate Le Forte].  
 
This letter also contains an allusion to the tension between the Navy and Company on the 
subject of the former pressing men out of the latter’s ships:  
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… [this] will effectively obviate those difficulties that took place last Year 
between the Government [of India] and the captains of His Majesty’s Ships 
respecting the raising of men for His Majesty’s Service.52  
 
Rainier consistently emphasized how importantly he took trade protection by writing to 
Hobart that he could only blockade Mauritius by leaving the Bay of Bengal unprotected and 
by noting to Wellesley that the victory at Seringapatam would allow him to allocate more 
ships to convoy protection as he no longer would have to patrol the Coast to stop French 
supplies reaching Tippoo.53 This latter act would also fulfil the request he had received from 
the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors via the Bombay Presidency to protect 
merchant shipping.54 Rainier was consistent over the years in showing his adherence to the 
concerns of the Company rather more than did Wellesley. 
 
Rainier was clearly successful in his management of Wellesley but he was still unable to 
arrest the latter’s desire for control. The latter had rapidly come to the conclusion that he 
would need to destroy Tippoo if he were to extend British control in India. He needed Rainier 
to concentrate particularly on this task:  
 
Admiral Rainier has made the most full and timely communications to me of his 
views, and I have reason to believe that he will give a  willing attention to my 
suggestions; but this personal attention is no security for the interests of the 
Government. It is absolutely necessary to place the matter on some more solid 
foundation than that of mere courtesy … the Navy cannot be effective unless it 
shall be made the duty of the admiral at least to concert his operations with the 
Governor General … the want of a controlling power over the officers of the 
King’s Navy, has often exposed the Government here to the most disgraceful 
inconvenience, and impeded the Company’s Trade … Some of them [naval 
officers] have threatened to fire upon the Company’s ships under the most 
frivolous pretences, and they defy the Company’s Government on all occasion.55  
 
Wellesley could not leave the issue alone:  
 
The Admiral [Rainier] is here: he is very tractable. But I must have command of 
the fleet; for if a refractory spirit, such as Blankett, should succeed to the 
command, I could not enforce the protection either of the territory or commerce. I 
hope Lord Spencer will not leave Blankett here. He is a complete demon of 
discord.56   
 
At this stage the Governor General had not even met Blankett, yet he was willing to libel him 
to the highest levels of government. Wellesley stopped at the Cape on his way out to India 
and Blankett had been second in command to Elphinstone during his sojourn on that station. 
Whilst there, he had had less than satisfactory relationships with the army. It is probable that 
Wellesley learnt of this at the Cape. He should also have known that Blankett’s appointment 
had the support of Dundas himself so, indirectly, he was criticizing his own superior. In 1800, 
when plans were laid to attack Batavia: ‘I have committed the principal conduct of the 
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expedition to Admiral Rainier, and I have appointed Colonel Champagne to the command of 
the land forces’.57 Here is an example of how well the Governor General thought of Rainier 
in that he was prepared to give him overall command of a large combined operation. And, in 
1800, he was happy to send the Company frigate Bombay together with the rearmed Earl of 
Mornington to put themselves under Rainier’s orders.58 But even when relations with Rainier 
were at a low ebb following the aborted Mauritius expedition Wellesley was still positive:  
 
[Rainier’s] zealous disposition which you have manifested … your remarks … 
appear to me to be extremely judicious … confirm my entire confidence in your 
judgement, activity and zeal.59 
 
 Wellesley’s own letters to Rainier frequently read like detailed orders on how the Navy 
should be led for the good of the ‘Public Service’. It is likely that many admirals would have 
had difficulty keeping their tempers, but Rainier never showed any anger at the manner in 
which Wellesley wrote to him – at least not on paper. At the news of the French taking 
Alexandria, Wellesley wrote to Rainier worrying that there might be sufficient ships at Suez 
to take French troops south towards India.  So Rainier was told he needed to block the Red 
Sea and the Straits of Bab el Mandab. Wellesley thought two frigates should be sent at once 
and they could use Mocha as a base because there was a Company agent resident there.60 The 
whole tone of the letter is one of a commander speaking to his subordinate. Understanding 
that this was how Wellesley wrote to everyone, Rainier studiously ignored his manner, 
complaining neither to Governor General nor the First Lord, and continued to write in a 
cooperative manner informing of all his ship dispositions, asking for advice and requesting 
Wellesley use his influence to persuade the merchants to sail only under naval convoy. The 
Governor General was quite at home writing directly to Rainier’s subordinates too; 
sometimes with Rainier’s approval such as when he wrote to Blankett reminding him that 
Rainier had told Blankett ‘to attend to any suggestions which I might offer to your 
consideration with regard to future operations of the Squadron under your Command’. He 
then went on to say that all the ports in the Red Sea that were in French hands, or might be in 
the future, should be destroyed.61 Sometimes he wrote to Rainier’s subordinates without 
reference to the admiral as when he wrote to the ‘Senior Naval Officer’ off Trincomalee to 
‘recommend to you, in the most urgent terms, to adopt every possible means to recapture the 
Kent’.62 Although Wellesley carefully uses the word ‘recommend’, such a strongly worded 
letter, coming from a governor general to a mere captain, would be very difficult to ignore. 
This attitude is also demonstrated when, through his private secretary, Merrick Shaw, he told 
Captain Paget of HMS Caroline that he wished the captain to communicate officially to the 
Governor General the orders Paget had received from Rainier.63 Because the admiral was so 
distant from Paget it would appear that Wellesley wanted to blend his own Company plans 
with what Captain Paget had been ordered to do by Rainier. 
  
Thus it can be seen that in dealing with such a personality as Wellesley, Rainier showed 
extreme standards of patience and political and diplomatic skill. Although, to be fair to 
Wellesley, he must surely have known that Paget had written to his friend Shaw telling him 
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that he wished he could be under the command of the governor general: ‘…I wish upon my 
Heart we were under His Lordship’s Orders when so far from the Admiral. The Service 
would profit above all benefit’.64 He did not use this letter to forward his case for control of 
naval activities. 
 
The only public and serious quarrel between the two came when Wellesley asked Rainier for 
the Navy’s support for his intended attack on Mauritius in 1800. But, at least on the surface, 
there were no repercussions on their relationship.65 
 
But he could not stop himself meddling elsewhere, he wrote to the senior naval officer in 
China, telling him that, if he did not hear from the admiral, he was to watch for any French 
designs on Macao.66 And he did the same thing again in January, following the peace treaty 
between Portugal and France.67 With all this controlling he did not forget to thank the Navy 
for its help. He wrote to Rainier to recommend Captain Hargood of the Intrepid for the rapid 
movement of troops from Goa to Cambay during one of the many emergencies.68 And when 
he heard that the outbreak of war with France was again imminent he wrote to Rainier 
suggesting a process for passing on intelligence between the government and navy. He also 
mentioned that he would do everything within his power to prepare Rainier’s ships for war.69 
This was probably in response to Rainier’s letter saying: 
 
I shall always be ready with His Majesty’s Squadron under my command to 
cooperate in any measure Your Excellency may point out for the good of His 
Majesty’s Service agreeable to the tenour (sic) of their Lordships’ orders.70  
 
This demonstrates a somewhat legalistic approach by Rainier, allowing him to interpret how 
far any plans the Governor General might have with such phrases as ‘for the good of His 
Majesty’s Service’ and ‘agreeable to the tenour of their Lordships’ orders’. He might also 
have been warning Wellesley not to raise again the issue of attacking Mauritius. Following 
another act of thoughtfulness, Captain Batt of the La Sybille thanked Wellesley for sending to 
his crew some special food and drink whilst cruising off the Sand Heads.71 
 
It would be unfair to assume that the correspondence between the two was one sided. Rainier 
ensured that Wellesley knew of the whereabouts of his ships and the reason for their 
disposition. As he travelled round the station much more than the Governor General, he was 
able to warn him of local issues, for example, that the garrison at Banda was dangerously 
weak and the island could easily be retaken.72 On another occasion, whilst describing his 
deployments he mentioned that he had been ordered to send a ship to patrol the China Seas, 
he showed his own kind of foresight by returning to Madras in order to arrange for a 
storeship to follow so that the warship could stay on station for a longer period of time.73 
Whilst Rainier was always happy to receive advice from the Governor General as to the 
disposition of His Majesty’s Ships, he felt he could not adhere to Wellesley’s request to keep 
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all his ships together because he had to protect Trincomalee and the Malabar Coast and cover 
the Trade.74 This letter does demonstrate the difference between the two men; the “big 
picture” strategist who was following his own goals which were not entirely in line with his 
masters, and the more careful, defensive mind of a man who has to follow orders and keep 
the business of trade - his own “big picture” – moving and therefore creating the wealth that 
Wellesley was hoping to spend. Co-operation between two such men was never going to be 
easy.  
 
No further overt differences show up in later correspondence and good humour seems to have 
played a role right up to the dinner given by Wellesley to Rainier on the latter’s departure for 
England. After Wellesley vented his spleen at Rainier the relationship appeared to be back on 
an even keel right until the latter sailed for England just a few months before Wellesley 
himself, in 1805. In 1804 he wrote to Rainier that he felt that Britain should have invaded 
Mauritius in 1803, when the war recommenced but: ‘I [Wellesley] have the misfortune to 
differ with His Majesty’s present Ministers’. This is an interesting degree of openness from 
the Governor General to the Admiral who had thwarted him over this very same target in 
1801. He believed the island was now too strong to attack but wanted cruizers to sail off the 
French base to annoy them. He also agreed with all the dispositions that the Admiral had 
made with his squadron.75 This letter indicates a developing attitude of relative closeness 
between Rainier and the Governor General as the Admiral’s period of command was coming 
to a close. The tone also implies Wellesley did not blame Rainier for the Pulo Aur incident 
just five months previous – Wellesley was a heavy critic of anyone whom he felt had made a 
serious mistake. 
 
But over the whole period of their working together it is clear that they recognized the need 
for a high degree of mutual interdependence. Neither could be successful without the 
assistance of the other. Wellesley needed the Navy to protect the Trade, to carry and protect 
the movement of troops and their supplies, to stop the French from landing men and supplies 
on the sub continent, and to participate in conquering enemy colonies. Rainier needed the 
Company to supply his men and ships with almost all their needs, and to repair his ships in 
the Company dockyard at Bombay. Not long after Wellesley arrived in India he received a 
letter from Rainier asking if the dockyards could be left free in season in order that naval 
vessels could be repaired as quickly as possible.76 But Wellesley was the more proactive, not 
bothered with keeping to the rules and always looking for actions that could move his secret 
ambition forward to make the whole of India if not directly, then indirectly, a part of the 
British Empire. 
 
That Wellesley held no long term grudge against Rainier can be interpreted from the fulsome 
praise of the latter at his departure, surely more sincere than mere protocol would require. 
 
I trust Your Excellency will be assured of my unfeigned good wishes for your 
health and prosperity, and for your safe and happy arrival in England. [I offer 
you] my thanks for the many acts of personal favour and of useful and important 
Cooperation which have Distinguished Your Excellency’s Conduct towards me at 
the various periods of my Administration.77 
 
                                                 
74 N.M.M., RAI/ 9, Rainier to Wellesley, 1 September 1803. 
75 T.N.A., ADM 1/5121/5, Wellesley to Rainier, 8 July 1804. 
76 T.N.A., ADM 1/169, Rainier to Wellesley, 17 September 1798. 
77 B.L., Add. Ms. 37283, Wellesley to Rainier, 18 February 1805. 
61 
 
Wellesley, often such a domineering and vindictive man, therefore appears not to have borne 
a grudge against the Admiral. He would not have many allies in attacking Rainier, who 
enjoyed good relationships with the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras who were happy to 
place the ships of the Bombay Marine under Royal Navy command. But Wellesley was a 
friend of Pitt and it is possible that he played a role in deciding not to give any formal 
recognition to Rainier for his eleven successful years in the Far East. And Wellesley could be 
devious. The same day that he wrote to Rainier asking for his support in invading Mauritius, 
he wrote to the Court of Directors. But he did not mention his invasion plan.78 It seems 
strange that he did not mention his intention to attack Mauritius if he was so sure that he was 
at one with their views and intentions. 
 
c) Rainier and the Native Princes. 
One of the major roles of the Governor General was to manage relations between British 
authority in India and the Indian princes. Rainier therefore played a very minor role, 
operating under the guidance of the Company. This gave little opportunity for the admiral to 
engage in such relationships even if he had wanted them. Examples of such are sparse in 
Rainier’s letter books. There is a letter to the Nawab of Arcot advising him of the provision 
of a naval escort to take some of his vessels to the Red Sea. And he was also close enough to 
be one of the many creditors of the Nawab, parliamentary papers showing him to be owed 
£18,810.79 In between crossing from Madras to Penang and managing to avoid making 
contact with his successor, Rear-Admiral Pellew, he did find time to attend the durbar of the 
Nawab of the Carnatic in February 1805 so, whilst he was preparing for his homeward 
journey, he still could represent the Navy at this important ceremonial event. Further 
evidence of his minor role is illustrated in East India Company papers relating to the 
Marhatta War in 1803. There is a letter from the Company Resident at Poona requesting that 
Admiral Rainier fire a salute from the naval vessels in Bombay harbour on the occasion of 
the Peshwa of Poona being reinstated on his throne.80 
 
d) The Presidencies of Madras and Bombay and their Outposts. 
i) Madras. 
The process of assisting in the movement and supply of troops, and in trade protection, was 
also being followed with copious communication to and from the presidencies of Madras and 
Bombay. It illustrates how successful Rainier was. The Madras merchants asked for a frigate 
to escort a convoy from the Straits of Malacca to Bengal.81 Clearly Rainier was at Madras as 
this time as it only took him three days to reply that he would accede to their request.82 The 
next month Bombay merchants thanked him for protecting their ships,83 and Lord Hobart, 
Governor of Madras, thanked him for the speed with which he had transported troops and 
weapons of the Company to attack Vizagapatam.84 Until Sir Arthur Wellesley took seriously 
the need for logistical support for his troops, with upwards of 100,000 bullocks in attendance 
at one time, the army always had too few animals to carry its supplies over difficult terrain 
and in an inhospitable climate. Consequently ships were a vital method of supplying the 
army’s men and equipment to wherever they were needed. And the various presidencies 
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would require Rainier’s squadron to escort such valuable cargoes in case of attack by enemy 
warships. Without doubt the Navy gave the Indian government the freedom to choose the 
point of attack from the sea in the same way that it did in the other theatres of war. Rainier’s 
response to Hobart illustrates his keenness to cooperate with the Company, as well as his 
ability to use ten words when one would suffice:  
 
I confess myself much honor’d by the public manner, and the polite terms in 
which Your Lordship in Council is pleased to acknowledge my readiness to co-
operate with Your Lordship on all occasion for the good of the Honorable 
Company’s Service, particularly in the late instance of conveying in His 
Majesty’s Ship Suffolk the detachment of Troops ordered to Vizagapatnam. … 
Animated by the most zealous wishes for the Success and prosperity of Your 
Lordship’s wise and equitable Government of this most respectable 
establishment, I have the honor to profess myself always with every sentiment of 
respect and Regard.85  
 
Rainier’s relationship with the combative Lord Hobart was good for the entire period of the 
latter’s posting. After Elphinstone criticised Rainier for attacking Malacca, Hobart defended 
him to the new commander in chief:  
 
You will observe that he [Rainier] is gone in prosecution of the orders … which 
directed that our military operations should be progressive and pointed out the 
Molucca Islands as an object to which it was expected we should turn our 
attentions.86  
 
The following month he wrote:  
 
…it was in consequence of the express order from the Secretary of State, that, in 
communication with Admiral Rainier an expedition was sent by the Government 
into the Eastern Seas and however I may regret that any inconvenience should 
have arisen from the ships being employed upon that Service I should hope that 
Admiral Rainier will stand excused to Your Excellency as he has acted in strict 
conformity to directions from home.87  
 
Whilst Rainier looked primarily to the Navy Board for his financial needs, there were times 
when he needed the assistance of the closer, and therefore more immediate, Company in 
India. He wrote to Bentinck, Governor of Madras, that he had invoices for naval stores and 
transport and, to pay them, he had £20,000 of navy bills. Unfortunately, the discount rate was 
so high that his cash was running low. Whilst the number of warships sent out to India had 
doubled, when they arrived after such a long journey, they needed so much repair that he 
expected his money to run out. He asked Bentinck if he could assist by supplying Company 
money to help pay his bills.88 Unfortunately the Company was always short of money with 
widespread demands on its resources. It was not even able to increase the production of 
pepper in Sumatra as it did not have the specie to pay the farmers and they were unhappy 
with promissory notes.89 
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Hobart’s successor, Lord Clive, also had a good working relationship with Rainier. In 1800 
he wrote to the Admiral saying that if war were declared with Denmark he would give 
Rainier sufficient troops to take to capture the Danish colony of Traquebar, especially as he 
knew it was a base from which the Danes supplied Mauritius. He also told him that the 
Indiaman Rockingham had arrived at Madras with naval stores but that the spars were so 
large that they could not be unloaded.90 But this relationship did not mean that Clive would 
take any risks with his own well being. In 1803 he wrote to Rainier telling him that Wellesley 
had ordered him to provide some troops to be sent to protect Goa from a French invasion. But 
there was a lot of unrest in the Deccan and he needed all his troops for that problem, he 
wanted Rainier to protect Goa on his own.91 This also illustrates that, while Governor 
General, Wellesley officially had control over the two other presidencies, in practice this was 
obviously not the case. 
 
ii) Bombay.  
The potential threat to India from a French invasion of Egypt put the Bombay Council very 
much in the forefront of activity, it being the nearest British settlement on the Indian 
mainland that Bonaparte might attack. During this period, Rainier spent much time and 
energy working with it. In September 1798 a letter, which Rainier had sent to Bosanquet, the 
Chairman of the Directors of the Company, was read out during the Bombay Council 
Meeting, warning of the danger from Egypt. The Council suggested to Rainier that he 
position a frigate at the mouth of the Red Sea to stop any French or Dutch ship taking 
supplies to Tippoo Sultan.92 The Bombay Council Meeting minutes of 28 September 1798, 
stated:  
 
It [is] impossible for us to be too much on our guard as knowing India to be one 
of the great objectives to which France is at present directing its attention, and 
believing from everything that Gentlemen can collect that to the conquest of 
Egypt and the conveyance of a force down the Red Sea may be carried into 
execution by France …. [therefore sending] a pressing invitation to Admiral 
Rainier to send without delay into the Red Sea as strong a force as may be in his 
Excellency’s power as in his judgement requisite for the purpose of effectively 
Counteracting the designs of the enemy either in collecting Vessels and Boats in 
the different ports of the Red Sea or in proceeding down towards India. 93  
 
The minutes also stated that the Bombay Council was sending a cruiser to the area under 
Captain Wilson to act as agent and to obtain intelligence. He should be contacted by any 
naval vessels operating in the Red Sea. Conscious of a high degree of nervousness in the 
Bombay Council Rainier ensured that its members knew that: ‘I have already given directions 
to Commodore Blankett to appoint a proper convoy for the service … to give protection to all 
ships, as well as Europeans, returning to India’.94 Again, Rainier showed a high degree of 
sensitivity towards the Company’s officials and also ensured the commitment of the Indian 
merchants whose financial support he would always need. 
 
Yet he was careful to maintain control over the dispositions of the Navy:  
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Admiral Rainier, with the major part of his own Squadron is now on this side of 
India and will proceed to the Red Sea as soon as the services of his Ships can be 
useful in that Quarter.95  
 
Rainier would not allow pressures from the Company to force him into sending ships to 
counter a danger which he did not think very serious. He could leave the situation in the Red 
Sea to Blankett, who had sufficient resources, and concentrate on the many other issues 
facing him across the vastness of his command. In fact he never went to the Red Sea at all. 
But it continued to be a thorn in Rainier’s side. Even as late as 1804 he was writing to 
Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, that Captain Vashon [his nephew] was trying to obtain 
Royal Naval deserters who had deserted at Mecca and had since become Muslims.96 
 
Rainier also ensured that his captains knew where their priorities lay. His letter to Captain 
Pakenham of the Resistance ordered him to escort a convoy to Bombay and then:  
 
… you are to consult with the Governor and Council as to the employment of His 
Majesty’s Ship under Your Command for the Protection of the Trade and 
Settlements.  
 
He was also to apply to the Governor for the naval stores that he required. If the Company 
would not give the said stores Pakenham was to buy them ‘at the most reasonable rates’ with 
navy bills.97 
 
Relations with Duncan, President at Bombay, were clearly good. A letter to Rainier explained 
the orders he had received from the Secret Committee of the Company which were to try and 
persuade the Governor of Goa to permit British troops to land in Goa to protect it from a  
possible French attack. Because Duncan feared attack from the Indian princes he asked 
Rainier if he might send some forces to carry out the same job. There was also an exchange 
of warships between Duncan and Rainier. Their relationship continued to be comfortable 
through the years. In 1804 he wrote to Duncan supporting the building of a causeway from 
the mainland to Old Warren’s Island at the entrance to Bombay harbour as it would enable 
troops to be moved more rapidly to defend the city.98 Four days later he agreed to Duncan’s 
request to transport Company troops from Surat to Bengal.99 
 
Perim, the island at the mouth of the Red Sea, became the source of friction when it was 
decided to withdraw its British garrison, placed there only months before in order to deter the 
French from moving their troops to India via the Red Sea. Possibly it had been noted in 
London that the local naval commander, Rear Admiral Blankett, had written to the Bombay 
Council saying:  
 
The Island of Perim is likewise objectionable as a station for Cruizers, the 
anchorage in the harbour is not good, the entrance is narrow … the Straits are 
subject to heavy squalls.100  
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The decision to evacuate was made by the Bombay Council without any consultation with 
either Blankett or Rainier, who was at that time based in Bombay.101 This example shows that 
cooperation between Bombay and the Navy was not always effective. Possibly this was due 
to the fact that Blankett was on bad terms with the Company army commander, Lieutenant-
Colonel Murray. Blankett did not learn the skill which Rainier had perfected of maintaining 
good relations with those with whom he had to work closely. 
 
However, Rainier’s political skills did not leave him. And part of those skills was to show 
gratefulness to the positive acknowledgements he received from all branches of the 
Company: 
 
I am extremely sensible of the value of your approbation of my Conduct and your 
politeness in conveying the address [from the Council of Bombay thanking 
Rainier for protecting the Trade] to me.102 
 
iii) China. 
Rainier could never forget that China was part of his station and the primary source of trade 
in the east by 1804. He had to work with the local Chinese rulers as well as the Company and 
his masters at the Admiralty. His situation was doubly difficult because the Chinese 
authorities refused to accept that naval power was separate from that of the Company and 
therefore would not deal directly with naval officers. Socially, they ranked even lower than 
merchants.103 Yet he wrote to the ‘Vice Roy’ of Canton asking for his permission to obtain 
local pilots and supplies at that port.104 Later he had to call on the Admiralty to help him get 
permission for his ships to anchor in Anson’s Bay or Linling Road rather than Macao Road 
because they were safer and closer to supplies.105  
 
That Rainier was sensitive to the feelings of the Chinese and the impact they could have on 
the profitability of the Company is illustrated by his concern that the arrival of three large 
warships at Canton might frighten the Chinese. He therefore told Osborne of the Arrogant to 
send a frigate in advance to warn the supercargoes.106 A more complex matter was raised the 
same year by the Company officials in Canton. It was the practice of Chinese boatmen who 
came aboard naval vessels to steal whatever they could. The response of the warships was to 
fire on any Chinese boat that came near them unless on official business. For some reason 
this practice annoyed the Chinese and they protested to the Company’s representatives. 
Knowing how much the Company relied on the goodwill of the Chinese government to carry 
on their trade the supercargoes complained to the Company in London, who complained to 
the Admiralty, who wrote to Rainier telling him to ‘restrain the Captains of the King’s Ships 
from firing at the Chinese Boats in the manner therein suggested’.107  
 
As soon as Rainier captured the Dutch Spice Islands the centre of gravity of his station 
moved eastwards and he had to take note of the new logistical situation. As he later explained 
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to Wellesley: ‘The Straits of Malacca, all circumstances considered ... is a very central station 
for the strength of His Majesty’s Squadron ... in the North East monsoon’.108 He now needed 
assistance from the Company representatives in Canton. He wrote to Henry Brown, the 
President of the Select Committee of the Company in Canton, telling him of the capture of 
Amboina and Banda and advising him that he was sending some of the captured spices to 
Canton in order that they could be traded for supplies needed in the newly occupied 
islands.109 This letter illustrates the wide geographical and weather knowledge Rainier needed 
to perform his duties most effectively; he had to calculate that it would be quicker at that time 
of year to get the supplies from China than going back to Bengal or Madras. 
 
Rainier did not always receive the help he expected from the Company’s representatives and 
he was not afraid to say so, albeit in his usual verbose manner:  
 
I am sorry ‘tis not in my power to express an equal satisfaction with regard to 
your exertions in complying with my request to assist Lieutenant Dobbie on his 
arrival at your Factory as they do not appear to me to have been made with the 
earnestness the Public Service required.  
 
The Company had not redirected its homeward bound ships to Amboina, as he had requested, 
so he did not have sufficient forces to take Ternate, as he expected. He then went on to say 
that he would wait at Macao to escort the tea ships to Coromandel: ‘if they will be ready in 
any reasonable time’. The importance of intelligence is also indicated by his request: ‘You 
will of course communicate to me every kind of Intelligence you are in possession of for my 
information’.110 
 
The importance of China rises again with the outbreak of war after the Peace of Amiens. 
Lord Clive felt he could write to Rainier warning him that war was imminent, mentioning 
that the strength of Linois’ squadron was well known, and demonstrating the effectiveness of 
British intelligence. He also warned him of the strength of the Dutch squadron at Batavia, 
meaning that Prince of Wales Island was at risk. Clive did not think Macao was in danger 
because the Chinese would not allow the weak Portuguese to be replaced by a strong French 
presence. Indeed, this would be the case in 1808 when the British occupied Macao for a short 
time before Chinese pressure forced them to evacuate. He also warned Rainier not to lose 
Trincomalee and to keep his squadron together and base it at Bombay in case the French 
attacked.111 With Clive now adding his advice to that of Wellesley Rainier must have 
wondered who was in command of the navy. He did well to keep control. 
 
The rivalry between the Company and the Navy for scarce seamen was always a source of 
contention with the presidencies. The subject will be addressed in detail in Chapter Seven. 
Suffice it to say that it was a common theme between that navy and the Company.  
 
e) The Bombay Marine 
The Bombay Marine had been established in the middle of the eighteenth century, primarily 
to protect the Company’s shipping. It was not meant to fight national navies and its vessels 
were primarily small vessels such as sloops and grabs. But in times of emergency, such as in 
1794 when Admiral Cornwallis departed for England leaving no naval ships on the station, 
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Indiamen could be re-armed to give them the power of frigates. Whilst there was peace with 
the European powers it had to patrol the entire region from the Persian Gulf to China. But 
when war broke out it could only deal with the lesser Country powers leaving the Royal Navy 
to play the major role against the European fleets. Even in 1772 there were two schooners 
based in Bussora to combat pirates in the area.112 They were also used for charting the 
unknown waters of the station and its officers therefore built up a large volume of local 
knowledge which was of much use to the Royal Navy. Indeed, Rainier received much of his 
knowledge of the Red Sea from Company officials during the threat from Napoleon. 
  
Rainier seems to have had a ‘love-hate’ relationship with the Company’s private navy. He 
was very happy to accept the offer of its vessels – its largest two ships were frigates – as they 
were always in short supply. But he had to ensure that their Lordships knew how ineffective 
they could be:  
 
 … an estimate of their Force [is] much inferior to His Majesty’s Ships of the 
same rate, on account of their being manned with more than half Natives and the 
European part of their crew are perhaps more than one half foreigners’ …. ‘There 
is something in the management of their Ships that disgusts British Sailors, and 
which may merit a particular enquiry being constituted by the Hon’ble 
Company.113  
 
Although what caused Rainier to have such a strong view is not mentioned. Six years later he 
was still writing to Spencer: 
 
Little dependence is to be placed on any assistance from the East India Company 
Cruisers as your Lordship has suggested, to look after the privateers, being 
generally half manned with Europeans and such as pass near the Sand Heads are 
immediately laid hold on for other purposes.114 
 
The Company itself had some concerns. Duncan, the President of the Bombay Council wrote 
to Dundas that: ‘The abolition of Convoy Money has taken away the Stimulus for the 
Commodores of Cruizers to take care of the multitude of small Boats that compose their 
Convoys’.115 Clearly the Bombay Marine officers required the same monetary stimulants as 
their naval colleagues. And not always did they show the required levels of bravery. In 1801 
Captain Richardson, late commander of the Mornington, was dismissed his ship by court 
martial for ‘improper behaviour’ in the presence of the enemy in the Bay of Bengal.116 
 
Rainier’s concerns were not replicated in his views of the Indiamen which assisted the navy. 
He wrote to Commander Burroughs of the Indiaman Earl Howe: ‘I have to express my entire 
satisfaction of the whole of your conduct while acting in that capacity [armed ship] under my 
orders’.117  The Earl Howe was one of three East Indiamen, including the Princess Charlotte 
and the Cornwallis, which had been transferred to Rainier by Wellesley to give extra strength 
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to the naval forces.118 Rainier wrote to the Admiralty explaining: ‘that great parts of the 
Squadron under my Command were absent on distant services, I suggested to His Excellency 
… the expediency of arming some of the East India Company’s large Ships’.119 But again it 
illustrates the willingness of the Company to lend men and materials to the Navy when the 
need arose. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Rainier developed a very good relationship with Sir John Shore – he knew how to work with 
people over whom he had no authority but who could make it impossible for him to function 
were they so minded. The East India Company was no small organisation which could be 
browbeaten by the reputation and arrogance of the navy. Rainier had to build close 
relationships with its officers so that they would assist the navy when it was needed. To do 
this he had to keep in close communication with them, try and help them meet their goals, be 
trustworthy, and not try to exploit them financially. This he did by transporting their troops to 
wherever they wanted to go, at least within the East Indies station. He also carried their 
supplies and ensured they were fed and watered, even at the cost of giving them the supplies 
of his own men. He communicated with them assiduously, letting them know what he was 
doing with his ships and why, and also attending Council meetings whenever he was in port. 
No-one could criticise him for not being a key member of the body waging the war. Yet he 
managed to keep his independence, even when under severe pressure from Wellesley. 
 
Wellesley expected everyone to follow his instructions and, as a “direct report” to Dundas, a 
friend of the prime minister and the commander of one of the largest armies in the world, he 
was a powerful man. He was the antithesis of what would now be called a ‘team player’. He 
was a risk taker, sharing his ideas with only a small inner circle that he thought he could trust. 
It is to Rainier’s credit that he managed the relationship on a positive level, keeping direct 
control over his ships, whilst, all the time, Wellesley was trying to tell him, and his captains, 
how they should direct the squadron. And Rainier was successful, Wellesley describing the 
Admiral as ‘very tractable’. But the Governor General, in spite of this aura of cooperation, 
still wanted to control the navy himself and finally had to be told by Dundas that it would not 
happen.120 Yet there were limits as to how far Rainier could be pushed: ‘The admiral, based 
at Madras, had the nasty habit of putting to sea when crossed’.121 
 
Their cooperation went smoothly until the plan to attack Mauritius in 1800. Clearly Rainier 
was careful and, knowing he could not easily replace any losses, did not want to risk his ships 
and men unnecessarily if he did not think he could succeed; and he was very unsure that 
Mauritius was really vulnerable to the size of forces the British could put up against such an 
island fortress. Rainier knew he could lose his command by opposing such an important man 
as the Governor General, but did so because he believed that it was not in the best interest of 
the Country. Rainier could not be said to be a man without principles.  
 
The senior army officers also all understood their interdependence and believed that the 
Admiral would always do all in his power to assist them. He had an excellent relationship 
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with the army Commander-in-Chief, General Stuart, who was on the Governor General’s 
governing council and therefore able to influence positively relations between the Company 
and the navy at the highest levels in India’. Admiral Rainier having very kindly offered his 
old friend General Stuart and all his Staff passage to Madras, we all embarked accordingly on 
the Suffolk ... and were most kindly received by the good old Admiral at Breakfast’.122 This 
clearly illustrates the nature of cooperation between the two forces. 
 
Protection of merchant shipping was one of the two matters on which there was continuous 
friction. And it was as serious at the end of Rainier’s commission as it was at the beginning. 
There was not the convoy discipline found in European and American waters where Lloyds 
would not insure any ship not in convoy. Theoretically at least, the Indiamen were 
sufficiently strong that they could repel any attack coming from a ship less than a fifth rate. 
But Rainier knew that, in practice, some Indiamen would surrender at the first shot and that 
convoy was the only means of guaranteeing their safety. The communication of the period is 
littered with letters from Rainier on one side and the Company and the Indian merchants on 
the other. Rainier knew he had to spend as much time as necessary – and it was a long time – 
to explain why he could not have ships everywhere that merchantmen might sail and why 
everyone in authority should persuade the merchants to sail their ships only in convoy. 
 
The other area of contention was the supply of seamen and it is difficult not to feel sympathy 
for both parties. Local replacements were hard to source but it can be seen that the plan to 
send out replacements from England was less than successful. There were several instances 
of bitterness as naval vessels took men out of Indiamen that their commanders felt left them 
in danger. And naval officers could be rude, insensitive and arrogant when dealing with their 
merchant service colleagues. Letters of complaint and explanation then flew across all 
corners of the station and to England. But outright physical combat between merchant crews 
and naval press gangs of the kind seen in European waters and ports did not occur and that 
must, in part, be due to the manner in which Rainier managed his captains.  
 
Whilst the West Indian merchants could cause their flag officer many headaches with their 
demands, Rainier was in a different position to any other commander-in-chief in that the East 
India Company was such an important organisation, both in London and on station. It was a 
key element of the City with its demand for money through bonds and loans, and, at other 
times, as a provider of finance, men and materials for the government. The Chairman of the 
Board of Control which oversaw the activities of the Company on behalf of the government 
was headed by Dundas, arguably the second most powerful man in the government and the 
main director of the war against France. It had a Company army of 192,000 men in 1805 and 
it had its own fully serviced dry dock at Bombay – the only one available to the Royal Navy 
outside the United Kingdom. There was clearly no other organisation which any flag officer 
might deal with which had so much power and influence in Britain and abroad. 
 
To the credit of both parties, they recognised their mutual dependence in that the army could 
not move or be supplied without the Navy, that the trade with Britain and around the East 
Indies would collapse without the Navy’s protection, that the Navy was a major source of 
intelligence and communication and that the Navy was a powerful symbol of the strength and 
reach of Britain’s and the Company’s sway when dealing with local rulers. 
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Rainier equally knew his ships could not function without the Bombay dockyard, without the 
naval stores which were brought out from England in the Indiamen, without the Company’s 
financial muscle in India itself, without its network of agents around the station who could 
always obtain supplies and intelligence for naval vessels working remotely. 
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   CHAPTER 4. 
 
           ‘A CONSIDERABLE TIME HAS ELAPSED SINCE WE [HAD]  
                    NEWS FROM EUROPE’.1 COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE  
                                  – ITS SOURCES AND USES. 
 
Having demonstrated in the previous two chapters the necessity of operating effectively 
within the navy and with the Company, this chapter will explain the methods by which 
Rainier communicated with these bodies. A major reason for this communication was the 
transfer of intelligence. The sources and uses of this intelligence will be explored, together 
with some examples of how its quality impacted upon Rainier‟s actions. It is necessary to 
analyse how he interpreted and used it. Obtaining intelligence in a thirty million square mile 
station presents enormous challenges as does evaluating its quality and knowing what to do 
with it when it is received.  
Communication. 
As Parkinson has said of communications between London and India: 
Messages … could go by the overland route, but there was always an element of 
risk … A duplicate was always sent by sea … and usually a triplicate by another 
ship, to provide against shipwreck.
2
  
From the late seventeenth century, with the Cape of Good Hope settled by the Dutch, the 
journey to India via deep sea routes, was well accepted and understood. It also suited the 
British attitude to long distance trade, keeping well out of the way of potential enemies. Apart 
from the risk of shipwreck or enemy action, the major drawback was the time taken – usually 
around six months from England to India – although a fast non-stop frigate might, with luck, 
reduce this to four. However, the cost of sending a warship solely to send a message was not 
one that could be regularly contemplated. This contrasted with an average three months 
overland. 
 
There were two general alternatives to the all-sea route.
3
 One was overland via Vienna, 
Constantinople, Aleppo, Baghdad, to Bussora and hence by sea to Bombay. The other went 
via the Mediterranean to Egypt, going overland to Suez, and then sailing down the Red Sea 
and into the Gulf of Arabia, or by sea to Alexandretta, north of Damascus, and then overland 
via Aleppo. The former was preferred by the Company as it could utilise the banking house 
channels of communication. However, it was inoperable during the periods Austria was in 
alliance with France.
4
 During these times sea transport would go directly to Constantinople. 
But both these routes were unusable between 1796 and 1798 when the British had evacuated 
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the Mediterranean. Most people had originally seen the route as primarily one for trade, but 
some prescient merchants realised that it could also be an efficient route for communication. 
The most notable example of using Egypt was in 1778 when news of the declaration of war 
by France against Britain reached Madras from London in sixty eight days. This enabled 
British forces to capture the French possessions in India before the French even knew they 
were at war.
5
 The main issue with the Constantinople route was still its expense. In 1801 a 
single packet from the Governor of Bombay to London cost nearly £800.
6
 
 
Whilst there were possibilities of picking up trade on the Suez route, the religious and 
political volatility meant that it was frequently unstable. It also concerned the Company that if 
the route became well accepted then goods could be sent from India to Suez, transhipped 
across Egypt and then loaded onto one of the many European ships using Alexandria. This 
would hit the Company‟s monopoly of trade with India and it therefore discouraged the 
concept. This fact was at the root of the dichotomy between trade and communication: 
„Sending goods overland would subvert its monopoly; on the other hand, dispatches 
unaccompanied by goods, might become ruinously expensive‟.7 But even as a communication 
channel there were problems from the outbreak of war. Company Agents Manesty at Bussora 
and Hartford Jones at Baghdad wrote to Sir Robert Ainslie, the ambassador to the Ottomans:  
 
It is with particular Concern that we inform Your Excellency that we have 
unfortunately experienced consequential difficulties in the transmission to 
India of the before mentioned public packets, and of the Important 
Intelligence of the existing War between Great Britain and the French 
Nation.
8
  
 
But Wellesley was not concerned with costs and he asked Dundas if he could receive from 
London: 
 
...every month, by overland dispatch, a short statement of all such events 
and movements, or preparations of the enemy in Europe, as appear likely, in 
your opinion to have any influence upon the safety of the British 
possessions in India.  
 
Wellesley also wanted the information sent in code.
9
 Unfortunately there was not the 
organisational discipline to carry this through. 
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Although the route through present day Syria and Iraq was preferred, there were still dangers 
on the sea sector, between Bussora and Bombay, as when Dundas complained:  
 
The overland dispatch dated the 23
rd
 of July has been lost on board the 
Pearl, taken by a French privateer [in the Persian Gulf]. I trust you will in 
future direct all important overland dispatches in time of war to be 
forwarded in duplicate, and to be sent by two separate conveyances from 
Bussora to Bombay.
10
  
 
But circumstances could change rapidly. Early in 1804 the Bombay presidency wrote to 
London that it had to suspend the actual overland route via Bussora because the situation was 
too dangerous due to the presence of robbers and religious upheaval.
11
 It would appear that, 
up to this time, most letters were being sent via Bussora or Suez. And Rainier understood the 
importance of this route. At the end of 1803 he wrote to Nepean that he had sent ships to the 
Gulf of Persia not only to protect trade but also to ensure that the “overland” route would be 
kept open on its last leg to Bombay.
12
 
 
But opposition from the Porte to Christians sailing up the northern half of the Red Sea and the 
whimsical attitude of Egyptian rulers to freedom of passage and taxation of travellers meant 
that the route was largely given up by the end of the American Revolution. Sir Robert Ainslie 
suggested a land route through Mesopotamia via Aleppo and Baghdad and down the 
Euphrates to Bussora: hence by sea to Bombay. However, this route also had its dangers as 
the local Arabs were not as interested in the fact that British messengers had passports from 
the Porte, but were rather more interested in robbery. So whilst a trial run took place, the 
actual route was not used until the late 1790s.
13
 
 
The success of Bonaparte on land meant that the British could not use the overland route 
through Egypt to Suez but could use that through Syria and Baghdad. Nelson sent Lieutenant 
Duval to India to give news of his victory at Aboukir Bay by boat to Alexandretta, then 
overland, via Aleppo and Baghdad, to Bussora. There he found a British packet that took him 
to Bombay for a total journey of approximately 70 days. This modified route, starting in 
Constantinople, then crossing Syria and what is now Iraq, and down to Bussora and the 
Persian Gulf, became the common communications route together with the all sea one round 
the Cape. But it was dependent on the political situation with the local Arab rulers. In fact, in 
1798, a Company Resident, Hartford Jones, was appointed to Baghdad to ensure the 
cooperation of the local ruler and to facilitate the movement of letters. As will be seen, he 
played a very important role in ensuring the government and military forces in both the 
Mediterranean and Indian arenas were kept up to date with the latest intelligence.
14
 Because 
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of the fluid political and religious influences in that region, the Baghdad Resident had to be „a 
man of wisdom, courage and experience‟.15  
 
Rivalry between Hartford Jones in Baghdad and Manesty in Bussora was so great that from 
1800 the Bombay government sent duplicate mails, one through Baghdad and the other 
through Aleppo, and then up to Istanbul, to see which was the faster. In time Baghdad was 
superior.
16
 From the Gulf the mail would usually be sent to Bombay. Depending on the 
season the next stage would either be overland, across India, to Calcutta, or round the coast 
via Madras. 
 
Even after the departure of the French army from Egypt, the situation for British 
communications through that country was not much improved. This was due to the ongoing 
struggle between the local ruling Beys and their Ottoman rulers. But such was the importance 
with which the British now viewed the need for a safe and reliable overland route that Lord 
Elgin, the Ambassador to the Grand Porte in Constantinople, and successor to the pro Turkish 
Sir Robert Ainslie and Sir Robert Liston, was ordered to ensure Turkish support for such a 
route both in Europe as well as Asia. And he was soon able to report to the Court of Directors 
that the residents at Aleppo, Bussora and Baghdad could now ensure a rapid and regular 
alternative flow of mail. These developments meant that Rainier not only had another channel 
for his letters to his superiors, but also he could be kept up to date with all the manoeuvrings 
taking place in the Ottoman Empire, Persia and Afghanistan, which could impact the 
disposition of his forces in Indian waters. Yet, even by 1803 and before war broke out again 
with France, it was still noteworthy for Rainier to tell Wellesley that he had received 
communication from London via Bussora.
17
 Growing reliance on the overland route is also 
indicated by the end of the same year when Rainier wrote to the Admiralty that, in spite of the 
huge demands on his ships, he had felt it necessary to send a ship to the Gulf of Persia to look 
for mail for India via the overland route because:  
 
a considerable time has elapsed since we have received any news from 
Europe … either by land or sea … [the] last advices by the former only 
reaching to (sic) May 28 from London.
18
  
 
Thus it can be seen that Rainier had not heard anything for seven months and, in spite of his 
now seven years of remote command, he was still anxious about the lack of information.  
 
Although the Ottoman powers were suspicious of Britain‟s intentions, it was not the policy of 
the Company to seize territory, but only to ensure that trade could take place. It had already 
learned that the occupation of land meant heavy expense and administration - which had 
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never been its goal. However the French were looking for a way to counter British influence 
in the East and saw that occupation of Egypt could give France a valuable lever with which to 
frustrate British expansion in that region. So, in 1783 and 1784, several French officers had 
studied the possibility of developing a communication route between France and India via 
Egypt.
19
 The French ambassador to the Porte was even asked to draw up a table as to the 
relative merits of the two routes via the Red Sea and via Bussora.
20
 It was clear that the 
French saw there were two other routes for communication with India, besides the long sea 
journey round Africa, and they were putting in more effort than were the British, whose naval 
superiority could more easily ensure safe passage via the Cape. 
 
The French efforts had been rewarded with a secret treaty in 1785 between France and the 
Beys who ruled Egypt, nominally under the command of the Ottoman emperor. This treaty 
allowed France to send sealed messages through Egypt and gave French merchants complete 
freedom to transport any goods they wished across the country with only minor fees and 
duties. However Turkish anger at this show of independence by the Beys led the Ottomans to 
distrust French motives and, in turn, French distrust of the Egyptian authorities meant that the 
treaty had little practical effect. But it did show Britain how much it had to watch French 
activities in that region. 
 
George Baldwin, the official communications agent in Egypt for the East India and Levant 
Companies, continued to stress the benefits to Britain of these routes so assiduously fought 
for by France and in his book, Political Recollections Relative to Egypt, stated: „France, in 
possession of Egypt, would possess the master-key to all the trading nations of the earth…. 
England would hold her possession in India at the mercy of France‟.21 Baldwin‟s strictures 
were heard and, in 1786, he was made British Consul in Egypt with the usual British 
governmental trait of ensuring that his salary was paid for by the Company. It was thus able 
to ensure that Baldwin‟s goal was primarily that of ensuring communication, not trade. 
However, by 1793, the cost was being borne by the Foreign Office which body had been 
trying to have him recalled as it was felt he was an unnecessary expense. Yet his skills 
enabled him to ensure British India received news of the outbreak of war before the French 
and Cornwallis was thus able to capture Pondicherry before the French even knew they were 
at war. Thus was his value recognised. 
 
The efforts of both Baldwin in Egypt and Ainslie in Constantinople to open up a reliable 
communication path were thwarted by an Ottoman firman banning all Christian ships from 
sailing in the Red Sea. The weak nature of Ottoman control over both the Egyptian Beys and 
the local rulers along the coast of the Red Sea meant that no-one knew how effective this ban 
would be. The lack of a clear decision led the British government to announce the closure of 
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its Egyptian consulate in 1792, just as the French were doing the opposite. But realisation 
seeped in and its mind was changed the following year before the closure could take place. 
 
Whilst Britain had the security, given by its naval strength, of its sea route to India via the 
Cape, French planners realised that their lack of naval power would make it extremely 
hazardous for them to attempt to send large numbers of ships and men via the same route to 
India. The route through Egypt was therefore viewed as a major opportunity which had to be 
developed. In line with the views of Ingram and his “Great Game in Asia”, Bonaparte said: 
„The times are not distant when we feel that, in order really to destroy England, it will be 
necessary to seize Egypt‟.22 
 
The negative side, for Rainier, of using the Red Sea was, if ever he had to carry out naval 
operations or keep open a communication channel there, he would be in difficulty. He would 
have to contend with both the weather patterns, as described in Chapter Five, and lack of 
charts. And, although there were many large areas on the globe uncharted, none were as 
important in the political and strategic battles between France and her enemies. But when 
Rainier heard that Bonaparte had definitely invaded Egypt, he had the confidence and 
presence of mind to act without waiting for orders from London – perhaps one of the reasons 
he had been allowed to remain in post. Realising he needed more intelligence from Egypt and 
in order to supplement that which he was receiving from the Bombay Council, he sent the  
Centurion (50) and the sloop Albatross (18) directly into the Red Sea. They could watch for 
signs of the French and show the local Arab rulers that Britain had the power to thwart 
French ambitions during the long period before Commodore Blankett arrived from England.  
 
The role of the Cape should be noted on the route to India. Although its anchorages were 
open to the winds and there was nowhere for repairing vessels, it was the only convenient 
port between Brazil and the East Indies. Its importance in the early stages of the war was held 
high in London:  
 
The Cape is a situation of unusual importance that a very respectable naval 
Force should always make its Head Quarters, and as the French have sent 
some strong frigates to the Mauritius, we have also sent out some of our 
best frigates for their annoyance, and the protection of our trade. … I hope 
that the force you will have by the time this letter reaches you, will enable 
you to give them a good reception; their having no force in the Eastern Seas 
of any consequence will make it more easy for you to be prepared for them 
about the Cape.
23
  
 
It was able to provide all kinds of food and water and act as a hospital for the recuperation of 
sickness, especially scurvy, on the long journey eastwards. However it was not necessary for 
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fleets to visit as Rainier showed in 1794 when he sailed directly from England to India 
without touching land. But it could be dangerous in French hands as a base from which to 
raid British shipping between Europe and India. For this reason it was taken in 1796 although 
returned to the Netherlands at the Peace of Amiens. In 1799 evidence of the Cape‟s benefit 
was described by the Governor General of India: „We have received [from the Cape] an 
effective force of 3,000 testimony (if any were wanting) to prove the solid advantages of that 
useful possession‟.24  
 
But actual events can disprove Wellesley‟s opinion that not having the Cape would make it 
impossible to hold Ceylon „for any long period of time‟.25 It was left in Dutch hands for three 
years after war broke out again in 1803 without causing the catastrophe that he feared. 
Clearly Ceylon was more important than the Cape when it came to the negotiations at 
Amiens. Indeed, Lord Hobart, Secretary for War and Colonies said in 1801 that the Cape had 
already cost a million pounds and that it was „a peculiarly expensive, insecure and extremely 
inconvenient port of refreshment‟.26 Lord Nelson agreed, now that Indiamen, as well as 
warships, were coppered, they had less need for refit and the Cape was merely a „tavern on 
the passage‟ which added considerably to the total journey time to India.27 
 
Admiral Rainier believed that he had physically to cover his command in person and 
therefore the many letters he wrote almost invariably show from their headings that they were 
written from his ships. It would appear that Rainier was very loath to commit himself to the 
vagaries of life ashore, even though he had palatial quarters provided for him by the 
Company, with a huge domestic staff, in Madras. He seems to have been much more 
comfortable in the plain, orderly environment of a third rate, than in the opulence of an Indian 
palace. He could be in harbour in Bombay, or, in summer, off Madras or the Sandheads, the 
dangerous area at the mouth of the Hooghly. It was here that most warships would wait to 
communicate with Calcutta and to protect from French privateers the many merchant ships 
that went through the area. He could be protecting the trade between Calcutta and Madras. He 
could be in Canton, dealing with the Company super cargoes in order that they felt their ships 
were being adequately protected, or writing to the “Hoppo”, the chief Chinese minister in 
Canton, to ensure his warships were able to obtain supplies. Since the early 1790s relations 
with China had not been good because the Chinese believed that the successful invasion of 
Tibet by Nepal in 1791 was due to the support of, and participation by, British troops which 
led to Macartney‟s failed diplomatic mission to Peking in 1793.28 Alternatively Rainier could  
be cruising in one of the several straits between the Indonesian islands through which the 
China trade to and from India and Europe navigated. He could be waiting at Prince of Wales 
Island, for ships to congregate before moving off in convoy. And, of course, during the 
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northeast monsoon he could be anywhere on the western side of India, keeping his ships 
away from the lee shore.  
 
Hence the four to six months of a normal sea journey out to India could be almost doubled 
when added to the time taken to find the actual intended recipient. Rainier noted in a letter to 
the Admiralty that a missive sent to him by the Navy Board, and dated 12 August 1803, 
finally reached him on the 19 July 1804 – over 11 months after sending.29 He noted to 
Spencer that a letter the First Lord had written on 6 May 1796 had not reached him until 6 
March 1797 – a total of ten months.30 A later communication from Spencer took 14 months 
to return. As an insurance policy, copies were sent to one or more of the Presidencies in case 
he arrived there.  
 
The problems with delayed communication did not only relate to the management of the war. 
Rainier, who was having difficulty with the Victualling Board due to its unhappiness with the 
victualling contract with Basil Cochrane, wrote to Cochrane in March 1804 that he had not 
heard from the Victualling Board since 6 January 1803, over a year ago.
31
 Such delays do 
make it difficult for the commander in the field to run effectively a large, disparate 
organisation when „head office‟ makes a criticism and then plays no part in indicating what it 
wants to be changed. 
 
Illustrating that the Admiralty understood this problem, Admiral Christian at the Cape 
received the following advice from London concerning a letter to be forwarded to Rainier:  
 
… addressed to Rear Admiral Rainier, to such places in India as from the  
Intelligence you may have been able to collect you may have reason to 
suppose the rear admiral may be.
32
  
 
A letter from the Secretary to the Bombay Governor sent to Captain Lewis of the Company 
Cruiser Teignmouth ordered him to find Rainier: „if he is not at Trincomalee, sail up the 
Coromandel Coast. If he is still not found, leave a message for him at Madras with Lord 
Clive, the governor there, and return to Bombay‟.33 It is clear that relying on communication 
from the authorities in Britain to guide one in one‟s duties as commander in chief could only 
lead to disaster. Self reliance was the only answer. Indeed Governor General Shore also 
suffered from poor communication complaining to Dundas that he received neither „Public or 
Private Letters‟ and that: „It is of much more Importance to us than you seem to be aware of‟ 
to know what was happening in Europe and what are the plans of the government‟.34  
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Another example of the difficulty of finding Rainier is illustrated by Rear Admiral Pellew‟s 
letter to the Admiralty describing his first meeting with the man from whom he was to take 
over command of the station. When Pellew arrived in Indian waters he went to Madras where 
he was told Rainier would be. He was not. Pellew then set off for Penang whither he was told 
Rainier had sailed. He was not there but had returned to Madras. Pellew turned round and 
followed him to Madras only to miss him again and be told that Rainier had returned to 
Penang. On his next journey to Penang, Pellew finally met Rainier.
35
 Pellew‟s frustration was 
somewhat assuaged by learning that Rainier was spending so much time in the east because 
he was escorting the China fleet back from Canton via the Straits of Malacca, as he told the 
Admiralty.
36
 
 
Any attempt to enter the Indian Ocean during the winter months, contrary to the monsoon, 
could add two to three months to the journey for a well manned warship and seriously 
contribute to heavy wear and tear on the ship. Merchantmen would not even attempt the 
journey. As an incentive to merchantmen not to risk such a journey, insurance policies were 
voided from 1 May to 1 September on the Malabar Coast.
37
 This ensured that, outside these 
specific periods dictated by the winds, the overland route was by far the quicker. But if the 
overland mail route were used via the Red Sea, its particular wind patterns meant that no ship 
could exit after the beginning of September until the following spring – clearly of no use for 
the carrying of letters. But if they were out before that date then the southwest monsoon 
carried them rapidly to Bombay. Naturally, the return journey was best made during winter 
when the voyage from Bombay to Suez could be carried out in three to four weeks. This 
would mean that the optimum route, for mail and intelligence, with the least dependence on 
the weather, was the one through the Mediterranean and then overland from Alexandretta in 
Syria to Bussora. Clearly bulk goods as shipped by the Indiamen could not be carried 
overland and were restricted to the sea route round the Cape. 
 
For the return journey from India, six months again would be usual: „four months would be 
thought very creditable and a passage of five months would be described as good‟.38 It was 
usual to stop at St. Helena, sometimes for several weeks, and it was here that convoy escorts 
were often increased for the dangerous run home through the Western Approaches. During 
this period the quickest journey was by the frigate Medusa (32) which arrived in England just 
eighty four days after leaving the Hooghly in 1805-6.  
 
Intelligence. 
 
Intelligence was a vital element in Rainier‟s decision making and its difficulties should not be 
underestimated:  
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Our information of their movements at the Isle of France, derived through neutral 
bottoms, has been always defective and oftentimes untrue, while theirs 
transmitted [to] them thro‟ their friends at Traquebar, has been always to the 
point.
39
  
 
a) Cooperation between the Navy and the Company. 
The intelligence cooperation between the navy and Company cannot be overestimated. The 
Company knew how important was the role of the navy. Although all the French possessions 
in India had been occupied as soon as war was declared, many Indian princes had armies 
officered by Frenchmen:  
 
there was always the fear that ... they would march against English ... possessions, 
whilst it was almost certain that the appearance of a French squadron would set 
them in movement.
40
  
 
In 1799 Governor Duncan of Bombay wrote to Rainier that his staff had discovered letters 
between the merchants of Muscat and the brother in law of the Nabob of Bengal. They were 
plotting against the British and were using French sailors on their ships.
41
 The Residents at 
Baghdad [Hartford Jones], Bussora [Manesty], and Mocha [Wilson] provided a continual 
stream of information about relations with Arab rulers, news from Constantinople and the 
Gulf of Arabia, as well as the official communications from London, both from the Admiralty 
and Company. Snippets came from such sources as the Company‟s broker at Muscat, who 
wrote to Rainier telling of the visit of a French sloop to that port.
42
 The exchange of 
information between the Governor General and Rainier appears to have been of a consistently 
high level. There are no instances of one complaining of the other. There are many letters 
from Rainier explaining to Wellesley the disposition of his ships and the reasons therefore. 
This is also the case with the Madras Presidency but not with Bombay where the stresses of 
dealing with the threat from the Red Sea occasionally frayed nerves. For example, when the 
Bombay Council decided to withdraw from Perim, both Rainier and Blankett were not 
involved although the move would impact the navy‟s ship dispositions: „My opinion or that 
of the rear admiral was not consulted on either occasion‟.43 However it did improve as when 
Duncan in Bombay wrote to Wellesley that there were two French privateers off Bombay and 
giving him a description of the one of them, La Nymphe, so that it could be passed onto the 
shipping community of Bengal.
44
 Bombay was also the focus of information and intelligence 
coming down the Persian Gulf from Bussora and Baghdad. Yet at the other end of his station 
Rainier sometimes complained that he did not receive sufficient information from the Canton 
Supercargoes about sailing times. He was also keen to ask them for any intelligence they 
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could provide.
45
 His request was evidently successful as a year later he thanked them for the 
information they had sent him.
46
 Other Company agents in the east of the station, based in 
Penang, Aceh, Bencoolen, Batavia, Amboina, and Manila also provided information. 
 
The Company was also the conduit for intelligence with the local Indian rulers. They were a 
good source of intelligence although the changing complexity of their relationships with the 
British meant that its quality was difficult to ascertain. The best intelligence came after years 
of establishing relationships and networks within the Indian ruling castes.
 47
  No naval officer 
would have the time to spend ashore to make this possible. The normal Company channels 
were therefore operated by the various British “residents” whose role was to ensure good 
relationships between the Company and the princes, and also to keep the Governor General 
informed of developments. There are virtually no letters of Rainier in direct communication 
with local rulers and it appears that he relied primarily on the Company‟s channels. And he 
had access at the highest levels. The tone of his letter to Sir John Malcolm, who was, at this 
time [1802], Wellesley‟s chief advisor, indicates that Malcolm and Rainier were friends.48 
This relationship was probably strengthened by the fact that Sir John‟s brother, Pulteney, was 
Rainier‟s flag captain, and another brother, Charles, had just been promoted to master and 
commander [and four months later would be raised to post captain] by Rainier.
49
 Major 
Alexander Walker, Secretary to Wellesley, also wrote detailed reviews of the happenings 
with the native princes on the Malabar Coast, even offering Rainier the use of his 
bungalow.
50
 Occasionally the admiral was able to return the favour. The previous year he had 
written to Wellesley about the probability that French gunners were serving on Persian 
warships – a fact that might help John Malcolm on his mission to Persia.51 Captain Wilson of 
the Company was also adept at working with the Arabs; in 1798 he wrote to the Sheriff of 
Aden telling him that three visiting “Armenians” were actually French and he would be better 
served working with the British against the French.
52
 
  
Rainier did not want to exclude intelligence coming from any source, even the logistics 
focussed Naval Officer in Bombay: „You will not omit to forward intelligence from the Red 
Sea, or any other of importance, with the utmost expedition‟.53 Another letter to a G.M. 
Gillis, the Sub Collector for the Centre Division [tax collection] at Malabar, acknowledged 
intelligence received from the British Resident at Travancore, in southern Kerala.
54
 Looking 
for confirmation of the outbreak of hostilities with France in 1803, Rainier wrote to the 
Admiralty that he had received intelligence from Mr. Stratton, who was the Ambassador to 
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the Grand Porte.
55
 The complexity of the routes through which information might flow is 
described in a letter from Rainier to Christian at the Cape [itself showing that the admirals 
kept each other up to date]:  
 
Our latest intelligence which was communicated by the Consul of Smyrna and 
forwarded by his Colleague at Aleppo to Bussora, was received from a Venetian 
at Latillea in rather indifferent English; he had it from a Turkish Aga to whom it 
was related by some common person.  
 
Rainier went on to repeat the rumour that Bonaparte was heading for India but the Resident at 
Baghdad [Hartford Jones] did not think he would succeed. The pressures on the disposition of 
his ships were noted in that he was not sending any more ships to the Red Sea and also by the 
fact that the Resistance (44) had blown up after being struck by lightning, with only five 
survivors.
56
 Moreover the Admiralty did not want to be excluded from the intelligence 
gathering industry. In 1798 Nepean wrote to Blankett telling him that Captain Blair had been 
sent overland to Judda (sic) and the Red Sea in order to obtain intelligence.
57
 It was also 
interesting for Rainier to receive information on the French in Egypt. Manesty described how 
bad were conditions for the French there, of a rumour that Bonaparte had been assassinated 
and that the French were trying to curb Muslim practices.
58
  
 
b) Mauritius. 
The quandary of how to use intelligence from neutrals will be examined later in this chapter. 
But they did make up a large proportion of that information he received. Data on Mauritius 
was much treasured and, because it was the base for French attacks on British shipping, it 
was Rainier‟s main concern before Bonaparte‟s invasion of Egypt. As it was a French island, 
intelligence was hard to come by. A report from the American ship Washington stated that 
morale on Mauritius was low, there were few supplies, the negroes were restless and they 
were expecting a British attack.
59
 But two years later Lt. George Gordon of the Bombay 
Army wrote from Mauritius of the high state of efficiency of the French naval squadron there 
and its plans to take troops and cannon to the Indian mainland. He was also able to give 
intelligence of French intelligence concerning British warships off Madras.
60
 Only judgement 
and possibly corroboration could help Rainier decide which intelligence to act upon. Cartel 
ships, bringing British prisoners back from French custody, were another good source of 
information. Decaen had been wise by holding back the cartel ship, Glasgow, from leaving 
Mauritius because, as soon as it returned to the Cape, Elphinstone was able to tell his captain 
blockading the island which ships were away cruising, their number of guns, and the one ship 
still in harbour.
61
 He also kept the explorer Flinders a captive on Mauritius for almost eight 
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years in order that he might not report back the strength of French defences. The Danes again 
figured in Rainier‟s reports when he told the Admiralty that they were selling „Sea Papers‟ to 
ships trading with the enemy in the Eastern Seas to protect them from arrest by the British. 
This was especially helpful [to the French] in ensuring that the French trade between 
Mauritius and Batavia had sufficient vessels.
62
 Captain Newcombe of the Orpheus wrote an 
undated affidavit stating that he had captured a Danish ship taking supplies to Mauritius. The 
vessel only had one Dane aboard and all the officers were British. He had therefore seized it 
as not really a neutral ship and he had sent it back to England for a legal ruling.
63
 But, on 
other occasions, Rainier was able to tell Wellesley that he had heard from a passenger who 
had visited Mauritius how many privateers were in the harbour,
64
 and later, from neutral 
merchant ships visiting Mauritius that there were no warships there.
65
 The Danish colony of 
Tranquebar was also a centre of intrigue and intelligence exchange. It was so well used by the 
French that Wellesley complained to the Danish governor in 1799 and, two years later, 
located a British agent there to watch over French activities.
66
 
 
c) The Arab World. 
Rainier was clearly concerned about the quality of that intelligence coming from the Arab 
world:  
 
I have wrote by the late ships to Commodore Blankett … to be more upon their 
guard against the wily Artifices of the Arabian Governments, as the Enemy, as 
well as their own particular interest might have had a design in fabricating the 
information they had received.
67
  
 
Blankett also, with much more immediate experience, illustrated the reason for hesitating to 
believe what intelligence came from Arab sources. He explained that the Sheriff of Mecca 
was trying to obtain his independence from the Turks and:  
 
he is not without suspicion that from our connection with the Porte, we might be 
led to endeavour to restore the lost power of the Grand Vizier in these Seas … he 
will assist the French in their establishment at Cairo.
68
  
 
But as communication via Egypt became impossible, the already established route through 
Aleppo, Baghdad and Bussora grew more important. Cooperation with Arab rulers also 
became necessary. As has been seen, Samuel Manesty, well established as the Company‟s 
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agent in Bussora and married to an Armenian, was joined by Hartford Jones in Baghdad. The 
decision to appoint him was made by Dundas on hearing of Bonaparte‟s expedition to the 
eastern Mediterranean:
69
 
 
Indeed, my opinion is, that the measure which has been taken of placing Mr. 
Jones at Baghdad, as a centre of negotiation and intelligence with India, will have 
the effect of informing you of every transaction in the Mediterranean and the 
Levant fully as soon as we learn them at home.
70
  
 
It was a pity that Hartford Jones was a proponent of an alliance with Afghanistan as a buffer 
to French or Russian expansion southwards, rather than an alliance with Persia, which 
Wellesley favoured. Given the Governor General‟s requirement that all his subordinates 
should think as he did, this difference of opinion meant that Hartford Jones‟ opinion was 
suspect on all issues. Dundas had long been concerned about French intentions in Egypt and 
how they might affect India. In 1784 he asked the ambassador at Paris to find out any plans 
of the French in the east, able to be furthered by a connection with Paris.
71
 The ambassador 
replied that the French had no immediate plans, but were seeking a fast and reliable route 
overland for despatches and agents, as a means of intervening more effectively in the politics 
of the Indian states.
72
 
 
As the war progressed, intelligence was sent overland from the Mediterranean and added to 
by British Government Residents: 
 
It will be the business of Mr. Jones at Baghdad, and the other residents in that part 
of the world, to convey to us such information as they can collect … and we may 
act differently from what theory and a well-digested policy may suggest.
73
  
 
This was a description of Hartford Jones, for which Rainier and the Royal Navy were very 
grateful. However, Wellesley had a different opinion:  
 
Mr. Jones (apparently a man of talents and activity) is not in a position to acquire 
speedy or correct information. My most useful sources of intelligence have been 
Constantinople, Aleppo, Bussora and our own in this place my most earnest and 
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anxious entreaty that the dispatch overland from England may be established on a 
proper foundation.
74
 
 
Captain Wilson, the Company agent in Mocha, was sent there by the Bombay Presidency on 
the news of Bonaparte‟s invasion of Egypt. Rainier built up an excellent partnership with 
him. He provided not just intelligence, but interpretation and advice for the admiral, and 
arranged for the re-supply of stores for naval vessels. Even Blankett was impressed: „… he 
claims every regard from myself and every officer of the squadron‟.75 Rainier‟s reliance on 
Wilson is indicated by his letter to the Admiralty noting that Wilson believed that: 
 
there was no likelihood of the French Army having crossed to Suez, neither had 
Commodore Blankett, or the Albatross been heard of in that Neighbourhood. The 
Turkish accounts are of so extravagant a cast that little reliance can be placed on 
them.
76
  
 
Wilson was also able to take in hand the diplomatic negotiations with the local Arab rulers, a 
task that did not come as easily to Blankett. This relationship was an excellent example of 
how well the Navy and Company could work together when egos and self interest permitted. 
And these were characteristics whose absence in Rainier‟s personality enabled him to be 
more effective than many of his contemporaries. He continued to feed the Bombay Council 
and the Admiralty with information; in March 1799 he advised them that the French had 
erected some fortifications at Suez and Kosire and were now assembling some vessels at the 
former. In the same letter he illustrated another source of negative intelligence mentioning 
that a frigate had arrived from the Cape with no news of Blankett.
77
 In November 1798 
Wilson received a letter from the Bombay Council telling him how pleased it was with his 
work in changing Arab attitudes to being anti French and pro British. It also told him: „the 
account you have transmitted of the Tonnage in the Red Sea is very acceptable and has been 
forwarded to Admiral Rainier‟.78 
 
d) Intelligence & the Cape Station. 
The importance of keeping open the communication channel between the Cape and India as a 
route between the Admiralty, the Cape flag officer and the East Indies can be seen in a letter 
from the Admiralty to Christian:  
 
Though no mention is made in your Despatches of your having sent any Advices 
to India, their Lordships are led to hope that you, or Mr. Pringle, the Company‟s 
Agent at the Cape, will have devised some means of conveying Information of 
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Tippoo‟s Disposition to the presidencies on the Coasts and also to warn Admiral 
Rainier in order to put them on their guard.
79
  
 
The Admiralty took this opportunity to remind Christian how important was the exchange of 
intelligence between different stations. It does appear that this particular route worked well. 
In order to ensure that intelligence reached everyone, the Admiralty‟s letter to Rainier telling 
him of Bonaparte‟s impending attack on Egypt and Blankett‟s squadron, was evidently 
copied to Christian at the Cape, copied again and sent onto Commander Charles Adam, a 
junior captain in Rainier‟s squadron, in order that he received the information as soon as 
possible.
80
 In 1801 Curtis was able to inform Rainier that he had detained a French ship 
carrying the nephew of the Governor of Mauritius and who was tricked into telling Curtis that 
the French were reinforcing the island‟s garrison.81 The benefits of the Cape as a source of 
intelligence are also demonstrated during the time that Rainier reported to Elphinstone. The 
latter was able to send copies of intelligence about French and Dutch movements, advise 
Rainier to protect Malacca and Prince of Wales Island and not to send any more ships to 
cruise off Mauritius as he will cover it from the Cape in future.
82
 This is the first reference to 
the French island not being part of the East Indies station whilst the Cape station was extant. 
 
e) Intelligence from the Enemy. 
After receiving intelligence from neutrals, the navy, and the Company, there was one other 
source - the enemy. This would come from captured warships or merchantmen. Because there 
were relatively few enemy vessels operating on his station, most information came indirectly 
via naval forces in the Mediterranean. Captured letters written home by French soldiers gave 
useful information as to what was happening in Egypt. They talked of the danger of Muslim 
assassins, of the lack of wine, but sufficiency of other supplies, and what would be the army‟s 
next destination. The interrogation of a captured French soldier was copied by Wilson and 
sent to Bombay and the Senior Naval Officer off Alexandria. Asked if Egypt were merely a 
staging post en route to India, the Frenchman replied:  
 
There was some talk of Men going to India, but everyone was at a loss to know 
how that was to be affected. They had no ships in the Red Sea … it was the firm 
opinion of all that they were to remain in Egypt, and that it was to be their future 
country.
83
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How Rainier used Intelligence. 
 
Rainier had scarce resources but much territory to defend. Intelligence was fundamental to 
the deployment of his resources. Indeed it was one of the keys to successful command.  
 
It was exceedingly difficult to interpret this information yet he had to make his plans based 
on such a weak foundation. Some was intentionally false, some was mistaken, some was 
merely wishful thinking, and some was true. Rainier‟s skill was in calculating which was 
which, often using his thirty two years of naval experience, and a total of twenty two years in 
the East Indies. An example of the difficulty can be seen in Rainier‟s letter to Governor North 
of Ceylon. He had received conflicting intelligence from „an English Gentleman‟ in 
Mauritius and from American merchant ships as to whether or not the Marengo was carrying 
troops, and therefore sailing to attack some undefined British possession. So that the enemy 
could not obtain information on his movements, he thought that foreigners should be 
excluded from Trincomalee.
84
 In another letter to North Rainier tells that an American ship 
believes that Linois had sailed north, but Rainier‟s judgement said they had sailed east.85 In 
this case he was wrong and the Americans were correct, much to his chagrin as this was the 
last opportunity to bring the French squadron to action before he sailed for home the 
following March. 
 
On the other hand, it was well known that intelligence coming from neutrals could be 
particularly untrustworthy because of their vested interest in circumventing the British 
blockade. For example, Elphinstone at the Cape passed onto Rainier that Dutch ships were 
sailing under Danish colours and Dutch cargoes were being carried in American ships to 
avoid seizure by the British. As an aside he also told him that he had heard that French 
reinforcements were heading for the East Indies from France.
86
 An example of American 
intelligence being false was illustrated in a letter from Rainier to Wellesley, informing him 
that the American ship Ganges was not to be trusted.
87
 Yet American vessels could also be 
helpful as when the Canton supercargoes told Rainier that an American ship reported that six 
French frigates had been seen heading east from Mauritius.
88
 It was also sometimes necessary 
to take a decision as to which conflicting intelligence was correct:  
 
Dispatches have been received … from Captain Wilson, who has been sent by the 
government of Bombay to the Red Sea. But the tenor of these dispatches has since 
been contradicted by advices from Constantinople.
89
  
 
Rumours of another escape of French ships from Brest, in early 1801, show Rainier 
interpreting intelligence with excellent results. The time was still one of great naval and 
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military activity in the Red Sea so Rainier sailed for Bombay in order to cover the sea routes 
thereto.
90
 But by July he felt the threat had decreased from one of a potential battle squadron 
to one of commerce raiding and he feared for the exposure of Popham‟s supply lines to the 
Red Sea. He therefore sent HMS La Sybille to the Seychelles and surprised La Chiffonne (36) 
at anchor in Mahé harbour taking her after a brief seventeen minute struggle. 
 
In another letter to the Admiralty he noted that he had heard the French had reached Suez, but 
the information was from a Turkish source and he could not trust what they said.
91
 He was 
also nervous about the impact on his line of communications of a Wahabi uprising which he 
feared might lead to the fall of Baghdad and Bussora.
92
 Indeed, from his very first days on 
station, he wrote to Spencer that he knew that French ships in Mauritius were short of 
provisions but he had no idea where they might be going.
93
 Some rumours could be wild; 
Manesty wrote to the Governor of Aleppo: „I cannot believe the death of Buonaparte, (sic) 
nor the Turks cutting to pieces 30,000 of [the French]‟.94 The Governor General could obtain 
strange intelligence: „A report has reached me (which however on every calculation appears 
impossible) that Bonaparte had passed Basra on his march to Moultan with 35,000 men, and 
would join the shah at Delhi‟.95 
 
Besides receiving information, Rainier also had an obligation to pass it on, as early in 1795 
when he told Sir John Shore that there were rumours of French ships and troops coming to 
seize Batavia.
96
 However obtuse the source, Rainier believed that intelligence should be 
communicated; to Elphinstone he wrote that he had heard from the master of the freighter 
Transfer who had heard from a Malay proa, that Spanish and Dutch warships had been seen 
in the Straits of Banca.
97
 He also acted as a communications medium with Blankett telling 
him that he had heard there were no troops embarked on the French ships that had recently 
left Brest,
98
 and again to Christian, that Blankett was moving up the Red Sea to stop the 
French transporting troops across from Kosseir to Arabia.
99
 Keeping the Governor General 
up to date, he passed on all Blankett‟s reports concerning matters in the Red Sea, which 
included evidence of the lack of communication between Colonel Murray, commanding the 
troops on Perim, and Blankett. Blankett had visited both Aden and Perim only to discover 
Murray had moved but had not left a message as to where he was going.
100
 At a later date he 
wrote to the Governor of Ceylon passing on intelligence, discussing whether the Dutch and 
French at Batavia would combine to attack British possessions, and telling him how he had 
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allocated his ships to counter them.
101
 Not forgetting the other side of his station, the same 
month he wrote to the Lieutenant Governor of Penang, Robert Farquhar, that he was 
immediately sending a large convoy from Madras to China with another one departing a few 
days later.
102
 
 
Intelligence had to be protected from the enemy. Therefore much secret communication was 
sent in code, which, in itself, caused problems. Rainier wrote to Philip Dundas, the Naval 
Officer at Bombay, that he feared the capture of the Indiaman Woodcott would mean that 
both naval and Company code and signal books might have fallen into French hands.
103
 All 
the relevant people needed informing of codes or they would be worthless. This was 
unfortunate as Rainier had only just received new code books from London for use between 
the Company and Navy.
104
  He thought it politic to keep Wellesley informed: „I take the 
liberty to enclose to Your Excellency a set of signals made out to be used between His 
Majesty‟s Ships and the Settlements in India‟.105 Code was also used for communication 
between the army and navy, as when Rainier advised Colonel Clarke, commanding British 
troops at Goa, of a new signal system. Not only could the codes be captured but some might 
not be very good:  
 
At present the cipher you use in corresponding with me is the India House cipher, 
which I understand is a bad one; and besides, I may not choose that the gentlemen 
of Leadenhall Street [East India Company] should know the content of my private 
correspondence with you.
106
  
 
The admiral‟s skill was in sending intelligence to the Admiralty in a manner which, whilst 
noting the dangers and problems, would not cause panic or a belief that their admiral in the 
East Indies did not know what he was doing:  
 
Please to inform their Lordships that Affairs continue in a tranquil State on this 
Station … save that three or four Privateers have been too successful … „Tis 
reported here that the French Army have evacuated Egypt. But I have no official 
account of it … [I] hope it (sic) will receive confirmation, as it will allow me to 
withdraw the Frigates and Sloops from the Service in the Red Sea to assist in 
defending the trade of this Country from the depredations of the Enemy‟s 
Privateers.
107
  
 
He carefully noted that he understood that his main role was to protect the Trade, which was 
not too badly affected by enemy privateers, and he would be able to do an even better job 
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when he had proof that the French threat from Egypt had been eradicated. However, he 
would not act until he had solid intelligence that the French threat was at an end. He would 
not take that risk. 
 
He continued to be selective with what he told the Admiralty. The following year he told 
them that he had heard of a French naval force at Brest, possibly arming for the East Indies. 
The Admiralty would certainly know this already but Rainier was probably just informing 
them that he had alternative sources of intelligence. For this reason he was heading for 
Bombay as the optimum place to wait for any French ships as, with the north east monsoon, 
he could easily run south to attack them. He also mentioned that Wellesley had requested a 
ship to bring bullion from Canton to Calcutta.
108
 Although this was just a week after he had 
received the angry tirade from Wellesley over his refusal to support an attack on Mauritius, 
he did not mention it to his naval superiors. Even though he had told Spencer privately about 
the difference of opinion, he was astute enough to know that the matter should not be raised 
in official documents which might become public. 
 
Rainier‟s leadership style, whereby he allowed his captains the confidence to use their own 
intelligence, is illustrated during the early months of 1797.  In January he was concerned 
about the vulnerability of British merchant shipping. He had told the supercargoes not to use 
the Straits of Banda, Sunda or Malacca. Yet they ignored his advice and used Sunda Straits. 
With most of Rainier‟s ships in the Moluccas protecting the newly acquired Dutch 
possessions and the Trade, there was a large hole in the British defences from Madras to the 
Hooghly. A French schooner, left by the French commander, Sercey, off Ceylon, was 
captured by HMS Carysfort (28), Captain Alexander, who learnt thereby of French plans to 
head north. Knowing how vulnerable British shipping was, Alexander cleverly fed 
information to Sercey via a neutral merchant vessel that there were four line of battle ships at 
Madras. Not wishing to face such odds Sercey therefore headed east towards Sumatra. 
Emphasising the role of chance Sercey came across the Victorious (74) and Arrogant (74), 
both having been on separate convoy duties. The ensuing battle was inconclusive but the 
damage inflicted on Sercey‟s frigates meant that the French had to call off their cruise to refit 
in the Mergui Archipelago off the Burmese coast. Wintering thereafter at Batavia Sercey 
awaited the return of the China fleet from Canton. Rainier escorted the first section of this 
fleet through the Straits of Malacca but the second half, with no escort, was met by Sercey. 
Pretending to be Royal Navy ships, the Indiamen caused the French to flee, Sercey, not 
wanting to receive more damage which could not be repaired. And it was quite reasonable for 
the French admiral to think he was faced by Rainier as his intelligence told him that Rainier 
was in the area but not exactly where. He had already been surprised by the Victorious and 
Arrogant; he did not want to make the same mistake again. Thus it can be seen that 
intelligence was a two edged sword. Sometimes it could ensure an easy victory but at other 
times it could lead one to make serious mistakes when it was not entirely reliable.   
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Four examples of the role of intelligence.  
 
Whatever the source of intelligence, it can be categorised into two parts; that intelligence 
concerning the enemy‟s intentions and thereby responded to defensively, and that which 
shows the enemy‟s weaknesses and can be exploited offensively. The first example is clearly 
one of intelligence to which Rainier had to react. Second and third examples illustrate 
Rainier‟s making decision in the absence of intelligence for which he was criticised by those 
experts using the benefits of hindsight. Without this advantage it is difficult to see what else 
he could have done. The fourth example demonstrates Rainier planning offensive action and 
using his experience and knowledge of the region. The one piece of intelligence he receives 
he discounts as he views it as unreliable and not fitting in with his plans.  
 
a)The Red Sea, pre and post 1798.
109
 
The Red Sea played a key role in how Rainier was effected by, and used, intelligence. Before 
Bonaparte‟s invasion of Egypt, the role of the Middle East in Rainier‟s consciousness was 
confined to its value as the overland communications route between India and London. The 
trade with that area was threatened only by pirates and the dangers were covered by the 
Bombay Marine. The news that started to filter into India from mid 1798 changed all that.  
 
News of the build up of a French fleet and transports at several Mediterranean ports had been 
followed in London by puzzlement as to their intended destination. Canning, at the Foreign 
Office, was busy sending news to the Admiralty from diplomatic sources.
110
 Skilled French 
misinformation allowed for a number of possibilities; Ireland, Britain, Portugal, Naples or 
Alexandria. This last possibility came with the added element of a march across the desert to 
Bussora or a march to Suez and then down the Red Sea. The force would then attack British 
interests in India. But the sheer size of such an undertaking meant that it was not initially 
taken seriously. However, talkative French academics that specialised in antiquities in the 
Middle East started to give credence to the idea.
111
 As the President of the Board of Control 
for India, and Secretary of State for War, Dundas had a vested interest in keeping the interests 
of India at the forefront of British defensive actions and, on June 16 1798, he wrote to 
Wellesley advising him of the squadron of warships he was sending to the Red Sea and the 
extra troops he was sending to India from the Cape.
112
 Given the four to six month by sea and 
optimistic [in time of continental upheaval] three month overland journey time, it is clear that 
both Indian land and sea forces would be totally in the dark about this impending storm if 
they had to rely on news from London.  
 
However, Malartic, the Governor of Mauritius, issued a proclamation on the 19 January 1798 
inviting Frenchmen to join Tippoo Sultan in his objective to eject the British from India. This 
news had soon reached Madras and therefore both Wellesley and Rainier would have been at 
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least mentally prepared to hear that the French were soon to threaten India. Spencer wrote to 
Rainier on 30 May that there was a rumour of a French attack on Egypt which would then 
flow down the Red Sea and thence to India. But Spencer did not give „much credit‟ to the 
rumour.
113
 On the 17 June he wrote again to Rainier confirming the French plans and telling 
of Blankett‟s squadron sailing for the Red Sea. He was clearly optimistic that Rainier would 
hear from other unmentioned sources because: „I have however the fullest Confidence that 
you will before the receipt of these Dispatches have been induced to take some precaution of 
a similar nature‟.114 That the Admiralty was concerned about the smooth flow of intelligence 
is illustrated by its acknowledgement of Christian‟s letter from the Cape telling of Malartic‟s 
proclamation: „Though no mention is made in your Dispatches of your having sent any 
Advices to India, their Lordships are led to hope … [that this was done]‟.115 The Secret 
Committee of the Company also wrote to the three Presidencies that Egypt was Bonaparte‟s 
goal and they were sending out 4000 troops immediately.
116
 But there were still doubts in the 
mind of Samuel Manesty:  
 
Local knowledge, which have derived from a personal visit to Egypt, convinces 
me that any attempt made by Europeans to conquer that Country, would be 
attended with difficulties, almost insurmountable … The Nature of the Inhabitants 
of Egypt is Savage, daring and treacherous, their Antipathy to foreign Christians 
is violent … the Climate … is inimical to the European Constitution. The French 
from their long Intercourse with Egypt, are well acquainted with the above 
mentioned Facts; and they must well know … they could not … command the 
means of fitting out from Suez the Sea Port … Expeditions adequate in Military 
and Naval Force, to Successful attacks on our Eastern Possessions.
117
 
 
However, by the date Manesty wrote this letter, Bonaparte had already been in Egypt for ten 
days and Nelson would be victorious at the Battle of the Nile in another ten. Only six days 
after this victory, captured French correspondence was already in British hands telling of how 
vulnerable the French were to be murdered in Alexandria and that: „Soon the Canals which 
are in existence will be cleaned and Navigable, then the Commerce of India may once more 
have its emporium in Egypt‟.118 All this information would be of great benefit to Rainier, 
anxiously wondering what was happening, the key was to get it to him.  
 
It is unclear when Rainier first heard of Bonaparte‟s actual attack on Egypt but by September 
17 he clearly realised the situation was serious, although he made no actual reference to 
Egypt. Rather more he was perhaps concerned that a French naval squadron might round the 
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Cape and head for Tippoo‟s base of Mysore on the Malabar Coast. He wrote from Madras 
Roads to Wellesley:  
 
… the apprehensions that may be reasonably entertained of the inimical; designs 
of Tippoo Sultan, and the cooperation that may be afforded him on the part of the 
French … I propose proceeding to the Malabar Coast with [the] Suffolk and 
Trident.
119
  
 
Accurate intelligence had reached India around the same time because the Bombay Council 
Meeting Minutes of the 21 September confirmed news of the French landings, and their 
occupation of Alexandria and Cairo. It also noted rumours of a British naval victory at 
Aboukir Bay and that copies were being sent to Rainier.
120
 Then came news of the activities 
of French agents in Baghdad.
121
 But the admiral was still on the Coromandel Coast and news 
would take at least a month to reach him. Information began to flow thick and fast into 
Bombay; intelligence indicated that the French were heading for India, French agents were in 
Baghdad, a captured letter written on the 15 May 1798 stated that: „a great army … will 
proceed, by the Red Sea to India, to Bengal [and] make alliance with Tippoo Saib (sic) and 
other powers in those parts, and raise all India against them‟. A letter from a „respectable 
Native‟ at Bussora related that he had heard of a French plan to dig a canal „thro the Isthmus 
of Suez by which they say the communication with India will be much facilitated‟.122 Rainier 
was also informed that Captain Wilson, the Governor of Bombay‟s aid de camp, was being 
sent to the Red Sea in a Company cruiser in order to obtain intelligence.
123
  
 
It was evident that the Company‟s intelligence network was springing into action and that it 
viewed Rainier as a major recipient. But firstly it had to reach him. Fortunately the season 
was on the cusp of change and he would already be on his way to Bombay. Probably he 
would now receive data in less than a month – a period that would be reducing as he 
approached Bombay – the nearest British base to the Red Sea. Unfortunately this had the 
added effect of moving him further away from the centre of military and political decision 
making – the Governor General, based in Calcutta. And his political skills would be called 
into play by a Bombay Council, normally the minor Presidency, but now the key front line in 
the defence of India.  
 
Rainier must have been worried. He had limited intelligence of what was happening, 
navigational knowledge of the area within the navy was scant, wind patterns severely limited 
freedom of action, the Admiralty had sent a squadron of warships to the Red Sea pointedly 
not under his control, the climate put severe strains on ships and men, the government was 
seriously worried about French ambitions towards India, and the Company would demand his 
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services paying little heed to the wider strategic concerns of the station as a whole. Rainier 
knew that whatever he did would come under the closest scrutiny in London. 
 
Rainier‟s first requirement was intelligence – in a region in which the navy and Company 
were poorly represented. He also had to establish a line of defence in the Red Sea in case 
Bonaparte‟s successes allowed him to march rapidly to Suez. Blankett left British waters in 
mid July, unaware of the frustrating journey ahead of him. At this time those commanding 
British forces in India were blissfully unaware that Bonaparte had already landed in Egypt on 
the 1 of July.  
 
Rainier, now in Bombay and attempting to obtain the latest news, was learning how to handle 
the officials of the Bombay Presidency. He wrote to Wellesley:  
 
The Bombay Government under this apprehension [of a French attack] press the 
expediency of my detaching as large a Naval Force as may be in my judgement 
adequate to the purpose of counteracting the designs of the enemy of the Coast of 
the Red Sea.  
 
In this same letter he advised the Governor General that he has heard of the French landing in 
Egypt:  
 
its primary object, which is generally conjectured to be the conveyance of a 
strong Military Force to this Country by way of the Red Sea, to co-operate 
with Tippoo Sultan in an attack on the British Settlements.  
 
He also said that he was expecting a frigate and sloop from England so clearly had no idea 
that Blankett has been sent out.
124
 It is noteworthy that, at this late date, Rainier still thought 
it necessary to tell Wellesley of the French landing. However, nine days later in another letter 
to Wellesley, he noted that he wanted the Bombay Government to arm two of their ships: „to 
be sent to reinforce Commodore Blankett in the Red Sea where he may be in danger of being 
overmatched by the junction of the French and Dutch‟.125 In this letter he also mentioned 
Captain Wilson, the Company‟s agent at Mocha, from whom he expected intelligence. 
Rainier‟s appreciation of Wilson and his understanding of problems of communications can 
be seen in his letter to Captain Adam of the Albatross when he told the former to work with 
Captain Wilson to stop the enemy‟s progress and to leave advice of where he is going so that 
other senior officers will know where he is. He must also send frequent reports to Rainier.
126
 
The tensions in Rainier‟s state of mind come through in his letter to the Admiralty of 2 
December. He told them that the Centurion would be leaving for the Red Sea on the 7 
December and listed the dispositions of his other ships. He then turned to intelligence and his 
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meaning is unclear, showing how confusion was caused by the wide variety of intelligence 
sources:  
 
Certain intelligence, VIZ. Buonaparte getting possession of Cairo – Admiral 
Nelson‟s Victory – the French had not reached Suez the 25th of August last, nor 
was there the least apprehension of their penetrating through Persia in the middle 
of last month, on the contrary, the attempt is deemed utterly impracticable. 
Intelligence received from Bussora but not authenticated; burning of the Ships at 
Alexandria by Captain Troubridge, successive defeats and massacres of the 
French Army in Egypt by the Arabs – Buonaparte … had reached Suez with 8000 
men.
127
  
 
At least now he was keyed into the intelligence network that was beginning to provide lots of 
data – he just had to decide which was correct. However the Red Sea weather patterns 
allowed him the time to take stock:  
 
Being well assured that no well found Ships can get out of the Red Sea before the 
middle of March. I shall defer for the present sending any further succours that 
way in our present uninformed situation of affairs there; concluding nevertheless 
that Commodore Blankett must have arrived on that Station by this time.
128
  
 
He was clearly growing more anxious about the lack of news concerning Blankett‟s progress 
because only three days later he wrote:  
 
We have no news from the Red Sea … we are hourly expecting a dispatch from 
Bussora and in case no satisfactory information is received … I shall move this 
Government [the Bombay Presidency] to send a cruizer to endeavour of open 
communication with Commodore Blankett.
129
  
 
The detail of Wilson‟s work is illustrated when he wrote to Captain Adam of  HMS  
Albatross that he had heard that a dhow had been rented by three Europeans who were 
perhaps French; could Adam check?
130
 Two days later he confirmed that they were French.
131
 
The same day he wrote to the Imaum of Senna to warn him of French activity. If he could 
seize any Frenchmen please send them to Wilson in Mocha and he would be rewarded.
132
 The 
intelligence continued to flow, Captain John Sprat Rainier wrote: „The conduct of the Arabs 
hath hitherto been friendly, but I suspect they would not be very hostile to the French, if 
assured of their own safety‟. He continued that a “Bazaar report” said the Imam of Senna had 
ordered the Governors of Mocha and Hodenda to help the ships of any nation. He might 
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therefore have to remain up the upper reaches of the Red Sea to hinder the French so will 
require supplies being sent.
133
    
 
By now he should have expected to hear something of Blankett but his continued absence 
made Rainier anxious. A letter as late as May 8 the following year noted that if he did not 
hear from Blankett soon, he would think him captured by the French or having suffered a 
natural disaster.
134
 It also meant he must leave his ships in the area to the detriment of his 
other duties. By this time he probably would have received his orders from the Admiralty, 
dated 30 September 1798, telling him to arrange his ships as to stop Bonaparte but not to risk 
the Malabar Coast and the Bay of Bengal – not the most useful or helpful order Rainier 
would receive.
135
 
 
Rainier‟s frustration with the lack of intelligence concerning Blankett and the uncertainty this 
placed on the admiral as to what should be the disposition of his ships comes through from 
his letters. He wrote to the Admiralty that he had a letter from Captain Wilson of the 11 
March telling him there was still no news of Blankett but he gave him intelligence that the 
French had erected some fortifications at Suez and Kosire and had collected and repaired 
some craft and that Captain John Sprat Rainier had despatched the Albatross to join two 
Bombay Marine cruisers that would destroy the vessels and attempt to do the same with the 
fortifications. He ended the letter by saying that HMS Imperieuse, just arrived from the Cape 
to Madras, „brings no intelligence of Commodore Blankett‟.136 
 
Around this period he also received orders to help the Company occupy the island of Perim 
which Dundas felt would seal off the mouth of the Red Sea. The island could not do this; it 
had no water and the west channel was too wide for artillery from the island to cover all of it. 
How far Rainier realised this is not known but it was not politic to question the plan, coming 
from so senior a level of government as Dundas. The Bombay Council was aware of the 
situation on Perim. It had a survey from Lieutenant White of the Bombay Marine which 
stated that it was deserted, without any water „or useful produce of any kind … but had a 
harbour where ships might safely lie‟.137  
 
The following July, when he moved back to the east coast of India, he wrote to the Admiralty 
of the situation at Perim. The dates of the letters are illustrative of the time taken for 
intelligence to reach the admiral, even within his station. He told Nepean that Blankett had 
written to him from Mocha on the 17 April and 8 May respectively. The letters had been sent 
to Bombay and then redirected to him and he received them on the 24 June, over two months 
later. He was now writing to the Admiralty on the 10 of July. It would take a minimum of 
three months for his letter to reach London overland. Blankett would have sent copies of his 
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letters directly to London and the Admiralty would therefore know of the situation on Perim 
before it received Rainier‟s opinion. In this letter he described the faults of Perim, the 
untrustworthiness of the Arabs and the bad weather:  
 
… our next intelligence from that quarter may afford more information … as well 
as on the particular situation of the French in Egypt and, at Suez … when I shall 
be able to form a judgement of the Strength of Naval Force that Service will 
hereafter require.  
 
He also advised that he was sending an escort back to England with the China Fleet, as the 
Bombay Council had requested.
138
  
 
Rainier had already had example of Arab animosity from John Sprat Rainier telling his uncle 
that he mistrusted them and that a pilot ran the Centurion ashore near Mocha.
139
  
 
Perim continued to be a sink of resources in men and materials until finally, in December 
1799, the Bombay Council wrote to Colonel Murray agreeing with his plan to evacuate the 
island and return to Bombay.
140
 The time delay for information reaching Rainier is illustrated 
by his letter to Wellesley agreeing to the evacuation of Perim dated over four months after the 
original order to Murray:  
 
I understand from Rear Admiral Blankett that Your Excellency has given 
direction to the Bombay Government to withdraw the detachment under Colonel 
Murray‟s orders … a measure of much propriety in my humble opinion.141 
 
By this time Blankett was fully in command in the Red Sea and intelligence primarily flowed 
through him. The sources sending intelligence to him were the captains of RN and Bombay 
Marine vessels, Company employees such as Hartford Jones, Manesty, and Wilson, and 
occasional trusted local merchants and officials. With the usual practice of copying letters, 
Rainier would receive the information but, of course, it would normally be much later, having 
been sent via Bombay. He understood sufficiently that his own role was no longer one of 
immediate action as he was too far away and he did not want to confuse Blankett:  
 
… proceed to the Red Sea with all convenient dispatch with a view to the further 
prosecution of the Orders you have received from the Rt. Hon. The Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty.
 142
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There was a steady flow of intelligence from Blankett to Rainier, for example; the 
Convention of El Arish, by which the French army would evacuate Egypt, had been 
abandoned, Blankett believed the Sheriff of Mecca had been in negotiation with the French 
all along, he had heard that Kleber, [commander of the French army since Bonaparte‟s 
departure], was dead and that the French were in „much confusion‟.143 By this time Rainier 
had other important matters requiring his attention. He was ordered by the Admiralty to 
inform the Tax Office of all men under his command who earned over £60 p.a. in order that 
they might be assessed to pay the new income tax.
144
 
 
Rainier‟s role was now mainly one of logistics support. He had plugged the entrance to the 
Red Sea as soon as he heard of Bonaparte‟s invasion, he had worked with the Company to 
establish the intelligence networks in the region, and he had ensured the political 
communication between himself, the Company and the Admiralty remained effective and 
trusted. Further evidence of Rainier‟s attention to intelligence is seen in his reply to 
Wellesley acknowledging news of the Convention of El Arish. He hoped the Bombay 
Government had told Blankett so that he could leave the Red Sea which was very expensive, 
as supplies were difficult to obtain.
145
 
 
Thus it can be seen that the skill with which Bonaparte hid the destination of his expedition 
thwarted Rainier from preparing his forces to meet the new threat and also delayed the naval 
reinforcements which London sent. But the timing was fortunate for Rainier – he was about 
to sail to Bombay for his winter quarters and no enemy ships could leave the Red Sea before 
the following March at the earliest. He needed to obtain intelligence from the area quickly but 
had only the Company agent Manesty, in Bussora. This was remedied by Rainier sending the 
Centurion and Albatross and the Bombay Presidency sending Wilson to Mocha. He was then 
able to make his plans based on a steady flow of intelligence although he could not always be 
certain of its accuracy. His main frustration continued to be ignorance of Blankett‟s 
whereabouts. When he finally learned of his arrival he could leave the detailed control of 
naval activity in the region to Blankett and return to what he knew had been dangerously 
neglected, the protection of the trade. 
 
b) Pondicherry 1803.
146
 
It is probable that the confused manner in which war again reignited, and how the uncertainty 
of whether he was in a state of war or peace as communicated by the government, caused 
Rainier to allow the French squadron to escape at Pondicherry.  
 
Whilst still at peace, the French frigate Belle Poule landed 180 troops at Pondicherry on 21 
June 1803. The French authorities had been striving to obtain possession of that city from the 
British under the terms of the Peace of Amiens but the British were proving somewhat 
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obdurate in refusing to withdraw, knowing that the French reoccupation of their major 
possession on the mainland could become a threat to Madras. On 5 July Rainier‟s squadron 
anchored at Cuddalore, twenty miles down the coast from Pondicherry. Rainier then sent the 
Trident (64) and a sloop to anchor next to the Belle Poule.  Soon they were joined by Linois 
with the Marengo (84), two more frigates and two sloops. The power game continued when 
Rainier arrived with his squadron, which anchored close to the French ships. Linois would 
expect that Rainier would hear first of an outbreak of war, which they were both expecting, 
due to his superior communications. Knowing he needed to act before war broke out, he 
slipped his cables on the night of the 24/ 25 July, leaving lights on his buoys. When dawn 
came, Rainier found no French ships in sight. He did not follow them, but remained on the 
Coast for two more weeks then fell back to Trincomalee as the best focal point from which to 
watch French actions. One of the French transports, Cote-d’Or, was seized by Rainier but 
then released after French objections as to the legality of the action – another sign of 
Rainier‟s discomfort at making strictly illegal moves.  
 
He gave a factual report to the Admiralty of how Linois had escaped and was able to secure 
their Lordships‟ approval of his actions.147 It is easy to criticise Rainier for not chasing 
Linois. But it must be remembered that there was still no war and, legally, he would have had 
no defence in law if he had attacked the French. He had protected Pondicherry and ensured it 
did not fall into French hands, which was his prime objective. Rainier would also know that, 
in 1792, his predecessor, Cornwallis, had been engaged in a diplomatic incident in which La 
Resolue (36) had surrendered to the Phoenix (36) when the former tried to stop the latter 
inspecting two French merchantmen suspected of bringing supplies to Tippoo, with whom 
Britain was at war. As this occurred during a time of peace the incident could have led to a 
major break with France but, in 1792, the French government had more important matters on 
its mind. 
 
However, the fact that Linois‟ escape figured in a debate in the House of Lords would 
suggest that there was more to the episode than was mentioned in official documentation.
148
 
The Earl of Carlisle accused the government of not advising Rainier in sufficient time to 
seize Linois: „… if the English admiral had been apprised of the probability, much less the 
actual commencement of war, he would, as it would have been his duty, detained the whole 
of the French squadron‟. Lord Hawkesbury‟s reply in defence of the government‟s speed of 
communication did not even query the legality of attacking the French before war was 
actually declared. Adding to the debate Lord Spencer, the former First Lord, noted that the 
frigate taking news of war out to India had been firstly ordered to escort a convoy to Lisbon, 
thus losing sixteen to eighteen days. He had no doubt that, had the situation been reversed, 
the French would have seized any British vessels. What Hawkesbury meant before the days 
of electronic communication by his reply is difficult to understand: „In fact, Admiral Rainier 
was appraised of the probability … of war when the French squadron arrived at Pondicherry 
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and it was actually under consideration to detain Admiral Linois when he was fortunate as to 
make his escape‟. This point is difficult to believe as the day after Linois‟ escape Rainier 
wrote to the Admiralty describing news he had received from Ambassador Stratton at 
Constantinople and asking for confirmation of the declaration of war.
149
 Lord Carnarvon 
stated that Rainier was: „without instruction for his conduct and that this omission enabled 
Admiral Linois to escape ... from a situation in which he might have been detained‟. This, he 
thought, was gross negligence on behalf of the government. Carnarvon believed that: „private 
information did arrive in time but not of sufficient authority to enable Admiral Rainier to 
have detained Admiral Linois‟ squadron in port‟. The vote against the government was 
carried by thirty one to thirty. 
 
The Admiralty‟s approval of Rainier‟s actions can now be seen in a different light. Any 
criticism of him would also be an implied criticism of its own tardiness. Rainier clearly knew 
war was imminent but felt that he did not have the authority to act illegally, remembering 
Cornwallis in 1792 – although the House of Lords debate would indicate a less sensitive 
approach to the legality of the situation by the British government. One wonders if a Nelson 
or Pellew would have been so cautious. Possibly an example of when the “safe pair of hands” 
is too safe and perhaps an example of changing times when the British government was 
growing less fastidious over legal niceties; vide the seizure of Spanish treasure ships in 1804 
and of the Danish fleet in 1807, both before the declaration of war, although both these events 
were authorised by the government. As there is no criticism of Rainier to be found in the 
literature, and certainly not in contemporary official documentation, perhaps this thesis 
should allow the admiral the credit of keeping Pondicherry in British hands without giving 
diplomatic ammunition to Napoleon.  
 
The actual timetable shows that the government tried its hardest. War was declared on 18 
May, 1803. Less than twelve weeks later the Bombay Presidency ordered the Bombay 
Marine brig Teignmouth (16) to take „secret intelligence‟ to the Governor of Ceylon, Rainier, 
the Governor of Madras and the Governor General.
150
 On the 4 September Rainier wrote that 
he had just received news of the outbreak of war from „a fast brig‟.151 It had taken only four 
weeks for the Teignmouth to sail from Bombay to the Coromandel Coast, having stopped at 
Trincomalee. This timetable illustrates that the government did its utmost to get news to India 
and there is no way that Rainier could have been advised of the war any earlier. Interestingly, 
the Teignmouth was not as rapid in reaching Calcutta because, on the 14 September, 
Wellesley wrote to Rainier that he had still not heard of the official declaration of war.
152
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c) Intelligence and Battle of Pulo Aur.
153
 
The battle of Pulo Aur was an example of Rainier making a decision with no intelligence at 
all, merely working on assumptions. The China Tea Fleet, under Commodore Dance, and 
carrying cargo valued at £8 million, left Canton in January 1804 with no escort. Linois, with 
the Marengo (84), two heavy frigates and two sloops, met it the following month. With the 
Peace of Amiens, the Britain Government had initiated its usual practice of immediately 
denuding its fleet to reduce costs and the East Indies was no exception. Rainier had been 
ordered to return several ships and mostly he was left with old and worn out vessels. 
Therefore he concentrated his ships as best he could in order to have with him a reasonable 
force in case he met Linois, which meant he had insufficient ships for convoy duty. His 
problem was that, due to necessary dockyard repairs to Tremendous (74) and Trident (74), his 
only available line of battle ship was the Lancaster (64). Unfortunately he did not know 
where the French admiral was, so he concentrated on what he saw as the weak points of 
India‟s defences, Goa, Trincomalee and Bombay.  
 
He could not afford to allow frigates alone to protect convoys against a powerful French 
squadron and risk their capture as well as the merchantmen they were supposed to protect.
154
 
Castlereagh informed Wellesley that St. Vincent had told him that St. Vincent: „will be 
prepared, if necessary, to reinforce it [the East Indies] so soon as the Channel arrangements 
are completed‟.155 This intention, probably decided in June 1803,156 would require ships to be 
fitted out, then sail to India. So St. Vincent‟s plan to send three third rates to reinforce Rainier 
could not arrive to help Rainier until March 1804 at the earliest, too late for the China Fleet. 
However, Rainier had been forewarned of this problem. In April 1803, the Admiralty had 
written to him saying that the Government and Parliament wanted to keep as many ships as 
possible in home waters. He was therefore advised to keep his ships together as much as 
circumstances would permit.
157
 How he might do this given the demands for trade protection, 
he was not advised. In fact the Albion (74) and Sceptre (74) were sent out and missed the 
Battle of Pulo Aur by two weeks. They were followed, not long after, by the Russell (74), and 
Grampus (50).  
 
In the event, Dance, with six of his Indiamen pretending to be third rates, chased off the 
powerful French squadron.
158
 If Linois had seen through the bluff he could have captured the 
entire fleet. Rainier‟s reputation would not have survived such a loss. Although the China 
Fleet was a priority, he had received no intelligence as to its departure date.
159
 Secondly there 
was no intelligence as to which channel the China ships would use to return from Canton.
160
 
Rainier was expecting reinforcements from England, and, indeed, they were already at 
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Madras. And it was usual for a warship escort to accompany the China Fleet to and from 
Canton. 
 
…The Protection of the Trade of the Company to, and from China, I 
apprehend will be provided for by the Admiralty, agreeable to the mode 
generally adopted during the late war.  … I do not conceive myself 
authorized to detach any part of the Squadron on that Service as things were 
circumstanced when the intelligence of the commencement of Hostilities 
was first received.
161
   
 
The usual route when heading towards Bengal was through the Malacca Straits. But because 
it was well known as a potential trap, it was usually avoided by going through one of the 
more easterly passages such as Bali or Lombok. In fact Rainier noted that the Straits of 
Malacca had only been used once in the last war and that was when he personally was the 
escort commander, otherwise it was too dangerous to use.
162
 A more direct route if heading 
solely for Europe was through the Sunda Straits, between Sumatra and Java. Because Bali 
and Lombok were less frequently used there was less chance of the enemy lying in wait. 
However, they were narrow and less well charted for such a large and valuable convoy. 
Unfortunately Rainier was as much at a loss as to which route the convoy would use because 
no-one had told either him or his senior naval officer in the Moluccas. In fact, he had not 
even been asked to provide an escort, either for India- or England-bound ships. He assumed 
that the Admiralty had sent out an escort with the China Fleet and that it would have stayed in 
Canton in order to escort it back to England. He did not know where Linois was, and, because 
of the monsoon, he himself was on the Malabar Coast. He was therefore predisposed to 
believe that the Admiralty would extricate him from his dilemma of needing to protect the 
China Fleet so that he would not have to take on the duty for which, in any case, he did not 
have the ships. 
 
Wellesley appreciated Rainier‟s predicament on the resumption of war, rather more than the 
Admiralty, when he told Rainier that he would give every assistance possible to prepare his 
ships for war.
163
 The Albion and Sceptre arrived in Indian waters in January 1804 with sick 
and worn out crews. With orders only to wait at Madras until they learned of Rainier‟s 
commands, they waited to recoup until news of Linois raid on the British base at Bencoolen 
panicked the Governor of Madras, Lord William Bentinck. He persuaded the two ships to 
rush off to the east to protect British interests. This action infuriated Rainier. Although the 
governor could not officially give orders to the Royal Navy, it would be a brave captain, 
especially newly arrived on the station, who would ignore suggestions from such a high 
ranking official. So Rainier did not blame his captains. Instead he wrote to Bentinck to 
„express to Your Lordship the deep and sensible regret‟ for sending his ships „so far from my 
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reach‟. This had seriously weakened his forces and he could not now provide an escort for the 
Bombay Presidency for its troopships.
164
 
 
Not only could the two reinforcements not arrive in time to protect the China Fleet but, more 
frustratingly for Rainier, they would end up being too far to the east to reinforce his squadron 
for potentially a period of months. 
 
When everyone had calmed down after Pulo Aur, Rainier followed up his campaign to 
protect his reputation in a letter to the Canton supercargoes:  
 
 … but for want of information of Your arrangement for the sailing of the 
Homeward bound Ships both to Europe and to this Country, and from mistakes 
that followed, they [Rainier‟s warships] were mostly dispersed with Convoys 
before the intelligence was announced of the Enemy being on the look out for 
them so near the Eastern entrance of the Straight (sic) of Malacca.  
 
He ended by urging them in future to tell him and the local senior naval officer, when 
and by what route, they were sailing.
165
   
 
Naturally, Rainier wrote to the Admiralty to explain what he had done to protect the China 
ships before Pulo Aur. He tried to blame Captain Bathurst of the Terpsichore who he had sent 
to Penang to protect the ships coming from China and who he felt had disobeyed his orders to 
wait for the entire fleet of country ships but, instead, had followed the request of the governor 
general to escort just the first division of the country ships. But even if he had waited at 
Penang he would have been too far north to have had any effect on the action. It would 
appear that Rainier used this deviation from his orders, and Bentinck‟s „orders‟ to the Albion 
and Sceptre sending them out of his reach, as somewhat disingenuous excuses for the China 
Fleet having been left unprotected. He also criticised Captain Page of the frigate Caroline 
who: „would have been a very acceptable considerable reinforcement to me … but he 
preferred Cruizing according to his own Caprice‟. However, it would seem that the Admiralty 
understood his dilemma and did not, at least officially, note his „smokescreen‟ of excuses 
because, in the usual manner of replying to admirals‟ despatches, in the corner was written 
that the Admiralty approved of his actions.
166
 
 
The impact of Rainier‟s protestations about convoys and the near disaster at Pulo Aur would 
seem to have had little lasting impact because, in February 1805, Pellew wrote to the 
Admiralty that eight Indiamen had been told by Rainier to come in convoy with the departing 
admiral. But, in the night, they had broken free and were never in convoy again.
167
 And in the 
1806-7 season, there were still no escorts available for the journey from Canton to Bombay 
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and four ships had to take the voyage unescorted. They knew how dangerous it was and had 
taken out double insurance.
168
 The gains of such unilateral trade clearly overcame the obvious 
risks. 
 
It is interesting to note that study of the factors affecting Rainier‟s decision could still lead to 
a difference of opinion. Gillespie, in his article in the Mariner’s Mirror believed that the 
admiral had made: „quite good arrangements beforehand for meeting the China Fleet, but 
these failed. I do not think he was a Nelson‟. Gillespie also noted the puzzle as to why 
Rainier did not order his small squadron, which he sent to Penang, to travel further into the 
Straits of Malacca, especially as this would give the British more chance of obtaining the 
intelligence which Rainier needed.
169
  It is possible that he wanted to avoid the risk of these 
two frigates, one en flute, and a sloop, meeting Linois with his 84 gun Marengo, aided by two 
heavy frigates and two sloops. This would only lead to their capture by the French. And 
Rainier only had one ship, the Lancaster (64), in his entire squadron with which he might 
contest directly with Linois, which ship was with him on the west coast. On this part of his 
disposition he had the support of Admiral Ballard who wrote in the Mariner’s Mirror 
following Gillespie‟s article: „I adhere to my view that Rainier‟s dispositions were the best 
that could be foreseen, and that he was justified in remaining on the Malabar side‟.170 On 
balance Rainier‟s judgement in the absence of intelligence seems logical, but it turned out to 
be wrong. Therefore, practically, Rainier had no alternative but to keep his forces on the 
Ceylon/ Malabar Coast. He clearly knew in how much danger this placed the China Fleet and 
he was worried. But atypically, he made positive assumptions that the Admiralty would 
already have sent out escort ships to China and that the Canton supercargoes would have the 
intellect not to send the Fleet through the Straits of Malacca. He was faced with the choice of 
defending only one of the two vulnerable targets which he was supposed to protect. With his 
cautious nature he felt that India was the more important and in this he was correct. His 
understandable error was in overestimating the dangers to India and underestimating those to 
the China Fleet. 
 
A letter written by St. Vincent, stating that his successor in the Mediterranean should have 
„temper and good nerves‟, has been used to conclude that the most supportive way for a 
commander to have these traits would be to be able to make „considered decisions‟ from high 
quality and timely intelligence.
171
 Given the size and complexity on his station, it was almost 
impossible for Rainier to benefit from these attributes. Yet only during the aftermath of the 
battle of Pulo Aur did he appear to manifest a degree of loss of „temper and nerves‟.172 A 
reflection of this was an implied criticism of the Admiralty in not telling him if they had sent 
out an escort with the outward bound China Fleet, which they could easily have done and 
which was a common practice. That he only learned of the absence of an escort from the 
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newspapers illustrates the level to which he was sometimes reduced in order to obtain his 
information.
173
 
 
d) The Disposition of Rainier‟s Squadron: autumn 1804. 
The fourth issue was one in which he had years of experience – assessing what might be the 
French admiral‟s intentions. Parkinson‟s views appear contradictory; on one hand he says: „if 
his guesses were unfortunate, it does not appear that anyone else had proved a better prophet‟ 
but he also says: „In a game of hide and seek it sometimes happens that imagination is more 
needed than experience‟.174  No doubt the scars from the near disaster of Pulo Aur had 
coloured Rainier‟s mind. He expected Linois to attack the China fleet again so he positioned 
his ships in a manner to catch the French Admiral amongst the Java archipelago. But then he 
heard that Linois had been seen in the Bay of Bengal, in the path of the Calcutta trade and 
there were no British defences capable of stopping the Marengo with its two heavy frigates. 
His sources of intelligence had failed him and he had put the Country Trade at risk. He 
rapidly returned to Madras and sent Captain Williams of the Russell to Penang, taking the 
sloop Victor with him. If he obtained news he was to return himself or send his consort.
175
 
The one piece of intelligence he had, from an American ship, he ignored as it did not fit with 
his preconception. But he had many years of experience of American misinformation so he 
can be exonerated for not believing it in the absence of any other news. The incident is a 
good example of the challenges Rainier faced when interpreting intelligence in the light of 
decades of experience in the East Indies; it was never complete, it was rarely up to date, it 
was often unreliable.  
  
Conclusion. 
 
The intelligence picture was more of an incomplete jigsaw puzzle than the basis for action. 
Intelligence, if it came at all, arrived from a great variety of sources, covering many subjects. 
Rainier‟s challenge was to decide what was valuable and what not, taking into account the 
source, the subject, and whether or not it was out of date. Arab opinion on the state of the 
Ottoman army would always need a strong filter. But only his own experience could help him 
judge whether American and Danish data were valid. He needed to understand if Company 
officials‟ information was accurate or had they been tricked by their enemies. Information 
from the Admiralty might have been accurate when it was sent, but nine months later might 
be totally out of date.  
 
Of the examples above concerning the use of intelligence, that concerning the Red Sea was 
clearly a success.  It is difficult to criticise Rainier for the escape of the Linois at Pondicherry 
in 1803 if one takes a purely legalistic point of view – he had no intelligence of the outbreak 
of war and therefore an attack on Linois would have been illegal. His memory of the furore 
caused by Cornwallis‟s fight with a French frigate in 1792, before war was declared, would 
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have predicted Bonaparte‟s diplomatic skills casting him as a villain in the eyes of Europe. 
Ballard answers the critics over Rainier‟s actions prior to the battle of Pulo Aur but clearly, 
whatever the logic of his actions, he would have received no mercy if it had gone the wrong 
way. His misreading of Linois‟ intentions concerning a possible attack on the China Trade in 
October 1804 had no long term repercussions, apart from denying Rainier the kudos of a final 
victory in battle. But it does illustrate the difficulties of offensive operations with poor 
intelligence. 
 
But, given these caveats, it would appear that Rainier had, on balance, a true appreciation of 
the importance of intelligence, asking for it from such disparate sources as the Naval Officer 
in Bombay and the Supercargoes in Canton, seeking to evaluate its worth, be it from an 
American merchant ship or an Arab trader, and passing intelligence to the Governor General, 
the Admiralty, and the C-in-C Cape. He gave recognition to those who supplied it as with his 
praise of Captain Wilson at Mocha. He always took it seriously, even if he mistrusted it. With 
great skill, and a certain amount of good fortune, as in the timing of Bonaparte‟s invasion of 
Egypt, he used this key tool to ensure that his squadron was most effective at thwarting 
French ambitions, supporting the expansion of British rule in India, and in protecting the 
Trade.    
 
Understanding the weather and communications, how the Company was both a vital resource 
and a hindrance, and how effective he was in operating with the navy and Company, this 
chapter has analysed the pros and cons of the intelligence available to Rainier. The next three 
chapters will demonstrate how well he achieved his goals taking into account the 
environment in which he functioned. 
 
Looking at the elements of this relationship it is clear that there was much scope for 
dissention and internecine warfare, especially with the conflicting interests that would arise 
during a world war. In some ways it would have been easier if the Governor General had had 
command of the Navy. But, given the world of cooperation rather than command in which 
they operated, it can be seen that Rainier managed to wage the war against a complex set of 
enemies with consummate skill. 
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    CHAPTER 5. 
 
 ‘[YOUR ORDERS ARE] TO BEST PROTECT THE TRADE ... OF HIS             
MAJESTY’S SUBECTS AND HIS ALLIES IN THE EAST INDIES’.1 
  
THE GEOGRAPHY OF MARITIME TRADE AND ITS PROTECTION. 
        
It is the contention of this thesis that Rainier’s achievements can be identified under four 
categories; trade protection, the protection and expansion of British colonial possessions, the 
growth of British power in India, and the establishment of a logistics structure for the navy. 
This chapter will address the first achievement. But before one can appreciate the matter of 
trade protection it is necessary to understand the context in which it took place. One must 
understand the physical features of this enormous station, including its primary weather 
patterns,2 and the trade routes which formed the skeleton of British interest and power in the 
region.  
 
The Station’s Geographic Features.3 
 
The actual area which Rainier covered consisted of more than thirty million square miles. It 
stretched from Canton in China down through the Philippines to Sydney in Australia, then 
west across the Indonesian archipelago and Bay of Bengal to India. Onwards over the Indian 
Ocean it went northwards into the Red Sea. Its western boundary depended on whether or not 
the Cape of Good Hope was in British hands. When it was, Rainier’s command stopped short 
of the African coast south of Madagascar and the key French islands of Mauritius and 
Reunion. Before the Cape was taken in 1795, and after it was returned to the Netherlands in 
1801, Rainier had the doubtful privilege of covering the entire sea lanes westwards to South 
Africa. 
 
Unfortunately the station’s geographical features were not well known and this had a serious 
impact on the trade and naval operations during Rainier’s command. According to Parkinson: 
‘English charts, based on hearsay and legend, were, and were known to be, utterly 
unreliable’.4 In fact Elphinstone wrote to the Admiralty when he heard of Rainier’s 
expedition to the Moluccas, that because of Dutch pusillanimity: ‘the navigation of those seas 
appears to me to be the greatest risk attendant on the Rear Admiral’s undertaking’.5 Rivalry 
between the European powers meant that charts were treated as secret documents, and 
religious rivalry meant that the same attitude applied in the Red Sea. Because the Netherlands 
was an ally of Britain care was taken not to irritate Dutch sensibilities. And because Britain 
had no wish to extend its colonies it only required access to harbours for supplies and minor 
                                                            
1 T.N.A., ADM 2/1347, Admiralty to Rainier 25 February 1794, see Appendix 9. 
2 See Appendix 10f. 
3 See Appendix 10a. 
4 Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas, p. 104. 
5 Elphinstone to Admiralty, 24 June 1796, in Perrin (ed.), Keith Papers, vol. 1, p. 419, see Appendix 10d. 
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repairs. Consequently the navy’s only experience of the Eastern Seas would be to escort the 
Trade to and from Canton. Even after 1815 it was clear that the route through the Straits of 
Sunda was poorly charted. En route to Canton in 1817 HMS Alceste (44) hit a coral reef off 
the island of Gaspar just north of Sunda and “bilged”. Immediately before it hit there were 
fourteen fathoms of water.6 Four years earlier HMS Volage (22), passing to the other side of 
Gaspar, noted a ‘very dangerous’ uncharted rock’.7 The dangers of this area were also 
described by Robert Sawyer: 
 
 ...till the extent of the dangers off the South end of Banca are better known, the 
approach of it must be dangerous and we seem to be equally ignorant of what 
dangers may lie off the numerous islands lying to the south east.8 
 
Voyaging to his new station in 1794 Rainier entered the Indian Ocean from the west with a 
journey of 4,600 miles from the Cape to Bombay. He would know that suitable naval bases 
along the way were rare. In the western sector the most suitable were the two French islands, 
Reunion [Isle de Bourbon] and Mauritius [Isle de France]. Madagascar had a good harbour at 
Fort Dauphin but was too far west to be an effective naval base. A small French settlement 
there provided food and slaves for Mauritius.  
 
Mauritius was the main French base with a population averaging over 82,000 between 1804 
and 1825.9 It also had an excellent harbour in Port Louis. The prime drawback was that it 
could not feed itself, sustenance coming primarily from Reunion, 130 miles to the south west, 
from French and neutral vessels sailing from Europe and the United States, and from 
Madagascar. Naval stores had to come from France or from British prizes captured by the 
many privateers and warships based there. Its distance from India [2500 miles] meant that an 
effective blockade would require more ships than were available to the Royal Navy. Its 
unique weather patterns gave it a hurricane season: 
 
 The island is subject to hurricanes, and in the stormy months, which are January, 
February and March, they are sometimes very violent ... when the velocity of the 
winds ... exceeds 140 feet in a second, nothing is able to resist its fury.10 
 
 This narrowed the period that a blockade or full invasion could be organised and its rocky 
coastline gave no easy landing points - at least until detailed surveys were made in 1810 
when a suitable landing site was discovered. But even these surveys did not solve all 
problems. In 1812, HMS Nisus (44) noted that the position of the southern tip of Mauritius on 
                                                            
6 U.K.H.O., Misc. Papers, vol. 65, Remarks Book HMS Alceste, p. 617. 
7 Ibid., vol. 64, Remarks Book HMS Volage, p. 571. 
8 Robert Sawyer, The Oriental Navigator or New Directions for Sailing to and from the East Indies (London, 
1794), p. 454. It is worth noting that, in this book, Sawyer describes the routes with the word “dangerous” 156 
times. 
9 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 16. 
10 Sawyer, The Oriental Navigator, p. 74. 
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the charts was incorrect.11 However, not all opinions about Mauritius were positive. ‘“The 
Isle of France was and will always be fatal to the establishments that the French have in 
India”’.12 Although it was a haven to which the French navy could retire from Indian waters 
at the first threat of defeat, it was too much of a diversion from more important locations on 
the mainland, such as Pondicherry. And to a resourceful admiral it was not necessary. Suffren 
did not once return to Mauritius during the entire course of the American Revolution. 
 
Moving eastwards, the next important piece of land was Ceylon with its excellent harbour of 
Trincomalee, in 1794 a Dutch colony. This harbour was so situated that it could be used year 
round. It had been utilised by Suffren in the previous war and Rainier appreciated its 
significance; it was his first target when the Netherlands were occupied by France in 1795. Its 
drawback was that it had no productive hinterland so could not provide a naval squadron with 
much more than water and firewood. However, its location was optimum for moving up 
either side of India, depending on the circumstances and wind, and for meeting convoys 
either coming from England or to assemble the Trade coming from the Bay of Bengal, prior 
to returning to Europe. Yet its navigation was not always easy. As quoted in a document from 
the Remarks Books of HMS Leopard and Trident: ‘Admiral Rainier in August and 
September gained very little ground with very hard beating [it was] difficult to round Ceylon 
to westward in the south west monsoon’.13 In 1802 Ceylon became a Crown colony, no 
longer under the control of the Company. Potentially at least this made it a self-sufficient 
Royal Naval base of its own where admirals and captains would no longer have to “kow tow” 
to Company officials in order to make their vessels ready for operations. Dundas appreciated 
Ceylon’s importance saying that, should France seize it, the French Minister of War ought to 
lose his head if France had not taken all British possessions in India within four years.14 
 
To the north the Red Sea formed the limit of Rainier’s station.15 It was primarily a Muslim 
sea. Therefore the local rulers tried to exclude Christian sailors and merchants because of its 
economic importance, as a conduit of grain from Egypt to Arabia, as a route for passenger 
traffic, and its religious importance for carrying pilgrims to Mecca and Medina. The extreme 
Sunni Wahabi sect sacked the Shia holy place of Karbala in 1801, and seized Mecca and 
Medina in 1806. These acts did not help the cause of Christian influence in the Red Sea 
region.16 And prior to these events the Egyptian trade associated with the haj was thought to 
be worth £3 million to Egypt alone, as much as British trade with Bengal.17 This was too 
large a sum to be risked by allowing Christians the opportunity to disrupt the traffic. 
                                                            
11 U.K.H.O., Misc. Papers, vol. 64, Remarks Book, HMS Nisus, p. 424. 
12 Sonnerat, Voyage aux Indies Orientales et a la Chine, vol. 11, p. 366, quoted in Sen, The French in India 
1763-1816, p. 534. 
13 U.K.H.O., Misc Papers, vol. 64, “Remarks on a voyage to the Red Sea in 1798 and to India in 1805 by HMS 
Leopard and Trident, p. 670. 
14 Fry, The Dundas Despotism, p. 192. 
15 See Appendix 10e. 
16 C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: the British Empire and the World 1780-1930 (London, 1989), p. 36. 
17 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, p. 232. 
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Consequently the Sea was largely uncharted: ‘I do not think there is any place of large extent 
so little surveyed or known’.18 A local opinion elaborated on this concern: 
 
… Ships are every Night obliged to put into some Place of Safety, for fear of 
striking upon the Rocks; they sail in Day time only, and all the Night ride fast at 
Anchor. This Sea, moreover, is subject to very thick fogs, and to violent Gales of 
Wind, and so has nothing to recommend it, either within or without.19  
 
Therefore it is understandable how frustrating Blankett found operating in the area and how 
important was the relatively local Bombay dockyard for repairing all the hulls of ships 
damaged by grounding. Ports able to support a naval squadron were few, consisting primarily 
of the trading port of Mocha in the south, Jeddah further up the eastern coast and sensitive 
because of its role as the gateway to Mecca, and Suez in the far north, the departure point for 
pilgrims and grain southwards.  
 
The entrance to the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandab, is only twenty miles across and that is divided 
by the island of Perim.20 The west channel is sixteen miles wide and the eastern one two 
miles. When the winds were from the north, between April and September, it was impossible 
to leave and when the winds were from the south, between October and March, it was 
impossible to enter the Sea. 
 
The Persian Gulf was important because of the trade between Bombay and Muscat, and 
because mail and intelligence flowed from London, Constantinople and the British 
representatives in Baghdad [Hartford Jones] and Bussora [Manesty]. Intelligence would 
primarily be carried in Bombay Marine or naval vessels for security and speed. The trade was 
usually carried by Arab vessels although it was often escorted by the Bombay Marine as 
pirates were active in the area. 
 
Rainier never visited the sector. Apart from during the French occupation of Egypt it was not 
an area of concern. He managed his operations there from Bombay to ensure British 
manoeuvres were adequately supported and to ensure the communication routes with Britain 
remained open. 
 
On the sub continent itself, the centre of British government, Calcutta, at the head of the Bay 
of Bengal, was not ideal from a naval point of view.21 The problem was that, during the north 
east monsoon, India was to the leeward so any emergency that required naval vessels to head 
east would be struggling against the wind. And Calcutta was eighty miles up the river 
Hooghly – a river of currents that could rise to eighteen knots, a tidal range of twenty two 
                                                            
18 A. Bissell, A Voyage from England to the Red Sea and along the East Coast of Arabia to Bombay (London 
1806), p. 67, quoted in Ingram, In Defence of British India, p. 21. 
19 Abu Zaid Hasan ibn Yazid, Ancient Accounts of India and China (London, 1733), quoted in M. Pearson, The 
Indian Ocean (Abingdon, 2003), p. 17. 
20 See Appendix 10e. 
21 See Appendix 10b. 
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feet and with daily shifting sand banks. Many ships were lost travelling both up and down the 
river, and even moored, they could be swept aside by the current.  
 
The other major presidency, Madras, was situated some 800 miles further south on the 
eastern side of India. Its eminence was due primarily to its position on land, close to some of 
the important Indian rulers, and due to its proximity to Pondicherry, which had been France’s 
main possession on the mainland before being taken by the British in 1793. Although the 
strongest of French mainland possessions, Pondicherry was seen as incapable of supporting 
an offensive campaign without the assistance of Tippoo.22 Madras was also the main British 
naval base on the east coast of India during the south west monsoon, so was a location well 
known to Rainier. If Madras were to be threatened by any enemy, the ability to reinforce it 
from Calcutta was heavily dependent on the season. During the north east monsoon, between 
October and March, the journey might take five days, but in the south west monsoon, 
between April and September, the journey could take more than five weeks. As a naval base 
it was poor, with no harbour, just an open roadstead, and a lee shore for half the year. As 
described by Parkinson: ‘there was no harbour at all, just an open roadstead, a dangerous lee 
shore for half the year and an inconvenient landing place during the rest’.23 It was described 
in a contemporaneous navigation guide: 
 
... you lie exposed to all winds ... with a large swell perpetually rolling ... which 
makes ships labour very much. Your ship must be watered by the country boats, 
as none other can land, on account of the surf.24  
 
And as one visitor wrote: 
 
I am detained here by the tremendous surf, which for these two days has been 
mountains high: and it is extraordinary, that on this coast, even with very little 
wind, the surf is often so high that no boat dares venture through it; indeed it is 
always high enough to be frightful.25  
 
Clearly this meant that it was also difficult for merchant ships, both to land stores and as an 
anchorage during the north east monsoon. The authorities did not want to encourage shipping 
during the most dangerous period. Such was the danger that the flag-staff, by which vessels 
took their bearings before anchoring, was struck each year on 15 October, and was not 
erected again until 15 December. HMS Nisus noted that, between 30 April to 2 May 1811, 
                                                            
22 Archives National, Guerre, A1, 3765, Souillac to Castries, 15 Sept 1785, quoted in H. Furber, John Company 
at Work, p. 73. Tippoo Sultan, ruler of Mysore, son of Hyder Ali and inveterate enemy of British rule. Killed at 
Siege of  Seringapatam in 1799. 
23 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 12. 
24 Anon, Sailing Directions for the East-India or Oriental Pilot, and for the navigation between England and the 
Cape of Good Hope (London, 1781). 
25 J. Kindersley, Letters from the Island of Teneriffe, Brazil, the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies 
(London, 1777), quoted in Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 26. 
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112 vessels were lost off Madras during an unexpected typhoon in the supposedly safe 
season.26 
 
It is an indication of how few suitable harbours there were on the eastern side of India that 
Madras was the major summer naval base in the region.  
 
The third major Indian base for the navy was Bombay. It had many positive assets. It had a 
safe harbour during the north east monsoon, October to March, and this is where the navy 
preferred to stay through this period. Thanks to the East India Company, it had excellent dry 
dock facilities. It was well positioned to cover any threat from the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf 
and was the eastern terminal of the overland mail route from England. It was from this base 
that Rainier coordinated the naval activities against Bonaparte’s perceived threat from Egypt. 
 
Formerly important locations that had lost their eminence included the Portuguese possession 
of Goa, which had been founded in 1510. Its vulnerability and Rainier’s dilemma are noted in 
Chapter Four. A letter from Rainier to the Admiralty in 1799 tells of his negotiations with the 
Governor of Goa to obtain his agreement to allow the British to help him if the French were 
to attack.27 
 
Moving east across the Bay of Bengal towards China there was therefore much activity to 
find a suitable base to windward.28 Cornwallis, Rainier’s predecessor, spent much time 
charting the Andaman Islands but was frustrated by the common drawback to all the islands 
to the west of Java – they might have a good, safe harbour, but they lacked the population and 
resources to meet all the demands of a naval base. The solution was Penang, an island in the 
Straits of Malacca. Not only could it support a population of over 10,000 people, it was on 
the main route from Calcutta to China at one of its bottlenecks and could thus deter enemy 
ships from waiting in that area, and it could perform minor repairs. Acheen, on the northern 
tip of Sumatra, although controlled by local rulers, was regularly used as a base by French 
commerce raiders. Indeed Suffren had used it to great effect during the American Revolution. 
Penang was useful as a centre from which to cover this threat. In 1795 the port of Malacca, to 
the south of Penang, was taken to provide a base for ships covering the Trade through the 
Straits of Malacca. 
 
Rainier’s experience to the east of India – the Dutch East Indies – had been minimal, apart 
from sailing through to attack Manila in 1762. All five of the battles against Suffren had been 
fought in the narrow area between Madras and Ceylon. This was not unusual as the Dutch 
were keen to maintain a monopoly of that region’s trade. But the French occupation of the 
Netherlands made the islands Rainier’s third target after Trincomalee and Malacca. To the 
south east of Penang, the large island of Sumatra had the small British base of Fort 
Marlborough, otherwise known as Bencoolen. Even this harbour was dangerous: ‘In this 
                                                            
26 U.K.H.O., Misc. Papers, Remarks Book, HMS Nisus, p. 332. 
27 N.M.M., RAI/7, Rainier to Admiralty, 17 May 1799. 
28 See Appendix 10d. 
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Road the sea sometimes came in so heavy that, on account of the vessels rolling, we were 
obliged to lash the sheets in the steerage ... between September and March’.29  The next large 
European centre was Batavia, the “capital” of the Dutch East Indies, on the island of Java. It 
had a safe harbour and an excellent dockyard, providing its own timber from the hinterland. 
And it had powerful forts defending it. A population of 160,000 is estimated to have been in 
residence in 1805.30 Unfortunately it had a reputation of being the most unhealthy place in the 
east, although it is believed its 10% mortality rate was no higher than in Bengal.31 
  
At the extreme eastern limit of the station lay Manila in the Philippines. As Spain was, in 
theory at least, an enemy for much of Rainier’s period of command, he had to monitor 
developments there.32 Across the bay from Manila lay Cavite, the naval base. It could hold a 
large squadron and, as the Spaniards were ever pusillanimous, Rainier had to watch this 
potential threat which was just 500 miles from the mouth of the Pearl River whence the China 
tea Fleet sailed.33 Here was the entrance to Canton, the only Chinese port with which 
foreigners were allowed to trade. At the mouth was the Portuguese colony of Macao. Since 
the sixteenth century Macao had been a place of refuge for European ships recovering from 
long voyages or trying to trade with the Chinese. Unfortunately the Portuguese were now 
weak and threatened with occupation by France.34 Britain could not allow France to become 
influential with the Chinese court and so was prepared to occupy Macao to forestall such an 
event.35 However, the Chinese authorities were sufficiently wise to see the dangers of having 
either France or Britain in power over the tiny colony and they ensured that it remained under 
Portuguese hegemony.36 
 
To the far south east, of the station lay Sydney in Australia. Whilst there was no strategic 
importance to Rainier he would have been aware that the first ship left India in 1793 with 
supplies for the new colony, followed by four others in 1794-5; a clear sign that many of the 
necessities of life for this nascent European culture would be supplied by one of the world’s 
oldest cultures.37 
 
Japan, notable merely because of its isolation, was never a country that required attention 
from Rainier. Apart from the visit of a Royal Navy frigate in 1808 to Nagasaki, there was no 
mercantile or naval contact with the xenophobic empire during this period. 
 
 
 
                                                            
29 Anon, Sailing Directions for the East India, p. 102. 
30 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 26. 
31 Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
32B.L., I.O.R., Add. Mss. 13757, Rainier to Wellesley, 21 September 1800. 
33 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 259. 
34 Ibid., p. 315. 
35 H.J. Wood, ‘England, China and the Napoleonic Wars’, The Pacific Historical Review,vol.9, No. 2, June 
1940, p. 141. 
36 B.L., I.O.R., Add. Mss. 13762, Rainier to Wellesley, 13 April 1803. 
37 Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 196. 
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The Impact of Weather Patterns on the Station’s Communications and Trade Routes. 
 
It is beneficial to understand the wind patterns as they often dictated the relative usefulness of 
occupied territories and the movement of warships and the Trade. Penang was convenient 
because, during the north east monsoon, it could cover the Bay of Bengal. During this time 
any ships to the west of the Bay could take months to reach the eastern side. This season also 
meant it was impossible to maintain Rainier’s squadron on the east coast of India as it was a 
lee shore. Therefore the navy moved round to the west coast, and to Bombay in particular, 
where its ships could be refitted. When Trincomalee was in British hands its harbour, being 
the closest base to Madras, could be used safely during both monsoons.38  
 
The main wind system in the region is the monsoon. From October to March the north east 
monsoon blows and between April and September the south west monsoon replaces it. 
However, they can only be relied upon for four of the six months because of variability 
during the changeover period. South of Mozambique the monsoon winds disappear.39 The 
“Roaring Forties”, well to the south of the Cape, and far from the French base of Mauritius, 
always blow to the east. This allows ships bound directly for China to head due east past 
India before turning north to Canton through one of the straits of the Indonesian archipelago. 
 
The ships for China and India would usually leave England between December and May in 
order to catch the summer south westerlies up the east coast of Africa.40 Most convoys would 
stop at the Cape to replenish food and water, especially if carrying troops.41 These convoys 
would usually be escorted by warships sent out to the East Indies as replacements or 
reinforcements, especially if carrying bullion to finance the trade.42 Occasionally those 
Indiamen heading for India had no escort, then they would be watched past Mauritius by 
warships based at the Cape, when the Cape was in British hands, and, if Rainier felt there 
were dangers, they would be picked up by his ships to the south of Ceylon and escorted to 
Madras and Calcutta.43 The occasional vessels heading for Bombay would normally be under 
insufficient risk to warrant any escorts. The China ships, almost always escorted the entire 
return journey, would sail more southerly into the Indian Ocean, around forty degrees [the 
Roaring Forties] to catch the westerlies which would take them almost to the west coast of 
Australia and up through one of the Indonesian Straits, usually Sunda, to Canton.44 Very 
occasionally they would even sail past Australia and head up the west coast of the continent 
                                                            
38 See Appendix 10f, Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 12, Trade in the Eastern Seas, p. 66. 
39 Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas, pp. 198-102, pp. 105-9. 
40 See Maps in Appendix 10 for Details. 
41 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 32. 
42 T.N.A., ADM 2/141, Admiralty to Rainier, 7 May 1801. 
43 Anon., ‘Trade Defence in the Indian Seas’, Naval Review, vol. XVIII, No. 1, February 1930, p. 67. 
44 G.S. Graham, Great Britain and the Indian Ocean (Oxford, 1967), p. 42. 
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and sail into Canton via the South China Sea. Both routes had the added benefit of passing far 
to the south thus avoiding predators.45  
 
During the south west monsoon ships heading for India would pass through the Mozambique 
Channel, called the “Inner Passage” and then through either the eight or nine degree channels 
between the Laccadive and Maldive Islands. At any other time the winds were so contrary 
that this route could not be followed, therefore ships took the “Middle Passage” to the east of 
Madagascar which was closer to the dangerous [for British ships] French islands. The lower 
route, through the “One and a Half Degree Channel”, below the Maldives, was not 
discovered by the British until 1811 and this cut nearly 1000 miles from the journey.46 
Consequently British vessels aimed to arrive in the Indian Ocean during the south west 
monsoon in order that they could use the “Inner Passage”.  The importance of choosing the 
right time to make the journey is illustrated by Blankett’s voyage to the Red Sea in 1798-9.47 
Bad weather and delays in Portsmouth meant that he did not round the Cape until October 1 
and therefore had to struggle up the western side of the Indian Ocean against the north east 
monsoon. This gave him a total journey time of ten months. If the French had been quicker to 
the Red Sea and if Rainier had not immediately sent ships there from India, thereby making 
Blankett’s squadron less important, the impact of Bonaparte’s Egyptian adventure could have 
been much more serious. 
 
The shipping routes through the Indonesian archipelago were varied but dangerous and 
poorly charted.48 The Sumatran coastal route being described by Sawyer: 
 
 You are generally obliged to turn it hereabout, you must make the best advantage 
you can of the tides and be very cautious ... it may be considered as the most 
dangerous in these straits.49 
 
Ships from north east India tended to go through the Straits of Malacca but those from 
Europe, Bombay and Madras tended to use the Straits of Sunda. Other routes further east, 
used primarily in war, were the Straits of Lombok and Bali. Given the tea crop preordained 
sailing times to and from China, and with few possible routes, it was relatively easy for 
predators to lie in wait across the possible courses to be taken by the merchantmen. Britain 
tried on different occasions to occupy certain islands to give support to its convoys. 
Bencoolen, situated on Sumatra, near the Strait of Sunda, was the most important. But even it 
declined in importance by 1801 when it was placed under the control of Prince of Wales 
Island, as Penang was called. Occasionally, when the threat of enemy privateers was 
particularly serious, vessels would take the “Eastern Passage” which went south of the 
Moluccas, north of New Guinea and then northwards to the west of the Philippines. Vessels 
                                                            
45 R.P. Crowhurst, ‘The Voyage of the Pitt – A Turning Point in East India Navigation’, MM, vol. 55, 1969, No. 
1, pp. 43-55. 
46 Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas, p. 106. 
47 Ibid., p. 110. 
48 See Appendix 10d. 
49 Sawyer, The Oriental Navigator, p. 430. 
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for Canton would then sail north, to the west of Borneo and the Philippines. The Dutch and 
Spanish showed little enthusiasm for war, concerned that any warlike moves could invite 
retribution from British forces. They had evidence that this was within Britain’s power, 
remembering its attack on Manila in 1762. But Rainier had always to plan for what they 
might do, and their bases at Batavia and Manila would have made any attacks on British 
shipping easier, being so close to the trade routes. 
 
With timing dictated by the tea harvest, ships from Canton would depart between January and 
February using the north east trades to take them down to about 15 degrees south and follow 
the south east trades, which are almost continual all year round, then south west much nearer 
the dangers of Mauritius to round the Cape and follow the south east trades to St. Helena, 
where they would usually pick up fresh supplies, and thence home to England. 
 
Those bound for India from China would take the north east monsoon south through one of 
the Indonesian or Malacca Straits, depending on the risks of enemy action, and then use 
either wind on a port or starboard tack up to India. Some China ships bound for England 
would not return directly, but would go to India to join with convoys at either Madras or off 
Ceylon. On these return journeys, both to India and back to England, they would usually be 
escorted by naval vessels at least through the Straits of Sunda and Malacca. 
 
Finally, the challenges of sailing in the Red Sea were magnified by its unique wind system.50 
There are separate patterns between the northern half, above Jeddah, and below Jeddah to the 
mouth of the Sea. North of Jeddah the wind is northerly for the entire year. This makes 
sailing north to Suez very difficult. In the southern half the wind is still northerly during the 
south west monsoon, but during the north east monsoon, the wind is a southerly one. This 
provides a reliable wind to reach Jeddah but makes it difficult to sail further up the channel. 
Such journeys were normally executed in smaller ships which could sail closer to the shore 
and use offshore and onshore winds. Due to the shape of the mouth of the Red Sea, this 
meant that the Sea could not be entered when the wind was from the north and exited when it 
was from the south. 
 
Trade Protection. 
 
Before analysing the effectiveness of Rainier’s efforts at trade protection, it is necessary to 
describe the Trade and how it changed during the period in which Rainier commanded. 
 
The pattern of trade formed two inter-dependent parts; the intercontinental trade between 
Britain and Asia, and the intra station trade. On such a wide station all trade was vulnerable 
to commerce raiding and this was Rainier’s main preoccupation throughout the tenure of his 
command.51 Suffice it to say that, in spite of fluctuations, total UK imports and exports grew 
                                                            
50 See Appendix 10e. 
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over the period 1794 – 1805, imports from the East Indies and China grew, whilst exports to 
the East grew or were static, depending on the statistics reviewed.52 This is due to whether or 
not the export of silver is included. However, as the demand in China for opium expanded, 
less silver was required to be transferred, thus reducing British “exports” even further. More 
frustratingly, as the opium came from India in private vessels there is no accurate measure of 
the volumes or value involved. The three-way nature of trade between Britain, India and 
China is illustrated by British exports to Bengal from 1794 to 1805 almost doubled as its taste 
for British goods and luxuries grew, largely financed by the profits from the opium trade. 
This allowed India to increase tenfold her import of British manufactures and: ‘to pour 
abundant revenue into the British Exchequer and benefit the nation to an extent of £6 million 
yearly’.53 ‘...without the Indian transfers Britain could have required mounting foreign 
borrowing in 1772-1820, to seemingly unsustainable levels after 1809’.54 Thus one can see 
how vital was Rainier’s defence of this trade. 
  
As important to the British economy as UK-Far East Trade was that within the East Indies 
Station, namely the Country Trade, which is described between pages 119 and 123. An 
example of its rapid growth can be seen in Appendix 4f, describing the expansion in private 
trade between Calcutta, the centre of British power in India, and various locations in the 
region. In spite of wild swings from year to year, the trend is clearly positive, especially to 
the important entrept centres of Penang and the Maldives.55 The enhanced activities at 
Penang are supported by the increased ship movements illustrated in Appendix 4g. Appendix 
4h shows that, whilst imports to Canton are largely static, exports to other parts of the region 
grew dramatically, thus stimulating the shipping companies, shipbuilders, and agency houses. 
 
Thus we can see that, whilst great care must be taken in giving too much credence to 
individual trade data, there is sufficient information from around the region to indicate that 
both trade between Britain and the East, and within the region itself, grew sufficiently rapidly 
to enhance Britain’s ability to finance the war. Rainier’s role in this phenomenon is described 
below.  
 
a) East Indian Trade: Britain and China/India. 
The friction and challenges described below need to be put into perspective. The problem 
facing Rainier grew bigger and even more nationally significant as imports, both from India 
and China grew steadily during this period, in spite of the continual state of war.  
 
Trade protection was a continual source of conflict between Rainier and the Company and 
merchants throughout his entire period of command and it applied to both the intercontinental 
and intra-station trade. From the very beginning of his command, Rainier stressed that the 
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best way for his warships to protect the Trade was by them all sailing in convoy. 
Unfortunately this was not something the merchants wanted and he often complained that 
they desired protection but were not prepared to accept the discipline to obtain it. Admittedly, 
masters had good incentives to avoid naval “protection”; they might lose sailors pressed into 
warships and, if sailing together, would lose the potential advantage of being first to market. 
Also, within the station, some of the Trade was not entirely legal. Even on his journey out to 
India in 1794, the admiral complained about the behaviour of merchant captains not keeping 
in convoy. He passed on his comments to the Admiralty which in turn wrote to the Court of 
Directors, enclosing Rainier’s complaints of the Company ships on the journey out to India.56 
He also told the governor general his thoughts:  
 
The private Trade of China I experience to be so very irregular in their 
movements I am at a loss how to act by them and shall request your Excellency’s 
interference next Season if they expect the protection His Majesty’s Ships.57  
 
That the admiral was under pressure from the merchants, in spite of the criticisms, is shown 
in this letter to the Governor General. He spent much time communicating directly with the 
merchants, as well as with the presidencies, to tell them what he was doing with his vessels 
and why. This he did in a letter to some Bombay merchants after they had complained to the 
President of Bombay.58 Sometimes the protests of the merchant shipping community caused 
even the calm and composed Rainier to lose his temper, noting: ‘what these people have had 
the presumption to call my inconceivable conduct’ when he was replying to yet another 
questioning letter from the Admiralty.59  
 
The Company was always ready to retaliate to the admiral’s criticisms by demanding from 
the Admiralty more naval protection. The admiral had therefore to spend his time writing 
back to the Admiralty explaining his actions.60 The merchants wanted frigates to cruise at the 
danger points, such as the Straits of Malacca and Rainier agreed, explaining to Nepean that 
he had been heavily criticised the previous year for the losses incurred.61 Although this 
approach was contrary to Rainier’s wishes for trade protection he probably felt it necessary to 
accede to the merchants’ request to eradicate just one of the many complaints they were 
making against him. But overall, Rainier was clearly successful as indicated in a letter to 
Dundas in 1799 stating that insurance rates for British ships sailing in convoy were 15-22% 
cheaper than the rates for neutral vessels.62 
 
Rainier’s somewhat pedantic nature probably annoyed Wellesley on one of the times the 
latter was concerned about trade. A French privateer had taken a number of merchant vessels 
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after the Peace of Amiens was signed. Wellesley wanted legal action taken against the 
French. But the admiral supported the French in a lengthy legal letter stating that the French 
had been within their rights as they had not known about the Peace when they made their 
captures. Whilst he might have been correct, his position would not have been well received 
by merchants who might have lost considerable amounts of money, if not been bankrupted. 
However, Rainier was also signalling that the same rules would apply to British ships taking 
enemy vessels in the same situation, thus paving the way for his own officers to continue to 
profit from prize money when knowledge of the state of war or peace was uncertain.63  
 
Rainier’s concerns over the merchants’ recalcitrance was continual as illustrated by his earlier 
letter to Admiral Christian at the Cape, telling him he had spoken to an American vessel 
which told him they had seen six heavy frigates heading east from Mauritius. He was 
therefore trying to persuade the merchants to send their ships under his protection through the 
Straits of Malacca to Prince of Wales Island.64 This is a good example of the steady flow of 
communication and openness with which Rainier treated his colleagues at the Cape. But it 
could not solve the problem of those who would not use the convoy system. The importance 
of China played heavily on Rainier and he was constantly thinking ahead of how to 
ameliorate the situation. He wrote to the Admiralty at the end of 1799 asking them to request 
the Company to send out their China ships early so that they could join his own convoy of 
Country ships to China and then go through the Straits of Malacca together.65 
 
However, Rainier was hampered in his attempts to engender cooperation between the 
merchant service and the navy by the usually negative relationships between Indiaman 
commanders and naval captains.66 The latter, usually younger and less experienced in the 
ways of the Eastern Seas, would often treat with disdain their colleagues brought up in 
“Trade”. Managing a convoy required much patience and tact – attributes which were not 
readily taught in the navy. So it is no surprise that, for many Company commanders: ‘the 
Navy had become in itself an object of dislike, embodying … all the arrogance, stupidity and 
ill-breeding they had endured while sailing with convoy’.67 Yet the Company was keen to 
ensure rewards for those responsible for capturing privateers. Captain Adam of La Sybille and 
Commander Frost of the Company cruiser Mornington were both presented with valuable 
swords by the insurance company of Calcutta for capturing French warships and privateers.68 
 
Although, to be fair, the period is littered with letters of complaint from merchants about the 
lack of protection provided by the navy, it never got out of hand. This could have been 
because Rainier had been a merchant ship master himself, had some empathy with them and 
understood their ways of thinking.  It must have reduced at least slightly the natural animosity 
between the two parties. The insurance market never got too overheated and there were no 
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formal complaints to the Admiralty, as there were with his successor, Pellew, who was the 
subject of a ‘Memorial’ which is shown in full in Hickey’s Memoirs.69 The feelings in India 
about Pellew can be inferred from Hickey: 
  
Certain it is that … Pellew who commanded upon the East India Station during 
the period of unheard-of losses therein stated, having soon after completed the 
object of his voyage to the East by making a handsome fortune, returned to 
England, where instead of being censured for any omissions or neglect of duty … 
was received by the members of the administration in the most flattering manner 
… This gallant Admiral, however, did not prove a successful smuggler, having 
had contraband goods to the amount of several thousand pounds seized by the 
Custom House officers on board his ship…70  
 
The schadenfreude shown by Hickey is quite palpable. Rainier did not generate such feelings 
by never allowing relations with the merchant class to deteriorate to that level.  
 
The merchantmen had a mixed reputation for protecting themselves. Some fought lengthy 
battles and others surrendered without a fight. Rainier saw the problem was worse when the 
crews consisted mainly of lascars, who were not a warlike community. He told Spencer that it 
was a mistake to arm trading vessels because their crews would not fight and therefore, when 
they were inevitably captured, they were already sufficiently well armed to be put 
immediately into action as privateers against the British.71 It must have appeared to Rainier 
that the merchants wanted their individual ships each to be protected by their own individual 
naval escort. The Bombay merchants wrote to Duncan, the President of the Bombay Council 
saying they wanted protection for the Canton Trade.72 But they would not fit in with Rainier’s 
convoys. 
 
However, larger Indiamen were rarely lost to enemy action. It should be noted that these 
ships were the main commercial outlet of British and Company trade to Europe. The figures 
compare very favourably with the experiences under Pellew and his successor, Drury. In fact, 
the losses of the most valuable Indiamen speak for themselves; Rainier’s ten years of war saw 
seven lost, [0.70 p.a.] Pellew lost three in four years [0.75 p.a.] and Drury lost six in two [3.0 
pa.]. When taking into account that French commerce raiding was much more prevalent 
during Rainier’s command, the figures stand rather more in his favour. Perhaps some of this 
was due to the disdain with which they treated the merchant classes.  
 
This was not the case with the Country Trade, especially those vessels trading from Bengal 
which were often targeted by privateers cruising around the Sandheads, at the mouth of the 
river Hooghly in the Bay of Bengal. 
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b). The Expansion of Trade within the East Indies Station.  
The Country Trade was important for four reasons; it assembled goods for the 
intercontinental trade, it dispersed British goods from the main arrival points, and it generated 
profits in India which could be used to pay for tea, thus reducing the demand for bullion to be 
sent from Britain.73 ‘A sum ... not less than one million pounds annually has for many years 
been sent from this country to purchase the teas’.74 With the demand for British bullion to 
finance continental coalitions against France, any new source of money would be seized 
upon. It was also the main wealth development and dispersing tool which made the East 
Indies trading empire work. The Dutch had been keen to exclude competition but now Royal 
Naval presence encouraged merchants so seek new markets. Indeed, British policy had been 
to avoid offending the Dutch so as not to give them any reason to support France in its rivalry 
with Britain. But once France occupied the Netherlands, this reason disappeared.75  
 
Intra station trade received a boost from Rainier’s capture of the Spice Islands and knowledge 
of the relatively unknown waters of the East grew: ‘From the conquest of the Moluccas a new 
line of rich Commerce is opened’.76  Whilst trade figures can be obtained between India and 
China,77 that within the Malayan and Indonesian Archipelagos has not been recorded, much 
of it in British vessels and including illegal opium. Foreign ships were also involved. In 1800 
their numbers visiting Calcutta doubled from the previous year.78 And Cornwallis’ reforms of 
the early 1790s prohibiting Company servants from private trading, gave the opportunity to 
free merchants who benefitted from the opening of new markets and led to the expansion of 
the agency houses, from fifteen in 1790 to twenty nine in 1803.79 This, in turn, brought: ‘a 
well established British system of administration and control’.80 Trade between Calcutta and 
Madras expanded with the role of the former as a grain supplier to the Coromandel which 
could no longer feed itself.81 Yet the vagaries of war could always impinge on trade. In 1801 
the demand for merchant shipping to take Indian army troops to Egypt meant that there were 
no private British ships between Bengal and China.82 
 
Much of the navy’s traditional trade protection had centred around escorting ships sailing 
between Britain and India and China, with only occasional forays into the Gulf of Arabia and 
to China covering its commerce with India. The combination of factors, including the growth 
of the financial markets in India, the demand for cotton and opium in China, and the opening 
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of the Dutch East Indies, meant that Rainier had to take much more notice of the eastern side 
of his station than had previous naval commanders. The clamour of Indian merchants trading 
with the East when French privateers cruised the Bay of Bengal is a sign that Rainier could 
not ignore this relatively new “Country Trade”, even if he had wanted to. But he did not, as 
his voluminous correspondence on the need to protect this sector of the station, and the 
irresponsibility of the merchants who would not sail in convoy, indicates that he did 
acknowledge that his responsibilities had moved eastwards. 
 
The Great Wars against France were fought on a global scale and, although Rainier was far 
from the centre of the war, the strategy which he exercised was very much based on what was 
happening in Europe and the Middle East. This is especially demonstrated by the reaction to 
Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt – which showed that an army can have just as much impact on 
naval dispositions as naval operations can have on that of an army. As the French occupation 
of Egypt pulled the Royal Navy eastwards in the Mediterranean in order to break the link 
between France and Egypt, the navy in the east was pulled westwards towards the Arabian 
Gulf and the Red Sea to counter the danger to India from that quarter. Thus, in 1798, Rainier 
had to ignore the Sand Heads at the mouth of the Hooghly and the Strait of Malacca as he had 
insufficient vessels. This gave Surcouf, the most successful French privateering captain, the 
opportunity to take advantage of the absence of British warships to capture the Indiaman Kent 
(800 tons). Yet Rainier was clearly annoyed. He wrote to Wellesley that there was no need 
for the Kent to be taken as it had refused to sail under naval escort.83  The following year 
Surcouf practically blockaded Calcutta, taking another Indiaman, the Triton (800 tons).84  
 
The expansion of trade was also due to the demand for opium, indigo, copper, tin, lead, 
woollens and cotton in China, the availability of finance and insurance in India, the 
construction of larger European-style merchantmen less vulnerable to piracy, the absence of 
Company monopoly, and the relative safety of the seas patrolled by the Royal Navy.85 The 
actual volumes of trade are difficult to measure but are believed to have quadrupled in ten 
years up to 1793.86 ‘The independence of the Country service was of its essence, its lack of 
definition and freedom to engage in unsupervised action, its strength’.87 Its very nature, 
sometimes illegal, makes it impossible to give accurate data as to its volume and rate of 
growth. What is not in doubt is that, by 1800, China had a one million pound p.a. trade 
surplus with India.88 This trade was carried out around the vast coastline of India, the 
Malaysian peninsular, to and between the Indonesian Islands, especially Batavia which was 
an entrept centre for the opium trade, and between India and China. The trade between 
Bombay and Persia and Arabia was carried out primarily by native ships but this did not 
mean that it was left to the tender mercy of pirates and privateers. The Navy’s escort duties 
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were not restricted to protecting British ships. In a letter to Hobart, Rainier mentioned that 
HMS Swift (16) had escorted three of the Nabob of Arcot’s ships out of the Red Sea and 
damaging itself in the process on an uncharted rock coming out of Jedda.89 
 
The Country Trade was not carried in ships owned by the Company but in those owned by 
local Indian and European individuals and partnerships. These were the kind of businesses 
that worked on narrower margins than the Company and where speed to market was more 
important. The fine ships built in Bombay could reach over 1000 tons over three decks and 
with a crew in excess of 140. Although pirates were prevalent off the Sumatra and Malayan 
coasts, such vessels, armed with eighteen pounder guns, feared little from their depredations. 
Even if there were no naval escorts, the more common smaller vessels, more susceptible to 
piracy, would sail in convoy with them for protection through the most vulnerable areas. The 
Calcutta trade was not always legal, often carrying contraband and “illegal” opium which had 
not come from Company sources, so no owner would want to be convoyed by a naval vessel 
by which it might be arrested. The trade between Bombay and China tended to be bulk cotton 
and very predictable in its timing. The owners of these vessels were more comfortable with 
naval protection and consequently accepted the convoy system more readily than their 
Calcutta brethren. 
 
The cotton trade from Bombay to Canton began to boom in the late 1780s. From 1802 it was 
suffering from higher quality cotton from Bengal.90 But even with this competition volumes 
of 80,000 bales in 1801 had still grown to 150,000 in 1805. And between 1795 and 1807 
private traders shipped more cotton from Bombay to China than did the Company.91 Return 
cargoes included chinaware, sugar, rhubarb, alum, camphor, raw silk, tea and cassia lignia. 
Some of these goods were transhipped in India for passage to Britain. Opium had been grown 
in Bengal as a Company monopoly and then sold on the open market through auction. 
Through the period of Rainier’s command the trade was steady at around 2000 chests per 
annum but a further 2000 chests were smuggled into the Malay Archipelago.92 As the 
physical volume was much less than cotton the vessels used were much smaller. Opium’s 
impact on the overall volume of business came from its high price and use to fund the 
enormous tea trade. 
 
Financing the trade was very fluid. Agents often managed the process of dealing with the 
Chinese by becoming partnerships, such as Jardine Matheson. The often illegal profits made 
in Canton were paid into the Company Treasury there in return for bills on both the 
governments of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, and the Company in London.93 These bills of 
exchange became a market in themselves and were traded ‘anywhere between Burma and 
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Canton’.94 The owners themselves would even raise loans on the value of their ships and 
cargoes. Not only were Free Merchants and Company officials involved,95 but also Indian 
bankers, shroffs, and even the Parsee shipbuilders themselves, who financed the trade with 
the profits made from ship building. British traders who could not obtain licences from the 
Company, found a loophole by becoming consuls for other powers, such as Austria, Prussia, 
Sweden, and even non-existent Poland.96   
 
From the beginning of the war, the French island of Mauritius harboured French national 
warships and privateers. In 1795 the Dutch colony of Batavia became a potential enemy base, 
as did Manila in 1796 when Spain went to war with Britain. Rainier was not to know that 
only the first of these would be a real threat, the others being merely occasional bases which 
French vessels could use for repair and replenishment. The privateers were particularly 
successful; 25 were licensed by the Mauritius authorities and between 1793 and 1802 they 
took 200 prizes, compared with the 40 taken by national warships.97  
 
Rainier’s Defence of the Trade. 
 
The defence considerations of the trade routes that Rainier had to protect are succinctly 
described in a memorandum, author unknown, but which was sent by him to the Admiralty in 
1801.98 As its editor in Naval Review says: ‘The fact that it was considered by Rainier worthy 
of the attention of the Admiralty is a testimony to its value, for Rainier was an officer with an 
exceptional acquaintance of those seas’.99 It also shows the depth of Rainier’s study of the 
subject. The report was written from the point of view of someone based in India and 
highlights the following danger points; 
 
1. The Straits of Malacca. 
2. The south east Coast of Ceylon. 
3. The Malabar Coast. 
4. The Sand Heads. [at the head of the Bay of Bengal]. 
5. Straits of Banca and Sunda. 
 
To defend each of these areas the following resources are recommended; 
 
      1. Not less than three frigates. 
      2. Two line of battle ships. 
      3. Can be protected by the ships based at the summer headquarters off Madras. 
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      4. Two frigates between November and April. 
      5. Not less than two ships. 
 
Additionally a force from the Cape should be ‘constantly cruising’ to protect ships rounding 
the Cape from the predators based at Mauritius. This is a much smaller force than was to be 
recommended by Pellew but does not include vessels employed in convoy, occasional 
Persian Gulf-Red Sea trade, and those required for offensive operations. Taking into account 
the distances involved, the poor charts, weather patterns, easily blocked choke points, a lack 
of cooperation from the merchants and ships masters, and uncertainty about the enemies’ 
intentions, one can see the complexities of Rainier’s challenge in the light of this 
memorandum:  
 
...the precise Force necessary must depend upon the extent of our Naval Power in 
India, regarding that of the Enemy, the immense extent of Coast we have to guard 
... and the French [practice] of sending all their frigates to cruise together.100 
 
From a defensive point of view Rainier had two alternatives for the allocation of his ships; he 
could either position them at the various choke points and shipping highways, such as the 
Ceylon, the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Bali and the Bay of Bengal, or he could escort the 
trade using the convoy system.101 The former was preferable to the merchants as it gave them 
the greatest flexibility of sailing times. But this solution would require more vessels and 
Rainier was not over endowed with warships.102 It has to be remembered that, over the time 
of his command in Asia, he had many other demands on his resources; there were the attacks 
on Trincomalee and the Spice Islands,103 the planned but not executed attacks on Batavia and 
Manila,104 there was the defence of the Red Sea and Goa,105 and the support of the army 
against Tippoo and the Marathas varying from coastal blockade to the movement of troops 
and their supplies.106 Added to these actions was the pursuit of French forces, including the 
occasional blockade of Mauritius, to achieve all the above goals.107 
 
With the relatively small number of ships involved on both sides and the huge distances 
involved on the station, it is no surprise that there were no fleet actions during the whole 
period of Rainier’s command. The more visible threat came from French warships, notably 
the squadron of six heavy frigates under Rear Admiral Sercey who arrived at Mauritius in 
1796. It took three years of heavy merchant ship losses before all the ships of this squadron 
were finally accounted for, two taken and one destroyed in single ship actions with British 
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frigates, and three returned to France in need of repair that could not be completed in the 
East.108 This illustrated the handicap that France suffered in not having full repair facilities in 
the region. In 1803 Rear Admiral Linois arrived to continue the battle with one third rate and 
three frigates. Linois continued to trouble Rainier’s successor, Pellew, until finally defeated 
in 1806 in the Atlantic.109 The French third rate the Marengo caused more concern than one 
might expect because convoys were usually escorted by frigates or sloops and these could not 
take on the Marengo’s 80 guns, far more powerful than even a British 74 or 64. 
Consequently, whenever Linois was feared to be in the vicinity, Rainier had to detach one of 
his own third rates to convoy escort duty. And Linois understood Rainier’s dilemma. He 
heard that the British were being reinforced by two 74’s making Rainier’s total squadron 
much more powerful than that of France.   
 
But there are many points to guard, their forces must be greatly stretched. That 
gives me hope to do them much harm by moving the great distances within the 
different parts of the Indian Seas.110 
 
This meant that, although Rainier knew what needed doing, he did not have the resources to 
do it. This conflict is illustrated in a letter to Lord Hobart, President of Madras, when he said 
that he could only blockade Mauritius by leaving the Bay of Bengal unprotected.111 In 
accepting that the centre of the region’s trade was moving eastwards, he wrote to Spencer that 
the pressures from the Red Sea to the west meant that the trade between India and China was 
at risk.112 Another letter to the Admiralty indicated his dilemma; when escorting troops to 
Trincomalee ready for the invasion of Egypt in 1800 that he had no ships for trade 
protection.113 And into 1803, he explained to Wellesley that he could not concentrate his own 
ships to fight Linois’ squadron because he needed to protect the Trade, Trincomalee and the 
Malabar Coast.114  
 
His general concerns can be seen in a letter to the Admiralty in 1798 in which he tells them 
that four ships would be sent to the Malabar Coast to stop French supplies reaching Tippoo, 
as requested by Wellesley, and he would keep one 74 at Malacca and send two frigates to 
China.115  
 
His letters indicate that a major worry was the China Trade because of the ease by which it 
could be attacked travelling through the Straits of Malacca and the Dutch East Indies. And 
when told that there was no protection for the returning China Trade, he sent the Orpheus and 
Swift to Malacca and he personally sailed in the Suffolk, accompanied by the Resistance, to 
                                                            
108 Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, pp. 112-31. 
109 Ibid. pp. 250-75. 
110 Archives Nationales, BB4 185, Campagnes. 1803. vol. 19, Linois to Ministre de la Marine, 25 frim, an XII. 
111 N.M.M., RAI/4, Rainier to Hobart, 19 April 1795. 
112 B.L., Add. Mss. 75862, Rainier to Spencer, 20 May 1799. 
113 T.N.A., ADM 1/170, Rainier to Admiralty 27 December 1800. 
114 N.M.M., RAI/9, Rainier to Wellesley, 1 September 1803. 
115 T.N.A., ADM 1/169, Rainier to Admiralty, 27 September 1798. 
127 
 
Prince of Wales Island to cover their return.116 The major bottleneck on the journey from 
Canton, was Malacca, both geographically and temporally. Because of the predictability of 
departure from Canton, Rainier would usually provide an escort until the China Fleet 
returning via India was close to Madras. Added to these facts was the knowledge that East 
Indiamen were large, well armed vessels with large crews. They should, theoretically, be able 
to fight off most privateers on their own, especially if they were in convoy. So it was not as 
important to escort them unless it was known that a French naval squadron was at sea. The 
result of attempting to reconcile the conflicting demands of protecting the Country Trade and 
escorting the China Fleet led to Rainier’s decision in 1804 to protect the former thus leaving 
the latter without an escort. The resulting battle of Pulo Aur, its origins and results, have been 
described in Chapter Four. But it is an excellent example of Rainier’s dilemma of how to 
allocate inadequate resources against the balance of probability of which ships will be 
attacked. In January he wrote to the Admiralty telling them he had sent three ships to 
China.117 Yet by November he was concerned that he had no vessels to protect the China 
Trade.118 Even as late as 1804 Rainier showed extreme nervousness about this route. In June 
he told Wellesley that he was sending three ships to escort the China convoy as the 
supercargoes had requested. But he could only cover one convoy to Canton, which he knew 
would upset the merchants as: ‘they would wish to have a convoy for every two or three 
ships’. The remainder of his squadron was protecting shipping on the Coast, and between the 
Straits of Malacca and the Sand Heads. Yet he still found it necessary to organise two 
convoys to cover the trade between Bombay and Madras. He personally would sail to 
Malacca to cover the return of the China convoy the following Spring.119 In July he wrote to 
Wellesley telling him he wanted the merchantmen to assemble off Madras and then be 
convoyed to China,120 and in October he kept Wellesley informed by telling him that he 
would be escorting the China convoy through the Straits of Malacca.121 
 
The following month Rainier was escorting the China Trade and bringing together as many 
ships as he could around the Straits of Malacca, hoping to catch any French or Dutch ships 
trying to prey on British merchantmen and probably to ensure there would be no repetition of 
Pulo Aur.122 His letter to Duncan at Bombay illustrates that he was also keeping the senior 
officials of the Company informed of his movements as he noted that, as he had missed 
Pellew at Madras he felt he must go eastwards to protect the returning China ships.123 Thus it 
can be seen that Rainier had not given in to the lethargy of impending succession by Pellew 
and, to the very end, he was protecting the trade and trying to bring the French to battle. 
Indeed, as his period of command grew to a close his reports back to London grew longer and 
more filled with minutiae. It is possible that he actually was reluctant to relinquish his 
                                                            
116 N.M.M., RAI/4, Rainier to Spencer, 20 March 1795. 
117 T.N.A., ADM 1/170, Rainier to Admiralty, 15 January 1800. 
118 Ibid., Rainier to Spencer 30 September 1800. 
119 T.N.A., ADM 1/175, Rainier to Wellesley, 14 June 1804. 
120 T.N.A., ADM 1/5121/5, Rainier to Wellesley, 4 July 1804. 
121 T.N.A. ADM 1/175, Rainier to Wellesley, 20 October 1804. 
122 N.M.M., RAI/8, Rainier to Admiralty, 1 November 1804. 
123 N.M.M., RAI/10, Rainier to Duncan, 11 December 1804. 
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command with its status, authority and relative certainty, to return to an England which he 
had left eleven years ago and where he would know few of the people in command at the 
Admiralty.  
 
Concern over the depredations in the Bay of Bengal are also illustrated by a letter Rainier 
sent to the Admiralty on 15 January 1800 when he told them he was keeping two frigates in 
the Bay of Bengal. Within the next six days he evidently had a change of mind because he 
told Wellesley he was keeping just one frigate there. He was dispatching the second frigate to 
Madras there to consult with the President as to the best way to protect the trade in that 
region.124 This is a good example of the need to be constantly reviewing the situation in the 
light of news. Uncertainty of the whereabouts of Linois in 1804 also led to concern about 
French activities in that region. In January Rainier’s drive to keep Wellesley informed led to 
a sixteen page letter advising of the disposition of his ships, including two Bombay Marine 
sloops and a frigate in the Bay of Bengal, where he thought the French were operating, and of 
the threat from the Dutch at Batavia. He again asked for Wellesley’s help in persuading the 
merchants to adhere to the convoy system.125 In October the number in the Bay was increased 
to two frigates.126 There was clearly concern in Calcutta because the same day Wellesley 
wrote to Rainier telling him that he had stopped all ships leaving the city because of worries 
about Linois.127 
 
With Linois at sea Rainier also feared that the French might intercept his successor, Pellew, 
as he arrived in Indian waters. He sailed for Madras with two third rates and a frigate, 
knowing that this was the most likely port of call for Pellew. He had guessed correctly as to 
where Linois might be but he just missed him as the French admiral decided to sail north 
towards the Bay of Bengal. ‘An hour or two’s difference would have brought on a collision 
between the two admirals’.128 Even with his superior force Linois did not manage to take the 
Centurion which he found at Masulipatam on his way northwards. The British ship put up a 
spirited defence during which it was able to retreat to shallow water.129  But although pleased 
at the competent way in which the Centurion had been handled, Rainier was still thinking of 
what might have been. He wrote to Wellesley: ‘How unfortunate I was in my conjecture of 
the French Admiral’s … object’.130 He had expected that Linois would make another attack 
on the China Fleet; a reasonable assumption and one perfectly feasible to the French, but he 
guessed incorrectly. If he had caught Linois it would have raised his profile so much in 
Britain and perhaps have given him the recognition which was his due. Yet it does show that 
he was still keen on bringing Linois to battle, right to the end of his command. 
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126 T.N.A., ADM 1/175, Rainier to Wellesley, 20 October 1804. 
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Perhaps Rainier would have been more fortunate if Linois had been more aggressive. 
Napoleon described his admiral as ‘thoroughly  second rate’ but felt that the antipathy 
between Linois and  Decaen, the Captain General of all French possessions in the East, would 
cause Linois to remain at sea for as long as possible. This was the only way that trouble 
would be caused for British shipping. ‘Activity and boldness is what is wanted in the East’.131 
Clearly Napoleon did not think that he was getting it. 
 
The reference to Bombay Marine vessels indicates that Rainier was short of warships, and 
this was not uncommon. In 1800 he suggested to Wellesley that he maintain a Company 
frigate and an armed Indiaman off the Straits of Malacca as there were no naval vessels 
available.132 
 
Whilst this activity was taking place to the eastwards, the demands on Rainier’s attention are 
also illustrated by activities in the north west of the station. As early as 1795, Rainier was 
escorting the merchant ships of the Nawab of Arcot from the Red Sea.133 And in 1803 he had 
vessels protecting the trade in the Gulf or Persia and looking for the mail ships bringing 
communications from London.134 
 
Concerning the depredations of piracy, as opposed to privateering, this appears to have been 
primarily a responsibility of the Bombay Marine to counter. The sources of disruption of this 
nature were the Arab pirates of the Gulf of Arabia, the Indians based on the Gujurat coast to 
the north of Bombay, and in the Indonesian Archipelago. The Arab pirates did not receive 
much notice from Rainier, given the other demands on his attention, and he appears to have 
left patrolling the area to the Bombay Marine apart from in 1803. They were finally attacked 
in 1808 by combined naval and Company forces.135 The Indian pirates did come to his notice 
in 1805, and he despatched Captain Vashon of the Fox (32) with a Bombay Marine cruiser, to 
destroy them.136 Those pirates in the east appear never to have caused Rainier sufficient 
annoyance for him to take any actions against them. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
The sheer size of the station, its often uncharted waters, and routes affected by changing wind 
patterns, made communication between the admiral and London an unreliable process. Not 
only had Rainier to interpret his orders and intelligence in view of what had happened in the 
months since they were written, which might change their impact, he often had to operate 
without information at all, using his own judgement and that of the people with whom he 
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consulted. Thus we can see that what the C-in-C East Indies station needed were great 
navigational skills and a deep understanding of his environment, together with self 
confidence – knowing that he would have to take responsibility if they were wrong because 
distance and time meant that no-one else could be involved.  
 
Ideally Rainier would have organised convoys for all major shipping routes, but the 
opposition of the merchants and the other claims on his ships meant that this was not 
possible. He could have stationed vessels at the various choke points and shipping lane 
junctions mentioned above but again, he had insufficient ships. He could occasionally rely on 
the Bombay Marine and up-gunned Indiamen but they would likely be ineffective if French 
national warships were involved. Consequently he had to balance the intelligence he received 
as to the likelihood of threats with the political pressures he was under and allocate his 
resources accordingly. That the trade continued to grow and insurance rates were stable 
indicates that he was successful. And faithful to his principles to the end, his final task was to 
escort the Trade from India back to England between March and September 1805. The 
convoy consisted to fifty vessels with cargo valued at £15 million. Its destruction would have 
had a severe impact on the British Treasury and the City of London. It arrived home without 
loss.137 
 
Thus we have seen how Rainier adhered to his primary objectives of trade and territory 
protection together with the supporting objective of taking enemy possessions. In having to 
make compromises as to the allocation of his inadequate resources in order to meet these 
goals, he was never likely to win the undying support of all those who demanded protection 
from him. But, on balance, one can see that the trade continued to expand and the ships losses 
were always bearable. One should not underestimate the importance of this trade to the 
British war effort. It was central, directly through taxation and indirectly through the 
remittances of profits to Britain, and the intra-station trade covered the massive trade deficit 
with China.138  
 
The next chapter will chart the success of two more of his goals, the protection of British 
possessions in the East and the expansion of territory controlled by Britain, both in India 
itself and within the wider station. 
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                             CHAPTER 6 
 
‘[YOUR ORDERS ARE] TO BEST PROTECT THE ... SETTLEMENTS OF    
HIS MAJESTY’S SUBJECTS AND HIS ALLIES IN THE EAST INDIES’.1           
 
     THE DEFENCE AND EXPANSION OF BRITAIN’S OF BRITAIN’S   
                                                           EASTERN EMPIRE 
 
Among the leading reasons for Rainier keeping his command for so long was the Admiralty’s 
recognition that he was not a commander so paralysed by caution as to confine himself purely 
to static defence. He was always ready, whenever realistic opportunities occurred, to act 
offensively. This chapter will analyse the steps he took to defend British interests in the East 
Indies not only by defensive measures, but by the capture of Dutch colonies across the 
station. It will explain how growing French military successes across the globe forced Rainier 
to act more defensively. An analysis will follow of the navy’s support of Wellesley’s 
activities to expand British control of India which, by 1805, had ensured that British 
domination of India would not be seriously endangered for 140 years. 
 
The Defence of British Possessions. 
 
British territory was protected by the actions of both the army and navy, often in combined 
operations, of which Rainier became expert. It could be effected by both the direct defence of 
colonies and through the offensive action of depriving the enemy of potential bases from 
which to attack British interests. This section will analyze the complex relationships between 
the two armed forces and then review how their strategy was implemented, both defensively 
and offensively.  
 
Political Control of the Army.  
Because of the time taken for letters to reach Rainier, he was, to all intents and purposes, in 
an independent command. As the Governor General was, de facto and de jure, the 
commander-in-chief of the army, Rainier had to use his own judgement as to the optimum 
method of cooperation on behalf of the navy. He could not pass on his problems to a more 
senior officer and he could not bow to Wellesley’s authority and power as that would be an 
abrogation of his own position. His original orders from the Admiralty had enjoined him to 
consult with the Governor General, implying that he was not to take orders from him. This 
was not an easy situation in which to find himself. He had also to remember that Wellesley 
had a huge army at his disposal, far larger than in any other arena of war. Potentially the 
imbalance between this huge force and the relatively small squadron at his disposal could 
cause conflict with the Company, as in 1800 when Wellesley wanted to invade Mauritius. It 
was relatively easy for the Company to find enough troops for the attack but not for Rainier 
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who believed he had insufficient ships to protect both the Trade and current British 
possessions, his primary objectives, as well as escort an invasion force to far off Mauritius. 
 
Wellesley always wanted more troops for India. In July 1800 he wrote to Dundas that the 
current numbers of royal troops was only 14,000, which, when taking into account sickness 
and other duties, left only 10,500 in the front line. He thought he needed 30,000 in total. 
Naturally, he also needed more artillery and cavalry.2 The British government at this time 
was desperately short of money to finance both the war, now in its eighth year, and British 
allies on the Continent. A letter from Dundas, demonstrating this financial scarcity, crossed 
this request on its journey to Wellesley:  
 
… I cannot omit the present opportunity of expressing to you the anxiety I feel on 
the extent of the military establishments in India, and the little prospect hitherto 
held out of such a reduction as to give a prospect of any substantial useful surplus 
from the revenues of India. 3   
 
He went onto say that he wanted to reduce the number of royal regiments from seventeen to 
fourteen and that the Company army should also be reduced. By 1805, Dundas had managed 
to keep royal troop numbers down to 20,000, but Wellesley had managed to create a 
Company army of 192,000 men.4 This debate had an impact on Rainier because the number 
of available troops and ships would dictate how risky would be attempts on enemy colonies. 
After the capture of the Spice Islands it was believed that there were insufficient troops both 
to protect British possessions from the threat of enemy attack and to initiate operations 
against Java and Mauritius. Therefore, for the remainder of Rainier’s period of command, he 
stayed on the defensive with regard to joint operations with the army. 
 
Given the size of the Indian army it is difficult to accept the suggestion propounded by 
Ingram that it: ‘was meant to act as a splendid symbol of British power rather than as an 
effective instrument’.5 His argument that it was rather more an imperial police force seems 
more the kind of hyperbole which Ingram used to make a point. Whilst its exploits in the 
attack on Egypt were not those of a dynamic, fast moving force such as the new French army, 
its successes in taking the numerous enemy possessions from the sea, and often in difficult 
physical conditions, showed great fortitude. It has also been the perceived wisdom that 
victories over the native Indian armies were easy. But the training of the Mysorean and 
Maratha armies was first class. With their modern artillery and cavalry, they were formidable 
on their own territory, as several victories over the British attested. The final demise of these 
two Indian armies by Generals Arthur Wellesley and Lake illustrate a level of competence 
                                                            
2 Wellesley to Dundas, 13 July 1800, quoted in Ingram (ed.), Two Views of British India, p. 275. 
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and tenacity which at least equated with the exploits of the regular British army in its 
struggles in other parts of the globe.6 
 
Whereas the Bombay Marine could never challenge the navy with regards to size or 
influence, the three Company armies, one for each presidency, were much bigger than the 
royal one. They therefore carried a much heavier burden of campaigning. Yet, as with the 
navy, their officers’ status was always lower than that of the royal army, irrespective of 
experience of the officer. It should be pointed out that the royal army officers needed a 
private income in order to maintain their standard of living. The Company officers were in 
their positions because they did not have private means and therefore were looking for ways 
to make their fortunes in the service of the Company in India. This social difference was the 
basis of much of the conflict. In this instance the Company officers were more like the royal 
naval officers who, at this time, came largely from the British middle classes and were in the 
navy to make their fortunes. And the risks that the Company cadets took were illustrated by 
the fact that, of approximately 280 cadets sent out each year from England between 1793 and 
1808, only one in four returned.7 And at the top of the hierarchy, Company officers could see 
that the head of the army in India was always a royal officer, never a Company one, as 
Dundas refused to appoint one from the latter’s officer corps.8 
 
Because of the size of the military presence in India its levels of efficiency and cost were 
highly visible to Dundas. He had asked the retiring Governor General, Cornwallis, brother of 
the admiral, to create a reform plan. This caused so much unrest, especially in Bengal, whose 
army would be most impacted, that there was talk of arresting the current Governor General, 
Shore, and the army commander, Abercromby. Shore was so concerned that he asked Rainier 
to stand by to bring troops from Madras to quell any potential mutiny.9 Fortunately changes 
were made to the plan and the furore died down. However, this took place in late 1794, when 
Rainier had only just arrived. One can imagine that, in the pre 1797 naval mutiny world, 
Rainier must have been concerned at how useful would be the military forces in India. Again, 
it is to his credit that he showed no public concern or distrust and this helped him to build up 
his good relationships with the army’s senior officers. 
 
The Admiral’s respect was probably enhanced by the army’s evident prowess, especially that 
of Bengal. In Bengal high quality recruits came from areas which had been used by the 
Mughals since the fifteenth century to raise its armies. Now these young soldiers looked for 
work from the Company, especially since its pay was both high and regular – unlike the local 
armies. They were also well trained by their European officers. Earlier religious concerns had 
stopped their use outside India but these had been overcome by the time they were sent to 
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Egypt in 1801. Their cavalry and artillery improved greatly during this period to make the 
total army such an impressive force that its use on the west coast of Central/ South America 
was even considered.10 
 
The Relationship between the Army and the Navy. 
At a grand strategy level, probably understood only by Wellesley, and perhaps by Pitt and 
Dundas, Britain had a  potentially powerful tool, the Indian army, the like of which no other 
European country possessed. Dundas wanted a strong force based permanently in India which 
could occupy all French possessions in India at the outbreak of war, to defend British 
territory, and be available for operations elsewhere in Asia.11 The debate with Wellesley was 
primarily about how large this should be. It is frightening to imagine what Napoleon would 
have done if he had an army of 192,000 men based in the Middle East. Its initial reluctance to 
fight outside the shores of India were overcome in 1789 when Governor General Cornwallis 
persuaded them to be used at Bencoolen on Sumatra. This was followed in 1795 by their use 
in the capture of the Moluccas, in 1800-1 in the Red Sea, Macao in 1808, and Mauritius and 
Batavia in 1810-11. Thus developed an increasingly effective strike force which had no equal 
in the Far East. 
 
Occasionally the army provided soldiers to act as marines on board ship, although it was not 
obliged to do so. Indeed, Rainier was keen to give thanks when this happened as when he 
thanked Wellesley for providing troops for Cooke’s La Sybille.12  He also asked General 
Stuart13 for troops to act as marines on the French frigate La Chiffonne, captured by La 
Sybille,14  But, otherwise, it could be argued on a superficial level that Rainier did not need 
the army, but the army needed him. He could go about his business of protecting trade and 
chasing enemy warships and privateers but the army needed the navy to carry its troops and 
supplies, to protect the transports performing the same function around the coastline of India 
and to keep reinforcements from reaching Britain’s East Indian enemies by sea. This support 
gave the army the ability to strike at the enemy unannounced anywhere, as long as it was 
close to the sea. ‘The most serious deficiency of the army was not its performance in the 
field, but the time it took to get there’.15 The confidence of the army in the navy was 
expounded by Major-General Stuart, commander of the Madras army in 1798, when he stated 
in considering Bonaparte’s arrival in Egypt:  
 
I confess that my firmest hopes of Security are grounded on a prompt disposition 
of the Navy, and the arrival in time of Men of War from England; for if they have 
… taken up a position in the Red Sea, I am of the Opinion that they will 
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11 T.N.A., Cornwallis Papers, 30/11/112, Dundas to Cornwallis, 22 July 1787. 
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effectively prevent any considerable number of French Troops or vessels arriving 
by this Route to India.16  
 
It should be noted that this missive was not sent to a naval officer in order to gain his support 
so it can be deemed to be an honest representation of what the army thought of the navy – 
and a view whose veracity Rainier wished to maintain. Wellesley was also aware of the 
importance of the navy during his campaigns against Tippoo, thanking Rainier for his 
‘cordial cooperation in the Mysorean War’.17  
 
However, a closer view would show that the enemy needed its own bases from which to 
attack the British and Rainier would be foolish not to acknowledge that working with the 
army to neutralise potential enemy bases would greatly assist his chances of protecting the 
trade. There was also the additional benefit of prize money if any potential capture was a 
thriving trading centre. Thus, whilst Mauritius was a serious threat, its position of strength 
was such that it would need far more resources to capture than were available in the East 
Indies. However, the occupation of the Dutch Netherlands by France meant that their bases at 
the Cape, Trincomalee, and Malacca could now be used by the French to threaten British 
shipping routes to India and China. Rainier knew that they would have to be taken if only as a 
defensive measure.18 
 
Rainier and the Army on the Offensive 1795-8. 
 
Rainier’s low profile personality and combined operations experience in the East Indies made 
him an ideal naval commander to work with the army. He had participated as a midshipman 
in the capture of Pondicherry in 1761 and Manila in 1762, had served with Hughes at the 
capture of Trincomalee in 1782, and then its subsequent loss, and had seen the benefits of 
Hughes’ excellent relationship with the army commander Eyre Coote. He was therefore 
comfortable with the concept of combined operations. He had perceived that the act of 
capturing Trincomalee in 1782 was insufficient in itself to ensure its continued occupation. 
He had also noted that the Madras Presidency’s refusal to reinforce the base, as requested by 
Hughes, meant that its weak garrison quickly surrendered to Suffren. His experience of 
combined operations was clearly understood in the army. An unknown officer wrote of the 
proposed attack on Manila in 1797: ‘Admiral Rainier…will collect his force, and as he is 
always ready, there will be no delay in that department’.19 
 
Although there are no records of his hearing of it officially from the Admiralty, Rainier 
probably heard of the French occupation of the Netherlands in June 1795. His memory of the 
capture and loss of Trincomalee, and the use made of it by Suffren during the American 
Revolution, is possibly the reason for his immediate journey to Madras, to consult with its 
                                                            
16 Exeter University, Bombay Diary 67/29, Stuart to Bombay Council, 2 October 1798. 
17 B.L., Add. Mss. 13751, Wellesley to Rainier, 29 September 1800. 
18 See Chapter Four for these colonies’ role in communication. 
19 Letter from unknown army officer in St. James’s Chronicle or the British Evening Post, 21 December 1797. 
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President, Lord Hobart. Hobart had already received orders from London to take 
Trincomalee, Malacca and Amboina, as he was later to write to Rainier.20 And Rainier had 
written to Stevens that when he met Hobart the latter had already decided that Trincomalee 
should be the first target.21 He and Hobart therefore agreed on a plan to take both 
Trincomalee and Malacca, a city that sits at the northern end of the Straits of Malacca, and 
through which the China Trade generally sailed, being therefore easy prey to any waiting 
enemy vessels. The confidence that Rainer had already built up with Hobart is indicated by 
the latter detaching two companies of Company soldiers under Rainier’s command. The fact 
that he wrote to Dundas, telling him what he had done shows Hobart thought this a positive 
move.22 And later in the year he wrote to Dundas that: ‘The cooperation of the Navy has been 
very serviceable’.23 The fact that this sensitive letter was sent via an American ship shows 
great faith during a time of difficult relations between Britain and the United States. 
 
Dundas had already briefed Elphinstone as to the intention of putting the Cape under British 
protection before the latter had left for the East. As early as March 1795, Elphinstone wrote 
to Dundas that it might not be possible to attack Trincomalee from the Cape if the Dutch 
offered any resistance as the season would be too far advanced. In this case might it be 
possible to launch an attack from Madras?24 And Elphinstone, writing to Rainier before he 
even left Spithead, told him to ‘collect the strongest Force which can be spared from attention 
to Trade to be in readiness to act with the land forces’,25 although it did not specify for which 
operation they would be employed. So the admiral was probably not taking a big risk with his 
political masters in using his initiative, and, indeed, he had sailed before these orders arrived. 
There was an understanding in London that offensive operations would be undertaken in the 
East Indies as soon as possible. However, it should be noted that, there are no specific orders 
in ADM 2 concerning what should be his specific targets. Elphinstone’s decisions would be 
formed solely from discussions held with Dundas and, presumably, Spencer. 
 
Whilst everyone knew that the capture of Mauritius would be of great benefit to the safety of 
British trade, as the original plan to attack it in 1793 indicated, its continuing existence in 
French hands could not easily destroy British India. Yet Rainier knew that Ceylon in French 
hands would be like a pistol at the head of British India, lying in the path between the Royal 
Navy’s summer and winter bases of Bombay and Madras and on the sea route to Europe. It 
should be pointed out that, with British encouragement, in January 1795, the Stadtholder of 
the Netherlands sent out a letter to the governors of all Dutch colonies usually carried by the 
very British forces that he was telling them to accept in their territories.26 Not knowing how 
this document would be received, British forces had to be prepared for any response from 
immediate surrender, as at Banda, or to fierce opposition, as in certain parts of Ceylon. It is 
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uncertain as to how much this letter brought about the decision to attack Ceylon but certainly 
Rainier knew from experience how important Trincomalee was geographically with its 
excellent harbour which could be used year round, irrespective of the trade winds and 
monsoons. It ‘had the advantages of complete shelter, at all times of the year, in one or other 
of its two bays; the protection of its batteries; and an ample supply of water and fuel’.27 The 
inland geography was such that an army would find it impossible to attack from the landward 
side so that, with a reasonable garrison, it was almost impregnable. Its prime drawback was 
that it could not supply itself with food and the garrison had to live on salt provisions. He 
therefore knew that it was correct to use the available forces to take Trincomalee – which he 
did.  
 
Whilst Rainier was collecting his forces to attack Trincomalee, he despatched Captain 
Newcombe of HMS Orpheus, together with Major Brown leading Company troops, to 
capture Malacca.  His orders to Newcombe illustrate his priorities:  
 
You are always to cultivate from your Example and Influence the most perfect 
harmony between the two Services as the Success of every joint operation will 
much depend thereon.  
 
Rainier went on to mention a letter addressed to himself and Major General Abercromby  
requesting that the navy help the army: ‘…you are at all times to pay them due attention 
complying with every requisition therein made to the best of your Judgement and Ability 
according to existing circumstances’. 28 His trust in his subordinate is clear when he ordered 
Newcombe to decide for himself after he has taken Malacca, if he is able to take any other 
Dutch islands. But he must not risk losing it again to the French and allowing them to use it 
to threaten the China Trade. This letter is a perfect example of Rainier’s beliefs in how to 
work with the army but also how the navy must never lose sight of the fact that trade 
protection was its first priority. 
 
Trincomalee surrendered to Rainier on the 30th August, approximately two weeks after 
Malacca fell to Newcombe. The losses taking the former were fifteen killed and fifty four 
wounded royal and Company troops and one killed and six wounded sailors. These were 
small losses for so important a prize.29 Worthy of note is the fact that, instead of the 5000 
troops that Elphinstone wanted to attack Mauritius, Rainier, with a 74, a 50, and two frigates 
of 44 and 32 guns respectively, took Trincomalee with two European companies and a 
battalion of Sepoys, approximately 900 men. These operations were relatively easy against a 
weak enemy and could be seen as useful training operations for the future. Cooperation 
between the army and navy was very smooth with Rainier lending the army three of the 
Suffolk’s guns as its own were faulty.30 He also sent sailors ‘in parties of one and two 
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hundred’ to haul the cannon into position and a group of artillerymen under the command of 
one of Suffolk’s midshipmen. He had organised a party of 300 seamen and marines under 
Captain Smith of the Diomede who were prepared to storm the fort if it had not capitulated. 
This meant that the Navy provided one third of the land forces. Ever sensitive to the benefits 
of praise he wrote to the Admiralty of Colonel Stuart that the capture ‘was so judiciously 
planned by Colonel Stuart and the work so ably executed as to do amazing execution’.31 And 
Stuart wrote of Rainier ‘I am beyond measure indebted to Commodore Rainier for his cordial 
cooperation and the active assistance of the Navy in every department of the public 
service’.32 It is not surprising that relations between the two continued to ensure cordial 
cooperation between the army and navy. And Wellesley agreed with Rainier’s opinion: 
‘Stuart 33 is unquestionably the best officer in India’.34  The admiral remained on good terms 
with the General. Major Lachlan Macquarie, on the staff of General Stuart, wrote in his 
journal in 1799:  
 
Admiral Rainier having very kindly offered his old friend Genl. Stuart and all his 
staff a passage to Madras … we were most kindly received by the good old 
Admiral at Breakfast.35 
 
During the same year other combined operations took the Dutch colonies of Jaffna and Galle 
in Ceylon, Cochin on the Malabar Coast, Perak on the Malayan Coast, and Padang in 
Sumatra. Rainier was certainly acting without orders and using his initiative and speed of 
operation to take as many Dutch colonies as possible. How far the incentive was to deny 
bases to the French or to obtain prize money is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, his actions 
were such that Black was able to write: ‘Rainier … proved a capable defender of British 
interests’.36 
 
In the same month as Trincomalee was captured, Elphinstone captured the Cape and advised 
Rainier that he, Elphinstone, was now the commander-in-chief. 
 
Apparently ignoring this change to the command structure, and with the agreement of Hobart, 
Rainier sailed to attack the Dutch Spice Islands, leaving Madras on the 15 October 1795.37 
Rainier was sufficiently bullish that he intended to follow their capture with an attack on 
Batavia, the capital of the Dutch East Indies, which he believed would fall easily. And he had 
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to move rapidly because of the impending monsoon season which would make naval 
operations very difficult. 
 
Rainier felt that he could take sufficient ships for the expedition because he had been given 
control of the Bombay Marine vessels Bombay, Swift, Queen and Drake. These would protect 
the Coromandel Coast and blockade Columbo which still refused to surrender.38 He also 
assumed that Elphinstone would soon arrive in India with his own squadron and thus add to 
the security of merchant shipping around India. Moving with commendable speed, he arrived 
at Malacca in November 1795. His carefulness is again demonstrated by the fact that he 
wanted to plan for the attack on Amboina to take place after preparations at Malacca, rather 
than go straight in after a long journey from India.39 
 
His planning was rewarded by the capture of Amboina in February 1796 and Banda a month 
later.40 Persistence was also recompensed with the taking of Columbo in Ceylon by the son of 
Rainier’s old mentor, Captain Alan Hyde Gardner.41 Although Ceylon was not finally 
conquered until 1815, the occupation of both Trincomalee and Columbo signalled the 
effective beginning of British control of the island. The importance of Ceylon is illustrated by 
the fact that it was one of only three possessions kept by Britain at the Treaty of Amiens, the 
others being Trinidad and Tobago.42  
 
This same month Elphinstone returned to the Cape to face a Dutch attempt to retake the 
colony leaving Rainier once more in command of his own destiny. It is clear that Rainier took 
seriously the confidence of Shore in giving him command of the Company forces as well as 
his own. On the army’s landing at Amboina he issued an order to the troops ‘exhorting them 
to an exact observance of Discipline and Sobriety’.43 He realised that there were insufficient 
troops to garrison the island so he took the original decision to put a company of Dutch 
soldiers under the Company’s control, telling the Madras Council that it could decide 
whether or not to make the decision permanent.44 He also had much to do to maintain the 
discipline of the army during debates over the allocation of prize money – his diplomatic 
skills were again in demand.45 
 
These moves did not meet with Elphinstone’s approval: ‘The object of the Rear Admiral will 
doubtless be conducive to the British interests; but another arrangement might have retained 
the Naval Force more collected and prepared for Service not so remote’.46 In a letter to 
Rainier, he took a more defensive stance, telling Rainier that he should protect Malacca and 
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Penang and not send any ships to Mauritius as he, Elphinstone, would cover the French island 
from the Cape – so he was not expecting Rainier to help him attack the French island. It is 
possible that Ephinstone felt Rainier’s expeditions to the east were both a diversion from 
more strategic goals and an opportunity for Rainier to maintain his own independence of 
action. However, he was only too willing to take the prize money which Rainier earned for 
him without any efforts on his own part. But approbation came to Rainier from the Admiralty 
to confirm he had acted correctly: ‘Their Lordships … very highly approve of the Measures 
which were taken by you for the reduction of those Settlements [Dutch East Indies]’.47  
 
As Elphinstone developed his knowledge of the region he noted the dangers emanating from 
Mauritius and felt that it should now be given attention.48 This island had indeed been the 
proposed first goal of the squadron the British government had planned to send out in 1794 
under Gardner. With his own experience during the American Revolution against Suffren, 
Rainier knew the dangers of Ceylon and the East Indies being in French hands should they 
arrive with a battle fleet. But as a current French base Mauritius was clearly the most 
dangerous thorn in a British Indian Ocean. Rainier’s cautious nature would lead him to avoid 
joint expeditions which he felt might not succeed and received wisdom was that Mauritius 
would be very difficult to take. Rainier’s more easterly targets were always logical and more 
easily taken, even though none were as large a threat as the French island. And it would 
appear that Rainier held the same view as more important people in the government; Dundas’ 
opinion, that an attack on Mauritius would fail, was given to Elphinstone in a letter from the 
Admiralty.49 
 
Rainier could not rely on reinforcements being sent to his command because British 
government strategy was still in a state of flux following the outbreak of war with Spain. In 
January 1797, when apparently an attack on Mauritius would consume too many resources, 
the Admiralty asked Pringle at the Cape to look at the idea of attacking Spanish South 
America.50 This uncertainty continued as, two months later, the plan was cancelled.51 But 
Rainier was not a man to panic. Knowing that he had to rely solely on his own resources, on 
8th December 1796, he ordered Captain Pakenham of the Resistance (44), together with three 
sloops, to remain in the Moluccas. Here he was to protect the new British possessions, add 
Great Timor (which he did in July 1797) and survey the surrounding waters to see how 
accurate were the Dutch charts. The Admiral seems now to have put on his trade protection 
hat as he sailed to Macao to pick up the China Fleet and escort it back to Madras. Although 
Rainier did not yet realise it, events in Europe had ensured that there would be no more 
combined operations in the eastern part of the station during Rainier’s command. 
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Still in offensive mood, the declaration of war with Spain in 1797 allowed Rainier to think of 
repeating the 1762 capture of Manila, at which he had been present. With Rear Admiral 
Pringle situated at the Cape with seventeen vessels he need not fear danger from the west. 
Shore had already been told by the Court of Directors to plan such an attack and Hobart 
approached Rainier to obtain his views. The Admiral was very keen and began preparing for 
the expedition, which he knew would take many months to organise. But by August the first 
transports were making their way to Penang. The land forces consisted of 2059 men, 
European and Sepoy, and the escorting squadron comprised of 4 third rates, one 50, and three 
frigates. Additionally there were five Indiamen each carrying between 34 and 36 guns. The 
size of this force can be compared with that capturing the city in 1762, 2000 men and fifteen 
warships.52 Rainier had been able to collect such a large squadron because he had taken an 
unusual risk for him, leaving only one frigate off the Indian coast to protect the trade. He was 
relying on being covered from the Cape in the west, and on luck that the French would not be 
competent enough to cause more than acceptable losses in the Trade. 
 
Before the attack could take place, however, news of the Peace of Löben made Rainier and 
Shore realise that French victory in Europe would allow their enemy to concentrate on other 
theatres of war, in particular India, with their potential ally, Tippoo Sultan. In a letter of 10th 
August Rainier reviewed the pros and cons of attacking Manila or remaining on the 
defensive. He noted that the Philippines were distant from India if he needed to bring troops 
back rapidly, navigation around the area was difficult, and there were more French ships 
active in the Indian Ocean.53 Consequently Rainier, returning to a more traditional risk 
profile, and supported by the Governor General, cancelled the attack on Manila and went on 
the defensive to protect India and its trade.54 Again, an enemy colony was saved by events far 
away in Europe. The episode also illustrated Rainier’s usual risk aversion when his primary 
roles – to protect British Indian possessions and of China/ India Trade – were in jeopardy. It 
also demonstrated that the possibility of gaining enormous wealth through prize money 
would not influence his decision making when he had responsibilities elsewhere. 
 
Apart from the capture of Tidore in the Maluku Islands and Menado on the island of 
Sulawesi, both in 1797, and Ternate in the Molucca Islands in 1801, this early flurry of 
offensive activity was the limit of British eastward expansion until 1810.  To make matters 
worse, all these Eastern conquests, apart from Ceylon, were returned to the Dutch at the 
Peace of Amiens in 1801. In view of its importance the Cape was retaken in 1806 but 
Amboina and Banda were not recovered until 1810-11, when both Mauritius and Batavia 
were finally taken. Plans were made to occupy Manila, Batavia, Mauritius, Tranquebar and 
Goa at different times during Rainier’s command but all were postponed. The primary reason 
for halting these attacks was the perceived threat to India following French successes in the 
European war. Once French military power was omnipotent on continental Europe, it would 
be free to make forays onto other continents to harm its only worldwide foe, Britain. 
                                                            
52 E.L.Rasor, English Naval History to 1815: A Guide to the Literature to 1815 (Westport, CT., 2004), p.130. 
53 T.N.A., ADM 1/168, Rainier to Shore, 10 August 1797. 
54 Ibid., Rainier to Admiralty, 3 September 1797. 
142 
 
Bonaparte might send ships and troops to India and, if he did, British forces needed to be 
available in India itself, rather than mopping up Dutch and Spanish colonies thousands of 
miles to the east. Thus ended Rainier’s offensive period. It was rather early in his command 
but he could not avoid being buffeted by events in Europe. After war broke out again in 1803, 
even Wellesley could see no opportunity for acquisition: ‘It appears to me not to be 
practicable to attempt any Expedition for the purpose of recovering the Eastern islands from 
the Dutch’.55 The Marengo was still at liberty, the Trade needed protection, Rainier had 
insufficient serviceable vessels, the second Anglo-Maratha War was still in progress and the 
Dutch were not making any warlike noises. There was no need to be territorially aggressive 
even if Rainier had wanted it.   
 
Rainier and the Army on the Defensive 1798-1805. 
 
British possessions in the East Indies often had small garrisons whose troops would stand 
little chance against the efficiency of the French army – if it could be brought to these 
colonies. They were the centres of British trade with their finance, shipbuilding/repair and 
logistics facilities. If lost then Britain’s interests would be severely damaged. There were two 
attack routes which Rainier had to counter; from Egypt down the Red Sea and directly from 
France, possibly via Mauritius, having broken the Channel blockade. The changed tenor of 
Rainier’s approach to meeting his strategic goals came in 1798 with Bonaparte’s attack on 
Egypt. If, as was suggested, the French ultimate aim was India, then the first British 
possession to become vulnerable was Bombay. Here was the Indian end of the overland 
communication route to Britain and the wintering home and dockyard of Rainier’s squadron. 
The Bombay Presidency would also make sufficient noise as it demanded naval protection. 
Rainier knew he would have to keep the Admiralty informed of his actions to show that he 
was in control of the situation. 
 
a)The Threat from Egypt. 
The campaign which showed Rainier’s strategic and political skills at their best was that of 
the Red Sea in 1798-99. It illustrates his appreciation of the varied forms in which French 
threats could arise, how to judge their probability, and how to allocate his resources 
accordingly. He was far too politically adept to question how serious was the danger to India 
from Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt and we do not know his true feelings on the matter. 
However, there had been considerable discussion as to whether or not the French initial goal 
was Egypt, followed by an attack on India. Indeed, the impression coming directly from the 
Admiralty was not very threatening: 
 
Their ideas are so extravagant, and their successes on the Continent of Europe 
have rendered them so very sanguine, that though such a scheme is not, at first 
sight very probable, I do not think it quite unworthy of some attention. The naval 
part of any such expedition must necessarily be of inconsiderable force and would 
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therefore require but small exertion in comparison with the importance of the 
object to defeat it.56 
 
So, before he had received any orders from London he despatched, under the command of his 
nephew, John Sprat Rainier, the Centurion (50) and the Albatross (18) to the Red Sea to 
watch for any French activity. It was as well that he did because the small squadron, 
consisting of a 50 gun fourth rate, a frigate and a sloop, sent out from London under 
Commodore Blankett in July 1798, did not arrive at Mocha until the following 13th April. 
Dundas, ever anxious about the security of India, also despatched 4,500 extra royal troops to 
the sub-continent. Although, as Parkinson said:  
 
The idea of sending a small squadron to watch Suez was not … as brilliantly 
original as all that. Rainier had already thought of it himself … and had acted 
early in December with calm efficiency.57  
 
Parkinson also noted that it would have been normal to send orders and reinforcements 
directly to Rainier’s command and indeed it would have been quicker if Dundas had done so. 
But the admiral was not one to take a slight at the actions of his superiors. He also showed his 
initiative by refusing his order to send home the Intrepid (64): ‘as their Lordships were not 
then apprised of the Expedition of the Enemy to Egypt, or the War since undertaken with the 
Tipu Sultan’.58 
 
He told the Admiralty that he had to allocate his ships between the Coromandel, covering 
Madras, the Bay of Bengal, covering Calcutta, and Bombay whence he could watch the Red 
Sea. He therefore had to give up any further long term offensive plans against Manila or 
Java.59 It was a fine judgement he had to make as to where was the most pressing danger to 
British interests, and trade protection was uppermost in his mind. 
 
It was also possible that a French squadron could slip past the English Channel blockade, 
with troops and supplies for Tippoo, and sail round the Cape. Illustrating Rainier’s good 
relations with the Commander at the Cape, Admiral Christian, he asked if the Cape could 
spare a frigate to escort the China fleet as all his were tied up watching the Red Sea. And 
Christian wrote to the Admiralty: ‘it will therefore be my object to hold in readiness the 
means for supporting Rear Admiral Rainier if the occasion should require it’.60 Meanwhile 
the demand for vessels on other parts of the station continued. The following year Rainier 
wrote to Blankett that: ‘I am desirous you should keep no greater force with you than what is 
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absolutely necessary as these Seas [Bay of Bengal] begin to be much infested with 
Privateers’.61 
 
At this distance from London, Rainier was able to control the timing and content of his 
communication with the Admiralty and officers of the Company, thus enabling him to exploit 
his diplomatic strengths. For example, he wrote:  
 
I am assured by the Bombay government that there is an absolute certainty of 
being duly informed of any attempt of the French to invade Persia in time to send 
a detachment of the King’s Ships to oppose the French in their attempt to procure 
transports in that Gulf. We are more alarmed about their possible progress in the 
Red Sea, than in any other quarter. It is therefore absolutely necessary to keep a 
respectable force on the Malabar Coast, as the French may have got out of the 
Gulf of Mocha.62  
 
And the Admiralty was evidently happy with Rainier’s actions:  
 
We have as yet heard nothing from Admiral Blankett … from the means you have 
very judiciously placed in his hands, I have no doubt we shall hear of his having 
completely succeeded in obtaining command of that important point.63  
 
At the same time Rainier was calming nerves in London:  
 
I conceive a force of two frigates or so will be sufficient to be stationed in the Red 
Sea to support the garrison on Perim and to prevent supplies being conveyed to 
the French army by that channel, as in addition to the little probability there exists 
at present of the Enemy’s being able to effect an embarkation in the Gulf of Suez, 
the French General will be farther deterred from such an attempt when he receives 
news of Tipu Sultan’s death, and the success of his Majesty’s Arms in the entire 
conquest of his whole Dominion in India.64  
 
Not having authority over the movements of the Royal Navy, the officials of the Company, 
were more anxious than Rainier and put more pressure on him as their fears of a French 
attack increased:  
 
The General Tenor of these advices leading to a well-grounded Supposition that 
the French may attempt to Convey a large force to India by the Channel of the 
Red Sea … we beg leave most earnestly to Submit to Your Excellency’s 
Consideration the propriety of immediately detaching as large a force as may be 
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in your Power or in your judgement requisite for the purpose of effectually 
counteracting the designs of the Enemy.65  
 
However the circumstances and Rainier’s calmness played their part and by the New Year 
the Council was saying:  
 
Admiral Rainier with the major part of his own Squadron is now on this side of 
India and will proceed to the Red Sea as soon as the services of his ships can be 
useful in that quarter.66  
 
A further example of the Council’s faith in Rainier and their working relationship is shown in 
its letter to him telling him that all the transports for Perim were ready to sail and they were 
awaiting his orders.67 
 
As noted above, General Stuart placed all his faith on the navy defending India before any 
French troops got to the mainland – again, an indication of Rainier’s ability to engender a 
feeling of calmness, trust and competence. His understanding of the conditions faced by 
troops on the Red Sea also appeared to be deeper than that of his army opposite number as he 
would not support Stuart’s idea of sending troops up the Sea to Kossire to eject the small 
French garrison there. He knew the heat and the supply of all the necessary equipment from 
the sea would be very difficult, as much could be achieved, and more cheaply, [always a 
concern of Rainier] by a heavy bombardment.68 
 
Although never going to the Red Sea he had borne the brunt of bottling up any French forces 
there during the first few months before Blankett arrived. He had sent warships and supplies 
to the region, moved most of his ships to the west of India, blockaded Tippoo Sultan’s 
Mysore coast to stop supplies reaching him, protected convoys where possible – all with 
limited resources that required him to use his judgement as to what the French might do and 
dispose his ships accordingly. He cooperated with the officials of the Company, especially 
the Bombay Council and Governor General, to ensure they knew what he was doing, to ask 
their advice, and to explain why he could not do everything they wished. This helped the 
Company to assist the navy with supplies, ships, cash and intelligence whenever possible:  
1 
This cooperation would seem remarkable in any age, knowing the strong 
likelihood of any two organisations to squabble, even when nominally on the 
same side.69 
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Even though the threat within the Red Sea had greatly diminished by 1801, Rainier was still 
concerned over the possible attacks to the British line of communication. He estimated that 
the Seychelles would be a likely place for French raiders to base themselves and sent La 
Sybille (38) to investigate. As Parkinson said, this was an ‘astute move’.70 She found the new 
French frigate La Chiffonne (36) and quickly captured her. Thus we see another example of 
Rainier’s ability to calculate likely French moves and, on this occasion, he was correct.  
 
b)Thwarted attacks on Batavia & Mauritius. 
In May 1800, both Wellesley and Rainier received orders from their respective masters to 
seize Java. Both agreed on this plan and Rainier, taking personal control, began a blockade of 
Batavia as a precursor to invasion. The whole expedition was to be organised from Calcutta 
where Wellesley was situated and which was not the usual base, it being eighty miles up the 
river Hooghly. Rainier viewed this as an important operation which needed his own presence. 
There could be many reasons for Rainier believing he should command; this would be a large 
operation and his only other flag officer was Blankett, who was not a favourite of the 
Governor General. Rainier was comfortable with the senior army commanders – which 
Blankett was not. He also knew well the waters around Java and, whilst there, he would be 
near the centre of his command, able to detach ships, if necessary, to cover any threats to the 
China Trade. Rainier appears never to have seen the danger from the Red Sea as too serious, 
believing it more a two frigate operation.71 Whilst Rainier was now sufficiently wealthy not 
to need further prize money, it is possible he felt his presence on the operation would allow 
him to place his nephews in optimal positions to make their own fortunes.  
 
The other pointer to the importance given to the expedition by Rainier was his decision to 
keep two ships from the Cape command under his control. Wellesley’s confidence in 
Rainier’s military skills shows by telling the admiral to consult with the army officers on the 
attack on Batavia, but if there are any differences, he was to make the decisions.72 That this is 
a personal sign of trust is shown by the fact that, when Wellesley learned that Rainier might 
send Blankett to Batavia rather than go himself, he told the admiral that, if this were the case, 
he would transfer the negotiating with the Dutch from the naval commander to Colonel 
Champagne.73 This attitude of Wellesley towards Blankett is a little strange because, as 
Rainier reported to the Admiralty, the governor general had told Blankett that Perim and 
Aden were being evacuated and Blankett could use the troops thus relieved however he 
wished.74 
 
Then, in the midst of all these preparations Rainier received a letter from Wellesley telling 
him that Java was cancelled and the plan was now to attack Mauritius.75 He must have felt 
absolutely certain of Rainier’s support as he had recently written to the Court of Directors 
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that he found the admiral in ‘uniform spirit of cordial cooperation’ with the ‘utmost degree of 
alacrity of judgement’.76  
 
The threat from the French island had suddenly become pressing. An Indiaman, the Kent, had 
been taken off the Sand Heads and HM Sloop Trincomalee (16) had blown up during a battle 
with a French warship in the Persian Gulf. Rainier had known for a long time that Mauritius 
was a serious problem. It was the key French base from which to attack both the Country and 
the European Trade and, in 1799, Rainier had written to Spencer asking if either he or Curtis 
at the Cape could be given sufficient ships to enforce a permanent blockade of the French 
island.77  
 
So sure was he that it would take place, Wellesley even mentioned it in a letter to Captain 
Pulteney Malcolm of the Suffolk giving his thoughts that:  
 
I have the fullest confidence that his Excellency [Rainier] will concur both in the 
necessity of the determination which I have formed to relinquish the Expedition 
concocted between us [Java], and in the plan of measures which I propose to 
adopt in consequence of the recent advices from Europe and Egypt.  
 
He wanted Malcolm to escort the troopships down to Trincomalee ready for the attack on 
Mauritius.78 Wellesley was clearly feeling confident as he told Malcolm that he had even sent 
his dispatches to Rainier by an American brig. At the end of November he suggested to 
Rainier that he send some ships down to Mauritius to assist Curtis who had a small squadron 
from the Cape blockading the French island.79 A week later he wrote: 
 
The same motives of respect and confidence which induced me to solicit your 
Excellency’s assistance in the prosecution of the measures intended against 
Batavia, render me equally desirous of securing the same advantage on the 
present important occasion.80  
 
He continued: 
 
[I] submit to your Excellency’s consideration a general view of the plan which 
appears to me most eligible for the purpose of enabling us to act offensively and 
defensively, as the case may require, to frustrate any attempt of the French, either 
for the relief of their army in Egypt, or for the disturbance of our possessions in 
India, and to answer the expected demand of his Majesty’s Minister for our co-
operation in Egypt in the approaching season.  
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A general outline was then made, explaining how few and poor were the troops on the island 
as reported by a ‘seafaring gentleman who had been a short time a prisoner there’.  
 
Rainier was not convinced; just cutting one buoy, and thus destroying possible safe 
approaches to the treacherous Mauritian shore, would thwart the plans. Additionally he was 
concerned that the season was too far advanced and there was little chance of the required 
secrecy if they had to wait until the next season. Even after the island had been charted and 
captured, the Remarks Book of HMS Ariadne (20) stated: ‘As soundings with hand lead 
cannot be got above ½ mile off the Reefs I do not recommend running along shore for the 
Anchorage at night’.81 So Rainier was wise to be concerned for the navigational aspects of 
attacking an island not even rudimentally charted. Because of the artillery required, and 
because the island was short of supplies, more ships would be needed for the equipment to be 
carried to bring stores. The people who had been given the responsibility of organising the 
transports had, in his estimation, too little experience of such a complicated exercise. The 
inability of the British to remove the French army from Egypt meant that the threat was still 
present and it was feasible that the British government would request an Indian army to be 
transported to Egypt via the Red Sea. He simply did not have sufficient ships to cover the 
Trade as well as these impending expeditions. He would also have agreed with Curtis, who 
told Spencer that it was unlikely that the colonists would greet the British with open arms, as 
Wellesley believed. He also knew that Mauritius received many of its supplies from the Isle 
de Bourbon because it could not feed itself. Therefore, if British forces were to take 
Mauritius they would also have to capture its granary island, which Curtis thought was 
almost impregnable.82 Rainier wrote to Nepean that he would keep his ships stationed off 
Java until he heard otherwise: ‘from their Lordships or other competent authority’. In fact 
Rainier could not understand why the Batavia attack had been called off at all. If it were 
acceptable to attack Mauritius, then surely it was also acceptable to attack the Batavia.83 It 
would seem that this interpretation of Rainier’s was correct because, in Wellesley’s next 
letter to him, Wellesley said that he expected the Batavia expedition to be renewed with the 
transports to be ready to take troops there in the second or third week of November.84 His 
idea that Mauritius could be subdued in two months maximum and that the British ships, 
troops, and equipment would be sufficiently robust then to attack the headquarters of the 
Dutch East Indies, perhaps the most unhealthy European colony in Asia, shows a level of 
ignorant optimism that would confirm all Rainier’s fears of the Governor General’s military 
skills. The total campaign which captured Reunion and Mauritius in 1810 took five months. 
Rainier wrote to Spencer with these concerns and his sensitivity is illustrated by his last 
paragraph:  
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I beg leave to repeat to your Lordship my assurance that I have been wholly 
actuated in my resistance to the above measure by a principle of duty, sensible of 
the delicacy of the situation I have placed myself in by opposing one of his 
Excellency’s exalted rank, and deservedly high estimation in the eyes of his 
Majesty’s Ministers …85  
 
Clearly there was some slight suspicion that all was not well because Wellesley noted to 
Rainier that: ‘It is my intention to prosecute the Expedition to the Isle of France 
independently of any assistance from Your Excellency, if I should unfortunately fail in 
obtaining your cooperation’.86  
 
Then came the bombshell from Rainier. It is therefore not surprising that Wellesley was 
astonished by the response of the ‘tractable’ admiral:  
 
I am concerned to inform Your Excellency that I am withheld from giving my 
concurrence to the Expedition projected, and so strenuously recommended and 
urged by Your Excellency … no such enterprise can with propriety be 
undertaken, unless by the express command of the King … with much regret as 
being the only instance of a difference of sentiment on plans of public service, 
that has arisen within the length of time I have had the honour to correspond with 
Your Excellency for the good of His Majesty’s Service.87 
 
It is likely that the prime reason was that a cautious Rainier was less sanguine about the 
possibility of success and he was using this as an excuse.   
 
There followed from Wellesley a barrage of letters explaining the need for the invasion, 
which obviously Rainier would understand. He had listened to all the Governor General’s 
suggestions and acted upon them in the past so, on this occasion, the Governor General could 
not understand why he would not do so when the case was so clear. Apparently Rainier’s 
logic and Curtis’ negative critique could not sway the ambition of the Governor General. He 
was not used to anyone opposing his plans and he replied with a twenty three page diatribe 
against his naval colleague. He said that Rainier’s letter was:  
 
a subject of the deepest regret, and of the most severe disappointment to my mind. 
I cannot admit the force of any such rule to be so great as to impose on Your 
Excellency the duty of frustrating or impairing … the reasonable annoyance of 
the enemy.  
 
He continued to criticise Rainier for taking so long to reply to his letter and pointed out that 
local commanders had the duty to use their initiative in the light of local circumstances. As 
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someone close to the leaders in government he knew the strategic demands of the war far 
better that Rainier did.88 He reacted to Rainier’s refusal to assist him by telling him that he 
had written to Curtis at the Cape, asking for his support to attack Mauritius, although he did 
not imply that he would automatically receive it.89 And, it should be noted, Mauritius was 
physically within Curtis’s command so this action would seem appropriate. 
 
Whether or not Rainier originally specifically agreed directly to an attack on Mauritius, or 
whether Wellesley just took it for granted is impossible to ascertain. There are many letters 
between the two but none in which Rainier actually agrees to such a plan. It is therefore 
probable that, because the Admiral had been so “tractable” in the past, Wellesley never 
imagined that he might not be so in the future when the case was so obvious to the Governor 
General.  
 
Further communication followed; Rainier should prepare to send ships to the Red Sea and 
they should also address the more the fundamental issue of who was in charge:  
 
… the important principle at issue between Your Excellency and me should be 
settled upon permanent grounds, for the guidance of those who may succeed Your 
Excellency and me in the arduous situations we respectively occupy.  
 
He also told Rainier that: ‘I consider the French Islands to be an outpost of the Army in 
Egypt’.90  
 
Rainier clearly knew he had to inform Spencer of the latest developments:  
 
‘[I] received a letter from Lord Wellesley expressive of much chagrin at my 
refusal to co-operate [in the expedition to Mauritius] … and suggesting a variety 
of arguments tending to prove me in the wrong, and to impress me with the idea 
that his public consequence and intimate connection with his Majesty’s Ministers 
were more than sufficient to shelter my conduct from any degree of responsibility 
in the issue. I must confess to your Lordship that I am not in the least convinced 
by his Excellency’s reasonings and have therefore forborne to make any reply to 
them, having neither the inclination nor leisure to enter into such tedious 
discussions … I feel no small satisfaction in the reflection that my application to 
your Lordship to be superseded preceded the period when this difference of 
opinion on public service appeared’.91 
 
                                                            
88 B.L., Add. Mss. 13752, Wellesley to Rainier, 5 February 1801. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 10 February 1801. 
91 Corbett (ed.), The Spencer Papers, I, N.R.S. XLVI, Rainier to Spencer, 10 May 1801. 
151 
 
In fact, Rainier had ordered a continued blockade of Batavia but it had to be called off 
because, even at sea, disease was so fierce that it left insufficient men to man the ships.92 The 
received wisdom of the period was that the French garrison on Mauritius was strong, with 
well trained troops and effective artillery. Almost ten years later, when the island was finally 
overcome, it was discovered that the French forces were greatly overrated and the actual 
conquest took only five days. If a more careful reconnaissance of the island had taken place 
in 1800, it is possible that Wellesley would have been proven correct and an assault on 
Mauritius would have had more chance of success than an attack on Batavia. 
 
It is noteworthy that, in his official report to the Admiralty, Rainier did not mention the 
attack on him by Wellesley, thus keeping their dispute private, but did say that the Governor 
General had asked him for a ship to transport some bullion from China to India,93 indicating 
that the navy was still supporting Wellesley in his role as protector of British India. 
 
Longford, in her biography of Wellington, whilst misunderstanding the command 
relationship between the army and navy, nevertheless was able to show what the great 
general thought of the venture: ‘It was true that Rainier had declined to serve under Arthur on 
the hair brained Mauritius venture (since Stokes, its lynchpin, turned out to be a pompous 
ass) and his plan, as Arthur agreed, “the greatest nonsense”’.94 Further corroboration is found 
in a letter from Arthur Wellesley to his brother Henry: ‘I never entirely approved of the 
Expedition to Mauritius’.95 
 
Clearly Rainier was already feeling the strain of such an arduous command before the 
disagreement with Wellesley, hence his earlier request for replacement.96 The tone of the 
letter is not one written by a content man. He also saw the seriousness of his difference with 
Wellesley in that, if he had offered his resignation after their quarrel, then people would have 
believed that his offer was made for that reason, which it was clearly not.  
 
This proposed combined operation was the only one on which there was a serious difference 
of opinion between Rainier and the head of land forces in India, namely Wellesley himself. It 
is important to note that Wellesley had never served even as a junior army officer, but his 
own self belief, probably fired by the victory over Tippoo Sultan, won primarily by Generals 
Lake and Wellesley, clearly overruled such a minor impediment to competence. His 
knowledge of the situation on the island came from a Mr. Stokes, a merchant who had been 
briefly imprisoned there. Wellesley planned to make him the government agent of Mauritius 
after its capture so he had a vested interest in the campaign. But Rainier clearly saw that it 
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was an amateur leading an amateur and he was not interested in risking either his ships or the 
army. Although there is no public record of any military opposition this is not surprising 
given Wellesley’s antipathy to anyone who did not think as he did. His brother did not say 
anything negative at the time. Whilst Rainier had previously been prepared to invade 
Mauritius the circumstances had been different. The islands were so far to the west of his 
command that they were indeed outside his station and he would need Admiralty permission 
to leave his command. Also, the greatly increased China Trade and the capture of the Dutch 
islands meant that the centre of gravity of his command had moved far to the east. If 
therefore he concentrated his squadron to the west he would leave the valuable trade, which 
he saw as his first priority, exposed to French, Dutch and Spanish attack. Under Governor 
General Shore the Indian sub-continent had been relatively quiet but the territorial ambitions 
of Wellesley had agitated the native princes. Rainier knew that moving the large number of 
troops that would be needed to take Mauritius would leave exposed British territories in India 
to attack, especially from the Marathas. Rainier’s inherent conservative and careful nature 
would interpret these factors as creating too big a risk. 
 
But it is worth pointing out that during his offensive period of 1795-7 Rainier had shown that 
he was not totally negative and defensive-minded if he saw the opportunity for gain without 
the likelihood of serious losses, both in the actual action and from leaving the station exposed 
to French commerce raiding elsewhere. Yet this attribute was forgotten by those historians 
with a more superficial study of the region and period in their desire to support Wellesley’s 
view that the capture of Mauritius would be easy. 
 
This serious difference between Rainier and Wellesley was the most important during the 
entire period of their cooperation. But it does illustrate that Rainier would not be swayed by 
extreme pressure from what he believed was in the nation’s interest, even if it would damage 
his own career. And his arguments were all logical and well thought out; as viewed from 
tactical, strategic and logistical points of view. Wellesley now revived the plan against 
Batavia. But, within a week Rainier and Wellesley received orders to prepare a force to attack 
Egypt from the Red Sea and the Admiral was able to write to Spencer that he felt his stand 
had been vindicated.97 
 
The Peace of Amiens restored Dutch and French colonies to their former masters except 
Ceylon, which the British government must have realised was too important to the security of 
India to be allowed to fall into an enemy’s hands. Although Rainier had received his prize 
money, his thoughts on all the efforts he had made to enhance the security of British 
possessions in the Far East must have been frustrating. But, being the private man he was, his 
views were not made public. He had orders to return the majority of his squadron to England, 
which would reduce the East Indies command to one for a commodore, two ranks below his 
current one. This meant he would expect a recall himself in the near future.  
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Whilst Europe lay in an uneasy peace, war in India continued under the guise of the Second 
Maratha War. By this time the Indian Army had reorganised its commissary, with bullock 
trains of over 100,000 animals. Much of the fighting was inland and Generals Lake and 
Wellesley proved able to defeat their enemies without support from the Navy. There was no 
likelihood of French reinforcements being sent to India so there was no need for a naval 
blockade. Consequently Rainier played only a minor part in this conflict. The remainder of 
his time in the East Indies was taken up with trade protection and trying to catch Linois. 
 
c)The Direct Threat from France. 
The unreliability of naval blockade also meant that, however Rainier felt about his local naval 
superiority, he could never be sure that units of the French navy might not escape the 
blockade of the French coast and reach Indian waters. His attitude to such possible events 
was somewhat sanguine. As he told Blankett, if the French sent a battle fleet, British 
reinforcements would undoubtedly follow and he had merely to wait for them to arrive before 
tackling the French squadron.98 He had to accept that the French Wars were primarily 
European wars, although with a global dimension that was much larger than in any previous 
conflagration. Communication was regularly sent to him of the latest rumours and actual 
facts, and, in spite of what he said to Blankett, his natural caution caused him some stress: 
 
         The almost constant alarm I have been kept in … of a French squadron being 
destined for these Seas has made me cautious of making any separation of the line 
of battle ships.99  
 
Given the problems for such news finding him, he always needed a plan to rush naval units to 
whatever part of his vast station required protection. It must be remembered that Rainier did 
not remain at one headquarters, or even in a close sea area such as the Western Approaches, 
the weather patterns and the sheer area to be covered meant that, as described in Chapter 
Five, he could be anywhere from Bombay to Canton. 
  
Under this threat Rainier was primarily in the hands of the navy in home waters. Vice 
Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, soon to be a member of the Board of Admiralty, described 
his own view of the French counter strategy as it would impact Britain’s Indian possessions 
and trade:  
 
         They will probably have flying squadrons in the East Indies, strong enough to 
intercept our China and India ships, and may attempt, at an early period of the 
war, the capture of St. Helena and the Cape.100  
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Indeed, in 1796 and 1800-1 Villeneuve and Ganteaume respectively had been rumoured to be 
arming squadrons to depart France for the Indian Ocean. The Admiralty’s strategy was to 
have only a small squadron, based in the East Indies, which could be reinforced from Britain 
as circumstances dictated. Consequently in 1803, after the recommencement of war, St. 
Vincent was only prepared to consider reinforcing the East Indies squadron after he had 
rebuilt naval strength in the Channel and Western Approaches, where imminent invasion 
threatened. Castlereagh wrote to Wellesley: ‘[St. Vincent] will be prepared, if necessary, to 
reinforce it [the East Indies] as soon as the Channel arrangements are completed’.101 As Colin 
Gray has said: ‘Sea Powers, used to waging war abroad, are singularly sensitive to the peril of 
invasion’.102 Thus the emphasis on concentrating naval strength in home waters meant that 
the East Indies squadron would never be a large one: ‘… sea power was only dispersed into 
distant waters in a limited and subsidiary form’.103 Indeed, given the difficulty of finding 
enemy ships once they arrived in the vastness of the East Indies it was probably easier to 
catch them in the Channel, even taking into account the impact the weather could have on the 
blockade. If they failed to catch them in the Channel then sufficient reinforcements could be 
sent out to India to reinforce Rainier to meet the new challenge. Hence resources should be in 
position in the region to cover any reasonable possibilities.104  
 
d)The Threat from India and Overland from the North. 
By definition, the role of the navy in countering attacks by land was somewhat limited. The 
danger could arise from native rulers, such as Tippoo Sultan of Mysore, or the Marathas of 
central India. Secondly, there were rumours that the French army in Egypt could march east, 
thus avoiding the Royal Navy, entering India via Persia or Afghanistan.  
 
How far Wellesley really believed in the threat to British possessions is unclear. Alder 
believed that, when Wellesley arrived in 1798, he did take seriously the danger ‘from Tippoo 
Sultan in Mysore, from the Nizam of Hyderabad, from the Marathas and from the French, 
apparently in league with all the other three’.105 Whether or not he did feel threatened is 
immaterial to the result of a consolidated position of Britain as the major power in India by 
1805. 
 
Wellesley was able to carry out his aims by persuading Dundas that the threat to British 
interests from the native rulers was so great that they had to be destroyed. This was especially 
the case if they were allied to France and thereby receiving French supplies and troops. 
Dundas would remember that this had been a considerable threat during the American 
Revolution. They could also provide bases from which French forces could attack British 
possessions. In 1787 Tippoo had sent an embassy to France to show to the world that he was 
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friendly with a powerful European nation and, although no treaty was agreed, trade 
agreements were reached in 1788. In the subsequent years before 1793, there were many 
visits and communications between Tippoo’s representatives and French officials in 
Pondicherry and on Mauritius. But France’s finances were too weak for active assistance, 
tellingly as Tippoo requested it when attacked by Britain in 1792. The main result of the ties 
between Mysore and France was the presence of Frenchmen in Tippoo’s army and the 
beginning of its training to high French standards.  
 
These developments, implying a common desire to destroy Britain’s power in India, were 
well known in London where any sign of an alliance between the two powers would be 
credible. 
 
The period of most concern in London for events in India occurred during the period in which 
the French army was ensconced in Egypt. Their long term aim was seen as marching from 
Egypt to India and there destroying British power, fighting in alliance with the native rulers, 
primarily Tippoo, whose own powers and independence were threatened by France’s old 
enemy. Once Wellesley was ensconced in India, how far he believed the seriousness of this 
threat is not known although Ingram believes he was not: ‘…he had never been alarmed by 
the French expedition to Egypt’.106 Certainly Longford believed Wellesley was not fearful: 
‘He almost certainly did not believe it possible, but he acted as if he did’.107 Yet it did present 
an ideal opportunity for him to persuade Dundas, who did believe it was serious, to permit 
him to destroy Tippoo before he could grow any stronger with French support. A letter from 
Bonaparte to Tippoo was obtained by the British at Jeddah before it could reach its intended 
recipient. It showed French intentions but not how they would be achieved: ‘You must 
already have been informed of my arrival on the coast of the Red Sea with a large and 
invincible army, filled with a desire to deliver you from the iron yoke of England’. There 
were no details of how Bonaparte would give succour to Tippoo.108 Yet against a French 
army, estimated somewhat generously by John Udney, the British Consul at Leghorn, of 
50,000 men,109 British India would be seriously threatened. With all Britain’s other 
commitments Dundas was only able to send to India an extra 4,500 men garnered from the 
Cape, Gibraltar and Portugal, together with a small squadron consisting of the Leopard (50), 
Daedalus (32), and Orestes (18). These vessels were under the command of Commodore 
Blankett and were sent to the Red Sea.  
 
The threat from Egypt continued until the French army’s evacuation at the Peace of Amiens. 
Yet it would appear that Wellesley lost all interest in Egypt after Amiens, seeing it as part of 
the European strategy which had no impact on him and he therefore turned his efforts 
towards destroying the Marathas. Although there is no evidence of any opinion voiced by 
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Rainier, it would appear from his actions that he viewed Egypt in the same way – this was an 
issue to be dealt with directly from Britain.  
 
The government tried to hold on to Malta which it saw as a useful base for the fleet to watch 
French activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its planned surrender under the terms of the 
treaty, and under pressure from Russia, was not welcomed by the navy.110 Wellesley’s view 
of the situation was confirmed by Sir Charles Whitworth, the British ambassador to Paris, 
when he wrote that he ‘doubted whether the French had made plans to challenge the British 
in India, which was beyond their strength’; General Decaen ‘possesses no very shining talent’ 
– beyond acute Anglophobia – and the French navy lacked the capability to operate so far 
from home waters.111 Whitworth concluded that the French: ‘intend rather to improve the 
possessions they already have in India, than to extend them by conquest or intrigue’.112 
Although of no direct concern to Rainier, the outbreak of war in 1803 focussed British 
diplomacy on French plans for Egypt, which the government saw as a serious threat to India. 
It appears that the aim was to stop France in the Mediterranean rather than build up naval 
strength in the East Indies, and Malta would be an important key in that defensive plan. 
 
Possible attacks on India overland, via Syria to the Persian Gulf, and thence by sea to India, 
or via various routes entirely on land, through a combination of Persia and Afghanistan, 
continued to exercise Wellesley and there were several attempts to ally with either or both of 
these regional powers. In the event of such threats, Rainier’s role would be one of blockading 
the coast to stop reinforcements of men and/or materials reaching the enemy and of moving 
British troops and supplies by sea, the most speedy and efficient method of doing so. 
 
Rainier’s Logistical Support Role. 
 
The role that the navy played in the defeat of Tippoo Sultan in 1799 was an important one. It 
blockaded the coast to ensure that no supplies reached Tippoo from Mauritius or the Red Sea, 
and escorted troops and supplies around the coast to attack where Tippoo was most 
vulnerable. Whilst Rainier could not take credit for the successful campaigns of Arthur 
Wellesley and General Lake during the second Maratha War he could also not be seen to 
have a hand in the defeats of the Kandyan War of 1803, when the British garrison at Kandy 
was massacred as it retreated to the coast, and of the more than 2000 men killed and wounded 
of the force under General Lake as he tried to capture the fort of Bharatpur. The former 
illustrated the vulnerability of a regular army to guerrilla tactics and the latter to forgetting 
the importance of siege artillery. Rainier had been able to provide artillery cover for the 
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Geopolitics of the First British Expedition to Egypt – IV:  Occupation and Withdrawal, 1801-3, Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol. l., No. 2 (April 1995), p. 336. 
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attack on Trincomalee but when the objective was deep inland, the limits of naval power 
were obvious. 
 
In the major expedition to send the Indian army to Egypt via Suez in 1800-1 to complement 
Abercromby’s attack from the Mediterranean, Rainier’s role was very much that of logistics 
provider. Rainier would play a minor part in the Egyptian exercise but he moved to Bombay 
in order to ensure the smooth collection of the resources necessary for such a large number of 
troops. And he knew it would be a difficult task; Blankett wrote to him that supplying the 
army as far north as Suez would be very difficult, especially with the lack of fresh water. 
There was a great need for cash to keep the Arabs on side – those at Mocha were friendly but 
not those at Jeddah where they were ‘not fond of even touching a Christian’.113 That both 
Dundas and Wellesley now wrote directly to Blankett indicated that they saw the operation as 
not being in Rainier’s hands. Popham was sent out to replace Blankett with what Rainier 
believed to be sufficient ships. He therefore decided not to send any of his squadron with the 
Red Sea operation. 
 
Apart from his own personal experience, he now knew what actions were important to ensure 
the success of the attacking forces and these he provided for Blankett and Popham. These 
consisted of providing escorts for supply ships to the Red  Sea,114 of sending supplies from 
Trincomalee,115 of ensuring Blankett and Colonel Murray had sufficient ships and stores to 
capture Perim,116 and by sending supplies from Madras to Popham in the Red Sea.117 How 
successful he was is illustrated by the ability of Baird’s army of 5822 men, brought both from 
India and Popham’s squadron, to travel in luxury, with all the baggage to be expected in the 
train of an Indian potentate. So luxurious were their conditions that Hutchinson, the army 
commander who was in overall command and who had arrived from the Mediterranean, 
refused to allow the two armies to meet in case the poor, bedraggled northern army saw what 
their Indian comrades possessed. The comparison even came down to actual money when 
Hutchinson asked Baird: ‘If you could lend us ten or twenty thousand Pounds it would be a 
great object, everything is in arrear[s] … this arises from most of the Ports of Europe being 
shut against us’.118 Even the loss of the precious frigate La Forte, hitting an uncharted rock 
on entering Jeddah harbour, and full of supplies for the army, did not impact its relative life 
of ease. Although it did make Rainier extremely angry as he felt that Blankett had been 
careless. 
 
The remainder of Rainier’s contact with the army consisted of supporting its advances and 
retreats on the Indian sub continent, of moving troops and supplies and escorting transports. 
Sometimes he had to provide supplies from his own naval resources. For example, on writing 
to Elphinstone to tell him of the capture of Amboina and Banda, he mentioned that he had to 
                                                            
113 B.L., Add. Mss. 13760, Blankett to Rainier, 8 October 1800. 
114 T.N.A., ADM 2/1358, Admiralty to Rainier, 10 October 1800. 
115 T.N.A., ADM 1/168, Rainier to Basil Cochrane, 24 May 1797. 
116 Exeter University Bombay Diary, T74/54, Rainier to Bombay Council, 11 March 1799. 
117 Ibid., 108/1801, Bombay Council to Home Popham, 27 May 1801. 
118 Ibid., 112/53, Hutchinson to Baird, 3 June 1801. 
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give some of his arrack and biscuits to the troops.119 On the other hand, he did benefit from 
detachments of troops being sent aboard his warships to replace marines lost through the 
ravages of disease and occasionally, war. 
 
Apart from Abercromby’s actual expedition to Egypt, there were two combined operations to 
the Red Sea during Rainier’s command. But, again, his role was purely secondary, 
concentrating on ensuring that there were adequate resources in ships, supplies and men. This 
first operation carried out by the East Indies command was the occupation of the island of 
Perim in June 1799.120 Perim lies at the mouth of the Red Sea in the Straits of Bab el 
Mandeb. The military force came from the Bombay Presidency under Lieutenant Colonel 
Murray and the naval contingent was commanded by Commodore Blankett who had just 
arrived from England. Rainier’s role was a logistics one in which he ensured Blankett and the 
troops had the supplies he needed. In this role Rainier excelled; in five days in April 1799 he 
told the agent for the Blake, transport, to take supplies to Colonel Murray and that she would 
be escorted by the Indiaman Princess Charlotte.121 The next day he wrote to Captain Prescott 
of the Princess Charlotte to ensure that the soldiers received the same level of victuals as the 
sailors and four days later he was telling Captain Stuart of HMS Fox that the ships operating 
in the Red Sea did not have sufficient cash or credit in order to buy water. He told Stuart to 
obtain 5000 rupees from the Bombay Victualling Agent.122 Rainier’s was also a diplomatic 
role in which he assured both the Bombay Presidency and the Admiralty that the navy was 
doing all that was necessary to ensure a successful operation. Rainier’s close relation with 
Bombay is shown by the letter from the latter that tells Rainier the military forces are ready 
for sea and they just await the admiral’s signal to sail.123 This letter followed Rainier’s of the 
11th saying he was ready to give the navy’s support whenever they wanted.124 Thus the 
expedition sailed, occupied the island and erected a battery with which, theoretically, to cover 
the sea lanes around the island.125  
 
Once in possession of the island it was discovered that land based artillery could not cover 
the entire sea passage out of the Red Sea so warships were still necessary to be based at the 
island. The other problem was that there was no water on the island so supplies had to be 
brought at great expense by sea from Mocha. Blankett realised that he would have to make 
extra patrols and also bring water from Mocha – both activities which would detract from 
what he saw as his prime role of searching out French activity in the Red Sea. Rainier also 
learned that Blankett did not have the same cooperative skills as he did and Blankett built up 
a level of animosity with Murray that lasted for the entire period of the occupation. For 
example, Blankett told Murray that he could not guarantee supplying the island with water if 
his ships would be needed to watch for the French, to which Murray replied that he was not 
                                                            
119 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Elphinstone, 27 March 1796. 
120 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed description of the strategic situation and Appendix 10e. 
121 N.M.M., RAI/6, Rainier to Thomas Blast, agent for the Blake, transport, 2 April 1799. 
122 Ibid., Rainier to Prescott, 3 April 1799, Rainier to Stuart 7April 1799. 
123 Exeter University, Bombay Diary 75/4, Bombay Council to Rainier, 29 March 1799.  
124 Ibid., T74/54, Rainier to Bombay Council, 11 March 1799. 
125 Ibid., T74/ 66, President’s Minute to Council Meeting, 15 March 1799. 
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very happy and wondered why Blankett could not give him some of the ships’ water.126 The 
island was finally totally evacuated in March 1800 by which time both Rainier and Wellesley 
felt safe in acting on their intuition that there was no risk to British India from the Red Sea. 
 
But even with this uneasy relationship, Murray was sufficiently certain of the power of the 
navy to take his troops anywhere. He wrote to the Bombay Council telling it that he wanted 
to keep his troops in the Red Sea in case they were needed for further offensive operations.127  
 
Even after the Perim adventure Blankett continued to have high hopes of getting the army to 
listen to him. But he was disappointed. On the moves to send an Indian army expedition to 
attack Egypt from the Red Sea he caustically commented to the Admiralty:  
 
There appears to be a[n] … impropriety in sending out a squadron of ships to an 
unknown Sea where an Admiral Commands without ordering them at least to 
follow his advice, but it appears the direction is left to General Baird.128  
 
There was then a certain amount of schadenfreude when he further told the Admiralty that he 
has received orders from General Hutchinson to send more troops into Egypt. But as the wind 
was now set from the north, he could not obey.129 The unwritten comment was that any 
competent sailor would know it was impossible and should therefore be listened to by the 
army commanders. Surprisingly the Bombay Council also seemed to ignore the naval 
command, telling Captain Hardie of the Company frigate Cornwallis to remain at Mocha 
until either General Baird or Colonel Wellesley arrived to take command.130 
 
It is difficult to understand why Rainier did not take a more active part in helping Blankett in 
his relationship with the army. The two had already served together during the American 
Revolution. He might have felt less helpful due to the initial independent nature of Blankett’s 
command when he had been sent out to the Red Sea from England. Rainier’s letters are not as 
friendly as they are to other senior officers. An example of Rainier’s strange behaviour 
towards Blankett is shown in a letter to the admiral from the Bombay Council. Blankett had 
complained to the Council that he had not been informed of the initial plan to seize Perim. 
The Council reminded Rainier that it did not know when Blankett would arrive and, as 
Rainier was fully involved in the discussions on the subject, they assumed he would 
communicate with Blankett – as indeed one would.131 Rainier clearly thought he had 
communicated with Blankett because, in August 1799 he wrote to the Bombay Council:  
 
I have before expressed to you my surprise at the dissatisfaction Commodore 
Blankett has expressed on your not having advised him of [the plan to] take 
                                                            
126 Ibid., 79/51-53, Blankett to Murray & Murray to Blankett, 8 May 1799. 
127 Ibid., 81/19, Murray to Bombay Council, 9 July 1799. 
128 T.N.A., ADM 1/171, Blankett to Admiralty, 17 May 1801. 
129 Ibid., 6 June 1801. 
130 T.N.A., Bombay Council to Capt. Hardie, copied with ADM 1/171, Blankett to Admiralty, 6 June 1801. 
131 Exeter University, Bombay Diary 80/57, Bombay Council to Rainier, 27 June 1799. 
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possession of Perim, and am utterly at a loss to account for his reasons for so 
extraordinary a proceeding which I shall acquaint him with the first 
opportunity.132  
 
But Blankett’s somewhat petulant nature, with which Rainier had to contend, is illustrated in 
a letter to Colonel Murray. The colonel has previously asked for Blankett’s opinion as to the 
possibility of withdrawal from Perim. Blankett replied that, as he had not been told why 
Perim was to be occupied in the first place, it was impossible for him to give any comments 
on its evacuation.133 
 
With evidence such as this to frustrate any naval commander-in-chief, it is clear that Rainier 
showed great patience and diplomatic skill in order to engender cooperation with the army 
whilst maintaining friendly relations, although, as shown above, he was either unwilling or 
unable to assist Blankett in achieving the same success. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
Rainier was always steadfast in his belief in the need to protect British India and played an 
active part in defending it – even when it was a secondary one supporting the army on the 
mainland or supporting the Red Sea operations. Yet he also knew when it was the opportune 
time to go on the offensive to protect British interests. As a fighting captain he had shown 
that he had sufficient aggressive qualities. But he was sufficiently cautious not to take too 
great risks, knowing he was far from any support if a situation went disastrously wrong. 
There had to be sufficient troops to carry out the operation, there had to be adequate 
transports and logistical support to ensure that the operation would not have to be cancelled, 
the season had to be sufficiently long that there was enough time to carry the objective, and 
the threat to his other responsibilities from the enemy had to be covered by his other 
resources. His cautiousness came through in his dealings with Wellesley over the attack on 
Mauritius. Here he felt that there were just too many factors operating against a successful 
conclusion and, added to the fact that the operation would take place outside his own station, 
he felt he had to deny his support. This would have been extremely difficult to do against a 
Governor General so overbearing, dogmatic, well connected and so used to having people do 
as he wished. It showed his courage was not only to be found in battle. But it also illustrated 
that one of the reasons for choosing him to go to the East Indies in 1794 was valid – he could 
be aggressive but only when the circumstances gave him a good chance of success and he 
would not be risking his resources which he needed to perform the other prime element of his 
objectives, namely the protection of the Trade and control of the sea. 
 
His occupation of Trincomalee and Malacca gave much security to trade routes in their areas 
and occupation of the Dutch Spice Islands enhanced the opportunities for British trade across 
                                                            
132 Ibid., 82/1, Rainier to Bombay Council, 9 August 1799. 
133 Ibid., 80/83. Blankett to Murray, 21 May 1799. 
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the region. These successes could not have been achieved without close cooperation with the 
army and Rainier again showed a personality which engendered the support of the decision 
makers in other organisations without whom success would have been impossible. Rainier’s 
collegiate style of cooperation with the army was very successful. He had a good relationship 
with the senior army officers, in spite of the difficulty of dealing, in effect, with two armies 
whose own structures led to conflict within the land forces. He also tried to encourage the 
same approach in his own subordinates, apart from with Blankett who was too old a dog to be 
taught new tricks. His success in this matter, and his evident pride, is illustrated in a letter he 
wrote to Lord Bentinck, the Governor of Madras, in which he mentioned Bentinck’s 
predecessor, Lord Hobart. ‘The Confidence Lord Hobart then placed in me by putting the 
troops of the Presidency … under my Orders claimed my lasting acknowledgements’.134 This 
confidence in Rainier should be put into a context of less than perfect reliance which Dundas 
placed on the First Lord of the Admiralty, Spencer:  
 
There is a backwardness somewhere in somebody under you in forwarding what 
they might not approve of, or have not themselves suggested. The responsibility 
of the naval department rests with you and you only, and your colleagues in the 
cabinet can look nowhere but to you for the rapid and prompt execution of what is 
resolved upon.135 
 
It should be remembered that when Rainier was carrying out his successful operations in 
1795-6, he was continuing a long history of successful British combined operations in the Far 
East, using both Company and royal troops. He continued the practice, success meeting every 
attack which he made. This conflicts with Hall’s contention that the period 1793-98 was a 
failure for the strategy of colonial expansion.136 
 
Having analysed three of the four major achievements of Rainier, the next chapter will 
describe his fourth success, the maintenance of his squadron at sea through an effective 
system of logistical support. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
134 N.M.M., RAI/10, Rainier to Bentinck, 20 March 1805. 
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Agents in the Near East in the War of the Second Coalition, 1798-1801, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 10, No. 1 
(January 1974), E. Ingram, p.17. 
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         CHAPTER 7. 
 
‘THE DEFENCE OF THE COMPANY’S POSSESSIONS IN THE EAST 
INDIES DEPENDS IN A VERY GREAT DEGREE ... ON THE     
SUPERIORITY OR EXERTIONS OF HIS MAJESTY’S SQUADRON.1   
                        MAINTAINING THE SQUADRON AT SEA.             
Having examined Rainier’s achievements in the diplomatic, military and naval arenas, his 
abilities as an administrator will now be explored. Experience had taught him how difficult it 
was to keep his ships at sea and to achieve the maximum sea time. He knew he needed to 
maintain an adequate supply of naval supplies, victuals, seamen and money. This chapter will 
describe the situation Rainier found when he arrived in India, what resources were available, 
how he obtained them, how he used them and what limitations their availability put on him. It 
will be shown that his administrative and managerial skills enabled his squadron to operate in 
an effective manner across the entire station and enabled the admiral to create an 
infrastructure which, after eleven years of refining, his successors could use to continue to 
extend British control of the region and protect the Trade. 
 
Rainier was new to the role of independent command and he had much to learn.  At least he 
had in-depth experience of his vast station of thirty million square miles and appreciated what 
could go wrong during the 15,000-16,000 mile journey out from England. In theory there 
were some naval supplies held for him in Madras and Bombay by the Company, there was a 
private victualling organisation under a contract held by the Honourable Basil Cochrane, that 
held food for the Navy in Madras, and there was the Bombay Dockyard, the only one 
available to the Royal Navy outside Britain. The yard could hold three 74’s simultaneously 
and was owned by the Company.  The Admiralty Boards had little knowledge of the East 
Indies – it being numerically the smallest station and it is important to note that Rainier could 
expect to receive little or no help from them. 
 
Primary Concerns. 
 
But when Rainier actually arrived at Madras in September 1794 he found himself in the 
unique position of having no resident Royal Naval forces and a minimal shore based 
organisation. The lack of naval stores was an immediate concern. As a captain under Hughes, 
Rainier would have noticed the way in which logistical problems with naval stores hindered 
the navy’s moves against the French. He appreciated the need for detailed planning to ensure 
that the stores and equipment he required were always available when needed. Within two 
weeks of arriving in Indian waters at Madras, he wrote to James Moseley, the Marine 
Storekeeper at Bombay, requesting an inventory of all Royal Navy stores in Bombay.2 And a 
week later, on the 29 September, he had a very busy letter writing day; to Spencer, he 
                                                            
1 Hughes to the Council of Bombay, 27 January 1784, quoted in Wadia, The Bombay Dockyard, pp. 47-8. 
2 N.M.M., RAI/ 4, Rainier to Moseley, 22 September 1794. 
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complained about the lack of naval stores,3 he asked the Admiralty for information on when 
and how to use navy bills to pay invoices,4 and he advised the Navy Board that he had to buy 
cordage and other naval stores.5 His frustration at the poor communication is shown when he 
discovered that the Indiaman Raymond, which was part of the convoy he had escorted out to 
India, was actually carrying naval stores for him, and whilst he was buying these up locally, it 
was unloading them without his knowledge. Not only had the ship’s captain not told him of 
his cargo, but also no-one from the Navy Board had told him. 
 
He had also shown sensitivity to his neophyte position as a commanding officer: ‘…should 
there be any irregularity, for want of due form, you will have to have the goodness to 
overlook, and set me to rights for my future Government’.6 The questions continued through 
the winter as he saw the full extent of the shortages. The cordage was of poor quality and had 
been stored too long; he would have to buy more. The last ship to arrive from London, which 
brought stores, was missing many items such as twine, sails for fourth and sixth rates, and 
spars. What should he do with all the stores he was condemning, including the 10,000 lbs. of 
bread destroyed by poor stowage on the voyage? There was no ‘muster paper’ for muster 
books and could he be sent some more? 7 
 
Secondary Concerns. 
 
The issues facing Rainier immediately, which are described above, could be tackled at once. 
But, in order to solve them in the long term, he realised that he would have to build up good 
relationships with the Company. Hughes’ stormy relations with Company’s officials during 
the American Revolution only exacerbated the problems. Probably because the East Indies 
squadron was a small one, the Admiralty was content to allow naval supplies and ordnance to 
be provided primarily by the Company – the unique organisation found on no other station. 
Whilst the Company could apparently meet all the demands made on it, there was the need to 
manage affairs in order to maintain the required standards. Rainier’s many letters to them 
attest to his understanding of this vital part of his role. He would also need to build up, and 
maintain, good relationships with the navy’s bureaucratic organisations at home. 
 
His previous experience taught him that replacement sailors were not easily obtained. 
Therefore great care must be taken of their well-being. Provisions of the highest quality 
possible must be obtained and every effort must be made to protect their health. Fulfilling 
these requirements would need large sums of money and Rainier must quickly learn the 
navy’s accounting processes and the limits of his authority. 
 
Active service had a deleterious effect on the serviceability of warships and Rainier also 
knew that he must not only establish a means of providing naval supplies, but also ensure that 
                                                            
3 N.M.M., RAI/4, Rainier to Spencer, 29 September 1794. 
4 N.M.M., RAI/4, Rainier to Admiralty, 29 September 1794. 
5 ibid. 
6 T.N.A., ADM 106/1411, Rainier to Navy Board, 29 September 1794. 
7 N.M.M., RAI/4, Rainier to Navy Board, 26 February 1795. 
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the Company’s dockyard facilities at Bombay were at his disposal when required. Again, this 
would demand good relationships with the Company as well as an adequate source of funds. 
These were his second group of priorities which would at least enable him to have well 
founded ships, adequate crews, well provisioned to operate anywhere throughout the station. 
 
How Rainier addressed these issues will be studied under the five categories in the order they 
would have faced the admiral in terms of priority. A conclusion summarises the evidence;  
 
1. Maintaining warship strength. 
2. Ensuring their armament.  
3. Provisioning the squadron.  
4. Manning the squadron. 
5. How all these activities were financed. 
6. Conclusion. 
 
1.Maintaining the Squadron’s Warship Strength. 
 
The issues in this section will be covered under the following headings; 
a) The Number of Ships 
b) Organisation 
c) Naval Stores 
 
a)The Number of Ships. 
The year-end size of the squadron for the full period of Rainier’s sojourn in the East Indies 
was as follows;8 
 
 3rd Rate 4th Rate 5th Rate 6th Rate Sloop/Bomb Troopships Total 
1794 1 1 2  1 0 5 
1795 1 1 4 0 1 0 7 
1796 3 1 5 2 2 0 13 
1797 5 1 5 2 3 0 16 
1798 5 1 6 2 3 0 17 
1799 5 3 6 3 3 0 20 
1800* 6 4 5 1 3 0 19 
1801* 7 3 8 1 2 1 22 
1802* 4 3 9 1 2 2 21 
1803 7 1 0 0 4 2 13 
1804 7 2 8 0 4 1 22 
1805 9 2 11 0 4 0 26 
1806 8 1 15 0 6 1 31 
1807 9 0 16 1 6 0 32 
* includes ships in Red Sea. 
 
                                                            
8 T.N.A., ADM 8. 
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These figures, sourced from ADM 8, do not include the vessels of the Bombay Marine or 
Indiamen that were attached to the Navy from time to time. They do include the small 
squadrons of Rear Admiral Blankett and Captain Sir Home Popham operating in the Red Sea. 
Apart from the predictable dramatic reduction in size at the Peace of Amiens,9 the list 
demonstrates a steady increase in size. This was due, in 1796, to the threat of Rear Admiral 
Sercey’s six frigate squadron based in Mauritius, then, in 1798, to Bonaparte’s invasion of 
Egypt, and by the response to Rear Admiral Linois’ arrival in Indian waters in 1803 
following the outbreak of war.10 But Rainier’s squadron was still smaller than that of his 
successor, Pellew, who had, arguably, to deal with a less threatening situation. And even with 
his larger squadron, Pellew complained that he could not blockade Mauritius, let alone 
conquer it, without more ships.11 It should also be noted that Richmond stated that the station 
strength recommended in 1810 was four capital ships, 16 frigates, and 9 lesser craft.12 He 
probably obtained these numbers from a report of Pellew, written for the Admiralty in 1809 
when he returned from the East Indies. In it Pellew states exactly these numbers.13 
 
Given the time taken for ships to reach the East Indies, the Admiralty had to plan well ahead 
to send ships out. But they only sent out minimum numbers, responding more to news of 
French ships actually breaking the British naval blockade of French ports. As early as 1795, 
Elphinstone wrote to Spencer that ‘so large a force may not be required in India’. He wanted 
permission to withdraw ships when he had solved the threat to the sub-continent.14 Having 
withdrawn the vessels noted above in 1801, the Admiralty was slower to build up the 
squadron when war broke out again and well into 1804 Rainier was still overstretched, being 
unable to allocate ships to meet all the demands put on him. In fact the Battle of Pulo Aur 
would probably never have occurred if reinforcements had been received earlier.15  
 
Rainier was not an admiral who made heavy demands on the Admiralty and his only request 
to them on the subject of ships was for more sloops and frigates rather than third rates. This 
was especially the case when he had to cover the Red Sea and watch for French ships using 
the Maratha harbours. This latter threat Rainier viewed as one which could be neutralised by 
the navy with shallow draught vessels.16 The danger from the French was primarily from 
their privateers and National frigates so it could not be viewed as an unreasonable request. As 
this was a common demand, the East Indies was not favoured with the satisfaction of 
Rainier’s wish. Naturally the majority of vessels that made up Rainier’s command came out 
                                                            
9 N.M.M., RAI/7, Rainier to Admiralty, 6 October 1802, ships recalled were Intrepid, Victorious, Leopard, La 
Chiffonne, La Virginie, La Sybille, Orpheus, Eurydice, Romney, Daedalus. 
10 Rear Admiral Marquis de Sercey, French C-in-C East Indies 1796-1799, by which time his entire squadron 
had been destroyed. Sailed to France, retired and then returned to Mauritius where he had been born. Rear-
Admiral Linois, French C-in-C East Indies 1803-6, captured in the Marengo whilst returning to France. Was a 
prisoner of war until 1814. 
11 Durham University, 2nd Earl Grey Papers, Pellew to Grey, 30 September 1806. 
12 Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power (Oxford, 1946), p. 226. 
13 Sir E. Pellew, quoted in ‘Trade Defence in the Indian Seas’, anon, Naval Review, vol. XVIII, No. I, February 
1930, pp. 69-72. 
14 B.L., Add. Mss. 75854, Elphinstone to Spencer, 13 November 1795. 
15 See Chapter 4. 
16 B.L., Add. Mss. 75856, Rainier to Spencer, 19 December 1799. 
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from England. Any repair was effected in Bombay whither the squadron repaired during the 
months of the north east monsoon, from October to the following March. They moved back 
to the east coast when the winds changed to south westerly and Madras was no longer on a 
lee shore.  
 
With the relatively uncharted waters of the station and its fierce weather patterns, Rainier was 
always vulnerable to ship losses due to natural causes. The Resistance (44), Sheerness (32) 
and Orestes (18) were all lost at sea to storms. The precious frigates Forte (44) and Diomede 
(44) were both lost in harbour foundering on uncharted rocks – in Jeddah and Trincomalee 
respectively. Even if they were not totally destroyed, they could be put out of action as when 
the Trident struck a rock coming away from the Cape and had to go to Bombay for repairs.17 
Other ships were sent home due to their advanced age. Rainier’s flagship, the Suffolk, 
launched in 1765, was sent home in 1803 to be broken up. The Centurion, launched in 1774, 
suffering from a white ant infestation which was destroying its masts and spars, was sent 
home in 1804.18 The Blenheim (74), Troubridge’s flagship, had been launched in 1761; it was 
lost with all hands in 1807. The sloop Hobart (18) was sold into private hands in 1803.19 This 
French vessel, launched in 1794 and captured by the British in 1796, was not the best 
advertisement for French shipbuilding, lasting only nine years. Attempting to save the vessel 
illustrates Rainier’s desire for due process and what is now called the ‘audit trail’. He copied 
to the Navy Board a letter he had written to Captain Astle of the Hobart criticising him for 
using only his own carpenter to survey his ship. He could have used other carpenters as well 
as himself ‘as perfectly competent to distinguish a rotten timber from a sound one’.20 The 
Carysfort (28), launched in 1766, had to be sent home in 1800, requiring a substantial refit. It 
would appear that the Admiralty was comfortable with this process as it gave them a source 
of convoy escorts. In 1798 Rainier was advised that he was being sent out replacement ships 
from England and he was to send back those ships ‘in most need of repair’ as convoy 
escorts.21  
 
A review of the thirty one naval vessels sent out to Rainier during his period of command, 
excluding those captured, acquired locally, and lent by the Company, shows that eight were 
less than ten years old, fourteen were between ten and nineteen years old when despatched to 
India, and nine were twenty years or older. Eleven of these vessels were retired from active 
service after their commissions in the East Indies.22 One cannot necessarily conclude that it 
was Admiralty policy to send out to India only the oldest vessels. The third rates would 
expect to be involved in convoy escort, rather than fleet actions. The fifth rates would be 
primarily battling privateers rather than the latest French heavy frigates. Therefore it was 
natural that those warships sent out to India need not be the latest, heaviest, fastest in the 
navy. 
                                                            
17 N.M.M., RAI/5, Rainier to Hobart, 16 March 1797. 
18 N.M.M., RAI/7, Rainier to Admiralty, 1 November 1804. 
19 R. Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail 1793-1817 (London, 2005), p. 257. 
20 T.N.A., ADM 106/1412, Rainier to Navy Board, 1 July 1801. 
21 N.M.M., RAI/11, Admiralty to Rainier, 18 April 1798.  
22 Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail. 
167 
 
 
Rainier needed local sources to make up for all the losses he incurred. Because of the wear 
and tear on naval vessels and because there was always a shortage of sloops, brigs and 
frigates, the opportunity to buy new ships was treasured by remote commanding officers. 
Rainier clearly believed he had the authority, even less than a year after arriving on station: ‘I 
have it in contemplation to purchase some ships to supply the loss of the Diomede’.23 The 
drawback was that this was probably the most expensive item to be purchased and therefore 
much care had to be taken by the commander-in-chief to ensure that he had the appropriate 
authority. This was especially as: ‘Captains and admirals were happy to spend public money, 
with a good chance of retrospective Admiralty approval’.24 However, if this approval were 
not forthcoming, the bill would go to the admiral’s personal account. The vagaries of 
communications between London and India gave an added degree of uncertainty to the 
approval process and Rainier certainly fell foul of the Navy Board, in spite of his naturally 
bureaucratic and careful personality. An added incentive for Rainier to want to acquire more 
ships was the presence of a fine shipbuilding industry based in Bombay. But Rainier did feel 
there was an unwritten limit to his authority, even eight years after he arrived on station. In 
1802 he wrote to the Admiralty telling that he had sold the Vulcan, bomb, as it was not 
needed, and was in great need of expensive repairs. Yet he recommended the same action for 
a sloop and three brigs, thereby waiting for approval before acting, probably because this 
kind of vessel was always in great demand.25 
 
Another source of additional ships was the French and Dutch navies, captures from which 
were often bought into the Royal Navy. Examples are the Java (32), Forte (44) and La 
Chiffonne (36), all much needed frigates. Rainier also persuaded the Admiralty to agree the 
purchase of the captured French sloop La Gloire which he renamed Trincomalee. However 
there was a strict protocol to be followed in purchasing ships for the Navy by the local flag 
officer. The Navy Board wrote to Rainier to say that it could not approve the purchase of the 
Trincomalee as there was no description of the vessel, no survey or details of its sale; these 
must be sent to London as soon as possible. In future, all these details must be sent to the 
Board for every ship to be purchased.26 Finally the Board did agree, after three years, to take 
the Trincomalee into the Navy with a complement of 121 men and 16 guns.27 
 
However, a month earlier Rainier had written to the Navy Board saying he had bought La 
Forte into the Navy:  
   
          which have duly communicated to Mr. Secretary Nepean for their Lordships’ 
Information’. [Note the word ‘information’, not ‘approval’], When I receive the 
                                                            
23 N.M.M., RAI/4, Rainier to Hobart, 7 August 1795. 
24 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 303. 
25 N.M.M., RAI/7, Rainier to Admiralty, 29 May 1802. 
26 T.N.A., ADM 106/2475, Navy Board to Rainier, 19 September 1799. 
27 T.N.A., ADM 106/2476, Navy Board to Rainier, 19 April 1802. 
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cost of her repairs [I] shall endeavour to estimate her real value to the King and 
draw for the same in order to distribute to the captors.28  
 
Again, he appeared to take responsibility for deciding the value of the ship, not any local 
surveyors. The Board was very keen to ensure that the correct price had been paid for the ship 
and that no-one was making a profit. This gave Rainier the clear limits of what he could do 
without supporting paperwork.29 La Forte caused Rainier more problems because Cooke, 
who had captured it, authorised repair to the severe damage it had incurred during its capture. 
Rainier told the Navy Board that the repairs were ‘uttlerly (sic) without my knowledge’,30 
and unfortunately Cooke died of his wounds so there was no “audit trail”. Consequently the 
Navy Board put an imprest on Rainier and on Cooke’s first lieutenant for the total amount of 
the repairs, £20,059 19s. 2d.31 After much indignation on the Admiral’s part the imprest was 
removed and all blame laid on the dead Cooke.32 
 
A temporary solution to a shortage of ships could always be solved by borrowing one. 
Fortunately Rainier’s relations with his opposite number at the Cape, Curtis, were good when 
he requested a line of battle ship or frigate to protect the China Trade as all his own resources 
were tied up handling the threat from the Red Sea.33 Curtis was clearly at ease with this 
because Rainier later wrote to him that he sent the L’Imperieuse and the Braave to Canton – 
both ships of the Cape squadron.34 
 
The Bombay Marine was another source of vessels. Its frigates Cornwallis (44) and Bombay 
(32) were bought into the Navy in 1805 although the actual purchase was finalised by 
Rainier’s successor, Pellew. The Sir Edward Hughes (38) was bought from private Bombay 
merchants by Rainier in 1804 and transferred to the Royal Navy.35 Rainier’s need for ships 
overcame his reluctance to make this purchase because their original officers were all put out 
of jobs as they were replaced by ‘royal’ equivalents.36 Other Bombay Marine vessels were 
lent to the admiral from time to time as were actual trading Indiamen which were readily 
transformable into powerful frigates with an upgraded armament. Rainier wrote to the 
Admiralty that, because he was so short of ships:  
 
I suggested to his Excellency the Governor General the expediency of arming 
some of the East India Company’s large ships … as named in the margin [Earl 
Howe, Princess Charlotte, Belvidere] and are now assisting in cruising with me 
on Tippoo Sultan’s coast.37  
 
                                                            
28 T.N.A., ADM 106/1412, Rainier to Navy Board, 9 August 1799. 
29 T.N.A., ADM 106/2476, Navy Board to Rainier, 5 March 1802. 
30 T.N.A., ADM 106/1412, Rainier to Navy Board, 24 January 1800. 
31 T.N.A., ADM 1/173, Rainier to Admiralty, 22 February 1803. 
32 T.N.A., ADM 106/1412, Navy Board to Rainier, 12 December 1803. 
33 N.M.M., RAI/7, Rainier to Curtis, 31 July 1799. 
34 Ibid., 18 October, 1799. 
35 Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, pp.  122, 175, 213. 
36 N.M.M., RAI/4, Rainier to Shore, 13 September 1795. 
37 N.M.M., RAI/7, Rainier to Admiralty 29 January 1799. 
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This letter also illustrated the trusting working relationship between Rainier and the Governor 
General. 
 
In 1801 the Indiamen Dover Castle and Asia were armed and sent to China to cooperate with 
the Royal Navy.38 This act shows how Wellesley was comfortable with Rainier’s 
management of the Company’s maritime resources. On a smaller scale, Duncan, President of 
the Bombay Council, sent five gunboats to the Red Sea in 1800, to be under Royal Navy 
control.39 However, the direction of vessels was not always positive to Rainier. Showing that 
the Company still had overall control of its vessels, a letter from Duncan to Rainier asked for 
the return of two schooners that he had previously given to the Royal Navy.40 The appearance 
of a very flexible arrangement is enhanced by another note from Duncan telling Rainier that 
he could keep the schooner Antelope in case he needed to send mail to China.41 
 
Due to the far sightedness of the Company, the greatest assistance for keeping as many ships 
at sea as possible came from the dry dock at Bombay. This facility, to some extent, 
compensated for the length of time taken to send out reinforcements to the East Indies. It was 
of great benefit in 1799 when Rear Admiral Blankett’s squadron was operating in the Red 
Sea. These waters were very poorly charted and Rainier wrote to the Admiralty: ‘most of the 
ships under his [Blankett’s] command I observe have been aground and suffered some 
damage’.42 It can be imagined how much more difficult would have been Blankett’s and 
Rainier’s tasks if they had not had the use of the Bombay Dockyard. But it is not surprising 
that, in spite of the enormous benefits arising from the dockyard, Rainier was unhappy with 
the costs of repairing ships, which fact he advised the Admiralty in 1799.43 Unhappiness with 
the cost of ship repair in India again raised its head when Rainier noted in a letter to the 
Admiralty that he had heard from Second Secretary to the Admiralty, Benjamin Tucker, that 
the Navy Board was very unhappy with the cost of repairing Captain Home Popham’s ship, 
the Romney, at Calcutta, after its activities in the Red Sea in 1801.44 As Rainier was not a 
supporter of the independently minded Popham, he was happy to stoke the fires which led to 
a parliamentary commission on the subject. Presumably Popham was ordered to Calcutta as it 
was the closest dockyard to Prince of Wales Island whence he was sent by Rainier. And a 
shipbuilding business had developed from the mid eighteenth century taking advantage of the 
good supply of Pegu teak from Burma which was lighter and more buoyant than the Malabar 
teak used in Bombay.45 By 1781 it was building ships of 500 tons.46 
 
The major drawback was that the Bombay dockyard did not belong to the Navy and 
sometimes there were competing claims on its resources. The yard was first built in 1754 
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with the capability of taking a 74. The capacity was doubled in 1762 and trebled in 1773.47 It 
meant that: ‘the outermost ship can warp out and another be admitted in her place every 
spring tide without any interruption of the work to the second and innermost ships’.48 As the 
dockyard was owned by the Company, this meant that Rainier had sometimes to be a little 
more circumspect than he otherwise might have wanted. Admiral Hughes had also 
acknowledged the advantages that the dry docks gave him and the role of the Company in 
ensuring that they were available to his squadron. His understanding of the strategic benefits 
of the dockyard was clear:  
 
   …if the defence of the Company’s possessions in the East Indies depends in a 
very great degree if not entirely in time of war, on the superiority or exertions of 
His Majesty’s Squadron, … then the safety of Bombay is of the utmost 
importance to the safety of the whole, for at no other port or place in our 
possession could the Ships of the Squadron be even properly refitted much less 
repaired.49  
 
He continued to declaim that it would be impossible to keep his squadron at sea without it, 
especially with the need to repair battle damage. And, in this instance it appears that the 
Bombay Council understood where its self interest lay as he praised the speed with which his 
ships were repaired. However, although having the dockyard meant that both Hughes and 
Rainier did not have to deal with the Navy Board on this issue, they were merely replacing 
the frustrations of dealing with one bureaucracy with another.  
 
Although Rainier often complained of its inefficiencies, his squadron was a heavy user of the 
yard. Indeed, support for the dockyard came from Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was very happy 
with the speed with which his troop transports were watered and provisioned in Bombay.50 
Rainier was keen to plan ahead so that the docks were empty in November, when he moved 
westwards to avoid the north east monsoon. That he viewed this to be a priority is shown in a 
letter to the Governor General asking him to keep the docks free so that his ships could be 
repaired as soon as possible.51. He worried that his repairs were being delayed because the 
Bombay dockyard was being used to build new ships. But it was difficult to move incomplete 
vessels, which Rainier appreciated.52 Unfortunately this concern was ongoing, he was still 
complaining to the Company the following year of delays to the docking of naval vessels.53 
Perhaps Rainier was hoping that, by complaining of delays, he might overturn the decision 
made in 1799 not to enlarge the docks as being too expensive a project.54 
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The situation must also have been difficult for the Navy Board: ‘Much of the Navy Board’s 
work continued to be the supervision of the dockyards’.55 But it had no direct role in 
shipbuilding and repair in India although this was a major part of its raison d’etre. 
Consequently it also was learning how to manage remotely through a secondary organisation 
and trying to keep control of a process for which it was held accountable by the Admiralty. 
As Rainier’s squadron grew in size and suffered the ravages of active service, there were 
more demands on the Board to supply not only consumables, but also replacement parts for 
his ships. It should be remembered that in every other station ships had to be sent home for 
serious repair. Only in India could Bombay, with its triple dry dock, compare with the 
resources the Navy had in England. Therefore the Board can be excused for some of the 
criticism loaded on it by Rainier from not sending out all of the items needed for almost 
rebuilding some of his ships.56 
 
The Company’s other far sighted move had been to persuade the Parsee shipbuilders to 
relocate from Surat to Bombay in 1736. Of these Lowjee Nusserwanjee became the master 
shipbuilder in 1764 and no English shipbuilders were thereafter employed in the yards until 
the retirement of his great grandson, Nowrojee Jamsetjee in 1844.57 These Parsees built 
excellent ships, usually of teak, which did not deteriorate in the manner of oak. They built 
ships primarily for the Country Trade, mainly between India and China, and they were not 
allowed to build East Indiamen for the home trade because Company regulation said they 
could only be built in certain shipyards in England. Naturally there was no question of them 
being allowed to build ships for the Royal Navy, although they did build vessels up to size of 
frigates for the Bombay Marine and the Sultan of Oman. 
 
Rainier grew to appreciate the quality of Bombay built ships and began a crusade to persuade 
the Admiralty and Navy Board that they should build for the Navy. In this act he was pushing 
at an open door as there was already support for this in the form of Secretary of State Dundas 
and First Lord St. Vincent. In fact Dundas saw Bombay as the proper base from which to 
monitor Tippoo Sultan in Mysore and had rejected advice from Governor General Cornwallis 
in 1787 to abolish it as a presidency.58 Rainier wrote to the Admiralty praising how well the 
Parsee shipbuilders had repaired the Tremendous and Trident and asked if they could be paid 
extra salary.59 He also praised their work to Governor Duncan of Bombay for their 
‘indefatigable zeal, activity and perseverance’, and asked if they could be given some land as 
a reward.60 Not forgetting to work on the Navy Board he also wrote praising the native 
shipbuilders and, following the first warship construction order from the Admiralty to the 
Bombay Yard, he told them that work on the 36 gun frigate had begun but not yet on the 74, 
due to a shortage of timber. He also criticised British dockyard workers by pointing out that 
the Bombay yard had discovered iron nails in the copper sheathing of the Indefatigable 
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which, in effect negated the use of the copper as resulting electrolysis would corrode the iron 
out of existence.61 Seven months later Rainier was able to give a positive report on the 
progress of building the frigate and asked what should be its name.62 In fact the success of the 
navy’s building programme in Bombay has encouraged the historian of India, C.A. Bayly to 
write: ‘In a sense the Navy represents the first true multinational manufacturing corporation’, 
as it took timber from around the region, brought in naval supplies from Europe, and built the 
ships in Bombay.63 
 
The Admiralty Report on Ships Building at Bombay and Cochin, covering all communication 
on this subject between 12 May 1802 and 18 January 1821, noted the agreement that the 
Company would build annually at Bombay a 74 gun third rate and a 36 gun frigate. Both 
ships would be built of teak, which Rainier had been encouraging as it did not rot. It was 
agreed that the costs would be 306,900 rupees [£38,142 10s] for the 74, and 170,700 
[£21,377 10s.] for the 36.64 All the: ‘copper bolts, copper sheathing and other such materials’ 
would be sent from England as soon as possible in Company ships.65 However, there were 
delays in commencing the building because of the shortage of sufficiently large timbers and 
the Resident at Anjenjo was instructed to ‘exert himself’.66 Although Rainier had requested 
several times that the Admiralty raise the wages of the master shipbuilders it took a letter 
from Pellew before their wages were increased from 6s3d to half a guinea [10s.6d.] per 
diem.67 The Admiralty was clearly warming to the idea of Indian-built ships because just 
before Rainier left India, he acknowledged his orders to buy six ships from the Company to 
act as frigates. He had advised Pellew to buy them in Bombay as that was the best 
shipbuilding centre in India.68  
 
The ship building activity continued throughout and even after the end of the Napoleonic War 
with the 74’s Minden (1810), Cornwallis (1814), Wellesley (1815), Melville and Carnatic 
(1817), and Malabar (1818). The frigates were called Salsette (1807), Amphritite (1816), 
Trincomalee (1817), and Seringapatam (1818). These ships were surveyed in England and, in 
the case of the Minden, found to be: ‘a credit to those Gentlemen under whose instructions 
she has been built’.69 There was a hiatus in the process in 1811 due to the difficulties of 
obtaining sufficient timber but this was overcome and the building recommenced. In 1810 a 
cost comparison was made between the three potential sources of new frigates. The Salsette 
had cost £20,667, excluding the copper and iron supplies sent from England. The cost of 
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building in a private yard in England was estimated at £17,729 and for one built in the royal 
yard at Chatham £16,187.70 Thus it can be seen that building in Bombay was not a cheap 
option but it was admitted that the quality was very high and the teak would mean far less 
maintenance during the ship’s life. It would also not deplete the precious stocks of timber in 
England. Rainier had been correct to push for warships to be built under contract in India, but 
his vision only came to fruition after he had left.  
 
The relationship between Rainier and Indian ships and shipbuilding did not end when he 
returned to England. He wrote to the Navy Board praising the Parsees, saying that they built 
excellent ships, they did not overcharge for materials, and when repairing naval ships they 
did not need watching over, as was necessary in England. He also commented that they were 
paid very little, suggesting that they might be granted a further parcel of land in Bombay.71 
 
b)  Organisation 
Rainier had the use of a Naval Officer in each of the three presidencies of Calcutta, Madras 
and Bombay. These men were not naval officers but were the Navy Board’s representatives 
in each city. They received no pay but a commission of 5% on all their purchases.72 There 
was an interesting three way relationship between the Navy Board, Naval Officer and 
Commander-in-Chief. It was important that there was a reasonable working relationship 
between the local Naval Officer and Admiral as the former had the authority, in the absence 
of a real senior naval officer, to open his mail and decide what actions to take therefrom.73 
This appears to be quite reasonable when one knows that Rainier also viewed the Naval 
Officer’s role as one of intelligence gathering. He wrote to Philip Dundas, Naval Officer at 
Bombay: ‘You will not omit to forward Intelligence from the Red Sea, or any other [item] of 
importance, with the utmost expedition’.74 
 
These administrators were officially appointed by the Navy Board, although Rainier believed 
he had the authority to hire and fire if the service required it.75 He made the local decision to 
appoint John Brouncker, who happened to have been his secretary, as Naval Officer in 
Madras in early 1800, after the incumbent, Sewell, died.76 Sewell’s death caused a minor 
panic when it was realised that he had spent on personal items the money authorised by the 
Admiral to be spent on naval supplies. It is noteworthy that it was Rainier who had to write to 
Nepean asking him to obtain the money from Sewell’s estate via the Court of Directors, 
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rather than the Navy Board.77 But the Board refused to accept Brouncker’s appointment and 
appointed Chinnery to the post. He was unacceptable to Rainier because he had not obtained 
the documentation to support Rainier’s signature for 58,000 star pagodas [approximately 
£23,000] of purchases for which the Navy Board duly issued an imprest against the 
Admiral.78 In fact Rainier wrote directly to Chinnery telling him he would not accept his 
warrant as Naval Officer because Brouncker was doing the job well.79 The compromise 
candidate was Hoseason who the admiral appointed on a temporary basis. Unsurprisingly, 
Hoseason had been the purser of Rainier’s flagship, the Suffolk.  In September 1801 Matthew 
Louis wrote to the Navy Board saying that he had been appointed as Naval Officer at 
Calcutta by Rainier, could the Board approve?80 Six months later the Board wrote to Rainier 
that it could not accept his appointment and could he dismiss Louis immediately?81 Rainier 
reacted by finding fault with Louis’ performance:  
 
I need no other proof of your inattention to these important Objects than the 
exorbitant charge made in your late disbursements for the Articles on account of 
His Majesty’s Ships under my Command.82  
 
Yet strangely the tone of Rainier’s letter to Louis four months later was more friendly. He 
thanked Louis for his offer to ship home any items the admiral might want to send prior to his 
expected recall after the Peace of Amiens.83  There must have been some nervousness in 
London because, in his short stay, Louis had spent a total of £80,833 5s.4d.on naval stores.84 
Rainier was not alone because, in 1800, Blankett’s appointment of his purser, Howden, as 
Naval Officer at Mocha, was refused by the Board.85 But Blankett did not show the kind of 
adherence to form filling as did Rainier, who had to write to Wellesley about his 
subordinate’s cavalier approach to administration:  
 
I have to make Your Excellency my acknowledgements on behalf of His 
Majesty’s Service under my Charge, for giving directions for the due Acceptance 
of the Bills in question.86 
 
Chinnery came back to haunt both the Navy Board and the Admiralty during the command of 
his successor, when Rainier’s view of the man seemed to be upheld. Pellew wrote:  
 
I beg [to inform you] the embarrassment which has occurred to me from the 
Board’s recent order of January last directing W. Chinnery to be instated as Naval 
Officer at Madras, an appointment to which he had been long since nominated. 
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Your Lordship will observe my public letter that I have taken upon me to suspend 
its effects from consideration of public Security, having reason to believe that his 
Circumstances [were] not fully known when that order was enforced. … These 
Objections were materially strengthened by the present Situation of his Affairs, 
which are in a State of absolute Bankruptcy … which have exposed him to every 
general Obloquy at Madras.87  
 
It seems that matters worsened because, the following year, Pellew wrote again that 
Chinnnery was ‘driven from Society for immoral offences’.88 
 
Often the Admiral appointed his secretary to the post on the assumption that it would be 
confirmed by the Navy Board, as was the case with Thomas Hoseason in 1801 to the Madras 
vacancy. In a letter the admiral gave him his warrant, told him that his compensation would 
now consist of salary and expenses and noted that he would receive: ‘3d. in the pound on the 
amount of all your disbursements whether in cash, stores or otherwise’.89 
 
Rainier was quite willing to criticise these administrators, whether or not he had appointed 
them. ‘The Naval Officers, particularly the one in Madras, have not been brought up in habits 
of being conversant in the business required of them’.90 He continued to tell the Board that 
the Naval Storekeeper at Woolwich was more skilled at estimating what stores he would need 
than the Naval Officers in India. Clearly Rainier had been put under pressure for spending too 
much money – an accusation which did not go down well. He told the Board that it was not 
sending him enough sails and he therefore had to buy them locally. So the Board should stop 
complaining about his expenditure. Seven years after his arrival on station, Rainier was now 
sufficiently confident in his authority that he had no qualms about challenging the Board. 
 
Naval Officers were responsible for ordering the naval supplies required by the squadron, 
storing them, usually in locations decided by Rainier, and obtaining the money which was 
required to pay all the bills incurred by the Navy. The supplies were sourced from England 
via the Navy Board and then shipped out in Company ships, or they were bought on the local 
market, which was usually more expensive, especially if there were competition with the 
Company’s own vessels. In Bombay, the items directly used for repairing warships came 
under the control of the Company’s Dockyard Storekeeper. That the Naval Officer was also 
responsible for transporting the stores is illustrated in a letter from Rainier to Captain 
Osborne, then the “real” Senior Naval Officer at Bombay. In it he told Osborne that all stores 
must be sent under the same conveyance so he would ‘write to the Naval Officer to provide 
Freight accordingly’. This was at a time when Rainier was assisting Blankett in the Red Sea 
with all the supplies he might need. Rainier continued to take responsibility for supplying 
naval forces in the Red Sea through 1801 as illustrated by a letter from the Bombay Council 
to Popham. This stated that the transports Phoenix and Commerce were being sent with 
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victuals and stores by Rainier from Madras.91 Further evidence of Rainier’s organisation of 
naval supplies for the Red Sea can be seen in his arrangement for the transport Eliza, sent to 
manage the distribution of stores to naval vessels in the area. Rainier’s task was not helped by 
the fact that La Forte, carrying supplies for Blankett, struck a rock and sank in Jeddah 
harbour, a total loss.92  However, the strain of managing a process from such a distance was 
telling. Blankett wrote to Rainier telling of his dependence on the Arabs of Mocha and 
Jeddah for local supplies and that it was easier to deal with the former.93 And to the Bombay 
Council he wrote:  
 
The want of provisions has been an invincible Check to all the operations I could 
have proposed to myself, and to be obliged now to seek them at Mocha, is a 
Circumstance of a most unpleasant nature.94 
 
The added level of complexity for Rainier came from the fact that he had to rely on officials 
of the Company to provide most of the administration and storage of supplies for his 
squadron. Apart from complaining, he was powerless. In 1795 he told the Navy Board that 
the Company Marine Storekeeper was incompetent and it would be beneficial to appoint a 
full time navy storekeeper.95 His suggestion was not taken up. 
 
The absence of an administrative staff continued to be an irritant. In 1804 Hoseason, the 
Naval Officer at Madras worried that the orders he received were not always easy to meet:  
 
… some Orders as are given to Officers on other Foreign or Distant Stations who 
have a regular Establishment of other Officers to consult with and to assist him in 
the execution of these arduous duties [are more difficult to carry out in India].96  
 
He emphasised that he did not have the knowledgeable staff to keep detailed control of what 
ships used and they came and went, seemingly out of control. He reminded the Board that 
repairs carried out at Madras had to be completed in an open road as there was no dock at all. 
 
c) Naval Stores. 
The majority of letters between the Boards of the Admiralty and Rainier were on this subject. 
They included such items as masts, spars, sails, cordage, copper, iron nails, and barrels. 
Because of the tropical weather and the distance from the source of supply Rainier appears at 
times almost paranoid about the subject. He could probably remember the serious impact 
their absence had on Hughes which had constrained the opportunities his predecessor had for 
attacking Suffren. He did not want lack of supplies to be a deciding factor in his own 
deployment of ships. 
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As a captain, Rainier was required to account for all naval stores consumed by his ship before 
he could be paid, but now he had to control many vessels, consuming and paying for stores 
across his entire station. Rainier had held no posts in the navy at fleet level, or at the 
Admiralty, which might have given him a deep insight into the demands of naval 
administration he now had to meet. But, in some ways, he had experience of ship 
administration because he had been a merchant ship’s master for several years. In this role he 
had to husband the ship’s resources or there would be no profit, and he had to pay directly for 
what stores he needed – there were no navy bills on which to rely in the merchant service.97  
This history gave him an understanding of, and ease with, the attention to detail needed in his 
new post. 
 
In “Primary Concerns” above, it was noted how Rainier was not informed when Indiamen 
were carrying naval stores. Four years later this was still the case. He also noted that Admiral 
Pringle was taking out those stores which he wanted at the Cape, without concern for the 
needs of the East Indies Station. But it was somewhat harsh of him to hold the Board to task 
for sending a fifth of the stores to Bombay and the remainder to Madras. This was not what 
he wanted, but how was the Board to know?98 Frustrations with the Navy Board continued. 
He wrote in 1800 that stores which had been sent to him in Country Ships had not arrived and 
he feared they had been taken by privateers. He explained that stores should not be sent in 
such ships unless as part of a convoy because they had so few European sailors to defend 
them. [A docket to this letter advises that there was no space on any Indiamen and that was 
why the stores were put into Country Ships]. An early letter from the Admiralty to the 
Company had requested that naval stores should not be sent to India in vessels sailing 
individually but should only go in protected convoys, indicating that this was an ongoing 
problem.99 Due to the absence of the stores the Naval Officer had had to purchase poor 
quality and expensive replacements locally. But Rainier had managed to persuade some 
Indiamen commanders to sell him spars and masts. He also thought India could supply good 
quality hemp to England. Rainier continued to push Malabar hemp for rope making, even into 
1804. But now he was being exploited by the Company which was selling him spars at 
enormous cost. And the cost of all supplies was greater to the east of India as that was where 
most of the action now took place.100 Ever convinced of the benefits of Trincomalee, he also 
recommended building go-downs [store houses] at that harbour so that repairs to his ships 
could continue during the south west monsoon, thereby giving the Navy all year round repair 
facilities.101 Further evidence of Rainier’s drive for economy is found in his letter to the Navy 
Board explaining that he had found a local substitute for top-mast timber which was nearly as 
light as fir.102 That the Navy Board was also enthusiastic about experimentation is shown 
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when it advised Rainier that it had sent out a new kind of cable for use on his ships and it 
wanted to know how well they worked.103 
 
His continuing crusade on behalf of forms was not a short lived issue: ‘We are so short of 
Stationery I fear it will not be in my power to furnish you with a complete set of 
Duplicates’.104 More reference to forms comes in a letter to Captain Rowe of the Trincomalee 
(16). He told the newly promoted Rowe how to purchase goods for his ship, reminding him 
that he must provide vouchers in triplicate.105 But Rowe was slow to understand the 
importance of due process. Rainier wrote to the Navy Board that Rowe had not sent vouchers 
for all that he had bought ‘tho’ strictly enjoined to do so by my Orders’. He was 
reprimanded.106 It is clear that, from their frequent mention, the shortage of forms was of 
grave concern to Rainier. In 1795 he needed more removal and discharge tickets: ‘printing 
them is not very practicable here and will be very expensive’.107 However, he gave in to 
temptation and ordered some discharge forms to be printed, informing the Sick & Hurt Board 
of the fact.108 And, in 1798 he was still reminding their Lordships: ‘I must beg leave to repeat 
the great inconvenience experienced by the Captains of His Majesty’s Ships on this Station 
for want of Muster Paper and printed forms of every kind’.109 
 
These last two points illustrate two particular aspects of Rainier’s character; with his well 
developed and necessary skills as an administrator, which he seemed to enjoy, he realised that 
the logistics issues were going to be a vital part of his task in keeping his squadron at sea, and 
that this fact was not fully understood in London. And perhaps not so necessary was the 
extent of the minutiae of detail in which he wallowed. 
 
To illustrate that he did not fear to complain directly to the Navy Board he raised the issue of 
the lack of naval stores.110 A whole year later he was writing a six page letter to the Board 
listing all his problems with naval stores, highlighting the fact that some storeships were 
delivering goods without bills of lading – something that would have been anathema to an ex 
merchant navy master. He also had to explain to them that one Indian coin, the pagoda, was 
worth 7s.6d in order that the London based clerks could interpret local invoices.111  
 
A year after his arrival, Rainier wrote to the Company’s Marine Storekeeper in Bombay:  
 
In your Account of the remains of the Stores made out in the month of April there 
is an omission of many articles which afterwards were shipped in the Ewer, and 
you put me to the expense of making a Jibb (sic) for the Suffolk when you had two 
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in store … [I must] report … the irregularities that I have so much occasion to 
complain of respecting the administration of His Majesty’s Stores in Bombay.112  
 
Having a local Navy Board presence would also solve Rainier’s belief that it did not 
understand his issues:  
 
Your Board can but have noticed how very widely the Service in this Country 
differs from that in almost every other Quarter of the Globe and therefore several 
of your regulations in the hands of Naval Officers at Madras and Bombay must at 
times be inapplicable.113  
 
Clearly he was setting out his stall to tell all relevant bodies that there were insufficient 
resources in India and he would have to spend more money to keep his squadron operable. It 
is possible that the Navy Board officials did not place much operational emphasis on 
supplying the East Indies station as they knew that supplies could be obtained locally 
although they were ignorant of local prices. Rainier pointed out that he was short of anchors, 
bower cables and large spars for masts and that, although they were readily available locally, 
they were very expensive and purchasing in India used up much scarce silver. It would 
therefore be much better if they could be sent out from England in East Indiamen.114 
Criticism of Rainier by the Board continued to the last days of his command to which he 
replied that, if the Board sent him insufficient supplies he had no alternative but to buy 
locally at higher prices.115 He implied, but did not say so, that this process would keep all the 
financial transactions in England and thus avoid not only the use of scarce currency, but also 
take much administrative burden from him. This letter also noted that ships from the Cape 
station were now being repaired in the Bombay dockyard in addition to his own ships and 
that this was at high cost. Another example of the lack of control when Rainier had to buy 
locally is illustrated when he told the Navy Board that the Company had started selling 
copper on the open market rather than directly to the Navy, thus forcing up the price he had 
to pay.116  
 
Rainier tried wherever possible to save money and in 1804 he told Hoseason to buy scarce 
naval stores although they were not immediately required, because their cost was increasing 
rapidly.117  The benefits far outweighed the cost and, as late as 1804, Rainier was able to tell 
the new Secretary to the Admiralty, Marsden, that all his squadron’s ships had been repaired 
at Bombay, apart from those newly out from England which did not need repair.118 It is clear 
that the admiral kept a keen eye on prices as when he told Popham that he had heard available 
naval supplies in Bombay and Madras were scarce but were cheap in Calcutta. He should 
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therefore get his stores in Calcutta.119 Perhaps to keep Popham busy, Rainier then wrote the 
following year telling him to get his repairs done in Bombay as Calcutta was too 
expensive.120 
 
That there was divergence of understanding between the admiral and the Navy Board from 
the start is illustrated by another letter to Spencer in March 1795 when Rainier complained 
that insufficient stores were still being sent from England even though the Company had 
publicly stated that the Navy Board was sending 300 tons of naval stores to India.121 Rainier 
fully appreciated that he needed to provide detailed evidence of all he was doing regarding 
naval stores and in August he wrote to the Navy Board again that he was sending home John 
Brouncker, currently the purser of the Diomede, with all the details of the losses in stores. 
Brouncker had been Rainier’s purser in the Astraea in the 1780s and he was a very good 
officer.122 Ever mindful that the Navy might forget to pay its officers Rainier requested that 
Brouncker be paid for his efforts. An example of the far sightedness of Rainier is illustrated 
by his comment in the same letter that Trincomalee was an excellent location to keep naval 
stores.123 His other concern was that, even if the stores were of high quality, they were kept in 
inadequate conditions. The storehouses were very badly built and therefore there was a need 
to construct more substantial, and therefore expensive, go-downs.124 But stores sent to 
Trincomalee were also damaged by rain, having been carelessly left out after unloading 
instead of being placed under cover.125 Rainier’s lobbying was effective because, the next 
year he wrote to Halliday, the Naval Officer in Bombay, to re-tender for smaller storehouses 
at Trincomalee as the best quote he had of R.15,600 for two large go-downs, was too high.126 
 
Rainier did not let up his lobbying during Elphinstone’s brief period of command. His 
keenness for communication also ensured that the former knew of the stores’ deficiencies. 
And concerning his frustration with the subcontracting of administration to the Company, he 
wrote to Adamson, the Company’s Marine Storekeeper at Bombay:  
 
As Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir George Elphinstone is soon expected I shall make 
no new arrangements but report to him the irregularities that I have had so much 
occasion to complain of respecting the administration of the King’s Stores at 
Bombay.127  
 
Clearly his words had an impact on his short lived superior who warned the new 
Commander-in-Chief at the Cape, Rear Admiral Pringle, that: ‘Great Inconvenience has been 
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experienced in the Navy Victualling and the Ships have at all times been detained from want 
of Provisions’.128 
 
Yet with all this activity to keep his squadron in good repair he had the sense to realise how 
his complaints and criticisms might be viewed in London. On the 11 May after he had arrived 
Rainier wrote to Sir Andrew Hamond, the Comptroller of the Navy, ensuring that Sir Andrew 
understood why he was spending so much money on stores. He explained the difficulty of 
keeping naval stores in the three major bases of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and of the 
need to have better go-downs in which to maintain the quality of the newly purchased stores. 
He realised that he might appear somewhat pedantic:  
 
I am afraid, my dear Sir Andrew, my letter will rather appear long and tiresome, 
my intent is to remove any impressions in your mind of any extravagancy in my 
conduct in the administration of Stores, wherein you may be assured no shadow 
of emolument has accrued to me or anyone I have employed.129 
 
Clearly Rainier understood the tenet of “no surprises” for his superiors. He was also aware 
that his criticisms of the state of naval stores in India could be seen as a criticism of Navy 
Board officials in London and they might be stirred into questioning his motives behind his 
back. Therefore a letter to the Comptroller to “put him in the picture” was a very wise move. 
 
Another example of Rainier’s strategic thinking can be seen in his letter to the Admiralty 
noting the effect of the change of activity more to the eastwards of India. He noted that 
Malacca was more expensive than he expected and it would be helpful if Indiamen bound for 
China could stop off with supplies there.130 
 
To be fair to the Navy Board, it was also in as difficult position over stores as it was over ship 
building. It clearly had little or no knowledge of the local Indian market, both for price and 
availability, and it suffered from the perennial problem of time delay when communicating 
with the ultimate users of its stores. This it pointed out in a letter to Sewell, the Naval Officer 
in Madras, when it told him that the Board would try and act on his complaints of damaged 
goods but they found it difficult as Sewell has not told them what was the problem – could he 
do so in future?131 Even before stores were damaged or used, the Board needed to know what 
stores to send out. That there was no automatic process to tell them is shown by the letter 
from the Navy Board to Mr. Secretary Nepean asking him for how many men and for how 
long they should send out supplies to the East Indies.132 The Board’s frustration also comes 
through in another letter to Nepean. They had planned to send stores to Trincomalee but 
Elphinstone told them not to as there were no storehouses there, and it was pointless to send 
them to Bombay as ‘the King’s Ships seldom rendezvous there’. [Bombay being the winter 
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rest and repair centre rather than a centre of naval activity]. He had suggested Madras and the 
Board wanted to know what was the opinion of the Admiralty.133 This subject continued to 
fester as a letter from the Navy Board four years later demonstrates. It told Rainier the Naval 
Officer at Madras had been told not to reject damaged goods but accept them and then send 
the details to the Navy Board as soon as possible.134 A year later it wrote: 
 
 We are perfectly aware of the uncertainty which prevails with regard to the 
demands which may be made on you for Stores for which the proper allowance 
will be made, but we must look to you to demand such as are likely to be wanted.  
 
The Board then suggested Rainier might give his views.135  
 
So it can be seen that the Board was not the obdurate body it was sometimes made out to be.  
 
The result of this difficulty in obtaining the correct naval stores created a large demand for 
“outsourcing”, as it would be called today, from the Company. It must have been a difficult 
balance for Rainier between complaining in order to improve matters, and complaining so 
much that he lost all cooperation from the Company’s officers. And on remote stations, 
where there was not the critical mass to have any Royal Naval organisation, his squadron was 
completely reliant on the officers of the Company. It was a major reason for his request for a 
Navy Board organisation to be established in India in order to take from him the heavy 
administrative burden.  
 
2. Ensuring the Squadron’s Armaments. 
 
The Ordnance Board, which provided guns and ammunition for the army and navy, was an 
independent organisation with its own representative in the Cabinet. It was not controlled by 
the Admiralty in any way. But in the East Indies, again differing from other stations, all the 
Navy’s guns and ammunition came from Company stores. Therefore Rainier had virtually 
nothing to do with the Ordnance Board officials in England. The only exception was prior to 
departure from England when guns and powder were prepared for overseas. For example, 
Rainier’s flagship had to have all its gun carriages replaced before it could leave for India as 
they were worn out.136 
 
There were over 212,000 royal and Company troops, plus artillery, with many forts to defend, 
in addition to the Bombay Marine. Naturally they required large amounts of powder. So it 
had already built up its own large organisation which provided weapons and ammunition for 
its own needs. From this source came almost all Rainier’s requirements. In fact, any 
purchasing independence his captains thought they might have was closed by the order 
received from the Admiralty in 1796 referring to an Ordnance Board order telling all HM 
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vessels in the East Indies not to buy powder privately but only to take it from the Company 
magazines.137 And any unserviceable ordnance stores should only be returned to the 
‘Commissary of Military Stores’ of the Company at Madras, Bombay or Calcutta.138  Central 
billing from India House would keep the cost in Britain, thus avoiding the expenditure of rare 
specie locally. 
 
The relationship between the Company and Navy in India had been settled by the decision of 
the Ordnance Board not to appoint an Ordnance Storekeeper in India as it had planned. This 
led Rainier to: 
 
 presume that your Hon’ble Court had consented that the Military Boards at the 
different Presidencies should transact the whole business of the Department in 
this Country [India] so far as regards his Majesty’s Ships both with respect to 
supplies and Returns.  
 
The letter went onto say that he expected that the Gunners of his ships would be given 
receipts for powder they returned to the Company and that it would then be sold ‘to the 
highest bidder’. The Military Board stated that it had told Rainier it would only supply 
‘Ordnance Stores for the use of His Majesty’s Ships’ but would not accept ‘Old unserviceable 
Stores in part payment of the supplies’. No longer would naval officers be allowed just to 
deposit bulky amounts of old gunpowder at the Company’s arsenals as they caused ‘great 
inconvenience’.  Rainier accepted that any stores left by his ships should be sold so as not to 
cause any trouble to the Board.139 The Company was keen to ensure that it was paid for the 
gunpowder:  
 
In consequence of a request from the Master General … we direct that orders be 
given to our Storekeeper to make such supplies of Ordnance Stores as may from 
time to time be required by the Admiral … and you must be careful to furnish us 
with the necessary Vouchers in order that the amount of the value … be 
accounted for to the Company by the Board of Ordnance.140 
 
Almost from the beginning of Rainier’s command he had problems with the quality of his 
powder and he had to ask the Governor General if he could replace that which was damaged 
by being incorrectly stored.141 Two years later he wrote to Hobart, asking if he could borrow 
some good powder from the Company whilst his own was being restored. He was nervous of 
being without powder if the French were suddenly to appear.142 It was clearly not common 
for the ships to require more powder because in 1804 Rainier had to explain this fact to 
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Hoseason, the Naval Officer at Madras, who was authorised to make purchases from the 
Company.143 Naturally Rainier was one of those allowed to do so because as late as 
September 1804 he asked the Governor of Madras, Lord Bentinck, if he could have more 
powder.144 
 
Although the Navy was billed back in England for the ordnance it obtained in the East Indies, 
this did not stop Rainier from trying to avoid having to pay. He told the President of Madras 
that, at home, new ships were paid for by the Navy and the guns supplied by the Ordnance 
Board. So could he have Company guns from the Madras Ordnance store?145 Using the same 
argument, he wrote to Clive, the Governor of Madras, to explain that normally the Board of 
Ordnance paid for all the ordnance stores, as they were in India did he think it would be 
possible for the Company Military Board to pay for these stores for the new ship?146 
 
Occasionally guns were taken out of ships to enable them to carry large numbers of troops 
and equipment as travelling by sea was much easier than by land. These en flute vessels 
stored their guns with the Company until they were required again. The same process 
occurred during the Peace of Amiens for those few ships remaining on station. 
 
It is worth noting that over 90% of Britain’s saltpetre came from India and it was of 
exceptionally high quality. Efforts were naturally made to stop it falling into the wrong 
hands. Rainier wanted to know who was trading in it from the Dutch colonies and what was 
its destination.147 Yet, two years later, the Company allowed 500 tons of it to be shipped to 
the US.148 
 
Thus we can again see that Rainier was almost entirely reliant on the Company for ensuring 
that his squadron’s firepower was always effective. Its organisational capabilities were so 
recognised by the Ordnance Board itself that it did not even attempt to replicate its own 
structure in India. It would appear that Rainier was content with this arrangement. 
 
3. Victualling the Squadron. 
 
Due to the distance from England, most victuals were sourced locally, so Rainier had more 
dealings with the local victualling agents of the Navy and Company than with the Victualling 
Board. Apart from initial food and drink supplied to ships in England before departure, most 
replacements came through the agency of the Hon. Basil Cochrane, under a contract obtained 
by his brother John, in negotiation with Rainier’s predecessor, Cornwallis. Rainier’s 
relationship with Basil, a very difficult character, was crucial to the smooth supply of 
victuals. Cochrane was not an easy man with whom to work and it is to Rainier’s great credit 
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that they developed a close working relationship. He had warehouses in the three presidencies 
and either bought or hired ships to transport supplies to wherever the Navy needed them. It 
meant that Rainier had little direct contact with the Victualling Board over day to day 
victualling issues. In fact, in March 1804 he was able to tell Cochrane that he had not heard 
from it for fourteen months.149 Nevertheless, having encountered severe victual shortages 
under Hughes, which had limited not only his possible course of action, but also the time he 
could spend at sea, Rainier knew that an efficient victualling system was vital.  
 
Those of Rainier’s concerns over victualling sent from England, primarily beef, were covered 
in his communications with the Navy Board, which paid for the food and drink and which 
was also responsible for ensuring that the supplies reached the consumers. But there is a great 
deal of correspondence indicating how much Rainier was concerned with the well being of 
his crews. In 1796 he halved the salt beef allowance ‘as injurious to the health of seamen’ and 
replaced it with extra flour and raisins.150 In 1799 he wrote to some of his ships to check the 
quality of flour and beef.151 And this enthusiasm still continued after he had retired when he 
wrote to the Victualling Board supporting the experiments with new methods of salting 
beef.152 
 
He realized that only continued diligence would enable him to keep his squadron at 
maximum strength. As he explained to Nepean: 
 
The constant employment of His Majesty’s Ships at Sea, or in open Roads on this 
Station, the nature of the Climate, the general poverty of the vegetables and the 
scarcity of Fruits [on] this Coast, and particularly this Port [Madras] affords, that 
victualled upon Fresh Beef frequently and upon every opportunity, exposes their 
Crews to scorbutic and other disorders disabling them from service in this 
Country, which now wears a serious aspect.153 
 
Shortages of fresh food caused problems during the entire period of Rainier’s command. In 
1795 he wrote to Governor General Shore telling him that scurvy was an issue.154 Although 
he had experience of the benefits of lemon juice he still had an incomplete understanding of 
the illness; his letter to the Sick and Hurt Board four months later noted that scurvy had 
returned even though they had fresh beef. He noted that fresh fruit and vegetables were hard 
to find.155 And the search for fresh food spread wider the following year when he captured 
the Spice Islands. Showing originality, he sent some of the captured spices to Canton to trade 
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for victuals,156 writing the same day to the Governor of Manila requesting stores from the 
Philippines.157 In 1799 Rainier ordered the Victorious to remain off Goa to obtain fresh food 
as its crew were so badly affected by scurvy.158 His continued ability to plan ahead to ensure 
that lack of victuals would not hinder his dispositions is illustrated by a letter to Wellesley in 
which he told the Governor General that he had been ordered to send warships to Canton and 
must therefore go to Madras to arrange for additional stores in order that they could remain at 
sea for a longer period of time.159 He also expected his captains to take as much care of the 
victuals for their crews as he did. Captain Surridge of the Trident received a letter from 
Rainier demanding an answer, in writing, as to why the Trident had run out of tea.160  
 
The provision of water appears not to have been an issue apart from during the campaign in 
the Red Sea. The main issues were the quality of the casks in which the water was carried, its 
availability and cost. He noted the quality problem and shortage of casks to Kemp, the agent 
to Cochrane, also telling him to give cash to John Sprat Rainier so he could buy water and 
victuals in the Red Sea.161 Knowing water was a serious problem he also told Osborn that he 
would have all the casks belonging to the King, but held by the Company’s agent, coopered 
and sent onto Blankett.162 Three months earlier he had written to Captain Losack of the 
Jupiter (50) at the Cape of Good Hope. He told Losack to obtain better casks as the last ones 
he had sent from Madagascar had been too leaky.163 This illustrates how far Rainier had to go 
to obtain his water. 
 
The Role of Basil Cochrane. 
The focal relationship on which the adequate supply of provisions to the squadron depended, 
was that between Rainier and Cochrane. The latter had previously been the Military 
Paymaster of Fort St. George but had to relinquish this post when the Madras Government 
decided that there was a potential conflict of interest for one person to be both a contractor 
and a government official. Cochrane chose to maintain his ties with the Navy, and he appears 
to have maintained this policy because, as he wrote to Lord Clive, the President of the 
Madras Council, he had no other contracts but his naval one and that there was no complaint 
about his attention to the navy contract on record.164 The Cochrane family, under the title of 
the earls of Dundonald, was not one of Scotland’s wealthiest, and its children were always 
searching for ways to improve their fortunes. John, and later Basil, clearly hoped that their 
victualling contract would make theirs.  
 
Whilst later Rainier came to rely much on Cochrane, initially this was not the case. Such was 
their poor relationship that Rainier was himself buying beef in every port where Cochrane’s 
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contract did not apply as he thought he could obtain it more cheaply.165 He admonished 
Cochrane at the attack on Trincomalee:  
 
I am farther to add that I am much dissatisfied with the Bread aboard the Suffolk it 
being very ill baked and flinty nor can I conceive otherwise than that there is 
some improper mixture in the preparing [of] it.166  
 
Two months later, having evidently been researching the subject, he wrote to the Victualling 
Board: ‘I have offered the Hon. Basil Cochrane of two English Biscuit Bakers, that article is 
now so well made as to give general satisfaction’.167 Indeed, he had already written to 
Captain Newcombe of the Orpheus asking him what was the price of beef and was it better to 
buy it locally or in Qatar?168 It indicates the length to which Rainier would go for the lowest 
price as, at this time, the Orpheus was cruising off the south east coast of India. Both these 
examples illustrate the early issues and the level of detail to which Rainier went in ensuring 
the best supplies for his crews.  
 
Rainier’s concerns continued and he wrote to Nepean that he had discovered: ‘a very 
extraordinary and corrupt’ agreement between Cochrane and Arnott, who had been the purser 
of the Suffolk. This stated that the profits of the sale of supplies to naval ships would be 
shared between the two men.169  
 
He immediately dismissed Arnott, who was the Agent Victualler, but only threatened 
Cochrane with losing his contract. If Rainier was such a guardian of propriety one needs to 
ask why did he not dismiss Cochrane. It can be argued that Arnott was easily replaceable if 
Rainier wanted to do so, however Cochrane was not – as the later contract re-tendering 
showed. Rainier was still relatively new to the station. He knew the importance of good 
logistics and how difficult they were to provide. With all the other aspects of his job, he could 
not afford the time to build a new supply organisation and, if he could ensure Cochrane’s 
future honesty by threatening him, it was surely in the best interests of the station for Rainier 
to concentrate on the naval elements of his role. He also understood that it was not in the 
interests of the navy to reduce its suppliers to penury. Perhaps he knew certain items could be 
bought more cheaply somewhere on the station but, with such a small administrative 
organisation, he had more important tasks to which he should attend. 
 
A key aspect of the victualling structure was the role of the Agent Victualler. This person was 
responsible for organising the victualling of the entire fleet on a station. He stood between the 
admiral and the contractors to ensure that supplies were provided at the correct quality, 
quantity and price. He reported to both the admiral and Victualling Board but, due to 
proximity, his first duty was to the admiral, and he was often appointed from the role of 
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admiral’s secretary or the flagship’s purser. In the normal process of events the contractor, in 
this case Cochrane, would obtain approval for his purchases from the Agent Victualler who 
would also provide the necessary finance. Rainier did not think it was helpful to have such a 
position so he terminated it.170 Thus he made the chain of approval only Cochrane and 
himself. For most items this was not a problem as there were invoices to back up the 
expenditure, although the pricing could still be suspect. However, there was a category called 
‘contingent expenses’ whereby the contractor asked for money in advance, and therefore 
without invoices, for those products which would be needed frequently and urgently, often on 
remote sectors of the station, such as some items of food.171 This was a common practice. But 
Rainier’s decision not to replace Arnott meant there was now a very short audit trail. And it 
was easy for approved money not always to meet up with future invoices, given the delays 
and the distances between the various centres of naval supply. Yet he knew he was not 
corrupt, and he could monitor Cochrane in an auditing manner, by terminating the role of 
agent victualler. In his mind he was probably merely ensuring there could be no 
misdemeanours within the victualling chain. Therefore it is not surprising that the two Boards 
were suspicious of such a weak audit trail. This would have gone some way towards 
explaining the pressure they put on Rainier when he returned to England to account for these 
often large amounts of money. In 1796, when Rainier made this change, he was still a very 
inexperienced flag officer. Perhaps he would not have done it if he had known the trouble it 
would cause him on his return. Yet the Victualling Board had agreed to it and it continued to 
be the arrangement under Rainier’s successors. 
 
Four years later there was still some animosity between the two men. Rainier was wise 
enough to realise that his wide range of responsibilities and the vast geography of his 
command meant he could not manage the day to day activities in the Red Sea to counter 
Bonaparte. He also knew that obtaining supplies there was difficult and expensive and he 
wanted to ensure that Blankett could concentrate on opposing the French, rather than 
worrying about naval stores and victuals. To this end Rainier did his utmost to ensure that 
Blankett received regular deliveries of supplies. He wrote to Mr. Grimes, Agent to the 
transport Eliza, that he was ordering him to the Red Sea to manage the distribution of naval 
stores in that area and to check that they were being properly stored. If there were any losses 
the cost would be deducted from his fee. He was also enjoined to ensure that he obtained 
receipts in triplicate: ‘from the proper officers to whom they are delivered’.172 When he 
arrived in Bombay, the nearest base to the Red Sea, he discovered that there was no arrack, 
and that the provisions he had previously ordered to be sent to Blankett had not been 
obtained, yet he knew that these stores were readily available in Bombay. He told Cochrane 
that: ‘I … require you will assign your reason for this manifest breach of contract … to 
supply His Majesty’s Squadron in this Country with Provisions’. He told him that there 
would have been no problems if Cochrane had done as Rainier had previously asked him to 
do. As an aside which was a good reflection of Rainier’s attention to detail and his desire to 
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see that his sailors were not exploited, he also mentioned that the biscuits were of poor 
quality.173  
 
The process continued in the same manner until 1803 when Rainier was ordered by the 
Admiralty to terminate the victualling contract with Cochrane and put out to tender for a new 
supplier.174 Presumably the original one was now thought to be too generous given the much 
greater scale of naval activity since it was first agreed in peacetime in 1790. The threat to the 
Cochrane clan initiated protest from a new source. Captain, later Admiral, Alexander 
Cochrane wrote to the Company that: 
 
…my late brother, the Hon. John Cochrane, did about the year 1790 take at a 
Public Sale, a Contract for victualling His Majesty’s Ships and Vessels in India, 
which Contract at the particular request of Commodore, now Admiral Cornwallis, 
was subjected to the review and received the approbation of the Governor General 
and Council of Bengal, after several of the Articles had been modified and altered 
as to render the whole a fair and equitable Contract between the Government and 
the Contractor. … the Contract was assigned over to the Hon. Basil Cochrane at 
Madras, who received a renewal of the same, first from Admiral Rainier. And 
afterwards from Sir George Keith Elphinstone … which Contract has been ever 
since executed to the entire satisfaction of the Squadron serving in India and also 
of the Hon. Commissioners in London victualling His Majesty’s Navy.175  
 
This letter would indicate that Basil Cochrane’s contract was not obtained through any 
nefarious means although there may be some question as to how satisfactory was his 
execution of the contract. 
 
There were only two tenders and the cheaper one was from Cochrane. It is easy to understand 
why anyone would be reluctant to tender for such a contract. The organisation to provide 
victuals across the entire station was expensive to run and required large numbers of 
premises; bakeries, breweries, warehouses and ships. Cochrane even built an eponymously 
named canal, in Madras, to facilitate the movement of supplies around the region.176 When 
one adds to these costs the fact that the contractor was only paid, in most cases, after 
incurring the expense of providing this service, it is easy to see how wealthy one had to be to 
stay in this business.  
 
Rainier wrote to Cochrane agreeing to his tender and, even though he was in a poor 
negotiating position, he insisted on a reduction of one shilling a gallon on the price of vinegar 
and one penny reduction in the price of a pound of bread. He noted that he still had not had 
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the approval of the Victualling Board to his decision but he had waited too long already; he 
needed to put a new contract in place. However, things might change once he did hear.177 
This shows that Rainier knew the limits of his authority but realised that he had to act in order 
to keep the navy effective. He also protected himself by writing to the Admiralty that he had 
signed a new contract with Cochrane although no instructions had arrived from the 
Victualling Board, because he needed to keep the squadron fed. He wanted to ensure that no 
corruption was suspected as he did ‘…hope their Lordships will approve … no fee or reward 
whatever was admitted’.178 
 
But the relationships gradually evolved until it became one of friendship, as can be inferred 
by the fact that Cochrane owned one of the two known portraits of the admiral: the one 
painted in 1805 by Arthur William Devis.179  
 
The poor accounting systems of the British government during this period ‘almost invited 
corruption when allied to the vast increase in expenditure’.180 As a huge user of government 
cash, naval administration had been subjected to investigation against corruption since St. 
Vincent was the First Lord. When even the navy’s paymaster, Alexander Trotter, was 
discovered to have been illegally using his own account at Coutts to carry public balances, it 
was not surprising that the Navy Board clerks would delve into Rainier’s eleven year long 
administration. But as the Admiralty itself was not equipped for competent auditing purposes, 
neither was Rainier. Added to this was the fact that John Cochrane’s successor was his 
brother, Basil Cochrane, and there were many who believed he had made a fortune at the 
expense of the navy. The admiral had initially been suspicious of Basil’s subsidiary contracts 
with suppliers and once, with a naval officer. But he had later come to be a friend and had 
supported him when the contract had been renewed. But there was no evidence of any 
corruption or collusion in the awarding of contracts. Yet there is still a question left by such 
comments, written by Rainier to Basil’s brother, Rear Admiral Alexander Cochrane: ‘what 
help your brother showed to me was more than I had favours in my power to show him 
during my Command in India’; he continued by telling Alexander that he had advised Basil 
to return to England immediately to agree his accounts with the Victualling Board.181 Much 
can be inferred by Cochrane’s decision to return to England when he heard that Rainier was 
departing. No longer would Cochrane be able to hide any nefarious dealings from the new C-
in-C. The Board’s concern was probably focused by the fact that Cochrane’s cash account, 
which needed to be passed, stood at a staggering £1,247,666 0s.2d.182 The Navy Board 
records show a steady flow of letters to the Admiralty from 1795, saying that they had 
received bills from Cochrane for various amounts. Although Rainier had approved them, 
there were no vouchers. Should they pay? The sums were large, £27,000, £30,000, £42,000, 
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£53,000.183 The worries carried over into Pellew’s command. When Cochrane heard that the 
Board was reviewing his accounts going back to 1794, and had asked for copies of all his 
documentation going back to that period, he decided it was time to return to England. 
Claiming ill health, he asked for, and was given, permission to do so. The negotiation to settle 
his accounts took until 1820 before they were agreed, resulting in Cochrane receiving £1000 
from the Navy Board. But one must believe that he was cleared of any wrongdoing as he was 
then presented to the King by Lord Keith in 1821. 
 
Parallel to this activity, imprests were placed on Rainier and many were the letters flowing 
between the Admiralty Board, the Navy Board and the Admiral. Finally there is a plaintive 
letter from the Navy Board to Admiralty Board saying that it had investigated the matter as 
far as it could and it was really a question of whether or not the Admiralty believed what 
Rainier said.184 It finally came down on Rainier’s side and the imprests were lifted. 
 
The East Indies was not the only station to experience rapid expansion, this was felt literally 
around the world and the Navy Board had also struggled to keep up with the administration 
of such a large organisation as the navy now was. It admitted that some paperwork had: ‘been 
mislaid in passing them thro’ the different Departments of this Office’.185 ‘Our naval boards 
are in such a weak state, that they cannot be relied upon for either advice or execution’ was a 
further admission that not all the fault lay with serving naval officers.186 And the errors even 
spread to the Admiralty Board; Lord Keith wrote to Marsden, its secretary: ‘[I] enclose a 
minute of the Board which has been accidentally sent [to me]’.187 
 
Whilst Cochrane appeared to organise the supply of victuals to the squadron in an 
increasingly acceptable manner, he was by no means a “fire and forget” figure. He clearly 
took up a great deal of Rainier’s time and attention which might have been better employed 
in managing the disposition of his squadron. But the result was a highly effective system 
which provided good service. As Knight and Wilcox say of Cochrane: ‘...a system took shape 
which was less costly, more reliable and more transparent than that which had gone before 
it’.188 It even, on occasion, tempered the shortcomings of the army’s own system by 
providing victuals to its soldiers.189 Clearly this could not have happened without Rainier’s 
active involvement.   
 
Until the very end of his command he was fighting victualling incompetence, even if it would 
cause embarrassment. Pellew, Rainier’s successor, had been requested by the Admiralty to 
show favour to Edmund Anderson, a purser. Pellew replied somewhat dryly that Rainier had 
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already dismissed him by court martial therefore: ‘their Lordships’ directions in his favour … 
are rendered fruitless’.190 It is also evident that Cochrane played the useful role of a private 
banker to Rainier’s captains. Charles Adam wrote to his father that the £3000 he would earn 
from the capture of La Chiffonne would enable him to pay back what he owed to 
Cochrane.191 
 
4. Manning the Squadron. 
 
Throughout the period of this study the Navy struggled to find an efficient method of 
manning its ships.192 And the issues it had were magnified in the Far East due to the distance 
from the main source of trained seamen - the merchant service. The East India Company’s 
monopoly of trade in the east not only kept out any competition but also meant that its ships 
were the only ones from which the Royal Navy could obtain skilled seamen in time of war, 
and they were officially exempt from the Press. There was no equivalent to the Baltic, the 
Newcastle Coal, the Deep Sea Fisheries, or the West Indies/ North America trades. In the 
absence of British merchant seamen the Navy had to take the local equivalents, usually 
Indian lascars or Chinese, who were not very effective in the harsh discipline of a British 
warship in the tumult of fierce storms and desperate battles.193 
 
As the captain of a warship Rainier already had experience of the difficulties of manning. For 
example, out in India, under Hughes, he had been assigned Company troops as marines.194 
During the Russian Armament of 1790-1, he wrote to the Admiralty that he had pressed men 
from the Worcester Indiaman, and other vessels.195 Not surprisingly, the following year he 
was writing that he was being sued for false impressments and was therefore sending all the 
legal papers to the Admiralty.196 Of course Rainier’s solicitous attitude to his crew members 
could be argued to be another method of obtaining and keeping rare skilled sailors. During 
the Spanish Armament of 1790, Rainier, then commanding the Monarch, asked for the return 
of a sailor who had been ashore on an errand and had been pressed. He was not a very 
intelligent man and could not explain what he was doing.197 In 1793 Rainier asked that a 
court martial on a deserter be annulled as he had been in irons for three months which Rainier 
thought was sufficient punishment.198 In 1794 the Admiralty agreed to his request that an old 
deserter who had rejoined the Navy under an assumed name could be released as long as he 
paid back his bounty.199 Whilst illustrating compassion, all these actions reduced the 
perennial problem of manning a warship in war. But his protection of individual old seamen 
showed that he had an altruistic side. He wrote to Nepean asking that one of his men, a John 
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Collins, had been invalided out of the Navy and could he find him a place at Greenwich?200 
Yet there was also a retribution side. When a British deserter was found amongst the captured 
crew of the French frigate La Prudente, he did not have to wait long for his court martial and 
execution.201 
 
So when Rainier arrived at Madras in 1794 he already knew that there was little hope of 
major crew replacements from naval sources, that there were relatively few British merchant 
seamen, and that disease and climate would take a heavy toll of his men. It was therefore 
important that he look after his precious resource of experienced fighting sailors. 
 
Minimising Losses 
With it being so difficult to replace seamen, the obvious first step was to try and keep 
effective those he already had.  Even as he was being nominated for the command he was 
writing to the Admiralty who agreed to his request for the release into the Suffolk of a French 
baker who had been captured on a French privateer.202 
 
Gardner had been keen to protect his crews from the threat of scurvy and had requested 
additional lemons for his aborted journey to take Mauritius, prior to taking over the East 
Indies Command.203 With the cancellation of the expedition and Rainier’s appointment to the 
now much reduced station, only his ships were provided with the extra lemons. Before he set 
sail he was advised by the Admiralty that he would receive the extra lemon juice and 
medicines he had requested.204 Evidently he was as convinced as his mentor of its anti-
scorbutic value although he still believed that there were other cures, such as fresh beef, 
noted above. But his subsequent successful voyage to India probably played a large part in 
persuading the Admiralty of the efficacy of lemon juice in the control of this debilitating 
disease.205 The Sick and Hurt Board had been pleased to hear that Rainier’s journey out to 
India had resulted in only fifteen men sick aboard the flagship after a nineteen week 
voyage.206 Signs of scurvy in individual sailors were eradicated by increasing the dosage of 
lemon juice. He also pointed out that some lemon juice had been adulterated with vinegar.207 
This achievement can be measured by comparing it with the fate of the ten Dutch East 
Indiamen that left the Netherlands in 1782. By the time they had reached the Cape, 43% 
[1,095], of their crews had died.208 
 
Yet six months later he was writing to Lord Spencer that, even though his squadron had fifty 
seven men sick, [evidently believed to be a large number, out of less than 2000] he had not 
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pressed a single man from the Company.209 And in January 1798 the eleven mutineers at 
Bombay who had been sentenced to death, were pardoned when news was received of 
Duncan’s victory at Camperdown. Indeed the rather minor mutiny had been defused by 
Captain Osborne reminding the crew of the Suffolk that their admiral had obtained for them 
high quality provisions, including a tea allowance and had established a naval hospital at 
Madras, illustrating his care for them. Rainier thought that the desire to mutiny had come 
from seamen pressed from an East Indiaman bringing out news of the Nore and Spithead 
mutinies from England.210  
 
As a flag officer, Rainier’s concern for the health of his men is clearly visible – witness his 
emphasis on lemon juice. From bitter experience he knew how easily crews were reduced in 
the Far East and he seemed keen to ensure this drain would be effectively blocked. Later in 
the year his attention to detail must have astounded the Navy Board when Rainier told them 
that, despite the fact that cocoa was twice as expensive in Manila as in the West Indies, he 
had still bought some for the sick of the squadron.211 This attitude was further shown by his 
standing order that all captains and their surgeons should visit their men in hospital every 
Monday when in port.212 
 
An issue that was important to Rainier for over twenty years was the treatment of Indian crew 
members and dockyard workers. The earliest example of this concern is the paying off of the 
Burford in England when he requested that five Indian crew members be given passage back 
to India.213 All seamen, including Indians and Chinese, needed to go to England in order to 
receive their wages. Unfortunately they then had to wait until they could find a ship that 
would take them back to their homes. Not until 1804 was he finally given permission by the 
Admiralty to pay off these seamen in their home country.214 In 1797 he wrote to Sir John 
Shore, the Governor General, that he wanted the commander of the East Indiaman Amboina 
punished for his ‘inhumanity to the native part of his crew’.215 Even after he had retired to 
England he was still defending the Indians. Sir Roger Curtis had been appointed to the 
‘Commission for revising the civil affairs of His Majesty’s Navy’. He asked Rainier’s advice 
on the establishment of a Navy Board organisation in India. Considering all he had suffered 
from the administrative side of his job it was not surprising that he agreed. Additionally he 
thought there should a European senior clerk: ‘to converse with the warrant officers of the 
Squadron and check their overbearing and often insulting carriage towards the Native Clerks 
and Porters’.216 
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Although it had already been suggested by the Sick and Hurt Board in January 1794 that a 
hospital should be established in India,217 it had not received approval from the Admiralty 
Board before Rainier took the initiative and created one in Madras. And when he took the 
Spice Islands he established temporary hospitals at Penang and Malacca to ease the recovery 
of sailors brought down by illness.218 The admiral was anxious because, ever careful with 
expense, he believed that the Company charged too much for providing medical care to naval 
seamen.219 Finance was at the base of another frustration for Rainier when he asked the 
Admiralty if it could settle the conflict caused by the Navy Board not accepting bills drawn 
for supplies for the Madras hospital. He had had to pay for the supplies himself.220 His 
correspondence with the Navy and Victualling Boards illustrates his desire to provide decent 
food for his men, including cocoa.221 In another letter, fresh fruit and vegetables for those 
suffering from scurvy were sent to the agent of the Victualling Board Commissioners at 
Bombay, although he must not pay more than one shilling a day for ten days.222 Mindful of 
the conditions in the Red Sea he ordered Captain Osborne of the Arrogant to take sugar out to 
Blankett and charge it to the Sick and Hurt Board.223 He also wanted the sick to go to sea on 
cruises to improve their health away from the diseases of the Indian sub continent.224 One of 
his more optimistic attempts to save money was to ask the Governor General if sick sailors 
could be treated with free medicines from the Company.225 The normal practice was ‘to 
supply the Medicines on indents being furnished by the Proper Officers, Charging the price 
of the Medicines to the Account of the Crown’.226 Unsurprisingly he received a negative 
response with the argument that, if the Company did this for the navy then it would upset the 
army.227  
 
When Rainier’s men did not recover, but did not die, he had to arrange for their repatriation 
to England. In 1798 he wrote to Christian at the Cape that he was sending home 129 invalids 
and Christian was welcome to take any that might have recovered by the time they reached 
the Cape. At the same time he requested the names of all those seamen that Christian had 
taken out of Indiamen on their way to India as Rainier never received the replacements he 
was promised.228 He also required the help of the Company in caring for his sick men, 
occasionally needing its help to return to England those seamen invalided out of the Navy, 
with, on one instance, a request for eighty sailors to be returned home on Indiamen.229 Yet all 
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his efforts could not stop his ships being infected by the diseases common in Java and, in 
1801, he had to call off his blockade of Batavia because of sickness on his vessels.230 
 
A review of the muster books of a cross section of Rainier’s vessels illustrates only that 
phenomenon common to all stations; the rate of sickness was lower with smaller crews.231 
This was primarily because smaller vessels were at sea more often, away from land-based 
diseases. The Orpheus, which seems to have suffered an epidemic with seventy two sick out 
of a crew of 220 when it returned to Bombay for serious repair in 1800, was an exception.232 
But apart from this, there were only slight increases in sickness when ships were stationed 
around Java and Amboina and in the Red Sea. 
 
Help from the Admiralty 
Conscious of Rainier’s manning problems, the Admiralty’s idea was to send out replacement 
seamen taking passage on Indiamen. Unfortunately, practice did not align with theory. As 
early as 1795 he informed Hobart that only eight out of thirty replacements sent to him were 
fit for service.233 Two years later, it was learned that Rainier’s replacements were being taken 
by the Cape command.234 The next year the admiral was driven to complain directly to the 
Admiralty that he had received not one replacement, contrary to what he had been told to 
expect.235 This countered directly Nepean’s assurance to Rainier that able bodied landsmen 
were being sent out to him on Indiamen so he would have no need to press men from the 
Company’s ships.236 The illusion under which the Admiralty was working is also illustrated 
by its letter to the Company saying that it had sent out enough men so there was no further 
need to send more out to India.237 Yet two months earlier Rainier had written to the 
Admiralty explaining what was the exact situation:  
 
The arrangement proposed by the Secret Committee … has been wholly omitted 
on their part, as not one of the ships mentioned brought out any men on that 
account, and on their arrival here universally complained of their inability to 
supply any men for the Squadron, owing to the numbers taken out of them at the 
Cape.238 
 
But still the system was not working as the following year Rainier complained that the 
Company ships were not sending enough men: ‘[they] have no regard to the proposal of the 
Committee to their Lordships’.239  
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The admiral needed to look for other means of recruitment. He wrote to the Admiralty 
acknowledging that the award of bounties had been prohibited but could he use them in the 
East Indies due to his special needs?240 
 
The Press 
The major source of replacement seamen was through the press and this was a constant 
source of friction throughout the period of Rainier’s command, and indeed, afterwards, as 
illustrated by a letter Pellew received from the Admiralty condemning the behaviour of one 
of his captains after taking men from an Indiaman.241 Dundas stated that the Company 
employed 7,000 seamen,242 which concurs with Cotton’s account of 50,000 tons of shipping 
at an average of approximately 14 men per 100 tons.243 Rainier was conscious of the 
problems and spent much time writing to the Company and Admiralty defending his actions. 
He did try not to upset the Company but felt that, on occasions such as the renewal of war in 
1803, he had to break the rules.  The Admiralty’s insistence on cutting back the squadron at 
the Peace of Amiens placed Rainier in a difficult situation when war was again imminent. He 
needed men quickly. He told the Admiralty that he had taken men out of Indiamen because 
his ships had only peacetime crews and the replacements sent out from England were of 
‘indifferent quality’.244 And he was prepared to defend his captains from complaints, telling 
Captain Lucas of the Arrogant that:  
 
The Commander of the Thetis has represented to me that You have taken eleven 
men out of his Ship … You are the best Judge whether that Ship’s Company will 
bear the draught for His Majesty’s Service.245  
 
But apparently the evidence against Captain Bingham of the San Fiorenzo was too great as 
Rainier wrote to Governor Duncan that he would reprimand the captain for his ‘uncivil 
conduct’.246 This was the kind of naval attitude amongst naval officers which gave it such a 
bad reputation with the Company officers. And, later that year, whilst criticising the Canton 
supercargoes for not telling him when the China Fleet was sailing, he apologised in turn for 
pressing more men out of the Indiamen.247 
 
Deserters from the army were also a source of recruitment, especially as marines, but the 
practice had clearly got out of hand when Rainier told Hobart that he had ordered his captains 
not to take any more deserters from either the royal or Company armies into his squadron.248 
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But official exchanges were still encouraged as when Rainier asked General Stuart if he could 
have some troops to act as marines on the newly captured La Chiffonne.249  
 
The men of the Bombay Marine were a tempting source of prime fighting seamen although 
officially the Navy was not allowed to take men from it.250 And Rainier was not exactly 
fulsome in his praise of the Marine, primarily because they had so few British crewmen and 
he thought its management was poor.251 But, as already seen, the rules were not always 
respected far from England.  Rainier’s letter to Duncan, the President of Bombay, stated his 
agreement to hand back all the men pressed from the Marine and he promised not to take any 
more.252 
 
He also had to explain some of the unique issues he faced. His letter to Duncan told how 
Captain Vashon was trying to take back deserters from Mecca who had become Muslims.253 
This was an issue Home Popham also had in 1801.254 The rewards of service with the 
Company meant that the movement of seamen was not one way. Rainier’s information to the 
Admiralty caused it to write to the Company noting that naval deserters had been found in 
Company ships and could the practice be stopped?255 A further letter asked the Company to 
stop enticing naval men to desert to Company ships.256 More locally, Captain Hills of the 
Orpheus wrote to the Governor General telling of two naval seamen seized by the 
Company.257 
 
That he also had lawyers to deal with, besides the Company, is illustrated by his letter to 
Tullock, Cannell and Brodie of Madras explaining that only six volunteers had been taken 
from the merchant ship Bridgewater ‘whose crew will well bear that reduction’.258 
 
5. Financing the Squadron. 
 
Whilst there are many similarities between the financial management issues in the East Indies 
compared with other stations, its sheer size and variety, the scarcity of specie, and the 
involvement of the Company made the whole process of obtaining the money necessary to 
keep the squadron at sea a complex and stressful one and took a great deal of the admiral’s 
time. There have already been a number of examples of how the matter of finance impacted 
the manner in which Rainier managed his squadron. The subject can be reviewed under the 
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general headings of how Rainier was supplied with the means of purchase, and how he 
actually made his purchases. 
 
The Source of Purchasing Power. 
Regular and large items of expenditure were paid directly in Britain from invoices raised in 
India and authorised by Rainier and the appropriate naval officer. This would apply, for 
example, in the purchase of gunpowder and naval stores bought in India from the Company. 
Due largely to the trade imbalance between Britain and both India and China and the land 
wars waged by the Governor General, there was always a shortage of specie on the station. 
This approach had the benefit of keeping the cash for these transactions at home, between the 
Admiralty and India House. 
 
When invoices were paid locally, money would be obtained from navy bills sent out from 
England, which could then be used to pay for goods and services directly. These bills would 
then be redeemable in England at a later date, payable with interest. Cash could also be 
obtained locally from wealthy individuals and trading companies, using these bills, and they 
saw this process as one by which they could transfer securely their wealth back to Britain. 
There were also many rich Indian merchants and they saw this as just one more legitimate 
means of making money if the discount was attractive. If there was insufficient cash in 
circulation, as sometimes happened when the land wars were not progressing well,259 Rainier 
was reduced to borrowing money directly from the Company. And there were many 
opportunities for the wealthy to lend their money, including to the Nawab of Arcot, who 
borrowed tens of thousands of pounds at high interest rates – unfortunately he never repaid 
anything he owed, much to the chagrin of his creditors, including one Admiral Rainier.260 
 
The discounts on navy bills could be very high – up to 30-40%. Occasionally the market was 
so wary that they could not be sold at all. Rainier wrote to Philip Dundas at Bombay: ‘as you 
inform me … that there has been no Tenders offered to your later advertisements in the 
public Papers for Cash for Bills on the Navy Board, for which you assign as a reason the very 
great scarcity of specie … [I] recommend the Board sending out a supply of silver’.261 A 
£20,000 tender by Hoseason in 1804 elicited not one reply and the Madras Council would not 
help him. But he managed to off load £5,000 to a friend. The Sick and Hurt Board was in 
debt to him personally and he had to buy stores daily.262 Rainier’s response was to write to 
Bentinck and ask if he could borrow £20,000 from the Company.263 This followed a long 
tradition because, in 1795, he had written to Hobart telling him he hoped Hobart agreed with 
him making ‘use of the Credit of Your Lordship’s government or even that of Calcutta if 
necessary.264 He also noted to Bentinck that, when his reinforcing ships arrive from England, 
they need so much money spending on them to prepare them for battle conditions that it 
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drained his resources even more.265 The Company would also provide financial support 
indirectly. In 1802 the Canton Supercargoes wrote to Wellesley that they had provided Basil 
Cochrane’s victualling agents with Spanish $25,000 to purchase food for the Navy.266 Rainier 
regularly asked for money to be sent rather than bills, as ultimately it would be cheaper.267 
Unfortunately there was not the specie to be had, even after the Navy Board passed on 
Rainier’s requests to the Treasury.268 But cognisant of his problems the Board also told him 
on one occasion that it had arranged for him to draw £150,000 over six months from bankers 
Messrs. Boyd Benfield.269 This banking house thereby would be repaid in London for assets 
it held in India without having to use the Company to transfer them. Unfortunately such 
transactions were unable to halt the bank’s collapse the following year. Even as late as 1804, 
he wrote to Bentinck, the President of Madras, asking for Company money as he had almost 
run out of cash to pay for all the stores that his enlarged squadron required.270 But the Navy 
Board was still sending out cash whenever possible. In July 1805, it asked Secretary Marsden 
in which ships it should send £20,000 to Madras and £28,000 to Bombay.271 
 
Even when there was good news the cup was dashed from Rainier’s lips as when a public 
subscription raised thousands of pounds in India for the Navy. Rainier’s clear need for cash 
was rebuffed when he asked for it to be handed over as the Governor General told him that 
the subscribers wished the money to be sent to England where, naturally, it would receive 
more good press.272  
 
Making Payments. 
For final authorisation to pay, all the correct vouchers, signatures, and valuations had to be 
presented to the Navy Board. If not, the invoice would be paid and an imprest placed on the 
individual that the Board felt had not followed the correct procedure. This happened to 
Rainier himself during his command, especially with ship purchases and repairs – the most 
expensive items. The various Naval Officers also bore the brunt of this crude weapon. Rainier 
was still arguing with the Navy Board two years after he had returned to England – a mere 
blink of the eye compared with Cochrane who finally settled his accounts in 1820 – fourteen 
years after his return from India. But Rainier did not let bureaucracy stand in the way of 
being fair to his seamen. He authorised the payment of £5,000 prize money to the crew of 
HMS La Sybille for the capture of La Forte even though it had not yet been approved for 
purchase by the Navy Board. He wanted the men to have some money before their long 
journey home to England. 
 
The major problem was marrying the amount of money obtained from the bills with vouchers 
for the goods purchased by that money. And the Navy Board realised that it could not always 
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do this. For example in 1798 it had a shortfall of £42,000 unaccounted for expenditure – it 
asked the Admiralty if it could write it off.273 It is not surprising that forms got lost, 
especially as the Navy Board admitted that it lost papers: ‘… have been mislaid in passing 
them thro’ the different Departments of this Office’.274 
 
To be fair to Rainier, he had no staff or accounting department to monitor the financial 
transactions of this large organisation covering thirty million square miles and in multi 
currencies. He even had to watch exchange rates, for example, writing to Cochrane telling 
him to buy forward star pagodas as he expected the rate to move to ten shillings to the 
pagoda.275 
 
The more common currencies with which Rainier had to deal were; 
 
Spanish dollar  0.25p 
    Batavia Rix dollar 0.21p 
    Madras Star pagoda 0.40p 
Madras rupee  0.11p 
    Bengal rupee  0.10p 
    Bengal sicca rupee 0.12p 
        Bombay rupee  0.11p 
    Chinese tael  0.33p 
 
Because of the size of the station there were not always established bases where supplies 
could be purchased and captains often had to be given large sums of cash in advance of their 
expenditure. For example, Rainier wrote to Francis Kemp, Cochrane’s agent:  
 
You are to consider on the readiest means of furnishing Captain John Spratt 
Rainier with a credit to purchase water and fresh provisions at Muscat, or 
otherwise advance the Purser a sum of Money for that Purpose.276  
 
This also caused Rainier some problems if his captains were not as conscientious in their 
form filling as he was, because ultimately he would be held responsible, having signed off the 
voucher to give the money out but then not having receipts for what it had purchased. This 
issue even went up to Rear Admiral Blankett:  
 
… you are to furnish the Bombay Government with like Bills for the Cash you 
took up of the Company’s Servants in the Red Sea, for their purposes; but you are 
to settle with the Victualling Contractors for the Cash I transmitted to you.277  
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Given the size of the station and the less than sophisticated financial regimes with which the 
Navy operated in some areas, it is not surprising that control of a proper accounting 
procedure was difficult to ensure.  And the problem would be made more difficult on those 
occasions when barter was employed such as when Rainier traded spices directly for naval 
supplies in Canton. 
 
One change that Rainier made to the purchasing process as described above, might, with 
hindsight, seem to have been a mistake and perhaps made both the Victualling and Navy 
Boards suspicious. There was now a very short audit trail and it was easy for approved 
money not always to meet up with future invoices, given the delays and the distances 
between the various centres of naval supply. This would have gone some way towards 
explaining the pressure they put on Rainier when he returned to England to account for these 
often large amounts of money. 
 
There appeared to be some nervousness in London concerning how defensible was the 
accounting process for victualling in the East Indies. Information that Cochrane was also the 
agent for the Board to receive stores sent out from England and to provide and distribute 
water, wine and tea was given to the Admiralty, on its request, in 1806. It was also told that 
cash accounts were generally returned in six months and stores accounts within eighteen to 
twenty four months. Their Lordships’ minds were probably focused by the fact that 
Cochrane’s cash account, which needed to be passed, stood at a staggering £1,247,666 
0s.2d.278  
 
Conclusion. 
 
It is clear that, whilst Rainier had a more difficult manning situation than other station 
commanders, he had no original ideas as to how to solve the problem. The charitable 
donations he made, which were noted in various editions of The Times, such as five guineas 
to French refugees, five guineas on three occasions to the Society for the Discharge and 
Relief of Persons imprisoned for small debts and two guineas to the Marine Society,279 
together with the letter he wrote to his nephew on the duties of a captain,280 would indicate 
that he was a man who cared naturally for those less fortunate than himself. This attitude, 
allied to his demand for the best available supplies for his men, ensured that the ravages of ill 
health that beset Hughes during the American Revolution were minimised. He therefore 
never suffered from the extreme shortages of manpower that limited Hughes’ possibilities for 
action. Shortage of manpower, as opposed to shortage of ships, never stopped him carrying 
out his plans, even if he had to beg, borrow, and occasionally steal, the necessary men. 
 
Reviewing Rainier’s experiences with the various naval boards highlights a number of 
discrepancies when judging his success as an operational admiral. There is sufficient 
evidence to show that, by the standards of the day, he was a meticulous, careful and honest 
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officer. He loved his forms and they had to be completed correctly. He expected due process 
to be followed and he was quick to admonish if it were not. He was keen to reprove publicly 
any transgression of rules which could be deemed to be corrupt. 
 
Yet his own relationship with Matthew Louis seemed suddenly to improve only months after 
he had been severely critical of him. And his relationship with Basil Cochrane, which lasted 
the full eleven years of Rainier’s sojourn in the East Indies, is more puzzling. He clearly did 
not trust Cochrane in his initial phase, either through competence or dishonesty it is difficult 
to say. But he did understand that he needed Cochrane’s skills to ensure the efficient 
victualling of his squadron. He must have been able to see how much money Cochrane was 
making by supplying his squadron yet he did nothing to reduce it, even though he was so 
meticulous in other areas to keep costs down “for the good of His Majesty’s Service”. And he 
terminated the role of the Agent Victualler in April 1795, saying that there was no need for 
such a post. Yet Cochrane had agents all over the station. Any agent victualler would not 
have such an infrastructure and would therefore need sub-agents. These would incur fees and 
thus would increase the cost of victualling the squadron.281 It is also worth noting that, when 
Elphinstone arrived at Madras in January 1796, he and his secretary and agent victualler, 
John Jackson, found the arrangement sufficiently satisfactory that Elphinstone agreed a new 
contract, on the same terms, with Cochrane, two months later.282 It is highly unlikely that a 
man of Elphinstone’s character would have allowed this arrangement if there had been any 
suspicion of foul play. The fact that no comments were received from the Victualling Board 
also implies that Rainier’s plan was acceptable. 
 
That Cochrane decided to come back to England around the same time as Rainier also gave 
some concern, although he did not actually sail until October the following year; perhaps he 
felt that he would never get the same opportunities to increase his wealth under any other 
commander-in-chief. It does leave a disconcerting feeling in the mind of anyone studying his 
correspondence today. In Cochrane’s defence, his year with Rainier’s successor, Rear 
Admiral Pellew, allowed him to build up a relationship from which Pellew acknowledged 
Cochrane’s reliability, competence and honesty.283 And, given fourteen years to investigate 
him, the Navy Board was unable to uncover any evidence of corruption on Cochrane’s part. 
The notice of his death in the Glasgow Herald stated that he came back from India: ‘with a 
large fortune which has always been applied in acts of charity and benevolence’.284 Clearly 
his reputation was by then unblemished. 
 
One should also view the evidence of Rear Admiral Drury, Pellew’s successor, who was 
noted for a considerable reduction in costs on the station. But Drury had several advantages 
over his predecessors; he had almost a year as “apprentice” to Pellew before assuming actual 
command, French power on the station was no longer a serious threat, he had sufficient ships 
                                                            
281 The Hon. B. Cochrane, An Expose of the Conduct of the Victualling Board to the Hon. Basil Cochrane, p. 61. 
282 Ibid., p. 100. 
283 T.N.A., ADM 7/40, Narrative of the Transactions of the Hon. Basil Cochrane with the Hon. Victualling 
Board, p. 79. 
284 Glasgow Herald, 21 August 1826. 
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to counter any possible danger and indeed enough to attack Mauritius, and he had a well 
established and efficient logistics organisation. However, he did address a number of issues 
regarding the provision of naval supplies as well as victuals and he did reduce their prices. 
He, like Rainier before him, also realised the danger of driving prices so low that the 
victuallers went out of business, and he refused offers to undercut items in the current 
contracts as that would destroy the relationship between the victuallers and the navy.285 But if 
he were able to reduce costs, one must also question why Pellew was unable to do the same 
during his command.286 
 
Given Rainier’s efforts to keep his squadron at sea, his love of administrative process was not 
always in evidence. His failure occasionally to meet his own high standards caused several 
harsh imprests to be placed on him, mostly after he retired. He can be excused for not 
knowing of Captain Cooke’s cavalier use of his own authority in repairing La Forte. But the 
enormous sums used in cash accounts and naval supplies were so large that surely, even if he 
would normally just sign without reading, occasionally he might have asked to see the 
vouchers that went with a particular bill. And the imprest for the purchase of two Dutch ships 
captured in 1799 was instigated because of a lack of paperwork of which the admiral must 
have known. He had seen the way such matters were handled many times by 1799. His 
argument was that, at the time, he had told the Admiralty and he had not heard any 
admonition, so it must have been acceptable. But previous actions might have agreed on the 
assumption that the paperwork would follow and when it did not then it was the Admiralty 
that caused the imprest to be invoked. 
 
Yet, to put these suspicions into perspective, when Rainier first arrived in India in 1794, there 
were literally no naval ships at all and no real infrastructure. He had to fulfil the role of the 
Navy, Victualling, and Sick and Hurt Boards with only the most rudimentary support. All the 
time he had another organisation, the Company, at his shoulder. This body continually 
impacted his decisions, sometimes for good and sometimes for bad. He had to put into place a 
financial system to ensure the Navy had sufficient funds to pay its way. He had to ensure 
adequate clothing, food and drink were obtained, including substitutes when traditional fare 
could not be obtained, and he had to ensure his ships were properly seaworthy and supplied 
with all the equipment, weapons and stores they needed. All this time he had to communicate 
with the Boards, primarily the Navy Board, to ensure that his needs were acted upon and that 
the Board understood how different were the circumstances in the East Indies. 
 
Assuming this to be the case, it can be seen that Rainier ran his squadron with a high degree 
of effectiveness. He obtained its finance from a variety of sources using whatever means 
were available to him even though, in the case of navy bills, they were not the most efficient. 
In the previous war, under Hughes, he had seen the impotence of a fleet without naval 
supplies and victuals. He ensured that his own operations were largely uninhibited by these 
considerations, apart from the repair of damaged and worn out ships at the Bombay dockyard. 
                                                            
285 T.N.A., ADM 1/182, Drury to Admiralty, 15 July 1809, Messrs Balfour & Baker [Victuallers], 25 July 1810. 
286 See Appendix 6 for relative costs of victualling in East Indies, West Indies and Mediterranean, which 
illustrate how much more expensive was victualling in the East Indies. 
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His own personality appears to have relished the challenges he encountered in the vast 
administrative task of keeping his vessels at sea across his enormous station as he built up, 
almost from scratch, an administrative system to cope with its demands, far from the support 
of the Admiralty Boards that were officially responsible for such activities. It is not surprising 
that, after eleven years on station, there were some gaps in the audit trail, and that some 
prices paid could have been bettered if there had been a department of clerks devoted to the 
task. The communication between the Navy Board and Rainier through 1806 and 1807 also 
contains requests from the former for his advice on how the Navy should be administered in 
the East Indies, what people should be paid, and where stores should be kept. He was also 
quoted by the Navy Board in its evidence to the Parliamentary Commission. It is difficult to 
believe that his advice would have been held in such esteem if there had really been any 
suspicion that he had been a user of corrupt practices. Surely an admiral who claimed to the 
Navy Board that he did not have enough blank forms could not be in a corrupt relationship 
with a naval contractor.    
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                    CHAPTER 8. 
    CONCLUSION: ‘REMOVING THE CLOUD’  
 
In 1799 a correspondent to the Oracle and Daily Advertiser complained that all the honours 
and rewards of the present war were being bestowed on the victors of naval battles – Howe, 
St. Vincent, Duncan and Nelson – while Rainier’s conquests were being forgotten. 
Comparing the recent celebration of Nelson with the plight of Rainier, he protested that ‘the 
former is surrounded in a blaze of glory, the latter seems enveloped in a cloud’.1   
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to remove that cloud.  
 
It was no accident that the Oracle’s correspondent signed himself ‘an E.I. Proprietor’ 
and pointed to the ‘immense territories’ and ‘countless treasures’ secured to the East 
India Company [and hence to Great Britain] by the commander of the East Indies 
Station. ‘The name of Vice Admiral Rainier’ he asserted, ‘will always appear with 
distinction amongst those officers who have effectually served their country, and 
signalised themselves in the present war’. 
 
Rainier abundantly demonstrated that he possessed the right qualities for his task. To 
command effectively the most distant station in the navy, where it could take a year between 
sending a message and receiving an answer, required patience, great self confidence and 
independent spirit. Commanding the widest, as well as the most distant, station also 
necessitated foresight and organisation. The main task was to protect the trade and 
possessions of the most politically and economically powerful British trading company on 
which depended the nation’s financial capacity to sustain the biggest war effort yet attempted, 
this required courage and commercial understanding. And at this particular time the Crown’s 
principal representative in India was a megalomaniac who wilfully ignored government and 
Company instructions to refrain from an expansionist policy and who wished to use the navy 
to pursue imperial expansion. Working with him required tact, self reliance and strength of 
will. 
 
As his eleven years in command attest, the Admiralty clearly believed that Rainier had these 
abilities. He had the most prior experience of serving on the station of anyone available and 
understood its needs well. He had time to grow into the job before its difficulties grew; when 
the Dutch switched sides, when the French sent warships, Richard Wellesley arrived, and 
when there was a major French invasion of Egypt. His own experience as a merchant ship 
master and trader enabled him to appreciate the needs of commerce, certainly better than his 
predecessors and successors in the East Indies. Having been severely wounded capturing a 
larger American privateer and facing the brilliance of Suffren in five fleet actions, he was not 
going to submit tamely to the blandishments of the Governor General. But he also had the 
political acumen not to tackle him head on, but to attain his ends more indirectly. Those ends 
                                                            
1 The Oracle and Daily Advertiser, 21 September 1799. 
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were always those directed by the Admiralty. He constantly kept in mind who were his real 
superiors and was sure to justify himself to them. And they responded by backing him once 
they found in him the sure and safe pair of hands on which they relied to run so complex a 
station. 
 
It must also be remembered that no East Indies flag officer after Rainier arrived with no 
operational warships and no organisation structure on station with which to operate. And, in 
contrast to his successors, he was never sent sufficient ships to complete all his tasks – he 
always had to make compromises. Surely Java and Mauritius would have fallen to him if he 
had been better resourced. As the volumes of trade grew and the centre of gravity moved 
permanently eastwards, so the station became more complex. Rainier matured in parallel with 
this growth and never allowed the complexities to overwhelm him. However, one measure 
was constant; the unequalled volume and value of trade. When Rainier sailed in 1794, he took 
the largest ever convoy from Britain to India. When he returned in 1805, he brought back the 
most valuable convoy ever to leave Indian waters. So important was this convoy that the 
Channel Fleet was diverted from its blockade of the French coast in order to cover its journey 
through the Western Approaches. 
 
The vital importance of the revenue generated by trade, both between Europe and the Far 
East, and within the region, was vital to the British government’s execution of the war.2 The 
growth of this trade was stimulated directly by Rainier’s capture of Malacca and the 
Moluccas, with the resultant presence in the area of British warships. Indirectly it was 
stimulated by the indigenous growth of an economic/ commercial structure of banks, trading 
houses, a modern legal system, merchant houses and ship building that became self financing. 
Thus it could generate its own wealth and, indeed, transfer large sums back to Britain.3 
Without the rule of law and protection provided by the navy, this dynamic expansion could 
not have happened.  
 
The navy also played a key role in the defence of British India. This had been acknowledged 
in the previous war by Vice Admiral Hughes:  
 
...the defence of the Company’s possessions in the East Indies depends in a very 
large degree if not entirely in time of war, on the superiority or exertions of His 
Majesty’s Squadron.4  
 
Although Rainier was almost certainly unaware of the impact of his successes, nevertheless 
his support of Wellesley’s territorial expansion meant that British domination of India was 
not threatened for another 140 years. His stimulation and protection of the Country Trade 
built up a self sustaining economic zone which paved the way for British ascendancy over 
South East Asia and the establishment of Singapore and Hong Kong. 
                                                            
2 See Appendix 4. 
3 Cuenca-Esteban, J., ‘The British balance of payments, 1772-1820: India transfers and war finance’, Economic 
History Review, vol. 54, No. 1 (2001), p. 67. 
4 Hughes to the Bombay Council, 27 January 1784, quoted in Wadia, The Bombay Dockyard, p. 47-8. 
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Overall Rainier can surely bask in the reflected glory of Pannikkar’s comment that: 
 
the mastery of the sea over Indian history was complete but unobtrusive. The 
question of sea power did not arise as the Indian Ocean was a British lake.5  
 
As the first objective given to Rainier in his initial orders, the requirement for trade protection 
was clearly understood by all parties. Rainier’s skill as a navigator, and vast experience of the 
region, gave him an understanding of the optimum use of his resources with which to protect 
that trade. Convoys were made available, warships patrolled vulnerable trading routes and 
Trincomalee was captured as it not only guarded India but also covered a focal rendez-vous 
point for shipping between the Indies and Europe. His low ego, experience of as merchant 
ship master, and calm and patient character enabled him to minimise the inherent conflict in 
the relationship between the navy and merchant class. There certainly were complaints, 
primarily over the unwillingness of merchants to submit to the discipline of the convoy 
system, and the habit of naval vessels to press merchant sailors. But these rarely reached an 
official level. As already noted, Indiaman losses were greater after Rainier which precipitated 
the final seizure of Mauritius. 
 
The conquest of the Dutch colonies, primarily to protect and enhance trade, together with the 
planned, but not executed, attacks on Batavia and Manila, demonstrated Rainier’s recognised 
ability as a combined operations leader. His organisational skills and his ability to work 
harmoniously with army commanders were crucial in ensuring their success; a factor 
accepted even by the despotic Wellesley. Indeed the support given by Rainier to the land 
operations against Tippoo and the Marathas received much praise from the Governor 
General. That the Admiral was so well appreciated indicates not only great personal and 
political skill and low ego, but also the strength of will not to be diverted from his primary 
objective, which would have been threatened by Wellesley’s proposed attack on Mauritius. 
Rainier’s strategic acuity could discern that, whilst the French island was a severe annoyance, 
it was not a fundamental threat to British rule. This ability to see the “bigger picture” is also 
illustrated by his speedy and measured response to Bonaparte’s attack on Egypt. Without 
waiting for orders he sent two warships to blockade the Red Sea and to demonstrate Britain’s 
naval power to the local Arab rulers. And he expended considerable amounts of time and 
diplomatic skill working with the Bombay Presidency keeping its members calm and 
focussed. 
 
Rainier was truly a man of the eighteenth century. He was born in 1741and fought in three 
wars against the French. He was a conservative, Christian monarchist brought up in the 
Huguenot tradition. Yet many elements in his personality seem to have more in common with 
a twentieth century person. He understood how organisations worked, skilfully managing 
people both upwards and downwards through his use of networks. The manner in which he 
communicated with his superiors at the Admiralty, managing the information flow, resulted 
                                                            
5 K.M. Pannikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (London, 1952), p. 8. 
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in not one admonition in his 11 years in command. Given the distances and time involved in 
communication with London, this in itself was a considerable achievement. Managing down 
the organisation, Rainier nurtured and supported his captains who might be operating alone, 
thousands of miles from his guidance. This required a different expertise than that of a flag 
officer of a squadron sailing together within sight of signalling flags. His care of the health 
and wellbeing of his ships’ crews, his lack of racism, his desire to minimise punishments, his 
understanding of the need to motivate, praise and communicate in order to get the best out of 
people, all indicate a leader of exceptional managerial ability, even by the standards of today.  
 
These same talents were also employed by Rainier when he was working with the Company. 
It was equally necessary, but more difficult, to manage its officials and employees, over 
whom he had no control. Thus did he receive, inter alia, the assistance of additional 
Company warships when needed, all his ordnance supplies, and the efficient use of the 
Bombay Dockyard to repair and maintain his own naval vessels. 
 
It is rare that a person who is a sensitive and capable “man manager” is also an accomplished 
administrator of systems, but Rainier had this ability too. When he first arrived in India in 
1794, there were literally no naval vessels at all and virtually no supporting infrastructure. 
Yet management was a vital aspect of Rainier’s function. He had to fulfil the role of the 
Navy, Victualling, and Sick & Hurt Boards with only the most rudimentary support. He had 
to ensure adequate clothing, food and drink were obtained, including substitutes, when 
traditional fare could not be obtained, and he had to ensure his ships were properly seaworthy 
and supplied with the equipment, weapons and stores they needed. All this time he had to 
communicate with the Boards, primarily the Navy Board, to ensure that his needs were acted 
upon and that the Board understood how different were the circumstances in the East Indies. 
The attention to detail, knowing when to micro-manage and when to manage at arms’ length, 
when to cajole and when to praise, all contributed to the success of Rainier’s management. 
 
Victualling was certain to be a major issue on such a large station. Rainier worked with Basil 
Cochrane to build an effective system which, whilst it may not have been the cheapest, it 
never hindered operations as had occurred during the American Revolution. Markedly, the 
structure was able to expand as the squadron grew under his successors. This is a true sign of 
a well designed enterprise. As Wilcox said:  
 
…despite the unprecedented range and scale of operations, no major operation 
was seriously disrupted by a lack of provision … it [victualling] made a crucial 
contribution to the eventual British victory.6  
 
Rainier also had to manage the finances of his squadron on a station where specie was always 
in short supply. This required negotiating discounts on navy bonds, borrowing money from 
the Company and from local bankers, trading houses and merchants in India, who were 
provided liquidity for the burgeoning Country Trade. This money was used to buy anything 
                                                            
6 M. Wilcox, ‘This Great Complex Concern’, forthcoming article for the Mariner’s Mirror. 
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from ships to cocoa on invoices to be redeemed by the Navy Board in London. He was also 
using at least ten major currencies in advanced cultures often with disparate traditions far 
older than his own, which had to be given the respect due to them.  
 
Today, with a clearer understanding of the importance of non-heroic trade protection and 
organisational abilities that would have been required to manage a sailing era squadron on 
such a large station, and with a  greater understanding of the vital importance of the 
contribution of the commercial wealth of the East Indies to sustaining the British war effort 
throughout the long and unprecedentedly expensive wars against the French Revolution and 
Empire, it would appear that Rainier’s achievements are worthy of far greater recognition 
than he received in his lifetime.  
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 Appendix 1. 
 
   Terminology  
 
Throughout the thesis the full description of the Honorable (sic) East India Company has 
been abbreviated to “the Company” as there was only one such important and powerful 
organisation. In the literature, Richard Wellesley, the Governor General, is occasionally 
named using his noble title, Lord Mornington. This thesis uses his family name throughout. 
The spelling of geographic names on the station proved to be a more difficult challenge as 
their phonetic translation into English tended to depend on the individual writing the letter. 
The most common spelling filtered from reading the many documents of the period has been 
used as no single example can be deemed the correct one. Many of the place names have 
changed in the late twentieth century. For example, Bombay is now Mumbai and Canton is 
now Guangdong. As the thesis covers a period two hundred years ago the names common in 
European parlance at the time have been retained. As Rainier’s period of command runs from 
the French Revolutionary War into the Napoleonic War, in the interests of brevity, the phrase 
“French Wars” has been used. 
 
In the Middle East modern Bushehr on the coast of Iran, is called Bushire. The main entry 
port at the north end of the Persian Gulf, in what is now Iraq, had two names at the time, 
Basra and Bussora. The latter, older name has been used at all times, unless in a quotation.  
 
Amboina is occasionally spelled Amboyna; the former spelling has been used. Aceh, on the 
northern coast of Sumatra, has been preferred to other spellings such as Acheen, Acheh, and 
Ache.  
 
One Indian ruler plays a large role during the period described. His name is variously spelled 
Tippoo or Tipu Sultan. The former spelling has been used throughout this thesis. 
 
The title used at the time to describe the chief naval administrative officer in each of the 
presidencies has been given capital letters as in “Naval Officer” to distinguish him from any 
real “naval officer” that may be mentioned. 
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             Appendix 2. 
 
            CHRONOLOGY 
1794 
February  Rainier ordered to East Indies as Commodore. 
April   Rear Admiral Cornwallis enters Spithead from India. 
May   Rainier sails for East Indies. 
September  Rainier reaches Madras. 
October Goes to Penang to escort Country Trade from China. Centurion and     
Diomede in inconclusive battle off Mauritius. British withdraw from 
blockade of the island. 
1795 
February Merchants say do not want convoys, just RN ships patrolling danger 
areas. Rainier has insufficient ships to blockade Mauritius. 
July French capture Netherlands. With Lord Hobart, Rainier plans attacks 
on Dutch territories. 
August Rainier takes Trincomalee, Captain Newcombe takes Malacca. 
Elphinstone takes Cape and assumes overall command of Cape and 
East Indies. 
September Bombay Marine blockade Columbo. Rainier plans attack on Spice 
Islands. 
November Elphinstone sails for Madras. Rainier arrives at Malacca.   
1796 
January Elphinstone arrives at Madras. 
February Columbo taken by Captain Hyde Gardner. Rainier takes Amboina. 
March Elphinstone returns to Cape because of Dutch threat. Rainier takes 
Banda. 
August Dutch surrender to Elphinstone. 
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September Rainier again C-in-C East Indies. Sercey has inconclusive engagement 
with Arrogant and Victorious.  
October Elphinstone replaced by Pringle at the Cape. 
 
1797 
January Sercey retires from attacking China Fleet, thinking them warships. 
April Wellesley becomes Governor General of India. 
1798 
January Agents of Tippoo Sultan land on Mauritius. 
April French volunteers land in India to help Tippoo. 
July Bonaparte lands in Egypt. 
December Rainier sends Centurion and Albatross to Red Sea. 
1799 
April Blankett reaches Red Sea. 
May Tippoo Sultan killed at Battle of Seringapatam, ending Fourth Anglo-
Mysore War. 
June                         Perim captured. 
1800 
March Perim evacuated. 
May Rainier and Wellesley receive orders to capture Batavia. 
September Rainier offers resignation to Spencer. 
October French victories in Europe lead to blockade of Batavia being called off. 
Rainier refuses to help Wellesley in attack on Mauritius. 
1801 
January Home Popham replaces Blankett in Red Sea. 
October Preliminary Peace Treaty signed. 
1802 
 Period of Peace 
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1803 
May War declared. 
June Belle Poule arrives to occupy Pondicherry with French troops. 
July Linois and Rainier arrive at Pondicherry. Linois escapes with his 
squadron. 
September Rainier hears of declaration of War with France. General Arthur 
Wellesley defeats Marathas at Assaye. 
October Linois raids British settlement of Bencoolen.  
November General Lake defeats Marathas at Laswari. 
1804 
February Battle of Pulo Aur. 
September Linois escapes Rainier’s trap in Straits of Malacca. 
November Linois returns to Mauritius. 
1805 
January Rainier meets his successor, Pellew, at Penang. 
March Rainier relinquishes command to Pellew and leaves Madras en route 
for England. 
September Rainier reaches England. 
1807 
June Rainier elected as an independent M.P. for Sandwich. 
1808 
April Rainier dies in London. 
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date = date of final promotion and rank
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   Appendix 4. 
TRADE STATISTICS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION. 
It is exceedingly dangerous to make too many conclusions from the data as figures vary 
depending on their source. For example, in Appendix 4a one can see that the UK export data 
varies between five and ten per cent between Esteban and the figures presented to Parliament. 
Numbers from the Company itself also show great disparity with both those previously 
stated. Care has to be taken as to whether or not the value of bullion is included in export 
figures. Silver was a major export to China to pay for tea until it was steadily replaced by 
opium, which came from India and is not therefore accounted for, and by the revenue 
generated in India by the Country Trade. The fluctuations between successive years also 
make dangerous comparisons over a period of time. For example, using Appendix 4d, export 
shipping tonnage rose by eight per cent between 1793 and 1805, but if one compares 1794 to 
1804, the growth is 92%. Where there is sufficient data moving averages can be used, as in 
Appendix 4c. Care must also be taken to specify whether or not the data is for the UK 
[including Ireland], or Great Britain [England, Scotland and Wales]. 
Perhaps the most reliable data comes from Mitchell and Deane.7 They note the difference 
between statistics at “Official Trade Values” and those that are “computed”. The former, as 
seen in Appendix 4b, are based on Customs and Excise fixed rates and the latter are an 
attempt to reflect the real life values of trade. The computed figures indicate a steady growth 
in imports as against a slight decrease in the official ones. A similar, less emphatic 
relationship, is noted in the export data. 
Appendix 4c clarifies the actual movements behind this data. Exports to the West Indies and 
United States grow rapidly whilst those to Asia decline, probably due to the replacement by 
Indian opium of British silver and by the growth of the Country Trade. Imports from Asia 
expand less quickly than those from both other locations although there is considerable 
percentage growth in all three. Appendix 4d, showing the growth in shipping tonnage to Asia 
supports the data indicating the growth of trade between Britain and India/ China. 
In addition to protecting the trade between Europe and Asia, Rainier also had to protect the 
Country Trade, within his station. As an example, Appendix 4e illustrates the enormous 
expansion of regional exports from China. The steady level of imports demonstrates the 
unattractiveness to the Chinese market of most British products and, as the trade was illegal, 
opium imports are not reflected. Appendix 4f also points towards the expansion of regional 
trade. Clearly Canton is an “end user” market, but the Maldives and Penang, without vast 
domestic markets, are benefitting from their entrept status. Although the data in Appendix 
                                                            
7 B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1971). 
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4g primarily covers the years around the Peace of Amiens, it nevertheless illustrates a 
confidence amongst merchants and ship owners that investment in trade was worthwhile and 
that any losses to enemy action or piracy would exceeded by the rewards made from 
successful voyages under the umbrella of Royal Naval protection. 
 
 
 
 
Sources: House of Commons Papers, 1806, J.C. Esteban, 'The Rising Share of British 
Industrial Output 1700-1851', The Journal of Economic History, vol. 57, No.4 (December 
1997), p. 901, H.V. Bowen, The East India Company Trade and Domestic Financial 
Statistics. 
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          Appendix 4h. 
       TRADE STATISTICS FROM HISTORICAL VIEWS OF PLANS F0R THE 
GOVENMENT OF BRITISH INDIA   AND THE REGULATION OF TRADE TO THE  
           EAST INDIES (John Bruce, 1793). 
                         
     CHINESE TRADE. 
Average Cost of goods imported from China to Britain: 
1762-65  £321,707 
1765-79  £501,137 
1779-85  £571,761 
Average sales of Chinese goods: 
1762-67  £1,046,816 
1767-77  £1,305,444 
1777-84  £1,309,545 
Average sales of British manufactures to China:   
1789-92  £496,713 
Estimated 1793 £626,100        
INDIAN TRADE. 
British Exports to India: 
1762-67  £386,319 
1767-77  £371,840 
1777-84  £364,746 
1784-90  £357,764 
1790-92  £415,264 
Imports to Britain from India: 
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1761-66  £549,712 
1772-79  £1,243,178 
1782-88  £1,222,832 
1789-91  £1,170,225 
Appendix 5. 
East Indies Naval Manpower Strength 1793-1812 
 
1793    1062 
1794   297 
1795          Combined with Cape Squadron 
1796 5353 
1797 7508 
1798 4001 
1799 5415 
1800 5698 
1801 5918 
1802 6108 
1803 5016 
1804 6188 
1805 7731 
1806 8779 
1807 8779 
1808 9103 
1809 7703 
1810 6962 
1811 8089 
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1812 6465 
 
Source: Wilcox, M., ‘The Great Complex Concern’, draft article for the Mariner’s Mirror, 
May 2011, ADM 8, Admiralty List Books 1793-1813. 
  
  Appendix 6. 
Cost of Victualling (£ Sterling) in the East Indies, West Indies & Mediterranean 1804-9 
 
 
 
 
 
East Indies West Indies Mediterranean 
            1804           140,000           110,000            61,000 
            1805           201,000             64,000            93,000 
            1806           268,000             82,000            67,000 
            1807           300,000           104,000          177,000 
            1808           166,000           130,000          167,000 
            1809           210,000           155,000          148,000 
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Appendix 7. 
      Commanders in Chief/ Senior Naval Officers of East Indies Station 1754-1814. 
 
Name Rank on 
leaving      
station 
Years C-in-
C/ 
      SNO 
Honours 
given/ 
       Date 
Honours 
given/ 
       Date 
Charles 
Watson 
Vice Admiral 1754-57 (d)   
Edward 
Pocock 
Vice Admiral 1757-59 Kt. 1761  
Charles 
Steevens 
Rear Admiral 1759-61 (d)   
Samuel 
Cornish 
Vice Admiral   1761-63 Bart. 1766  
John 
Tinker 
Commodore 1763-65   
Hon. John 
Byron 
Captain 1765-66   
Philip 
Affleck 
Captain 1766-67   
John 
Lindsay 
Commodore 1769-1771 Kt. 1771  
Robert 
Harland 
Rear Admiral 1771-75 Bart. 1771  
Edward 
Hughes 
Commodore 1774-77 Kt. 1778  
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Edward 
Vernon 
Commodore 1777-79 Kt. 1773  
Edward 
Hughes 
Vice Admiral   1779-84 Kt. 1778  
Andrew 
Mitchell 
Commodore 1784-86 Kt. 1800  
William 
Cornwallis 
Rear Admiral 1788-93 Kt. 1815  
Peter 
Rainier 
Vice Admiral 1794-1805   
Edward 
Pellew 
Vice Admiral 1805-09 Kt. 1793 Baron 1814/ 
Viscount 
1816  
Thomas 
Troubridge
Rear Admiral 1805-07 (d) Bart. 1799  
William 
O’Brien 
Drury 
Vice Admiral 1809-11 (d)   
Samuel 
Hood 
Vice Admiral   1811-14 (d) Kt. 1808 Bart. 1809 
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 Appendix 8. 
                      National Ships taken/ destroyed by Admiral Rainier’s Squadron8  
 
Date Name Captured By 
Oct 1794 Revenge (18) Resistance (44) 
Jan 1796 Harlingen (10) Suffolk (74) 
Aug 1796 Alert (16) Carysfort (28) 
March 1797 Modeste (20) Fox (32) 
Sept. 1797 Reunion (6) Oiseau (36) 
Oct. 1797 Yonge Frans (10) Resistance (44) 
“ Yonge Lansier (10) “ 
“ Wakker (10) “ 
“ Limbi (8) “ 
“ Resource (6) “ 
“ Ternate (4) “ 
“ Juno (4) “ 
Feb. 1799 Forte (44) Sybille (38) 
April 1799 Helena (12) Virginie (38) 
“ Brak (12) “ 
“ Helena Prau (8) “ 
May 1799 ? Arrogant (74) and Orpheus 
(32) 
                                                            
8 W. L. Clowes, The Royal Navy, A History from the Earliest Times to 1900, vols. IV and V. 
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Oct. 1799 Iphgenie (24)* Trincomalee (16) 
Dec. 1799 Preneuse (36) Boats of Tremendous (74) 
and Adamant (50) 
July 1800 Cerbere (7) Viper (12) 
Aug. 1801 Chiffonne (36) Sybille (38) 
Sept. 1801 Fleche (18) Victor (18) 
Aug. 1803 Haasje (6) Caroline (36) 
Jan. 1804 Passe Partout (2) Boats of San Fiorenzo (36) 
Fe. 1805 Psyche (32) San Fiorenzo (36) 
 
 Both vessels destroyed when Trincomalee blew up. 
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        APPENDIX 9. 
 
 CAPTAIN RAINIER’S ORDERS ON SAILING TO THE EAST INDIES 
           IN 17949 
 
‘Having detached the Sampson and Argo to St. Helena ... you are to pursue your voyage with 
the Suffolk and Swift Sloop and the East India Company Ships under your Convoy, making 
the best of your way to the Cape of Good Hope where you may expect to find His Majesty’s 
Ships named in the margin10 which have been sent to cruise off that Cape under Orders from 
Rear Admiral Gardner ... and upon joining those Ships, or any of them, ... you are to take 
them under your Command (their Captains being hereby directed to follow your Orders) and 
to prosecute your Voyage to the East Indies, proceeding to Madras and using your best 
endeavours to see the East India Company’s Ships thither, or as far as your way and theirs 
may lie together; and having delivered to the Honble Rear-Admiral Cornwallis, Commander-
in-Chief of His Majesty’s Ships in the East Indies, or forwarded to him wherever he may be 
on that Station, ... put yourself and the ships and sloop which may be with you, under his 
Command, follow his Orders for your further Proceedings.  
 
‘But if on your arrival in the East Indies you shall not find the above-mentioned Rear- 
Admiral, or any other officer of His Majesty’s Ships senior to yourself on that Station, you 
are in that case to employ the Force under your Command and such others of His Majesty’s 
Ships and Vessels as you may find there, or as may join you afterwards, in such manner as, 
upon consultation with His Excellency the Governor-General, or the Governor and Council 
of Madras, shall be judged best for the Protection of the Trade and Settlements of His 
Majesty’s Subjects and His Allies in the East Indies, until you receive further orders. 
 
In case you should not fall in with the Centurion, Orpheus and Resistance off the Cape of 
Good Hope when you arrive there, you are not to make any delay in looking out for them, but 
to leave in the Hands of the English East India Company’s Agent resident in the Cape Town, 
Orders for the Commanding Officers of those ships to follow you to Madras with all possible 
expedition’. 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 T.N.A., ADM 2/1347, Admiralty to Rainier, 25 February 1794. 
10 Centurion, Orpheus, Resistance 
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